ARM POLITICAL

Corporate Communications & Public Stance

• Arm’s reviewed materials frame its Israeli presence as an engineering and subsidiary location rather than as a geopolitical, governmental, or defence partnership.^{1, 2, 3}

• Arm’s FY2024 annual report stated that the Russia–Ukraine and Israel–Hamas conflicts had little direct impact on group performance for that financial year, while noting possible indirect semiconductor supply-chain effects.⁴

• SoftBank Group’s 2025 annual report refers generally to geopolitical risk, including “the situation in the Middle East,” in its discussion of regulatory, national-security, export-control, and supply-chain risks; the reviewed passage does not state a position on Israel–Palestine, Gaza, Palestinian civilian harm, Israeli policy, settlements, BDS, or military assistance.⁵

• SoftBank Group’s current social-initiatives page describes group human-rights and supplier-engagement principles, including risk identification and mitigation, but does not identify an Israel–Palestine-specific policy, programme, donation, or partnership.⁶

• No public evidence identified in the reviewed sources of a conflict-specific Arm statement concerning Israel–Palestine, Gaza, Palestinian civilian harm, the IDF, settlements, or support for the Israeli state.^{1, 2, 7}

• No public evidence identified in the bounded, targeted live searches and retrieved company materials of a SoftBank Group corporate statement concerning Israel–Palestine, Gaza, Palestinian civilian harm, settlements, BDS, or regional policy during its control of Arm; this conclusion is search-scoped and does not substitute for complete Japanese-language, political-finance, charitable, or lobbying-record reviews.^{6, 5, 8}

• No public evidence identified of Arm accepting Israeli state honours, sponsoring a state-backed cultural or public-relations campaign, or maintaining a disclosed non-commercial Israeli government or academic partnership in the reviewed materials.^{1, 2, 7}

• No public evidence identified in the bounded SoftBank Group review of acceptance of a relevant Israeli state honour, anti-BDS intervention, or Israel–Palestine-specific lobbying expenditure during SoftBank’s control of Arm.^{6, 5, 8}

• The current Ra’anana careers material describes ordinary engineering functions, including software and hardware engineering, security IP, architecture, project management, GPU, machine-learning, and AI teams; it does not state a conflict-related, government, or military purpose.^{9, 10}

• An IATI industry-booklet profile describes “Arm Israel” as having 115 employees, more than ten open roles, work in Arm’s global GPU group, security architecture, local sales, field-application engineering, and a strategic project involving about 30 engineers; it does not identify the project, a state or military customer, a conflict-related purpose, or a corporate resource transfer. As a self-described secondary industry profile, it is corroborative rather than a substitute for Arm’s corporate records.¹¹

Operations in Occupied or Contested Territories

• Arm announced in August 2016 that it had acquired Sansa Security approximately one year earlier and operated an IoT engineering-design centre in Kfar Netter, Israel.¹

• The 2016 announcement stated that approximately 40 hires had joined the Israeli operation after the acquisition, alongside 90 engineers from Sansa Security, and described the site’s work as relating to system-on-chip IP for IoT and mobile computing.¹

• Arm’s 8 February 2024 Form 6-K identified Arm Technology Israel Ltd. as the company’s Israeli subsidiary for employee-RSU purposes, stating that awards for those employees remained liability-classified; this confirms an entity and equity-plan reference at that date, not customers, products, or end uses.¹²

• Arm’s FY2024 Form 20-F described Arm Technology Israel Ltd. as the company’s Israeli subsidiary in its discussion of employee restricted stock units.²

• Arm’s 2024 Israel Sub-Plan applies to Israeli tax residents engaged by an Israeli-resident subsidiary.⁷

• Arm’s FY2026 Form 20-F identifies Arm Israel as a subsidiary for employee-equity-plan purposes, reports Israeli pension-plan contributions, and states that Arm leases facilities in Israel.¹³

• Arm’s July 2026 Form 6-K states that RSUs were granted to existing employees and new hires of Arm Technology Israel Ltd., with awards vesting in tranches over three to four years.^{14, 15}

