Akamai DIGITAL

Audit cut-off: 28 September 2026

Scope and entity/group resolution

The target is Akamai Technologies, Inc. and its controlled operating group. Akamai’s 2025 SEC subsidiary exhibit lists Akamai Technologies Israel Limited, Guardicore Ltd. and Noname Gate Ltd. as Israeli subsidiaries.¹ Those controlled entities, together with the acquired security businesses whose technology is described in Akamai’s filings, are therefore within this group-level Digital review.^{1, 2, 3}

Akamai’s 2026 proxy identifies The Vanguard Group as a 12.7% beneficial owner, BlackRock as 6.9%, co-founder and CEO Tom Leighton as 1.9%, and all directors and executive officers together as 2.3% as of 20 February 2026; Daniel Hesse is independent board chair.⁴ The filing therefore identifies one disclosed holder above the handoff’s 10% threshold, without establishing that Vanguard or an individual shareholder operationally controls Akamai.⁴

Akamai’s June 2026 10-Q states that approximately 6% of global employees are in Israel and have been affected by hostilities and military-duty call-ups.⁵ A November 2025 CTech interview with Leighton reported about 700 Akamai employees in Israel, most working in development and cybersecurity, and described the Israeli development center as built through the Guardicore, Neosec and Noname acquisitions.⁶ A May 2026 CTech report identifies Ofer Wolf as Akamai’s SVP/GM for Enterprise Security and its Israel site leader.⁷

Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships

Israeli-origin software, services and technology relationships

Check Point’s current technology-partner directory lists Akamai Guardicore Segmentation as an integration.⁸ This establishes interoperability for joint customers; the reviewed sources do not establish that Akamai procures Check Point as an internal enterprise-security dependency.⁸

Apiiro’s partner directory identifies a technical alliance with Akamai integrating Apiiro with Akamai API Security.⁹ In November 2025, Leighton told CTech that Akamai had also made a small investment in Israeli cybersecurity company Apiiro after beginning a strategic collaboration.⁶ The reviewed sources do not disclose the size of that investment.^{6, 9}

The Israeli technologies Akamai acquired are embedded in named security capabilities. Akamai’s SEC disclosures describe Guardicore’s microsegmentation as limiting user access to enterprise applications and data, Neosec as API detection/response based on data and behavioral analytics, and Noname as expanding Akamai’s API-security capabilities through flexible deployment, vendor integrations and enhanced attack analysis.^{2, 3} CTech reported that LayerX adds secure-browser and AI-usage controls to Akamai’s Enterprise Security business.⁷

For Akamai’s own internal enterprise stack, no public evidence identified in the reviewed sources that Check Point, Wiz, SentinelOne, CyberArk, Palo Alto Networks or another Israeli-origin vendor is Akamai’s primary internal security or cloud platform.^{4, 2, 8, 9}

Procurement and integrator relationships

The principal verified Israeli reseller/integrator relationship is ITway/NESS. Israeli government procurement records name ITway Solutions Ltd. as the supplier through which the National Digital Agency procured Akamai distributed-DNS services for 2021-2024 and again for 2025-2026.^{10, 11} NESS separately describes subsidiary ITway as Akamai’s oldest and leading platinum partner in Israel and says it provides Akamai solutions to dozens of cloud organizations.¹²

The same NESS page describes Project Nimbus in a separate section.¹² no public evidence identified in the reviewed records that Akamai itself is a Nimbus cloud provider, marketplace supplier or subcontractor.^{10, 11, 12}

Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology

Facial recognition and biometrics

Akamai MFA documentation states that platform authenticators can use Touch ID, Face ID, Windows Hello and Android device biometrics through FIDO2/WebAuthn authentication.^{13, 14} The documentation describes device/platform authentication factors rather than an Akamai-operated facial-recognition identification database.^{13, 14}

No public evidence identified in the reviewed material that Akamai uses or provides Oosto/AnyVision, BriefCam, Trigo, Trax or another Israeli-origin facial-recognition, gait-analysis or retail-biometric platform.^{13, 14, 15}

