Accenture MILITARY

Request ID: f6dfeb92-6c78-4a16-8ac9-098cb6e29a94 Evidence cut-off: 7 October 2026 Target scope: Accenture plc and controlled entities. Minority investments and institutional shareholders are identified separately so that ownership, operational control, and investment exposure are not conflated.

Entity scope and current group position

Accenture plc’s FY2025 Form 10-K states that its Health & Public Service clients include defense departments and military forces, and that U.S. federal work is delivered through Accenture Federal Services (AFS), a U.S. company wholly owned by Accenture LLP; AFS represented about 8% of Accenture’s total FY2025 revenue.¹ The FY2025 subsidiary exhibit lists Accenture Federal Services LLC and Avanade entities in the United States and, in Israel, Accenture Ltd, Inspirage Israel Pvt Ltd, Maglan Information Defense Technologies Research Ltd, and Nell’Armonia Israel Ltd.²

Accenture maintains a current Israel country page.³ A 2025 Israel Advanced Technology Industries profile says Accenture has operated in Israel since 2001, employs more than 140 people across Herzliya and Kfar Saba, and describes the 2016 Maglan acquisition as establishing its local cybersecurity R&D hub.⁴ [pre-2020] Accenture’s 2019 corporate material described Avanade as majority owned by Accenture and founded by Accenture LLP and Microsoft in 2000.⁵ No reviewed source identified an Avanade contract with an Israeli military or security end user.^{2, 5}

[pre-2020] Accenture acquired Israeli cybersecurity company Maglan in June 2016. Accenture described Maglan’s work as offensive cyber simulation, vulnerability countermeasures, cyber forensics, malware defenses, and security R&D focused on threat intelligence; its disclosed client examples were financial-services, telecommunications, and automotive companies.⁶ Reuters reported the same acquisition and quoted Accenture’s then-chief strategy officer describing Maglan’s roughly 30-person team as having expertise from Israel’s military and intelligence complex.⁷ [pre-2020] In April 2018, CTech/Calcalist reported that Israeli military and intelligence software/cyber activities were being transferred to third-party contractors and stated that Maglan had “assimilated such an activity”; the article did not identify the contracting body, programme, value, deliverable, timing relative to Accenture’s acquisition, or whether the activity continued, and Maglan declined comment.⁸

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

Ministry of Defence, IDF, and Israeli security-body contracts

No public evidence identified in the reviewed primary corporate disclosures, current subsidiary material, UN/specialist sources, and targeted searches of a named contract, tender award, or framework between Accenture plc or a controlled entity and the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israel Prison Service, or Israel Border Police.^{1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12} The 2018 Maglan report is evidence of a reported military/intelligence-outsourcing connection, but it is not a disclosed IMOD/IDF contract and does not identify an end user or scope.⁸

Accenture’s controlled group does have substantial military contracting outside Israel. In 2023 AFS received a position on a 10-year, $900 million U.S. Air Force Base Defense System digital-engineering contract, under which it could compete for task orders involving R&D, rapid prototyping, and solution delivery against threats ranging from small unmanned systems to hypersonic missiles.¹³ In 2025 the U.S. Department of Defense announced a $336,825,863 Air Force contract for continued maintenance, repair, and overhaul activity plus MRO-Supply, with completion expected in 2030.¹⁴ These awards establish group defense-sector capability; the reviewed award notices do not identify an Israeli end user.^{13, 14}

Defence trade directories and registries

No public evidence identified in targeted searches of an Accenture listing in an official SIBAT defence-export directory tied to an Israeli state contract.^{2, 6} Search results that merely co-listed Accenture with Israeli defence companies without a contract, procurement record, component, service scope, or end user were not treated as verified supply relationships.^{2, 11, 12}

Press releases and official announcements

[pre-2020] Accenture’s 2016 Maglan acquisition announcement and separate Israel cybersecurity-lab announcement describe Israel-based cyber capability, but neither announcement names an Israeli defense or security agency as a client.^{6, 15} The lab announcement says Accenture was collaborating with Team8 and identifies Team8 co-founder Nadav Zafrir as a former commander of IDF Unit 8200; this establishes an innovation relationship and biographical military background, not an Accenture-IDF procurement contract.¹⁵

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Militarised or military-specific products

Current AFS materials market Ageon ISR as an ITAR-exportable C4ISR platform for edge-based sensor fusion and command-and-control, and PICARD as an edge-to-cloud sensor-orchestration platform handling data for force protection, warehouse logistics, and aerial drones.¹⁶ The 2023 Air Force Base Defense announcement says Ageon ISR provides real-time mission control and forensic analysis and PICARD provides sensor fusion, and states that both had already been deployed in dozens of U.S. Department of Defense systems.¹³ No reviewed source identified either product as sold to an Israeli military or security end user.^{16, 13}

