BP MILITARY

Target: BP p.l.c. and attributable subsidiaries, joint ventures, and controlling principals Research cut-off: 26 October 2026 Geographic scope: Israel, Israeli defence and security forces, and occupied Palestinian territory Evidence period: Principally October 2023–October 2026, with historical references identified separately.

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

Israeli Ministry of Defence, IDF, and security-agency contracts

No public evidence identified of a BP-specific contract, framework agreement, tender award, or memorandum of understanding directly naming BP as a supplier to the Israeli Ministry of Defence, IDF, Israel Prison Service, or Israeli Border Police.

BP’s established commercial connection concerns the production and international transportation of crude oil that enters Israel’s refining and fuel-distribution system, including through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.¹

Data Desk’s 20 August 2024 investigation identifies BP as a 30.1% shareholder and the then-operator of BTC, which transports crude oil from Azerbaijan to the Turkish Mediterranean export terminal at Ceyhan.¹

The same investigation identifies SOCAR, Vitol, Petraco, Oilmar, and Glencore as charterers of relevant tanker shipments carrying Azeri BTC crude to Israel; the identification of these charterers does not establish that BP directly contracted with an Israeli military purchaser.¹

Oil Change International’s March 2024 investigation identifies BP among international oil and gas companies involved in the crude-oil supply chain serving Israel and describes the dependence of Israeli refineries on imported feedstocks, including for fuels ultimately used by military vehicles.²

Defence trade directories

No public evidence identified of BP being listed as an Israeli defence exporter, military systems contractor, or supplier of purpose-built military equipment in SIBAT or comparable Israeli defence trade directories.

Corporate and government announcements

On 30 October 2023, NewMed Energy announced that a consortium comprising SOCAR, BP, and NewMed had been selected for offshore natural-gas exploration rights in Israel’s Cluster I, with SOCAR designated as operator.³

Formal licences were issued on 17 March 2025, with Interfax reporting that the companies received six exploration licences from Israel’s Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure.⁴

NewMed identifies the consortium interests as SOCAR 33.34%, BP 33.33%, and NewMed 33.33%.⁵

The exploration arrangement concerns natural-gas resources in Israel’s offshore exclusive economic zone; the cited corporate disclosures do not identify it as an Israeli military or defence procurement programme.⁵

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Petroleum products and potential military applications

BP participates in petroleum extraction and transportation, and crude oil from the BP-associated BTC supply chain is delivered to Israeli refineries that produce fuel products for multiple categories of consumers.^{1, 2}

Oil Change International’s March 2024 analysis distinguishes military-specific JP-8 aviation fuel imported from the United States from crude-oil imports processed by Israeli refineries into diesel, gasoline, and other petroleum products.²

The United States Defense Security Cooperation Agency issued a proposed foreign military sale notification to Israel in April 2013 covering JP-8 aviation fuel, diesel, and unleaded gasoline, subsequently published in the Federal Register on 6 May 2013.⁶

The existence of this military fuel procurement notification does not establish that BP manufactured, refined, sold, or delivered the specified military fuel under the proposed sale.^{6, 2}

Military-specific products

No public evidence identified of BP producing a purpose-built Israeli military fuel formulation under a publicly documented BP–IDF contract, or marketing tactical, ruggedised, or military-specified equipment to Israeli state security forces.

Civilian-to-military distinction

Data Desk’s August 2024 attribution analysis identifies BP through its position in upstream oil production and BTC infrastructure, while identifying separate tanker charterers and downstream refinery relationships.¹

This establishes an upstream and transport connection to Israeli fuel supply; the available shipment analysis does not demonstrate exclusive BP control of the destination, processing, or military allocation of each delivered cargo.¹

Export licensing and end-user certification

No public evidence identified of a BP-specific export licence, military end-user certificate, or regulatory approval expressly authorising a petroleum shipment by BP to the IDF or another Israeli security force.

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

Equipment within occupied territories

No public evidence identified of BP-branded heavy machinery, demolition equipment, engineering vehicles, or construction systems being used to construct Israeli settlements, military barriers, checkpoints, detention facilities, or military installations in occupied territory.

