INDEX / DIRECTORY / SAMSUNG

Samsung

Consumer ElectronicsElectronics & Appliances 53 CITED SOURCES UPDATED 2026-09-08 METHOD V6.5
Complicity Index score 639 /1000 B Tier B - Severe
Military ↗ 0.15 Digital ↗ 3.45 Economic ↗ 7.20 Political ↗ 3.50
OWNERSHIP TREE 78 brands and group businesses View all

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Key Findings

  • Economic: Samsung Electronics maintains wholly owned Israeli marketing and R&D subsidiaries, including Samsung Electronics Israel, Samsung Semiconductor Israel R&D Center, and Corephotonics; the latter was acquired to secure camera-optics technology and talent.1, 2
  • Digital: Samsung SDS’s documented SentinelOne adoption is attributable through Samsung Electronics’ 22.6–23% minority interest and significant influence. It supports the Soft Dual-Use Procurement framing, while direct Samsung Electronics deployment and Israeli state-security use remain unestablished.3, 4
  • Political: Samsung’s public descriptions of its longstanding Israeli operations support the Business-as-Usual framing. SRIL has operated since 1997 and evaluates Israeli companies and research for potential product integration; this does not establish political advocacy or a state partnership.1, 5
  • Not found: No public evidence identified of a direct Samsung contract with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, intelligence agencies, police, settlement authorities, or an occupied-territory operation in the reviewed materials.6, 7

Target Profile

FieldDetail
Company NameSamsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
JurisdictionRepublic of Korea.8
Headquarters129 Samsung-ro, Yeongtong-gu, Suwon, Gyeonggi-do, Republic of Korea.8
SectorConsumer electronics, semiconductors, component solutions, and related technology businesses.8, 9
OwnershipKorean listed operating company. As of 30 June 2025, reported holders above 5% included Samsung Life Insurance, National Pension Service, BlackRock Fund Advisors, and Samsung C&T. The available disclosures do not establish beneficial control by a single natural person.10
Key Executives / GovernanceYoung-Hyun Jun (Vice Chairman and CEO, Device Solutions); Tae-Moon Roh (President and CEO, Device eXperience); Je-Yoon Shin (independent Board Chair).11, 12
Israeli-Nexus SummarySamsung has an established Israeli marketing, retail-distribution, R&D, innovation, and investment-related presence, but the reviewed evidence does not establish direct state-security contracting or occupied-territory operations.1, 9, 5, 6

Key Facts:

Executive Summary

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. is a Korea-headquartered technology company with a longstanding, documented commercial and research presence in Israel. Its FY2025 reporting identifies wholly owned Israeli subsidiaries: Samsung Electronics Israel Ltd. as a marketing entity, and Samsung Semiconductor Israel R&D Center, Ltd. (SIRC) and Corephotonics Ltd. as R&D entities.1 Samsung Research describes SRIL, established in 1997, as conducting advanced-technology research, engaging Israeli companies and academic researchers, evaluating potential product applications, and participating in investments through Samsung investment vehicles.5

The principal documented nexus is economic and technological. Samsung acquired control of Tel Aviv-headquartered Corephotonics in 2019, reporting that the transaction secured camera-image-sensor optical technology and talent.2 Samsung’s Israeli R&D material identifies work involving image sensors, image processing, computer vision, memory, AI, signal processing, encryption, and cybersecurity.9 Samsung also reaches the Israeli consumer market through retail and distribution channels: Sunny Communications identifies itself as Samsung’s official importer and marketer of mobile devices, while Samsung’s Israel locator lists branded Experience Store locations including Malha Mall in Jerusalem.14, 15

The evidence record does not establish direct military, intelligence, police, settlement, or occupied-territory provision through this research, consumer-market activity, or investment-related activity. No public evidence identified of a direct Samsung Electronics, Samsung SDS, Samsung C&T, or other Samsung-branded entity contract with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israel Prison Service, Border Police, intelligence agencies, or police in the reviewed materials.6 The record also identifies no confirmed Samsung operation in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, or an Israeli settlement.7

A limited indirect lead concerns a 2024 Cellcom telecommunications tender for approximately 40,000 IDF permanent-service personnel. NGO and press material report that Cellcom’s offer included iPhone and Samsung devices; however, they do not identify Samsung as tender bidder, contractor, direct supplier, subcontractor, manufacturer-to-Cellcom counterparty, or continuing device supplier. The underlying Ministry of Defense tender, Cellcom disclosure, Samsung disclosure, and manufacturer supply documentation were not located in the reviewed materials.16