• Arm Limited’s statutory accounts for the year ended 31 March 2025 list Arm Technology Israel Limited at 24 Zarhin Street, POB 4334, Ra’anana 4366249, Israel, as 100%-owned and engaged in “Development of system IP.”¹⁶

• The same FY2025 statutory accounts separately list Arm Technologies Israel Limited as dormant; that distinct spelling should not be conflated with the operating Arm Technology Israel Limited entry.¹⁶

• Arm’s FY2026 statutory accounts list Arm Technologies Israel Limited as 100%-owned and engaged in “Development of system IP,” with a registered-office address of 24 Alexander Street, Ra’anana.¹⁷

• The FY2026 Form 20-F uses the singular name Arm Technology Israel Ltd. for equity-plan purposes, whereas the FY2026 statutory accounts use Arm Technologies Israel Limited; Arm’s careers material identifies an operating Ra’anana office at 24 Zarhin Street.^{13, 17, 10}

• The reviewed records do not resolve whether the singular/plural names or the two Ra’anana addresses reflect a renaming, separate entities, or a registered-office versus operating-office distinction.^{13, 17, 10}

• Arm’s office directory lists an Israel office in Ra’anana at 24 Zarhin Street, POB 4334, and its current careers page describes the Ra’anana site as a development hub.^{9, 18, 10}

• A job posting dated 27 August 2026 sought a Senior Verification Engineer in Ra’anana for Arm’s GPU Hardware Verification team, describing work verifying Mali graphics processors.¹⁹

• A March 2026 Ra’anana vacancy likewise described verification work on Arm Mali graphics processors, and Arm’s Israel jobs page displayed four Ra’anana roles - GPU verification, physical-AI research, verification, and model-compression/efficient-AI research - when accessed.^{20, 21}

• The historical record documents an Israeli operation in 2016, and corporate, equity, facilities, careers, and recruitment disclosures document an Israeli operation from 2024 through 2026; the specific Kfar Netter site is historical, while current documentation identifies Ra’anana.^{1, 13, 16, 17, 10, 21, 15}

• These records establish a visible, ongoing Israeli engineering, employment, subsidiary, facilities, and recruitment footprint as ordinary corporate activity; they do not identify Israeli customers, projects, licensees, end users, government contracts, military use, settlement activity, or a conflict-period resource transfer.^{13, 9, 14, 16, 19, 18, 17, 10, 20, 21, 15}

• Current official descriptions identify a multi-function Ra’anana development hub spanning engineering, security IP, architecture, GPU, machine learning, and AI, but do not disclose employee headcount, budget, revenue, specific projects, customers, or end users.^{17, 10, 21}

• No public evidence identified in the newly reviewed corporate records of cessation, divestiture, office closure, or material reduction affecting Arm’s Israeli operations; the address and entity-name inconsistencies do not establish either cessation or expansion.^{13, 17, 10, 21, 15}

• Arm’s FY2026 significant-subsidiaries exhibit does not list an Israeli subsidiary, but expressly omits subsidiaries that are not significant individually or in the aggregate, so the omission does not establish that Israeli operations ended.^{3, 22}

• No source reviewed establishes that the 2016 Kfar Netter site itself remained open after FY2024; later evidence instead identifies Arm Israel and Ra’anana.^{1, 13, 9, 16, 17, 10}

• No public evidence identified in the bounded live review of a contract, tender award, subcontract, named licence, or direct commercial relationship between Arm or Arm Israel and the IDF, Israel Ministry of Defense, Israeli defence-research entities, a settlement municipality, or a named Israeli defence contractor.^{1, 2, 3, 13, 17}

• The supplied document-scoped pre-scan did not identify ARM in the specified 2023 and 2025 OHCHR settlement-business materials, UN A/HRC/59/23, Al-Haq’s 2024 report, BDS’s November 2024 corporate-priority list, or the specified Who Profits and BankTrack reports; this is document-scoped only and does not establish the absence of all relevant relationships, licensees, distributors, or end uses.^{23, 24}