Behavioral analytics and monitoring

Akamai’s 2024 10-K describes the acquired Neosec technology as API detection and response based on data and behavioral analytics.² CTech describes LayerX as technology for securing enterprise browsing and controlling employee AI usage, with the LayerX team joining Akamai’s Enterprise Security group.⁷ These sources establish general enterprise-security monitoring and control functions.^{2, 7}

No public evidence identified in the reviewed sources tying those capabilities to Israeli predictive policing, social-media monitoring, population surveillance or state workforce-surveillance deployments.^{2, 7, 16, 15}

Third-party deployment

Check Point and Apiiro each document integrations with Akamai security products.^{8, 9} no public evidence identified that facial-recognition, biometric-surveillance or predictive-policing technology reaches Akamai customers through those verified integrations.^{8, 9}

Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation

Israeli infrastructure and data exposure

Akamai’s June 2026 filing says approximately 6% of its employees are in Israel.⁵ Its September 2024 filing similarly said approximately 6% of global employees were in Tel Aviv and that some had been mobilized as Israeli military reservists.¹⁷ Those disclosures establish a substantial Israeli workforce, but they do not identify a specific Akamai data center, cloud region, colocation facility or customer-data-residency commitment in Israel.^{5, 17}

No public evidence identified in the reviewed final sources of a specifically named Akamai-operated or leased Israeli data center or of a public commitment that a particular customer’s data is resident in Israel.^{5, 2, 17} The Israeli engineering presence therefore is not treated here as proof that customer content, API telemetry or DNS logs are stored in or accessed from Israel.^{5, 2, 17}

Israeli government digital-infrastructure contracts

The Israeli National Digital Agency published a 24 June 2025 notice for Akamai distributed-DNS services, naming ITway Solutions Ltd. as sole supplier, with a value of NIS 450,000 and an engagement period from 15 September 2025 through 14 September 2026.¹⁰ An earlier National Digital Agency notice records an ITway-supplied Akamai distributed-DNS engagement worth NIS 1.1 million running from 15 September 2021 through 14 September 2024.¹¹

These records establish Akamai technology provision to an Israeli civilian state digital agency through a local reseller.^{10, 11} They do not disclose the downstream government systems or agencies whose DNS traffic is served, what logs or personal data are processed, the physical routing locations, or whether military/intelligence systems consume the service.^{10, 11}

Taken together, the two notices document a recurring state digital-infrastructure relationship spanning a three-year 2021-2024 engagement and a renewed one-year 2025-2026 engagement, with combined disclosed procurement value of NIS 1.55 million.^{10, 11} This is sustained, named government DNS provision rather than an incidental one-off commodity purchase. The evidence still supports only the civilian National Digital Agency use actually documented; it does not identify a military, intelligence, police, prison, border, or settlement end user.^{10, 11}

The 2025-2026 engagement began after the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion of 19 July 2024 and after the International Criminal Court’s 21 November 2024 announcement that arrest warrants had been issued in the Situation in the State of Palestine.^{10, 18, 19} This establishes chronology of continued/new civilian-government DNS provision after those dates; the procurement record itself does not identify a military, intelligence, police or settlement end-user.¹⁰

Sovereign cloud participation

NESS describes Project Nimbus separately from its description of the Akamai/ITway partnership.¹² no public evidence identified in the reviewed sources that Akamai participates in Project Nimbus or another named Israeli sovereign-cloud contract.^{10, 11, 12}

Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships

Military and intelligence contracts

No public evidence identified in the reviewed Akamai filings, Israeli procurement records or UN materials of a verified Akamai contract with the Israel Defense Forces, Israeli Ministry of Defense, Mossad, Shin Bet or Israel Police.^{5, 10, 11, 16, 15} The verified National Digital Agency DNS procurements are civilian-government technology engagements; their public notices do not name a defence or intelligence end-user.^{10, 11}

Akamai’s September 2024 10-Q says some employees in Israel had been mobilized as military reservists and that further mobilizations could affect Akamai’s security offerings and internal cloud-migration work.¹⁷ This is a workforce/business-continuity disclosure, not evidence of an Akamai military contract or technology provision to the IDF.¹⁷