Samsung SDS, an associate in which Samsung Electronics reported approximately 22.6% ownership at FY2025 year-end, has documented investments and commercial relationships involving Israeli technology companies, including SentinelOne and Iguazio. Yet the reviewed material does not establish Samsung Electronics control of Samsung SDS, a Samsung Electronics deployment of SentinelOne, deployment to Samsung’s Israeli subsidiaries, or provision to Israeli public, military, or security bodies.3, 17, 18, 4 The documented SDS adoption nevertheless supports the approved Soft Dual-Use Procurement framing through the significant-influence minority interest; it is not excluded merely because SDS is not a consolidated subsidiary. On this documentary record, Samsung receives a final human-vetted BRS of 639, placing it in Tier B (Severe Complicity). The score is driven primarily by the scale, continuity, and directness of its Israeli economic and corporate presence, together with the attributable SDS technology procurement and the Business-as-Usual interpretation of Samsung’s public corporate presence. It does not establish a direct military contract.

Timeline of Relevant Events

DateEvent
13 January 1969Samsung Electronics was established in the Republic of Korea.8
1984Samsung Electronics adopted its present name.8
1997Samsung Research & Innovation Israel was established in Herzliya.5
28 January 2019Samsung Electronics Benelux B.V. acquired 83.9% of Corephotonics Ltd.; Samsung reported the transaction as securing camera-optics technology and talent.2
4 March 2019Samsung Electronics Benelux B.V. acquired a further 8.5% of Corephotonics; a Samsung venture entity had already held 7.6%.2
March 2019Samsung SDS announced an investment through Samsung Venture Investment in Iguazio, described as an Israel-based serverless-computing company.18
10 June 2019Samsung SDS announced an investment in SentinelOne through Samsung Venture Investment and stated an intention to expand endpoint-protection business to customers using SentinelOne EDR.17
October 2022Israel’s Ministry of Finance stated that Google began operating a local cloud zone for Project Nimbus; Samsung was not identified as a provider or participant in that release.19
September 2024Reporting stated that Cellcom, not Samsung, won a Ministry of Defense cellular-services tender reportedly covering about 40,000 permanent IDF personnel and including unspecified Samsung handsets in its offering.16
2 December 2024Samsung SDS announced the appointment of then-Samsung Electronics Executive Vice President June-hee Lee as Samsung SDS President and CEO.20
11 July 2025SentinelOne published a case study identifying Samsung SDS as its customer and describing use of SentinelOne endpoint products; the case study does not establish deployment by Samsung Electronics.4
21 November 2025Samsung announced that Tae-Moon Roh had been named DX head and appointed co-CEO alongside Young-Hyun Jun.12
FY2025 / Q1 2026 disclosuresSamsung continued to list Samsung Electronics Israel, SIRC, and Corephotonics as wholly owned Israeli subsidiaries.1, 21

Corporate Overview

Samsung Electronics is the legal-entity anchor used in this dossier: the Korea-listed operating company issuing consolidated reporting. The reviewed record does not establish a single incorporated “Samsung Group” parent entity.22 Samsung’s half-year 2025 reporting describes a Korea-headquartered group with 230 subsidiaries worldwide, organised through DX and DS regional headquarters and including Samsung Display and Harman businesses.10

Samsung’s reported Israeli structure includes Samsung Electronics Israel Ltd. (SEIL), a wholly owned marketing entity; Samsung Semiconductor Israel R&D Center, Ltd. (SIRC), a wholly owned R&D entity; and Corephotonics Ltd., a wholly owned R&D entity.1 A FY2024 disclosure also lists Red Bend Ltd. as a wholly owned audio-product manufacturing entity, but the supplied record does not establish its current operational status or territorial location; this dossier does not treat it as a confirmed current occupied-territory nexus.22

SIRC and Corephotonics are listed at Tel Aviv-Yafo locations. Samsung Research identifies SRIL as operating in Herzliya.9, 5, 13 The reviewed corporate and location records do not identify these entities as operating from the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, or another internationally recognised occupied territory.7

Samsung’s Israeli consumer presence is documented through third-party and branded channels. Sunny Communications states that it has been Samsung’s official importer and marketer of mobile devices in Israel since 1998 and that its repair laboratories are Samsung-authorised.14 Samsung’s Israel store locator lists Experience Store locations, including Jerusalem’s Malha Mall.15 The reviewed sources establish Israeli retail activity but do not identify the legal entity that owns or operates every listed outlet.15, 23