• No public evidence identified in the reviewed filings and supplied canonical-library scan of Arm operations, licensed-equipment sales, services, or resellers in Israeli settlements, the occupied West Bank, East Jerusalem, or the Golan Heights.^{25, 4}

• The confirmed office and legal-entity records identify Ra’anana, Israel. No public evidence identified in the reviewed corporate records of an Arm operation in the occupied West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, or an Israeli settlement.^{9, 16, 18, 17, 10}

• No public evidence identified in the reviewed official-procurement-result checks and bounded searches of settlement-event sponsorship, settlement-entity donations, settlement-specific intermediaries, or an Arm relationship with a settlement municipality.^{23, 25, 26}

• Israel Ministry of Defense materials describing international defence cooperation and specified 2025 procurement and export activity do not identify SoftBank Group, Arm, or their reviewed Israeli entities as counterparties.^{27, 28, 29}

• Arm’s 2019 Hailo case study states that Israeli startup Hailo used Arm DesignStart in 2018 to prototype an automotive-oriented system-on-chip; a later Arm-hosted version describes a Cortex-M3 prototype, while the earlier material identifies a Cortex-M4.^{30, 31}

• Those Hailo materials establish a historical IP-access/prototype relationship, but do not establish a current licence, procurement arrangement, supply to Israeli state or military users, or an Arm role in any subsequent end use.^{30, 31}

Internal Governance, Content & Retail Policies

• Arm’s principal operations are licensing, marketing, and research and development for microprocessors, systems IP, graphics processing units, related software, tools, and services.²³

• The reviewed corporate materials identify Arm as a commercial semiconductor-IP business rather than a consumer content, retail, or social-media platform.²³

• No public evidence identified in the reviewed materials of Arm employee discipline, employee litigation, union action, platform moderation, product-origin labelling, charitable matching, or reservist-pay policy related to Israel–Palestine.²⁵

• No public evidence identified of Arm directing chips, IP licences, cloud services, device-management tools, transport, free services, engineering services, or other corporate assets to Israeli state, military, settlement, or state-aligned NGO efforts during the conflict.^{1, 2, 3}

• No public evidence identified of a named reseller, distributor, authorised partner, enterprise or mobile-device-management channel, or other intermediary linking Arm to IDF or IMOD device or weapons-system deployment in the reviewed materials.^{1, 2, 3}

• No public evidence identified in the bounded review of conflict-period asset mobilisation, reservist policies, or conflict-specific public statements by Arm Israel; the IATI reference to corporate support and a strategic project is too non-specific to establish such conduct.¹¹

• SoftBank Group’s reviewed social-initiatives materials describe general human-rights and supplier-engagement principles, but do not disclose a conflict-specific governance policy, employee policy, resource-mobilisation programme, or Israeli military, settlement, or state-aligned NGO programme.⁶

Brand Heritage & State Partnerships

• Arm’s 2016 Israeli-site announcement described the Kfar Netter operation as a global IoT engineering-design centre associated with SoC IP, IoT, and mobile computing.¹

• That announcement did not present military, state-security, or defence heritage as part of Arm’s branding for the Israeli operation.¹

• No public evidence identified in the reviewed authoritative corporate records of a state-held golden share, founding mandate, or charter provision requiring Arm to advance Israeli or other state geopolitical objectives.^{23, 32, 13}

• The reviewed record identifies Masayoshi Son as founder of SoftBank, not as a founder of Arm.^{33, 34}

• Young Sohn was quoted in a July 2016 Jerusalem Post article, while serving as Samsung President and Chief Strategy Officer, as saying Samsung would invest in Israel where it found the strongest entrepreneurs and ventures; the article does not document a personal investment by Sohn, an Arm investment, a political position on the conflict, a state partnership, or a settlement or military link.³⁵

• SoftBank Group’s 2022 annual report stated that SoftBank Vision Funds made their first investments in Israel during fiscal 2021, but did not identify investees, values, counterparties, purposes, any state or military connection, or continuation into later years.³⁶

