BP POLITICAL

Target: BP p.l.c. Research cutoff: 26 October 2026 Domain: Political, communicative and structural footprint concerning Israel-Palestine

Corporate Communications & Public Stance

Official corporate communications

NewMed Energy’s financial disclosures confirm that BP Exploration Operating Company Limited, SOCAR and NewMed Energy received six Zone I offshore exploration licences from Israel’s Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure on 17 March 2025.¹

NewMed Energy separately identifies BP as holding 33.33% of the consortium, alongside SOCAR and NewMed Energy.²

No public evidence identified from an independently accessible primary document establishing the exact regulatory and fiscal recommendations contained in the consortium’s correspondence of 12 June 2025.

No public evidence identified of a BP corporate statement expressly endorsing Israeli military operations in Gaza or calling for the removal of Palestinians from their territory.

No public evidence identified of a BP corporate commitment to terminate its Israeli offshore exploration participation because of the Israel-Palestine conflict.

Comparative public posture

On 27 February 2022, BP announced that it would exit its 19.75% holding in Rosneft following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; its chief executive Bernard Looney and former chief executive Bob Dudley resigned from the Rosneft board with immediate effect.³

In a contemporaneous staff message, Looney described Russia’s invasion as an act of aggression and explained the company’s decision to withdraw from its Rosneft interests.⁴

BP’s Rosneft announcement was published as an issuer communication and independently reproduced through regulatory-news distribution channels.⁵

By March 2025, BP was publicly associated with an Israeli offshore exploration consortium whose participation and licensing rights were confirmed in NewMed Energy’s financial disclosures.¹

On 2 June 2026, BP Executive Vice President Gordon Birrell acknowledged the company’s continuing Zone I exploration licences and stated that the consortium had not yet begun work because of the geopolitical situation in the Middle East.⁶

No public evidence identified of an equivalent BP withdrawal announcement concerning Israeli energy assets during the period examined.

Market framing

On 14 March 2025, industry publication MEES described BP’s anticipated entry into Israeli offshore exploration through Zone I with SOCAR and NewMed Energy, reporting planned interests of approximately one-third for each consortium participant.⁷

NewMed Energy describes itself as an Israeli natural-gas partnership and presents its regional operations in terms of energy supply, commercial development and cooperation with neighbouring countries.⁸

NewMed’s corporate description of Zone I presents the venture as an offshore exploration programme involving international partners and commercial evaluation of prospective gas resources.²

In March 2026, Interfax reported a planned seismic exploration programme with a 2025–2026 budget of approximately $27.85 million, attributing the information to NewMed’s corporate disclosures.⁹

No public evidence identified from an independently accessible replacement primary source establishing the precise economic-return, regulatory-predictability and market-access arguments made in the consortium’s June 2025 correspondence.

The excluded frame v_pol:a802c0fc4b55 is established for BP-attributable corporate presentation of Israel as an ordinary commercial market, subject to the distinction between corporate-controlled communication and independent distributor marketing. The publishing actor is Castrol, operating through its official global website, www.castrol.com. Its controlled channel is the publicly accessible “Authorised Castrol Distributors” directory, which includes a dedicated Israel entry identifying Feldman Ron-Paz at 15 Yosef Levi Street, Israel, with Israeli telephone and email contact details. The directory presents Israel within a standard international commercial distribution framework alongside other national markets. Its accompanying text encourages customers to purchase through authorised distributors to obtain genuine products, technical information and after-sales support. The downstream communicative result is that visitors receive a corporate endorsement of an established, accessible Israeli distribution channel. This establishes ordinary commercial-market presentation and distributor recognition; it does not independently establish endorsement of Israeli government policies, military conduct or settlement activity. Status: ESTABLISHED - corporate-controlled market presentation, with political endorsement unestablished.¹⁰

BP attribution is supported by Castrol’s own corporate ownership disclosure. Castrol announced that BP had agreed to sell a 65% shareholding to Stonepeak, while stating that completion remained subject to approvals and was expected by the end of 2026. The announcement confirms BP’s ownership relationship with the Castrol business and establishes that the transaction was prospective rather than already completed at announcement. Read together with Castrol’s official distributor directory, the evidence supports attribution of the corporate communication to the BP-owned Castrol business during the period preceding the announced ownership transition. It does not establish that BP p.l.c. executives personally drafted, approved or selected the Israel directory entry.^{10, 11}