Fuel infrastructure and occupied-territory distribution

Data Desk’s research documents the movement of crude oil through BTC to Israel, but its published attribution does not independently establish that BP directly supplied a particular settlement petrol station, military base, or occupied-territory construction project.¹

Oil Change International’s research connects imported petroleum to Israel’s national refining infrastructure and subsequent fuel distribution, while distinguishing the international crude supply chain from downstream end users.²

Direct versus indirect supply

The established BP-specific infrastructure relationship is a historical operatorship and equity position in BTC, rather than ownership of identified settlement construction assets.¹

Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Energy independently describes BTC as one of Azerbaijan’s principal international oil-export routes.⁷

Construction and engineering contracts

No public evidence identified of BP receiving a contract to construct, maintain, or expand a checkpoint, separation barrier, Israeli settlement, detention facility, or military base in the occupied Palestinian territory.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

Israeli defence manufacturers

No public evidence identified of a direct BP supply agreement for weapons components, materials, propulsion subassemblies, specialist manufacturing, or defence engineering services with Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, or Israel Military Industries.

Named Israeli commercial partners

NewMed Energy identifies BP and SOCAR as partners in the Israeli Zone I offshore exploration venture, with the participating interests divided approximately equally among the three companies.⁵

NewMed separately identifies its established Leviathan project as involving NewMed, Chevron, and Ratio; this separate project description does not establish BP as an owner or operator of Leviathan.⁸

Joint development and technology transfer

No public evidence identified of BP participating in a joint weapons-development programme, licensed military manufacturing arrangement, defence technology transfer, or strategic-platform co-production agreement with an Israeli defence manufacturer.

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

International crude-oil transportation

The most substantial documented BP-related logistical connection is the BTC oil pipeline, which historically transported Azerbaijani crude to Ceyhan for international shipment, including shipments subsequently delivered to Israel.^{1, 7}

Data Desk’s August 2024 investigation identifies BP as holding a 30.1% BTC equity interest and distinguishes the pipeline operator from individual tanker charterers.¹

In September 2026, Caspian Energy reported a BTC Co announcement that operatorship transferred from BP Exploration (Caspian Sea) Limited to SOCAR Midstream Operations LLC effective 1 July 2026.⁹

The reported transfer covers the Azerbaijani, Georgian, and Turkish pipeline sections, subject to stated exceptions concerning facilities at the Sangachal Terminal.⁹

Accordingly, BP’s historical operatorship should not be presented as continuing after the July 2026 transfer; its documented equity participation and the transfer of operational responsibility are separate matters.^{1, 9}

Military fuel sustainment

Oil Change International’s March 2024 investigation states that Israeli refineries process imported crude into products used by civilian consumers and military vehicles.²

The investigation identifies the BTC supply chain as one source of crude oil entering Israel, while identifying military-specific JP-8 aviation fuel as a distinct import category.²

Oil Change International’s November 2025 update reports tracking more than 21 million tonnes of crude oil and refined petroleum products delivered to Israel between November 2023 and October 2025.¹⁰

That figure covers the aggregate imports analysed by the investigators and cannot be attributed exclusively to BP.¹⁰

Direct base supply contracts

No public evidence identified of a contract directly between BP and an Israeli military installation for aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, catering, transport, maintenance, waste management, or facilities services.

Geographic specificity

The documented BTC route runs through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye to the Mediterranean export terminal at Ceyhan, from which relevant crude cargoes were shipped to Israeli destinations.^{1, 7}

The publicly examined BP-specific shipment evidence does not independently establish deliveries by BP to an identified IDF base in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Golan Heights, or Negev.¹

Shipping, freight, and port services

Data Desk identifies SOCAR, Vitol, Petraco, Oilmar, and Glencore as tanker charterers for relevant shipments of BTC crude to Israel during its investigation period.¹

The charterer information does not demonstrate that BP itself chartered the relevant vessels or contracted to transport military cargo for the Israeli Ministry of Defence.¹

No public evidence identified of a BP-specific agreement for military cargo handling, arms transportation, or dedicated defence freight forwarding to Israel.

Primary corporate records confirm that, as of 26 October 2026, SOCAR Midstream Operations LLC (SMO), a wholly owned subsidiary of Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR, held operatorship of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, effective 1 July 2026. BTC Co’s official announcement confirms that operatorship transferred from BP Exploration (Caspian Sea) Limited to SMO across the Azerbaijani, Georgian and Turkish pipeline sections, including management of BTC activities and common operational responsibilities shared with the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP). BP retained operatorship of the Sangachal Terminal, and BTC Co’s shareholder structure remained unchanged. This primary evidence confirms Military’s existing statement under “International crude-oil transportation” that BP’s operatorship ended on 1 July 2026. It also establishes that Political’s identification of BP as the current BTC operator requires correction for any period from that date onward; BP’s historical operatorship and continuing equity participation remain valid, but current pipeline operatorship belongs to SMO.¹¹