• A 2017 media report stated that SoftBank Corp., described as a SoftBank Group subsidiary, and Israeli semiconductor startup Inuitive Ltd. entered a collaboration to integrate Inuitive chips or processors into SoftBank Corp. IoT products; the report does not identify a government, military, settlement, or conflict-related counterparty, and does not establish continuation.³⁷

• A 2022 interview quoted Catherine Lenson, then a Managing Partner at SoftBank Investment Advisers, as saying that she was a director of “our subsidiary in Israel” and oversaw human resources and real estate; the interview does not name the entity, identify its activities, or establish a state, military, settlement, or conflict-related relationship.³⁸

• An Israel–Japan Chamber bulletin reproduced a 31 October 2024 announcement that SB Technology Corp., described in that announcement as part of SoftBank Group, entered a strategic partnership with Cato Networks for managed SASE services in Japan; the available source describes product handling and operational support in Japan, but does not identify SoftBank Group Corp. as contracting party, an Israeli governmental, military, settlement, or conflict-period beneficiary, or continuation after the announcement.³⁹

• The Cato/SB Technology item is reproduced in a chamber bulletin rather than supported here by the underlying corporate announcement; it is therefore limited to the reported announcement and should not be treated as verified contractual detail beyond that description.³⁹

• A July 2025 Globes report stated that SoftBank invested in Israeli quantum-software company Classiq in a financing round, describing the investment as managed by SoftBank’s Tokyo investment team for Vision Fund 2 with the U.S. team, and estimating the expansion at $20–30 million.⁴⁰

• SoftBank’s official materials identify the Vision Funds segment as including SVF1, SVF2, and Latin America Funds, with investment activity as its core business, while the Vision Fund site identifies SVF2 as advised by SB Global Advisers Limited; these sources corroborate the group investment structure but do not independently identify Classiq, confirm the reported amount, or disclose investment terms, governance rights, use of proceeds, or a continuing holding.^{41, 42}

• Classiq presents itself as an enterprise quantum-software platform with an Israel office and markets to an “Aerospace & Defense” industry category, but the retrieved sources do not identify a SoftBank-funded defence project, government customer, military end user, Israeli state contract, or restricted end use.^{40, 43}

• The reported Classiq investment is a commercial investment in a private Israeli technology company, not evidence of a political statement, military-welfare donation, settlement support, or state partnership.⁴⁰

• No public evidence identified in the reviewed sources of a SoftBank Group corporate state partnership relevant to Israel–Palestine during its control of Arm.^{36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 40, 8}

Lobbying, Advocacy, Financing & Logistics

• The U.S. House Lobbying Disclosure portal lists Arm Holdings plc as a client of registrant Invariant LLC.²⁶

• The reviewed lobbying-registry page does not itself identify Israel–Palestine, anti-BDS, settlement, military, or regional-policy lobbying subjects.²⁶

• No public evidence identified in the reviewed corporate disclosures and lobbying registry record of an Arm corporate PAC, Israel–Palestine-specific lobbying, anti-BDS lobbying, or contributions to FIDF, JNF/KKL, settlement organisations, or military-welfare bodies.^{23, 26}

• A Friends of the IDF release records that Yossi Cohen, described in that release as “Head of Softbank Investment Advisers in Israel,” was keynote speaker at a 2022 FIDF event supporting its Mamriot programme; FIDF states that the programme was operated by Israel’s Ministry of Defense and developed with the IDF Intelligence Corps.²²

• The FIDF release does not identify SoftBank Group Corp., SoftBank Investment Advisers, or Cohen as a donor, sponsor, organiser, or funder, and attributes event support to a named FIDF board member; it therefore establishes Cohen’s speaking appearance and contemporaneous business title, but not a SoftBank-authorized donation, funding arrangement, or institutional partnership.²²

• The Cohen/FIDF item identifies FIDF as the institutional counterparty and identifies the programme’s stated Ministry of Defense and IDF Intelligence Corps links, but supplies no evidence of corporate authorization, contractual relationship, recurrence, duration, or post-2022 continuation by SoftBank Group.²²