Dual-use technology provision

Akamai’s filings describe general-purpose cybersecurity capabilities including Guardicore microsegmentation, Neosec API detection/response and Noname API security.^{2, 3} no public evidence identified in the reviewed sources that those products were deployed by Israeli military, intelligence or law-enforcement bodies for surveillance in Israel or the occupied Palestinian territory.^{10, 11, 16, 15}

Offensive cyber and digital weapons

No public evidence identified in the reviewed sources that Akamai develops, sells or maintains spyware, zero-day exploit platforms, offensive cyber weapons or purpose-built digital attack systems for Israeli state actors.^{2, 16, 3, 15} The cited Akamai acquisition descriptions concern microsegmentation, API security, browser security and defensive access controls.^{2, 7, 3}

AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems

AI/ML provision

CTech reported that LayerX’s technology controls enterprise browser and employee AI usage and that the company was being integrated into Akamai’s Enterprise Security group.⁷ This is a general enterprise-security capability.⁷ no public evidence identified that Akamai supplies AI/ML systems to Israeli military, intelligence or security bodies for targeting, surveillance, logistics or operational decision support.^{10, 11, 7, 16, 15}

Training data and surveillance-derived datasets

No public evidence identified in the reviewed materials that Akamai trains AI models on civilian population data, intercepted communications or surveillance-derived datasets originating in Israel or the occupied Palestinian territory.^{2, 7, 16, 15} The identified Neosec and LayerX capabilities concern enterprise API behavior and browser/AI-use controls rather than a documented population-surveillance training corpus.^{2, 7}

Autonomous targeting and lethality

No public evidence identified of Akamai providing autonomous target-generation, fire-control, kill-chain automation or autonomous tracking systems to Israeli military or security forces.^{7, 16, 15} No reviewed source described an Akamai product whose primary designed output is a kinetic targeting or weapons decision.^{2, 7, 3}

Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint

Israeli R&D and security-development footprint

Akamai’s June 2026 filing places approximately 6% of the global workforce in Israel.⁵ CTech reported in November 2025 that Akamai had about 700 Israeli employees, most working in development and cybersecurity, and that Guardicore, Neosec and Noname were central to the Israeli development center.⁶ In May 2026, CTech identified Ofer Wolf as the company’s Enterprise Security leader and Israel site leader.⁷

Acquisitions and investment

Akamai acquired Guardicore in October 2021 for $610.4 million in cash; its SEC disclosure describes Guardicore’s microsegmentation as technology that limits users’ access to enterprise applications and data and protects enterprise networks.³

Akamai’s 2024 10-K records the May 2023 acquisition of Neosec for $91.4 million and the June 2024 acquisition of Noname Security for $452.3 million.² The same filing says Neosec provided API detection/response based on data and behavioral analytics and Noname expanded Akamai’s API-security offerings through flexible deployment, vendor integrations and enhanced attack analysis.² Akamai’s Israeli-subsidiary exhibit lists Noname Gate Ltd. as an Israeli subsidiary.¹

Akamai’s June 2026 filing records its July 2026 LayerX acquisition, while CTech reported a $205 million cash price and identified LayerX as an Israeli cybersecurity startup focused on enterprise-browser and AI-use security.^{5, 7}

[pre-2020] Akamai’s 2019 10-K records the 10 November 2019 acquisition of Israel-based ChameleonX for $11.9 million and describes its technology as detecting when websites link to or contain malware that can compromise end-user data.²⁰ The reviewed sources establish the historical acquisition but do not establish that every present Akamai client-side security product directly descends from ChameleonX.²⁰

Leighton told CTech in November 2025 that Akamai had made a small investment in Israeli cybersecurity company Apiiro after beginning a strategic collaboration.⁶ Apiiro’s current partner directory independently documents a technical alliance with Akamai.⁹