SMO’s own operational disclosure independently confirms that it assumed the roles of BTC Manager and BTC/SCP Common Operator on 1 July 2026. It clarifies the contractual and operational arrangements: BTC Co owns the pipeline system and delegates its operation and specified management functions to SMO under a Management Services Agreement. SMO directly operates BTC facilities in Azerbaijan and Georgia, excluding the Sangachal Terminal, while BOTAŞ International Limited (BIL) operates the Turkish section, including the Ceyhan Terminal, on SMO’s behalf and subject to SMO’s oversight and assurance. Accordingly, identifying SMO as the overall BTC operator is consistent with BIL’s continuing physical operation of the Turkish section. This distinction supplements Military’s existing transfer account and confirms that the change concerned operational responsibility rather than a transfer of BP’s ownership interest.^{11, 12}

Excluded frame v_mil:688a619b7e04 - BP’s own upstream production contribution. The evidence establishes an attributable physical production contribution to Israel’s military-inclusive refining system at the supply-chain level. The attributable actor is BP Exploration (Caspian Sea) Limited, operator of Azerbaijan’s Azeri–Chirag–Deepwater Gunashli (ACG) oilfield development on behalf of its production-sharing partners, with BP holding a 30.37% participating interest. The production act is extraction of crude petroleum at ACG. Data Desk identifies ACG production as a principal source of Azeri BTC crude transported through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline to Ceyhan, Türkiye, from which documented tanker shipments discharged in Israel between 27 October 2023 and 15 July 2024. The relevant downstream system comprises Israel’s crude-import infrastructure and its Haifa and Ashdod refineries. Accordingly, the evidence establishes BP’s operational involvement in producing crude of a grade physically delivered into Israel’s refining supply chain. It does not establish that BP owned, sold, chartered or controlled each Israeli-bound cargo, nor does it permit allocation of a precise proportion of any delivered cargo to BP’s equity interest.^{1, 13, 14}

Military beneficiary and documented downstream physical result. The relevant military beneficiary is the Israel Defense Forces, including military vehicle operators and the Israeli Air Force. Data Desk’s March 2024 infrastructure investigation identifies the Haifa and Ashdod refineries as processors of imported crude and documents military distribution channels: Israeli military personnel could refuel vehicles through contracted Delek and Sonol filling stations supplied by the Haifa refinery, while Paz Aviation Services held a Ministry of Defence agreement covering aircraft refuelling at seven Israeli airbases. Oil Change International and SOMO’s September 2026 investigation independently identifies the EAPC pipeline connections between crude-import terminals and both refineries, Bazan’s stated supply of fuel to the military, and Ashdod’s aviation-fuel production and associated military distribution arrangements. These findings establish actual military consumption channels downstream of the refining system supplied by imported crude. They support a system-level physical sustainment contribution from BP-operated upstream production, but do not demonstrate that molecules originating at ACG were incorporated into a particular military vehicle’s fuel or delivered to a named base. The precise BP-origin volume ultimately consumed by military users remains unestablished.^{13, 15}

Attribution boundary. The documented relationship is stronger than infrastructure ownership alone because BP operated a producing oilfield that supplied the crude grade independently identified in Israeli deliveries. It is nevertheless a contribution through a pooled commercial supply chain involving other ACG shareholders, additional BTC feedstocks, independently chartered tankers and downstream refiners. Data Desk identifies SOCAR, Vitol, Petraco, Oilmar and Glencore as charterers of relevant Azeri BTC shipments, without assigning those voyages to BP as charterer. The September 2026 OCI/SOMO investigation further distinguishes physical crude producers from traders and charterers and acknowledges significant gaps in charterer identification. The defensible finding is therefore an established BP-attributable upstream production contribution to a military-inclusive fuel system, with direct military allocation, BP-specific downstream quantities and contractual military supply remaining unestablished.^{1, 15}

Activity period and production continuity, 2023–2026. BP’s production attribution is independently supported across the relevant period. BP-operated ACG produced approximately 133 million barrels during calendar 2023 and 125 million barrels during 2024, averaging approximately 342,000 barrels daily in 2024. The production operation continued into 2025, when first-half output was approximately 59 million barrels, and into the first half of 2026, when ACG produced another approximately 59 million barrels at an average of 323,000 barrels daily. At 30 June 2026, 150 ACG oil-production wells remained active. This demonstrates physical production continuity after the October 2023 commencement of the investigated Israeli shipment period. Those figures describe total consortium production, not BP’s separately lifted entitlement or the amount delivered to Israel.^{14, 16}