• The reported 2017 Inuitive collaboration identifies SoftBank Corp. and Inuitive Ltd. as counterparties and describes commercial IoT-product integration with undisclosed financial terms; it does not establish recurrence, duration, parent-level authorization, governmental involvement, military end use, or a settlement nexus.³⁷

• The reported SB Technology/Cato partnership identifies SB Technology Corp. and Cato Networks as counterparties and states a commercial objective of offering Cato’s SASE service in Japan; the available source does not provide a contract, funding amount, parent-level authorization, government purchaser, or evidence of continuation after 31 October 2024.³⁹

• The reported Classiq transaction was publicised on 30 July 2025 and attributed by Globes to SoftBank’s Tokyo investment team acting for SVF2; SoftBank’s official Vision Funds description places SVF2 investment activity within the group’s Vision Funds segment, but no SoftBank press release, fund filing, Classiq announcement, or transaction document was retrieved to independently confirm the amount or approval route.^{41, 40}

• The reported Classiq counterparty was an Israeli quantum-software company; current ownership, board representation, recurrence, cessation, and any SoftBank investment after July 2025 are unknown from the retrieved materials.^{42, 40, 43}

• A 19 August 2026 Jerusalem Post report, itself reporting a Globes item, stated that former Mossad chief Yossi Cohen had headed Israeli operations within a Vision Fund 2 partnership since 2021 and had been appointed a strategic adviser by Masayoshi Son; it further reported that Cohen would continue working in the Israeli market and had participated in prior cybersecurity investments.⁴⁴

• The same report stated that neither Cohen nor SoftBank had responded; it is therefore media-reported employment and investment information, not company-confirmed evidence of a state partnership, state-directed investment, or SoftBank authorization of a relevant political or military act.⁴⁴

• No public evidence identified in the bounded SoftBank Group review of a corporate donation or sponsorship to FIDF, JNF/KKL, an Israeli military-welfare body, a settlement organisation, or a Gaza/Israel conflict-response body; this is not a comprehensive political-finance or charity-filing conclusion.^{6, 5, 8}

• Masayoshi Son’s Masason Foundation was established in December 2016, describes its purpose as supporting young people with exceptional talents, and lists Son as president.³⁴

• The reviewed Masason Foundation source does not publish a grant-recipient schedule, and it does not support conclusions about Israel- or Palestine-related grants.³⁴

• The foundation’s official description covers scholarships, youth-development facilities and environments, events, and research support; no IRS Form 990 or 990-PF recipient schedule was identified in the bounded review, so recipient-by-recipient Israel/Palestine grant analysis could not be completed.³⁴

• A June 2025 Masason Foundation release describes financial and facilities support for selected young members, but does not identify an Israel/Palestine-related grantee.⁴⁵

• The published Masason Foundation address is in Tokyo; its public materials do not supply a recipient-by-recipient grant schedule or a U.S. IRS Form 990/990-PF, and no inference is drawn from those materials about U.S. filing obligations.^{34, 45}

• No public evidence identified in the sources reviewed of Israel–Palestine-related public statements, IDF/FIDF/JNF or settlement donations, defence or cyber investments, or relevant advocacy-board roles by Son or René Haas.^{23, 33, 34}

• Targeted searches for Fisher, Sine, Dykstra, Schooler, Jacobs, Sohn, Child, Eaton, and Collins identified no primary source establishing a relevant political donation, foundation grant, political contribution, anti-BDS activity, advocacy-board role, signed conflict statement, Israeli defence/cyber investment, or tie to FIDF, JNF/KKL, settlement organisations, AIPAC/ADL or comparable bodies, military-welfare funds, or Israeli state institutions.^{23, 33, 34, 35}

• That person-specific result is search-scoped rather than comprehensive: no complete FEC or state political-finance review, charity-filing review, family-office portfolio disclosure, or non-U.S. charitable-disclosure review was completed for those individuals.^{23, 33, 34}

• Companies House records Richard Roy Grisenthwaite as an active director of Arm Operations Limited, Arm Limited, Advanced RISC Machines Limited, and other Arm group entities, and as an active director of Gresham’s School since December 2021.⁴⁶