Patents, universities and principal investments

No public evidence identified in the reviewed material of a material Akamai patent-licensing or co-development arrangement with Technion, Hebrew University or Weizmann Institute.^{5, 4, 2}

The examiner-directed expansion changes the earlier principal-investment finding. Akamai’s proxy identifies The Vanguard Group as the only disclosed holder above 10% of Akamai common stock, at 12.7% as of 20 February 2026.⁴ That threshold makes Vanguard substantive in-scope major-shareholder evidence for this review: its documented conduct is evaluated on its own terms even where the evidence does not show that Akamai directed the conduct. Vanguard states that on 12 January 2026 it completed an internal advisory reorganization into two wholly owned U.S. investment advisers, Vanguard Capital Management LLC (VCM) and Vanguard Portfolio Management LLC (VPM), with distinct investment-management and stewardship teams.²¹ A March 2026 Vanguard Group Schedule 13G/A for Palo Alto Networks explains that, after this realignment, certain subsidiaries/business divisions began reporting beneficial ownership separately and that the Group parent itself no longer reports those disaggregated holdings as its own.²² Accordingly, the post-realignment VCM/VPM filings below are Vanguard-managed principal-investment exposure; the lack of evidence that Akamai itself acquired or directed those positions limits the operational inference but does not remove them from the principal review.^{21, 22}

SentinelOne. SentinelOne’s 2024 proxy reported that entities affiliated with The Vanguard Group beneficially owned 25,158,987 Class A shares (8.83%) based on an April 2024 Schedule 13G/A, establishing a Vanguard-managed position before 19 July 2024.²³ After the 2026 realignment, VCM reported 17,468,471 SentinelOne shares (5.23%) as of 31 March 2026 and certified that the securities were acquired and held in the ordinary course of business and not for the purpose or effect of changing or influencing control.²⁴ VCM’s 30 June 2026 Form 13F then listed 14,595,039 SentinelOne shares with a reported market value of $247,677,812.²⁵ The 13G and 13F have different reporting scopes and dates, so their share counts are not used here to infer a precise increase or decrease. SentinelOne’s 2026 10-K says its Tel Aviv office draws on Israeli cybersecurity and intelligence expertise, that R&D employees are located primarily in Israel, India and the Czech Republic, and that its Singularity platform provides AI-powered endpoint, cloud, identity and security-operations capabilities.²⁶ no public evidence identified in the reviewed sources that Vanguard’s SentinelOne position financed a particular Israeli state, military, occupation or settlement deployment, or that the shares were purchased in a primary issuance earmarked for such use.^{23, 24, 25, 26}

Palo Alto Networks. Palo Alto Networks’ 2025 proxy reported 55,137,000 shares (8.2%) attributed to The Vanguard Group, based on a Schedule 13G/A filed 13 February 2024; this likewise establishes Vanguard-managed exposure before 19 July 2024.²⁷ Following the 2026 realignment, VCM reported 60,785,782 Palo Alto Networks shares (7.44%) as of 31 March 2026 and certified ordinary-course, non-control intent.²⁸ VCM’s 30 June 2026 Form 13F listed 53,129,128 shares with a reported market value of $18,118,095,231.²⁵ Again, the 13G and 13F scopes differ, so these figures are not treated as a like-for-like trend series. Palo Alto Networks’ 2026 10-K describes a broad cybersecurity platform and says its Israeli operations expanded materially through the CyberArk acquisition and that it intends to continue growing its presence in Israel.²⁹ no public evidence identified in the reviewed sources linking Vanguard’s Palo Alto Networks shares to financing a specific Israeli state, military, occupation or settlement digital deployment.^{27, 28, 25, 29}