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

The only identified military-adjacent lead is the September 2024 Cellcom tender. Available reporting describes Cellcom as the Ministry of Defense tender awardee for cellular services for approximately 40,000 IDF permanent-service personnel, reportedly for more than NIS 40 million over three years. The reported Cellcom offering included iPhones and unspecified Samsung handset models.16

This does not establish direct Samsung military contracting. The reviewed sources do not identify Samsung as a bidder, awardee, direct supplier, subcontractor, contracting party, manufacturer-to-Cellcom transaction counterparty, or provider of specified device models, quantities, or military-modified equipment.16 No public evidence identified of Samsung direct base services, defence infrastructure work, security-force communications services, defence-prime supply-chain integration, weapons manufacture, munitions supply, or military-specific variants supplied to Israeli forces.6, 24

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

Samsung’s strongest defence is that its documented Israeli entities are classified in its reporting as marketing and R&D entities, not defence-manufacturing or defence-contracting entities.1 SIRC’s work in AI, computer vision, encryption, cybersecurity, and related semiconductor technologies establishes civilian and potentially dual-use technical capability, but the material does not identify an Israeli defence customer, military deployment, or defence-prime integration.9

The Cellcom lead is indirect and incomplete. It is not supported in the reviewed record by a primary procurement document, manufacturer supply record, end-user certificate, export-license decision, or Samsung disclosure. The tender’s reported three-year term may indicate a Cellcom arrangement extending into 2027, but does not independently verify continuing Samsung-device supply or use.16

The approved military score therefore uses the Incidental framing (I=1.5), occasional/non-strategic magnitude (M=2.5) for the single indirect offering record, and passive-market proximity (P=2.0). Cellcom’s total contract value, duration, and personnel count are not treated as Samsung-specific scale evidence. This yields Military=0.15.16

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

Samsung maintains a documented Israeli technology and R&D footprint. SIRC describes research into image sensors, image processing, computer vision, flash memory, information theory, error-correction coding, AI, signal processing, encryption, and cybersecurity. Samsung Research describes SRIL’s innovation-scoping and engagement with Israeli technology companies and academic researchers.9, 5

Samsung SDS is relevant but must be distinguished from Samsung Electronics. Samsung Electronics’ FY2025 reporting classifies Samsung SDS as an associate and reports 22.6% ownership; Samsung SDS reports that Samsung Electronics and its subsidiaries exercise significant influence over the SDS group.3 Samsung SDS has documented a SentinelOne investment and markets SentinelOne endpoint-security offerings. A 2025 SentinelOne case study identifies Samsung SDS as a customer using Singularity Endpoint and Singularity Mobile.17, 4

The approved governing frame is SDS’s Soft Dual-Use Procurement (I=3.5), attributed to Samsung Electronics through its significant-influence minority interest (P=6.9). Deployment endpoints, duration, covered units, and geography remain unresolved; the record contains no affirmative evidence of a small, brief, or abandoned deployment. Under the rubric’s uncertainty rule, those gaps do not justify reducing magnitude below the standard documented-act value of 7.0. The resulting Digital is 3.45; this is not a finding of Samsung Electronics deployment or Israeli security provision.3, 4

Samsung SDS also announced an investment in Israeli company Iguazio, described as a serverless-computing and real-time machine-learning/data-science platform company.18 The record does not establish the amount or current status of that investment, deployment in Samsung Electronics, or provision to Israeli state or security entities.18

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest defence is that the record establishes R&D and commercial technology activity, not state surveillance or security deployment. No public evidence identified of Samsung’s use of Israeli-origin facial recognition, biometric identification, predictive-policing, behavioural-analytics, social-media-monitoring, or workforce-surveillance products in the reviewed material.9, 3

Neither the Samsung SDS/SentinelOne materials nor the corporate disclosures establish central procurement by Samsung Electronics, deployment across Samsung Electronics’ consolidated subsidiaries, deployment to SEIL, SIRC, Corephotonics, or SRIL, deployment in Israel, or use by Israeli public or security bodies.3, 17, 4 Samsung was not identified as a Project Nimbus participant in the cited Ministry of Finance release, and no public evidence identified of Samsung operating or supplying Israeli state cloud, data-residency, sovereign-cloud, or resilience services.19