• The Charity Commission lists Grisenthwaite as a trustee of Gresham’s School, charity number 1105500, appointed on 13 December 2021.⁴⁷

• Clare College’s 2023–24 donor record names “Richard Grisenthwaite (1986)” among its “Benefactors,” a category for persons giving or pledging at least £15,000 in the previous three years; the record identifies neither an Israel/Palestine-related recipient nor purpose.⁴⁸

• No public evidence identified in targeted live searches and retrieved primary or official records of Grisenthwaite making Israel/Palestine-related public statements, signing conflict-related letters, holding relevant lobbying or advocacy roles, making political or charitable donations to regional organisations, holding relevant investments, or governing a relevant external organisation. His identified school and college roles or donation do not establish such conduct.^{46, 47, 48}

• Arm identifies Will Abbey as Executive Vice President and Chief Commercial Officer, a role he has held since April 2023.¹³

• A 2018 GoFundMe page for a Kenya church-and-school-building fundraiser identifies its organiser only as “Will Abbey,” in San Jose, California, and refers to a proposed non-profit called Abundant Life Missions; it does not identify the organiser’s employer, provide sufficient identifiers to attribute it reliably to Arm’s executive, or concern Israel/Palestine.⁴⁹

• No public evidence identified in targeted live searches or retrieved records of Abbey making Israel/Palestine-related public statements, signing conflict-related letters, holding relevant lobbying or advocacy roles, making political or charitable donations to regional organisations, holding relevant investments, or governing a relevant external organisation. The same-name 2018 fundraiser is not reliably attributable to Arm’s executive.^{13, 49}

• The completed Grisenthwaite and Abbey searches were targeted rather than comprehensive global reviews of every political-finance, charitable, corporate-registry, social-media, family-office, or investment database; no primary source located in this bounded search establishes the specified Israel/Palestine-related conduct for either individual.^{46, 47, 48, 49}

• No public evidence identified of a court case, regulatory proceeding, OECD National Contact Point complaint, or parliamentary inquiry alleging that Arm’s Israel-related activity involves settlements or conflict-related political conduct.^{23, 25, 26}

Corporate Structure & Primary Mission

• Arm Holdings plc is an England-and-Wales public limited company, company number 11299879, incorporated as Arm Holdings Limited on 9 April 2018 and re-registered and renamed Arm Holdings plc on 1 September 2023.²³

• Arm’s registered office is at 110 Fulbourn Road, Cambridge, Cambridgeshire CB1 9NJ, United Kingdom, and the principal office of its U.S. subsidiary Arm Inc. is at 120 Rose Orchard Way, San Jose, California 95134.²³

• Arm’s FY2026 Form 20-F continues to identify 110 Fulbourn Road, Cambridge CB1 9NJ, United Kingdom, as its registered and principal executive office.¹³

• Companies House shows continuing statutory filings by Arm Holdings plc, including a 2026 confirmation statement and multiple share-capital filings; this is consistent with continued registration but does not itself identify beneficial-ownership changes after Arm’s 21 May 2026 disclosure.⁵⁰

• SoftBank Group Corp. is identified as Arm’s ultimate controller and, as of 20 May 2025, beneficially owned approximately 922,733,999 Arm ordinary shares, representing 87.1% of issued share capital and a majority of voting power.²³

• As of 21 May 2026, Arm’s FY2026 Form 20-F identified SoftBank as Arm’s parent and reported that SoftBank beneficially owned approximately 86.4% of Arm’s outstanding ordinary shares and a majority of voting power; Arm describes itself as a Nasdaq controlled company.¹³

• Arm’s FY2026 Form 20-F reports 1,064,055,252 ordinary shares outstanding as of 31 March 2026.¹³

• Arm’s FY2026 Form 20-F states that SoftBank’s voting majority generally gives it control over shareholder-vote outcomes and director elections and, while SoftBank and controlled affiliates own more than 70% of Arm ordinary shares, permits designation of seven board candidates; it may expand the board to nine members and appoint a further director, permitting nomination of up to eight candidates in those circumstances.¹³

• SoftBank’s 2025 and 2026 annual reports identify Arm Holdings plc as the group’s Arm business.^{51, 52}