Subsequent continuity and the October 2026 cutoff. Further evidence extends the documented production period beyond June 2026. On 20 October 2026, Anews reported BP Azerbaijan’s disclosure that ACG’s East Azeri platform maintained approximately 46,000 barrels per day of production through the third quarter of 2026, with 27 producing wells operational. Separately, Türkiye’s BOTAŞ data, reported on 21 October 2026, records 143.971 million barrels transported through BTC during January–September 2026, including 16.078 million barrels during September. The pipeline continued carrying predominantly ACG crude alongside Shah Deniz condensate and other Caspian feedstocks. These findings establish continued BP-operated oil production and continuing use of the associated export route close to the research cutoff. They do not independently establish that a particular September or October 2026 Israeli-bound cargo contained BP-operated ACG production.^{17, 18}

Verified cessation and residual contribution. No cessation of BP’s ACG crude-production operatorship is established by the reviewed evidence. The verified transfer effective 1 July 2026 concerned BTC pipeline operatorship, while August and October 2026 reporting continued to identify BP as ACG production operator. The two activities therefore require separate treatment: cessation of BP’s BTC operational responsibility does not demonstrate cessation of BP-operated crude production or extinguish its historically established contribution to Israeli refinery feedstocks. The September 2026 OCI/SOMO investigation tracked more than 250 crude shipments delivered to Israel from origins departing between 13 October 2023 and 30 June 2026, independently establishing subsequent petroleum-import continuity. It does not identify the BP-operated ACG proportion of those later shipments. As at 26 October 2026, BP’s continued physical upstream production is documented, but the residual BP-origin volume present in Israeli refinery inventories, finished military fuels or military storage is not publicly quantified.^{15, 16, 17, 18}

July–October 2026 - no public evidence identified: Searches of BP-operated ACG production reporting, BTC transportation statistics, Data Desk shipment attribution and the September 2026 OCI/SOMO investigation did not identify a verified cessation of ACG production by BP, a BP-specific termination of the Israeli-bound upstream supply relationship, a post-June 2026 cargo-level allocation connecting newly produced BP-operated ACG crude to an identified Israeli refinery, or a measured residual volume of BP-origin petroleum in military fuel stocks at the 26 October 2026 cutoff. This evidentiary gap limits the precision of the current downstream attribution; it does not disconfirm the documented historical production and physical supply-chain contribution.^{1, 15, 17, 18}

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

Lethal systems manufacturing

No public evidence identified of BP manufacturing, assembling, licensing, maintaining, or supplying firearms, artillery, missiles, military drones, armoured vehicles, or naval weapons for Israeli forces.

Munitions and precursor materials

No public evidence identified of BP supplying explosive ordnance, warhead components, military propellants, or documented munitions precursor materials directly to Israeli weapons manufacturers or defence end users.

Military aviation and vehicle fuel

A Defense Security Cooperation Agency notification published in the Federal Register on 6 May 2013 identifies a proposed US foreign military sale covering JP-8 aviation fuel, diesel, and unleaded gasoline for Israel.⁶

Oil Change International separately identifies the US-to-Israel JP-8 supply route and Israel’s dependence on imported crude for refinery-produced fuels consumed by military and civilian vehicles.²

The notification does not establish BP as the named supplier of JP-8 under a US Foreign Military Sales contract or a direct Israeli Air Force procurement arrangement.^{2, 6}

Strategic military platforms

No public evidence identified of BP supplying a specifically calibrated subsystem, guidance component, fire-control system, radar unit, weapons-integration system, or dedicated propulsion assembly for Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, Israeli combat aircraft, or Israeli armoured platforms.

Military-specific software and artificial intelligence

No public evidence identified of BP developing or supplying Israeli military targeting software, fire-control AI, autonomous weapons software, precision-guidance applications, or other systems designed primarily to produce kinetic military effects.

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

Israeli offshore exploration licensing

NewMed’s corporate disclosure identifies the BP/SOCAR/NewMed consortium as the successful participant in the 2023 bidding process for Israeli offshore exploration Zone I.⁵

Interfax confirms that the consortium received exploration licences on 17 March 2025.⁴

The licences concern commercial natural-gas exploration and are not identified in the cited records as military export licences.^{4, 5}

The consortium signed a Joint Operating Agreement on 22 December 2025, establishing the parties’ rights and obligations for the exploration project.¹⁹

Interfax subsequently reported an anticipated exploration programme budget of approximately $27.85 million, with each consortium participant expected to contribute approximately $9.19 million.²⁰

On 2 June 2026, BP executive vice-president Gordon Birrell stated that the consortium had not yet begun offshore operations and attributed the delay to regional geopolitical conditions.¹⁹

Subsequent reporting outlined plans for seismic surveying during autumn 2026; the cited planning announcements do not establish that drilling or survey operations had commenced by the research cut-off.²¹

Military export licences

No public evidence identified of a government granting, refusing, suspending, or revoking a BP-specific licence for the export of arms, military equipment, or military-controlled petroleum products to Israeli defence end users.