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

Samsung’s strongest documented vector is a continuous, wholly owned Israeli commercial and R&D presence. Samsung’s current reporting identifies SEIL as a marketing entity and SIRC and Corephotonics as R&D subsidiaries, each 100%-owned.1 Samsung acquired control of Corephotonics in 2019 for disclosed consideration of KRW 173.450 billion, including the fair value of a pre-existing Samsung venture interest, and stated that the purpose was to secure optical technology and talent.2

SIRC and Corephotonics are located in Tel Aviv-Yafo, while SRIL operates in Herzliya. Samsung describes SIRC as part of its global component-solutions network and describes SRIL as evaluating Israeli companies and research and participating in investments through Samsung vehicles.9, 5, 13 Samsung’s Israeli market presence also includes official import and marketing activity through Sunny Communications and branded store listings.14, 15

The approved economic frame is Core R&D (I=7.2), supported by the owned research operations and technology/talent acquisition. The active operations provide no evidence of an exit or diminished scale, so M=7.0; their wholly owned, integrated group status supports direct-operator proximity P=9.0. The resulting Economic is 7.20. The frame does not treat Samsung Electronics as Israeli-founded or infer systemic national dependence from the acquisition.1, 2, 9, 5

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The evidence does not quantify the economic scale of Samsung’s Israeli operations. Samsung’s disclosures confirm the subsidiaries but do not disclose Israel-specific revenue, profit, tax paid, workforce, dividend flows, manufacturing volume, or profit repatriation.1 No public evidence identified of Samsung factories or manufacturing in Israel, Israeli sovereign-bond underwriting, Israel Bonds activity, Israeli state financing, or holdings in OHCHR-listed or Israeli defence companies.1, 25

No public evidence identified of Samsung sourcing Israeli agricultural goods, settlement-origin goods, or direct procurement from Israeli agricultural or food suppliers. No public evidence identified of Samsung supplying products or services to the IDF, Ministry of Defense, settlement municipalities, or Israeli critical infrastructure.25 Retail and authorised-distributor material does not establish a Samsung-branded settlement outlet or direct appointment of every reseller.15, 26

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

The documented political-risk nexus arises principally from Samsung’s longstanding, active corporate presence in Israel and its research/investment ecosystem engagement, rather than from verified lobbying, donations, state partnerships, or public advocacy. SRIL’s establishment in 1997 and its ongoing Israeli research, company-evaluation, and investment-related activity establish a long-term relationship with the Israeli technology ecosystem.5

The approved political frame is Business-as-Usual (I=3.5): Samsung publicly presents and maintains ordinary Israeli corporate operations, which is more specific than the minimum neutrality-floor treatment of silence alone. The sustained public commitment supports M=7.0, and the wholly owned operating entities support direct group proximity P=9.0, producing Political=3.50. This assessment does not infer a private political belief, state partnership, donation, or advocacy act.1, 9, 5

Samsung Business Israel markets the Knox enterprise-security platform in Israel. The cited material establishes commercial availability, but not a government, military, settlement, or occupied-territory customer.27 Newpro’s authorised-distributor directory lists a retailer named “Hashmal Gush Etzion,” but the directory does not provide its address, establish a particular settlement location, or show that Samsung Electronics directly appointed it.26

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified of a Samsung Electronics corporate statement, campaign, or public-position finding concerning the conflict in the supplied research record.22 No public evidence identified of Samsung lobbying, political advocacy, financing, corporate donations, free services, physical logistics, or employee-reservist subsidy programmes directed to the IDF, military-welfare bodies, or state-aligned relief groups after 7 October 2023.27, 22

No public evidence identified of Samsung-specific settlement labelling, origin categorisation, supply-chain enforcement, or confirmed operations in an occupied territory.7, 26 The absence of results in targeted searches does not establish that non-public distributor or procurement arrangements do not exist; it does mean they cannot be treated as established findings in this dossier.27

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Complicity Index Score

Method: V6.5.

DomainIMPV-Domain Score
Military1.502.502.000.15
Digital3.507.006.903.45
Economic7.207.009.007.20
Political3.507.009.003.50

Economic supplies the V_MAX because the record documents a durable, wholly owned Israeli corporate and R&D footprint, a completed acquisition, and consumer-market activity. The final Tier B result reflects the fixed, human-vetted V6.5 assessment across domains; it does not convert unverified Cellcom-device reporting, R&D capability, or corporate association into proof of direct military or security contracting.