[pre-2020] Maglan’s disclosed capabilities - offensive cyber simulation, penetration testing, threat intelligence, forensics, and malware defense - are cybersecurity capabilities.^{6, 7} The reviewed sources do not establish that a Maglan product was purpose-built to generate kinetic targeting decisions, fire-control outputs, or weapons effects; under the requested domain boundary, those capabilities remain Digital context unless a kinetic design purpose is demonstrated.^{6, 15, 8}

Civilian-to-military distinction

Accenture’s 2016 Maglan release named commercial-industry client categories and described security services applicable across industries, while the 2018 CTech article separately reported a military/intelligence-outsourcing connection without naming the specific technology or deliverable.^{6, 8} The available evidence therefore does not permit a reliable classification of the historically reported Maglan activity as a purpose-built military system rather than general cyber/software work.^{6, 8}

End-user certification and export licensing

AFS describes Ageon ISR as ITAR-exportable, which indicates an export-controlled military-oriented product but does not itself establish an export to Israel.¹⁶ no public evidence identified of an Accenture, AFS, or Maglan export-licence application, end-user certificate, licence approval, denial, suspension, or revocation specifically for an Israeli defence or security end user.^{16, 9, 12}

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

Equipment in occupied territories

Accenture presents itself in aerospace and defense as a professional-services and technology-transformation provider, including consulting on engineering, digital operations, and supply chains; the reviewed materials do not identify Accenture as a manufacturer of bulldozers, armored construction machinery, or comparable heavy equipment.¹⁷ no public evidence identified of Accenture-owned or Accenture-branded heavy machinery being used to construct or maintain Israeli settlements, the separation barrier, checkpoints, or military installations, or to demolish Palestinian property.^{17, 9}

The 2025 OHCHR settlement-business database A/HRC/60/19 contains no Accenture text match in the reviewed report and annexes.⁹ That negative evidence is limited by the report’s own mandate: A/HRC/60/19 covers specified settlement-related activities, does not cover every business activity in the occupied Palestinian territory, and excludes business activity related to Gaza and the occupied Syrian Golan from that database mandate.⁹

Direct versus indirect supply

No public evidence identified of Accenture supplying heavy equipment to an Israeli end user directly, through an authorized dealer, or through a secondary-market channel.^{17, 9} No Accenture end-use monitoring policy specific to heavy machinery or settlement-related equipment was identified; Accenture’s current sustainability material instead describes enterprise and supply-chain human-rights due diligence, including heightened attention to higher-risk geographies.¹⁸

Construction and engineering contracts

No public evidence identified of an Accenture-controlled entity holding a contract to build, expand, maintain, or service an Israeli checkpoint, detention facility, military base, separation-barrier segment, or settlement infrastructure.^{2, 9} Accenture’s current aerospace-and-defense materials establish sector consulting capability but do not identify such an Israeli project.¹⁷

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

Components, sub-systems, and specialist services

No public evidence identified of Accenture or a controlled entity supplying a named component, sub-system, raw material, or manufacturing service for an Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, or Rafael weapon system.^{2, 11, 12} General search co-listings or sector references without a purchase order, contract scope, component, or end user were not treated as supply evidence.^{1, 17}

[pre-2020] Accenture’s 2016 Israel cyber-lab announcement documents collaboration with Team8, and Accenture’s Maglan acquisition release says Accenture had made a minority investment in Team8.^{6, 15} Those sources do not identify Team8 as a controlled Accenture entity or establish component supply to an Israeli defence prime.^{6, 15}

Joint development, co-production, and technology transfer

No public evidence identified of an Accenture-controlled entity entering a verified joint weapons-development, co-production, licensed-manufacturing, or weapons technology-transfer programme with Elbit, IAI, Rafael, or IMI/Elbit Land.^{6, 11, 12}

≥10% shareholder / controlling-principal evidence

Accenture’s 2025 proxy reported The Vanguard Group as beneficially owning 63,802,647 Accenture Class A shares, or 10.4%, based on an April 2025 Schedule 13G/A; BlackRock was then reported at 7.8%.¹⁹ A current-status qualification is required: on 26 March 2026 The Vanguard Group filed a Schedule 13G/A reporting 0% after a January 2026 internal realignment under which previously aggregated Vanguard business units began reporting beneficial ownership separately.²⁰ On 29 April 2026 Vanguard Capital Management separately reported 46,265,104 Accenture shares, or 7.51%, while BlackRock’s January 2026 Schedule 13G/A reported 8.3% as of 31 December 2025.^{21, 22} Thus the reviewed current Vanguard/BlackRock filings do not carry the 2025 proxy’s ≥10% status forward as a single reporting holder.^{22, 20, 21}