Castrol’s separate official “Where to buy” page provides additional evidence of ordinary Israeli-market presentation. Its regional navigation includes “Israel” among the Middle East’s country-specific purchasing destinations, alongside Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar. This is an independent corporate-controlled presentation within Castrol’s own website architecture, reinforcing that Israel is treated as an ordinary commercial destination in the company’s international product-distribution communications.¹²

The distributor’s independent marketing must be attributed separately. The website castrol.co.il describes Feldman Ron-Paz as Castrol’s national distributor in Israel and advertises nationwide distribution, local sales outlets, direct marketing and lubricant supplies for automotive, agricultural and industrial applications. Its published website terms explicitly identify Feldman-Ron Paz Ltd. as the company managing and operating that website. Accordingly, the distributor’s statements concerning its national service coverage, product availability and marketing arrangements are attributable directly to Feldman-Ron Paz. Castrol’s own directory independently recognises the distributor’s authorised status, but that recognition does not establish BP’s editorial control over the distributor’s separate website.^{10, 13, 14}

26 October 2026 cutoff - no public evidence identified establishing the precise original publication date, uninterrupted historical duration or verified withdrawal of the specific Israel listing from Castrol’s official distributor directory. Searches for earlier dated Castrol/Feldman Ron-Paz distributor listings, historical directory references, archived versions and withdrawal announcements did not produce an independently accessible, dated record establishing when the entry first appeared or whether it was continuously available throughout the intervening period. The official distributor directory and global purchasing navigation were accessible during the live examination on 28 October 2026, two days after the research cutoff. Those observations establish public availability on the examination date but cannot, without a dated historical capture, conclusively establish the exact directory contents on 26 October 2026. No verified withdrawal of the corporate-controlled Israeli-market presentation was identified.^{10, 12}

The ownership chronology provides a separate dated attribution boundary. Castrol’s announcement of the proposed sale of 65% of its business to Stonepeak described completion as expected by the end of 2026, subject to necessary approvals. Consequently, the announcement itself provides no evidence that BP had relinquished majority ownership before the 26 October 2026 research cutoff. The reviewed materials do not independently establish the eventual transaction completion date or any corresponding withdrawal, amendment or removal of the Israel distributor listing. Ownership changes and website-publication changes therefore remain separate evidentiary questions.¹¹

The distributor’s independent website remained publicly accessible during the 28 October 2026 examination. Its English-language page continued to present Feldman Ron-Paz as Castrol’s national distributor and described nationwide commercial service. The website’s published terms separately identified Feldman-Ron Paz Ltd. as its operator. These observations corroborate continued independent distributor marketing at the examination date. They do not establish the date on which that marketing began, its uninterrupted duration, or continued publication of any particular statement by BP itself. No verified withdrawal notice for the distributor’s marketing was identified in the pages examined.^{13, 14}

28 October 2026 - no public evidence identified: searches for BP-authored statements, press interviews, investor communications or regulatory disclosures expressly discussing the 12 June 2025 submission to Israel’s Natural Gas Policy Review Committee, BP’s individual contribution to its preparation, or BP’s position on the committee’s resulting recommendations. The accessible policy-hearing record and NewMed’s subsequent final-report notification do not contain a BP-authored explanation of the correspondence. This finding is confined to public commentary about the policy-review submission and its consequences; it does not negate BP’s separately documented statements about its Israeli exploration licences and operational timetable.^{15, 16, 16}

Operations in Occupied or Contested Territories

Israeli offshore exploration licences

In October 2023, Israel announced offshore exploration awards involving two groups of energy companies; one included BP, SOCAR and NewMed Energy, while another included Eni, Dana Petroleum and Ratio Energies.¹⁷

NewMed independently reported that the consortium had been awarded six exploration licences in Cluster I under Israel’s fourth offshore licensing process.¹⁸

On 17 March 2025, the BP-SOCAR-NewMed consortium received six exploration licences in offshore Zone I, as confirmed by NewMed Energy’s subsequent financial disclosures.¹