Cellebrite. VCM’s 30 June 2026 13F listed 251 ordinary shares of Israeli company Cellebrite DI Ltd. with a reported market value of $3,665.²⁵ Cellebrite’s 2025 Form 20-F identifies it as an Israeli company headquartered in Petah Tikva and describes AI-powered digital-investigative and intelligence software used primarily by public-sector customers, including approximately 5,300 federal, state and local agencies; public-sector customers accounted for more than 90% of 2025 revenue.³⁰ A 3 December 2025 Israeli Ministry of Justice exemption notice names Cellebrite Mobile Synchronization Ltd. as sole supplier for UFED 4PC usage/maintenance for מח”ש (Mahash, the department that investigates police officers), for NIS 89,463 and an engagement running 15 October 2025 to 24 September 2026.³¹ This establishes a post-November-2024 Israeli state investigative use of Cellebrite technology. The Vanguard filing, however, shows only a small ordinary public-equity position; it does not show that VCM bought newly issued shares, that proceeds went to Cellebrite, or that Vanguard financed or directed the Ministry of Justice deployment.^{25, 31} no public evidence identified tying this holding to military, occupation or settlement use.^{25, 30, 31}

Tom Leighton and the TBL Charitable Foundation. The latest publicly indexed TBL Charitable Foundation return reviewed here is for fiscal 2024; ProPublica’s IRS-derived record identifies F. Thomson Leighton as trustee, reports $31.66 million in year-end net assets, and shows interest/dividend income and asset sales, but the reviewed public summary does not identify a named holding in SentinelOne, Palo Alto Networks, Cellebrite or another Israeli security-technology issuer.³² Leighton’s February 2026 Form 4 concerns Akamai securities and does not purport to disclose his wider personal portfolio.³³ After focused searches of SEC filings, the foundation’s public tax record and contemporaneous reporting, no public evidence identified a separate personal or TBL Foundation equity stake by Leighton in an Israeli cybersecurity, surveillance, AI, cloud or military-technology business. This is a disclosure/search limit, not proof that no private or indirectly held investment exists.^{32, 33}

Continuation after the 2024 reference dates. For SentinelOne and Palo Alto Networks, public filings establish Vanguard-managed holdings before 19 July 2024 and again after both 19 July 2024 and November 2024, with current successor-adviser holdings reported in 2026.^{23, 24, 27, 28, 25} Vanguard’s internal reorganization means the older Group-level and newer adviser-level figures are not directly comparable, so the evidence supports continuation of principal investment exposure but not a defensible claim that either position expanded.^{21, 22} The Cellebrite position is verified only as of 30 June 2026; the reviewed sources do not establish that Vanguard held it before either 2024 reference date.²⁵ No affirmative divestment or cessation is documented for these three positions through the latest reviewed filings; the 30 June 2026 13F instead documents that VCM still held all three on that date.²⁵ These positions therefore remain affirmative in-scope principal evidence; their passive public-market character and the absence of evidence tying the purchases to a specific Israeli state, military, occupation or settlement deployment are limiting facts rather than grounds to exclude the conduct altogether.^{24, 28, 25, 31}

Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History

UN and specialist civil-society review

The 2025 OHCHR settlement-business database was checked for Akamai and no Akamai entry was identified in the reviewed database.¹⁵ The reviewed A/HRC/59/23 UN report likewise did not identify Akamai by name.¹⁶ These are bounded checks of those documents rather than proof that Akamai cannot appear in an indirect supply chain.^{16, 15}

The positive Israeli state relationship established in this audit is the National Digital Agency’s procurement of Akamai DNS distribution services through ITway.^{10, 11} no public evidence identified in the reviewed authoritative sources that the DNS engagement serves settlements, the IDF, a defence ministry system or an intelligence service.^{10, 11, 16, 15}

Boycott and divestment campaigns

No public evidence identified in the reviewed UN, corporate and public records of an organized target-specific boycott or divestment campaign against Akamai based on technology provision to Israeli state entities.^{4, 16, 15} This is a bounded result of the searches conducted, not a claim about every local campaign or unpublished action.^{16, 15}

Regulatory and legal actions

No public evidence identified in the reviewed material of a regulator, court or export-control authority bringing an Akamai-specific enforcement action over technology sales or services to Israeli state entities.^{5, 4, 16, 15} Akamai’s SEC filings disclose general geopolitical, sanctions and export-control risks, but the reviewed filings do not report an Israel-specific enforcement proceeding of this kind.^{5, 17}