• SoftBank’s 2026 report defines “Arm” as Arm Holdings plc and defines the SoftBank Group as SoftBank Group Corp., its subsidiaries, and associates, consistently with Arm’s disclosure that SoftBank is its parent.^{13, 52}

• In August 2023, a SoftBank Group subsidiary acquired substantially all of SoftBank Vision Fund L.P.’s interest in Arm Limited, and the September 2023 reorganisation made Arm Limited a wholly owned subsidiary of Arm Holdings plc.²³

• SoftBank’s March 2026 Form 3 identifies SoftBank as both a director and a more-than-10% owner of Arm, stating that it may be deemed a director by deputization because of director-appointment rights under the September 2023 Shareholder Governance Agreement.⁵³

• SoftBank’s ownership page lists Masayoshi Son as holding 1,865,511,000 SoftBank shares, or 32.73%, as of 31 March 2026.⁵⁴

Executive & Leadership Footprint

• Masayoshi Son is Arm’s Chair and is also identified by Arm as SoftBank’s founder, representative director, corporate officer, chair, and CEO.³³

• René Haas has served as Arm CEO and a director since February 2022, and Arm’s 2025 Form 20-F states that he has also sat on SoftBank Group’s board since June 2023.²³

• SoftBank’s 2026 report identifies Haas as a SoftBank board director, Arm CEO and director, and SoftBank Group International CEO.⁵²

• SoftBank separately announced that Haas became CEO of SoftBank Group International effective 21 April 2026 while continuing as Arm CEO and an Arm board member.⁵⁵

• The 2026 AGM notice proposed the re-election of Masayoshi Son, René Haas, Ronald D. Fisher, Jeffrey A. Sine, Karen E. Dykstra, Rosemary Schooler, Paul E. Jacobs, and Young Sohn, and identifies Son as Arm Chair and SoftBank’s founder, Chair, and CEO.⁵⁶

• The most recently inspected 2025 AGM notice listed Son, Haas, Ronald D. Fisher, Jeffrey A. Sine, Karen E. Dykstra, Rosemary Schooler, Paul E. Jacobs, and Young Sohn as Arm directors.⁵⁷

• Arm’s current board page lists Son, Haas, Dykstra, Sine, Jacobs, Schooler, Fisher, and Sohn as directors.³³

• Arm’s FY2026 Form 20-F lists Son, Fisher, Sine, Dykstra, Schooler, Jacobs, and Sohn as non-executive directors; Haas as CEO and a director; and Child, Eaton, Collins, Grisenthwaite, and Abbey as senior management.¹³

• Arm’s 2025 Form 20-F identifies Jason Child as Executive Vice President and CFO, Charlotte Eaton as Chief People Officer, and Spencer Collins as Executive Vice President and Chief Legal Officer.²³

• Arm’s FY2026 Form 20-F additionally identifies Richard Grisenthwaite as Executive Vice President and Chief Architect and Will Abbey as Executive Vice President and Chief Commercial Officer.¹³

• Arm’s current leadership page identifies Grisenthwaite as responsible for the long-term evolution of Arm architecture and Abbey as leading sales, field engineering, and partner enablement.⁵⁸

• Arm’s current leadership page also identifies Abbey as a director of EnPro Industries and Arm China; those external corporate roles do not establish Israel/Palestine-related conduct.⁵⁸

• Arm identifies Collins as Company Secretary and as leader of its global legal, compliance, company-secretary, trade-compliance, government-affairs, and corporate-development teams.³³

• Targeted searches located no public statement or signed letter concerning Israel, Palestine, Gaza, the IDF, settlements, BDS, or related government policy for Son, Haas, Fisher, Sine, Dykstra, Schooler, Jacobs, Sohn, Child, Eaton, or Collins.^{23, 33, 34, 35}

• The completed individual checks now include targeted live searches for Grisenthwaite and Abbey, which identified the non-conflict-related external roles and donor record noted above but no primary or official source establishing the specified Israel/Palestine-related conduct.^{46, 47, 48, 49}