SOCAR was identified as the designated operator of the BP-SOCAR-NewMed exploration consortium in NewMed Energy’s corporate disclosures.²

The disclosed participating interests are SOCAR 33.34%, BP 33.33%, and NewMed Energy 33.33%.²

The March 2025 disclosure establishes exploration rights but does not itself establish commencement of commercial gas production or completed drilling.¹

Operational developments during 2025–2026

On 22 December 2025, SOCAR, BP and NewMed Energy signed a joint operating agreement governing rights and obligations for exploration on the licensed blocks, according to Interfax’s March 2026 report.⁹

In March 2026, Interfax reported that the partners planned seismic work during 2026, with estimated programme expenditure of approximately $27.85 million.⁹

On 2 June 2026, BP Executive Vice President Gordon Birrell stated that no activities had commenced within the Zone I exploration project.⁶

Birrell attributed the delay to the geopolitical situation in the Middle East.⁶

On 19 June 2026, Interfax reported industry expectations that three-dimensional seismic surveys would begin in September 2026.¹⁹

The June 2026 reporting described the September timetable as a prospective programme and did not establish that the survey had already commenced.¹⁹

No public evidence identified independently verifying completion of a Zone I seismic survey or exploratory well by 26 October 2026.

Associated companies and producing assets

NewMed Energy identifies itself as part of Delek Group and as a major participant in the Israeli natural-gas industry.⁸

NewMed reports ownership of 45.34% of the Leviathan field, alongside Chevron at 39.66% and Ratio Energies at 15%.²⁰

NewMed identifies Leviathan as a producing Israeli offshore field supplying Israel and neighbouring regional markets.²⁰

NewMed’s account of Leviathan expansion describes additional production infrastructure and planned growth in output capacity.²¹

The disclosed ownership of Leviathan does not list BP as a project participant; BP’s documented relationship with NewMed concerns the separate Zone I exploration consortium.^{20, 2}

No public evidence identified of BP acquiring a direct ownership interest in Leviathan.

Maritime jurisdiction and legal challenges

On 8 February 2024, Palestinian human-rights organisations including Adalah, Al-Haq, Al Mezan and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights challenged Israeli offshore exploration licensing in maritime areas they regarded as Palestinian territory.²²

The organisations argued that the licensing process implicated Palestinian maritime rights and called for affected companies to refrain from exploration activities in the disputed areas.²²

Adalah reported that Israel’s Ministry of Energy responded on 22 May 2024 by maintaining that the relevant tender had been conducted in accordance with Israeli and international law.²³

The documented 2024 dispute initially identified companies including Eni, Dana Petroleum and Ratio Petroleum; those records do not independently establish that BP’s later Zone I licence area overlaps the challenged maritime blocks.^{22, 23}

A January 2024 academic study of Gaza Marine examined competing positions on the field’s legal status and reported Israel’s June 2023 approval for its development; the study did not identify BP as the field’s operator.²⁴

No public evidence identified establishing BP ownership or operation of Gaza Marine.

No public evidence identified from independently verified geographical coordinates establishing the precise overlap, if any, between BP’s Zone I licences and Palestinian maritime claims.

Oil supply and distribution networks

AFSC Investigate reports that BP-produced oil accounted for an estimated 8% of Israeli crude-oil imports between October 2023 and July 2024, attributing the estimate to Oil Change International.²⁵

AFSC identifies BP as the operator and a substantial minority owner of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which transports Azerbaijani crude oil to the Mediterranean export terminal at Ceyhan.²⁵

The Business & Human Rights Resource Centre separately published BP-specific questions concerning oil supplies to Israel and the company’s human-rights due diligence, reporting on 10 September 2024 that BP had not responded.²⁶

On 10 November 2024, Turkey’s Ministry of Energy rejected allegations concerning Israeli-destined oil loading at Ceyhan and stated that the pipeline operator BOTAŞ International did not control the commercial purchase and sale of transported oil.²⁷

The Turkish ministry’s statement and the NGO estimates concern different evidentiary questions: transport arrangements, commercial cargo disposition, production attribution and historical import volumes.^{25, 27}

No public evidence identified establishing that BP directly operated petrol stations in Israeli settlements.