For the historical period in which the 2025 proxy placed Vanguard above the prompt’s ≥10% threshold, Vanguard’s primary SEC 13F information tables report 874,352 Elbit Systems shares at 31 December 2024, 984,861 at 30 September 2025, and 998,267 valued at about $573.1 million at 31 December 2025.^{23, 24, 25} Who Profits’ 2023 weapons-supplier update identifies Elbit Systems as an Israeli weapons company supplying multiple systems to the Israeli military.¹¹ These records establish a historical institutional-investment overlap during the post-2024 period specified by the prompt, but do not establish that Accenture selected or directed Vanguard’s Elbit holdings or that Accenture had a supplier or integration relationship with Elbit.^{11, 19, 23}

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

Israeli military installations and support services

No public evidence identified of an Accenture-controlled entity providing catering, fuel, waste management, transport, facilities maintenance, telecommunications, or comparable base-support services to an IDF installation, Israeli detention centre, or other Israeli security installation.^{2, 8, 9}

The controlled group does provide military sustainment and operational support outside Israel. The 2025 U.S. Air Force award covers continued MRO activity and MRO-Supply.¹⁴ A 2024 Defense Health Agency option worth $16,727,604 supported the Joint Operational Medicine Information Systems programme’s Globally-Integrated Medical Common Operating Picture, which provides real-time medical situational information and operational-medicine information sharing.²⁶ Neither notice identifies Israel as an end user or place of performance.^{14, 26}

In 2026 NATO’s Communications and Information Agency signed an estimated €200 million, seven-year contract with Accenture for the Protected Business Network, a secure cloud-enabled platform for classified NATO operations and approximately 29,000 users across the Alliance.²⁷ The NATO notice describes support for decision-makers and warfighters but does not identify an Israeli military customer.²⁷

Shipping, freight, and port services

No public evidence identified of Accenture operating or contracting a shipping, freight-forwarding, or port-handling service specifically for Israeli military cargo or arms shipments.^{2, 9} In 2026 GAO denied AFS’s protest of a U.S. Transportation Command award to CACI for the Joint Transportation Management System; the decision shows AFS competed for U.S. military transportation-management work but did not receive that award.²⁸

Geographic specificity in occupied territory

No public evidence identified of Accenture base-service or logistics activity at a military/security installation in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, or the occupied Syrian Golan.⁹ A/HRC/60/19’s database scope does not extend to the occupied Syrian Golan, so absence from that report cannot be used to exclude all possible Golan activity.⁹

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

Lethal systems, munitions, and precursor materials

No public evidence identified of Accenture or a controlled entity manufacturing small arms, artillery, armored vehicles, tactical strike drones, warships, ammunition, explosives, propellants, warheads, or munitions precursors supplied to Israeli forces.^{1, 17, 11, 12} Accenture’s current business description and aerospace-and-defense offering are centered on professional, digital, engineering, and transformation services rather than manufacture of those platforms.^{1, 17}

Strategic platforms and critical sub-systems

No public evidence identified of Accenture supplying Israel with a component or integration service for Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, Israeli fighter aircraft, Merkava tanks, warships, or ballistic-missile systems.^{11, 12} The reviewed Who Profits December 2023 weapons-supplier update contains no Accenture occurrence and names other suppliers, including Elbit Systems.¹¹ The reviewed June 2024 PAX report The companies arming Israel and their financiers likewise contains no Accenture text match.¹² These are document-scoped negative findings, not proof that no relationship could exist outside the reports’ scope.^{11, 12}

Military-purpose software and AI

AFS’s Ageon ISR and PICARD are military-oriented digital systems, and the 2023 U.S. Air Force Base Defense award ties them to sensor-derived intelligence, mission control, sensor fusion, and threat-mitigation decision support.^{16, 13} The official descriptions reviewed do not say that either system autonomously selects targets, authorizes weapons release, performs fire control, or generates a weapons effect, and no source reviewed connects either system to Israeli forces.^{16, 13} No verified Accenture system analogous to a purpose-built kinetic targeting engine was identified for an Israeli end user in the reviewed sources.^{16, 13, 10}

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

Export-licence decisions

No public evidence identified of a government granting, denying, suspending, or revoking an export licence for an Accenture, AFS, or Maglan product specifically destined for an Israeli military or security end user.^{16, 9, 12} AFS’s description of Ageon ISR as “ITAR-exportable” is evidence of export-control relevance, not evidence of an Israel-specific licence or transfer.¹⁶