Legal proceedings concerning fuel supplied to Israel

On 23 December 2024, The Guardian reported that Palestinian claimants had initiated legal action against BP concerning its role in operating the BTC pipeline and the resulting supply of crude oil to Israel.²²

The reported pre-action correspondence alleged that BP’s continued involvement in the crude-oil supply chain contributed to violations of international human-rights and humanitarian-law obligations.²²

The Business & Human Rights Resource Centre independently documented the allegations and reported that BP had not responded to requests for comment associated with the reporting.²³

The material establishes a pre-action legal claim and publicly reported allegations, rather than a judicial finding of liability.^{22, 23}

No public evidence identified of a final judgment determining BP’s liability in this Israel-related matter.

Arms embargoes and sanctions

No public evidence identified of an Israel-related arms-export enforcement penalty, embargo-violation finding, or sanctions prosecution against BP arising from a verified direct defence supply contract.

Constructive-notice chronology

The claimants’ reported legal correspondence was issued in December 2024, after the International Court of Justice’s July 2024 advisory opinion and the International Criminal Court’s November 2024 arrest warrants.²²

Oil Change International’s November 2025 investigation continued to document petroleum shipments into Israel during the period following those legal developments, although its aggregate shipment figures do not establish BP’s ownership of every individual cargo.¹⁰

The BP/SOCAR/NewMed exploration licences were formally issued in March 2025 and the consortium executed its Joint Operating Agreement in December 2025.^{4, 19}

BP’s executive stated in June 2026 that no project activity had yet commenced, despite the continuing contractual exploration arrangement.¹⁹

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

Oil Change International and Data Desk

Oil Change International published its March 2024 investigation into countries and companies involved in supplying Israel with crude oil and refined petroleum products, drawing on research commissioned from Data Desk.²⁴

The accompanying analysis identified BP’s BTC operatorship and upstream production interests as mechanisms linking the company to crude-oil shipments subsequently delivered to Israel.²

Data Desk’s August 2024 research provided further shipment attribution, including pipeline ownership and named tanker charterers.¹

Oil Change International published an updated investigation on 13 November 2025, covering fuel shipments through October 2025 and documenting continued Israeli dependence on imported petroleum.¹⁰

Organised campaigns

Energy Embargo for Palestine documents an international campaign targeting the BTC supply chain, focusing on the movement of Azerbaijani crude through Türkiye and onward to Israel.²⁵

The campaign links its demands to the continued transportation of oil used in Israel’s national fuel supply, including fuel associated with military operations.²⁵

On 17 April 2025, The Canary reported that Fossil Free London, Energy Embargo for Palestine, and the Free West Papua Campaign organised protests outside BP’s London headquarters in connection with the company’s annual general meeting.²⁶

The reported campaign called for BP to stop its participation in fuel supply chains associated with Israel’s military operations.²⁶

Corporate response

The Business & Human Rights Resource Centre reported that BP did not respond to requests for comment concerning the December 2024 allegations.²³

No public evidence identified of a verified BP undertaking to terminate all Israeli-bound BTC crude shipments, publish shipment-specific military end-user records, or establish a dedicated monitoring programme for Israeli military fuel use.

Corporate governance and controlling principals

BP’s corporate announcement of 17 December 2025 identified Carol Howle as an executive responsible for supply, trading, and shipping and as a non-executive board member of the British Royal Navy.²⁷

The announcement additionally identified her as chair of the Navy Audit and Risk Assurance Committee.²⁷

This establishes a defence-sector governance relationship with the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy; it does not establish a corresponding role with Israeli defence institutions.²⁷

The same announcement appointed Meg O’Neill as BP’s next CEO, effective 1 April 2026.²⁷

On 26 May 2026, BP announced the immediate removal of Albert Manifold as chair and director and the appointment of Ian Tyler as interim chair.²⁸

No public evidence identified of an attributable BP controlling principal making a verified donation to the Friends of the Israel Defense Forces or an Israeli reservist fund, holding a documented governing position within an Israeli defence prime, or directing an identified personal investment vehicle to supply the Israeli military.

Settlement-specific scrutiny

The research identifies BP’s participation in internationally traded crude-oil supply chains serving Israel, while the available BP-specific material does not identify a direct BP supply agreement with an individual settlement operator or settlement-based military installation.^{1, 2}

No public evidence identified of a BP-specific OHCHR settlement-database designation established through an independently retrieved official database entry.