The method evaluates the documented activity type, scale, and directness of the nexus, while retaining caveats, exclusions, and contrary evidence.

Methodology Note

Footnotes

  1. https://images.samsung.com/is/content/samsung/assets/global/ir/docs/2025_4Q_Interim_Report.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17

  2. https://images.samsung.com/is/content/samsung/p5/global/ir/docs/2019_Business_Report.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  3. https://images.samsung.com/is/content/samsung/assets/global/ir/docs/2025_con_quarter04_all.pdf ; https://image.samsungsds.com/en/investor/financial_info/report/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2026/03/25/Samsung%20SDS_FY25_Audit%20report_signed.pdf ; https://www.samsungsds.com/en/investor/faq/faq.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  4. https://www.sentinelone.com/customers/samsung-sds/ ; https://www.sentinelone.com/resources/casestudies/samsung-sds-strengthens-endpoint-security-with-sentinelone/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  5. https://research.samsung.com/sril ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14

  6. https://images.samsung.com/is/content/samsung/assets/global/ir/docs/2024_con_quarter04_all.pdf ; https://images.samsung.com/is/content/samsung/assets/global/ir/docs/2025_4Q_Interim_Report.pdf ; https://www.news1.co.il/Archive/001-D-490457-00.html ; https://www.whoprofits.org/companies/company/3752 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  7. https://semiconductor.samsung.com/about-us/locations/ ; https://research.samsung.com/sril ; https://newpro.co.il/authorized-distributors/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  8. https://www.samsung.com/sec/ir/reports-disclosures/public-disclosure/3753/ ; https://images.samsung.com/is/content/samsung/assets/global/ir/docs/2025_Half_Interim_Report.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  9. https://semiconductor.samsung.com/sirc/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12

  10. https://images.samsung.com/is/content/samsung/assets/global/ir/docs/2025_Half_Interim_Report.pdf ↩ ↩2

  11. https://www.samsung.com/global/ir/governance-csr/board-of-directors/ ↩ ↩2

  12. https://news.samsung.com/global/samsung-electronics-announces-new-leadership-4 ↩ ↩2

  13. https://semiconductor.samsung.com/about-us/locations/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  14. https://www.samsungmobile.co.il/about ; https://www.samsung.com/il/articles/mobile-devices/go-down-to-eliat-and-renew-at-samsung/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  15. https://www.samsung.com/il/samsung-experience-store/locations/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  16. https://www.news1.co.il/Archive/001-D-490457-00.html ; https://dontbuyintooccupation.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/2025-DBIO-V-report-1.pdf ; https://www.whoprofits.org/companies/company/3752?cellcom-israel ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  17. https://www.samsungsds.com/in/news/samsung-sds-invests-in-sentinelone-the-endpoint-detection-and-response-solution-company.html ; https://www.samsungsds.com/en/ai-endpoint-security/sentinelone.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  18. https://www.samsungsds.com/in/news/samsung-sds-invests-in-iguazio.html ; https://www.iguazio.com/news-events/pr/iguazio-raises-24m-to-accelerate-growth-and-global-penetration-of-its-data-science-platform/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  19. https://www.gov.il/en/pages/_bpress_20102022 ↩ ↩2

  20. https://www.samsungsds.com/us/news/ceo-241128.html ↩

  21. https://images.samsung.com/is/content/samsung/assets/global/ir/docs/2026_con_quarter01_all.pdf ↩

  22. https://www.samsung.com/global/ir/reports-disclosures/public-disclosure-view.84359/ ; https://images.samsung.com/is/content/samsung/assets/global/ir/docs/2024_4Q_Interim_Report.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  23. https://www.samsung.com/il/support/apps-services/what-are-the-opening-hours-of-the-samsung-store-in-israel/ ↩

  24. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g25/094/40/pdf/g2509440.pdf ; https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/60/19 ↩

  25. https://www.samsung.com/il/articles/mobile-devices/go-down-to-eliat-and-renew-at-samsung/ ; https://images.samsung.com/is/content/samsung/assets/global/ir/docs/2025_4Q_Interim_Report.pdf ↩ ↩2

  26. https://newpro.co.il/authorized-distributors/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  27. https://www.samsung.com/il/business/mobile-solutions/samsung-knox/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  28. https://images.samsung.com/is/content/samsung/assets/global/ir/docs/Samsung_Electronics_Sustainability_Report_2025_ENG.pdf ↩