Arms embargo, sanctions, and compliance actions

No public evidence identified in the reviewed source set of an enforcement action against Accenture for breaching an arms embargo, export-control rule, or sanctions regime in connection with defence trade with Israel.^{1, 29, 12} AFSC Investigate documents Accenture’s U.S. CBP and ICE technology work and related civil-society concerns, but its Accenture profile does not identify an Israeli defence-trade enforcement action.²⁹

Legal challenges and judicial review

No public evidence identified of a court case or judicial review challenging an Accenture defence-supply relationship with Israel.^{28, 30, 12} GAO’s 2026 decision concerned a U.S. TRANSCOM procurement and denied AFS’s protest of an award to CACI; it is unrelated to Israeli procurement.²⁸

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

UN and specialist-source checks

The reviewed 2025 OHCHR A/HRC/60/19 settlement-business database contains no Accenture text match, subject to its limited mandate scope.⁹ The reviewed 2025 Special Rapporteur report A/HRC/59/23 also contains no Accenture text match.¹⁰ The report itself states that the entities it names are only a fraction of a broader corporate structure, so non-mention is document-scoped negative evidence rather than a universal clearance.¹⁰

AFSC Investigate has an Accenture company profile, valid through its stated August 2024 research period, focused on Accenture’s technology and planning support for U.S. Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement.²⁹ The profile does not identify an Israeli military supply relationship.²⁹ The reviewed Who Profits December 2023 weapons-supplier update and the June 2024 PAX arms-company report contain no Accenture text match.^{11, 12}

Boycott and divestment activity

On 12 July 2024, SOAS University of London published an update recording a campaign demand to divest from several companies alleged by protesters to be complicit in Israel’s occupation and denial of Palestinian rights, explicitly including Accenture.³⁰ In the same update SOAS said it had not identified investments that breached its ethical-investment policy and offered to share the grounds on which the named holdings were assessed.³⁰ The SOAS page therefore verifies organized divestment pressure naming Accenture; it does not independently establish an Accenture military supply relationship.³⁰

Corporate response, donations, and policies

Accenture’s FY2023 360° Value Report states that the company donated $1.5 million to Magen David Adom and $1.5 million to the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, for a total of $3 million for humanitarian relief, and matched employee donations to selected relief organizations in Israel and Gaza.³¹ The report describes the payments as humanitarian relief and does not identify the IDF, Friends of the IDF, or a reservist fund as a beneficiary.³¹

A January 2025 IATI profile quotes Accenture Israel’s country manager saying that in 2024 the company donated more than NIS 8 million to local causes; the profile does not name a military beneficiary.⁴ Accenture’s current sustainability material says it incorporates human-rights due diligence into enterprise risk-management and legal-compliance processes and focuses supply-chain attention on higher-risk geographies.¹⁸ No public statement identified in the reviewed material announces termination of a disclosed Israeli military contract, because no such named contract was established in this audit.^{8, 18}

Controlling principals

Accenture’s current board page identifies Julie Sweet as Chair and CEO and lists the directors used for the governance search.³² Targeted searches across current directors and named executive officers did not identify a verified Israeli defense-company directorship or a documented FIDF/reservist-fund donation; no public evidence identified.^{32, 19}

The historical institutional-shareholder point requires the temporal qualification above: Vanguard crossed the prompt’s ≥10% threshold in the 2025 proxy, while the March/April 2026 filings show that its reporting was subsequently disaggregated and Vanguard Capital Management reported 7.51%.^{19, 20, 21} The Elbit holding evidence therefore belongs to the 2025-period principal analysis and should not be described as a current ≥10% Accenture shareholder relationship in October 2026.^{19, 20, 21, 23}

Constructive notice and continuation after the 2024 notice dates

Current SEC evidence shows Maglan remained an Accenture subsidiary in the FY2025 subsidiary list, and the 2025 IATI profile describes the Maglan-founded Israeli cybersecurity R&D hub as part of Accenture Israel’s continuing footprint.^{2, 4} This establishes continued ownership and Israeli cyber operations after the prompt’s 19 July 2024 and November 2024 notice dates.^{2, 4} It does not establish that the military/intelligence-outsourcing activity reported by CTech in 2018 continued after those dates; no post-2024 source identified that activity, its customer, or its continuation.⁸

Current post-2024 military business elsewhere in the group is independently documented by the 2025 U.S. Air Force MRO award and the 2026 NATO Protected Business Network contract.^{14, 27} Those sources do not connect the activity to Israel.^{14, 27}

Settlement nexus

No public evidence identified of Accenture or a controlled entity supplying military-adjacent construction, demolition, logistics, or base services to Israeli settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.⁹ Accenture does not appear in the reviewed A/HRC/60/19 annex, while the report expressly limits its database to specified settlement activities.⁹ No inference is made about Gaza or the occupied Syrian Golan from that database because those areas fall outside its stated mandate.⁹