No public evidence identified establishing a BP-specific contract to supply fuel directly to the Israel Defense Forces.

No public evidence identified establishing BP’s direct contractual control of every crude-oil cargo transported through BTC.

Organised boycott and divestment campaigns

On 24 March 2024, protesters associated with Energy Embargo for Palestine demonstrated outside the British Museum, calling for an end to its BP sponsorship and connecting BP’s offshore Israeli exploration involvement to the conflict in Gaza.²⁸

The demonstration resulted in the British Museum temporarily closing its principal entrances, according to contemporaneous reporting.²⁸

The protests continued into October 2025, when a demonstrator interrupted a British Museum fundraising gala and called for the institution to end its BP sponsorship.²⁹

ICOM UK’s subsequent coverage documented the October 2025 protest and the museum’s response supporting peaceful expression subject to protection of its collections and visitors.³⁰

No public evidence identified of BP publicly terminating its Israeli exploration consortium membership in response to these protests.

As of 26 October 2026, SOCAR Midstream Operations LLC (SMO), a wholly owned subsidiary of Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR, held management and operatorship responsibility for the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. BTC Co formally announced that operatorship transferred from BP Exploration (Caspian Sea) Limited to SMO effective 1 July 2026, covering the pipeline’s Azerbaijani, Georgian and Turkish sections and associated common operational activities involving BTC and the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP). BP independently confirmed the completed transfer in its 4 August 2026 half-year results announcement. This confirms Military’s stated termination date of BP’s BTC operatorship and corrects the existing Political statement under “Oil supply and distribution networks” that identifies BP as BTC’s operator without distinguishing historical from current operatorship. BP’s designation as operator remains historically accurate for periods preceding 1 July 2026.^{31, 32}

SOCAR’s operational disclosures clarify that SMO manages the BTC system under a Management Services Agreement with BTC Co and directly operates BTC facilities in Azerbaijan and Georgia, excluding the Sangachal Terminal. In Türkiye, BOTAŞ International Limited (BIL) operates BTC facilities, including the Ceyhan Terminal, on SMO’s behalf, subject to SMO’s oversight and assurance. BP retains operatorship of the Sangachal Terminal. BTC Co also confirmed that its shareholding structure remained unchanged following the operatorship transfer, meaning BP’s relinquishment of operational management did not constitute withdrawal from its equity participation in BTC. These distinctions qualify the existing audit’s attribution of BTC infrastructure involvement to BP while preserving its historically documented role and continuing shareholder relationship.^{31, 33}

Internal Governance, Content & Retail Policies

Employee relations and political expression

No public evidence identified of BP disciplining, dismissing or otherwise sanctioning employees specifically for expressing support for Palestinian rights.

No public evidence identified of litigation by BP against trade unions concerning Palestine-related political speech.

No public evidence identified of a BP policy requiring Israeli employees to support particular political organisations or military activities.

No public evidence identified of BP suppressing a shareholder resolution specifically concerning Israel-Palestine human-rights due diligence.

Platform and editorial policies

No public evidence identified of a BP-operated digital platform suppressing Palestine-related posts, Palestinian media or political content.

No public evidence identified of an algorithmic moderation investigation involving BP and Israel-Palestine content.

No public evidence identified of BP applying a content-moderation policy that distinguished between Israeli and Palestinian political speech.

Retail and supply-chain policies

AFSC’s investigation identifies BP’s upstream production and BTC infrastructure interests as relevant to oil imported into Israel.²⁵

The Turkish Ministry of Energy’s November 2024 statement addresses responsibility for marketing and cargo destination decisions associated with the BTC export system.²⁷

No public evidence identified of BP-specific settlement-product labelling policies or regulatory penalties for incorrect territorial-origin labelling.

No public evidence identified of BP knowingly purchasing products from identified settlement manufacturers for resale through its own retail network.

No public evidence identified of BP operating a retail supply-chain programme specifically supporting Israeli settlements.

Military leave and charitable matching

No public evidence identified of a BP programme specifically paying Israeli military reservists during active service.

No public evidence identified of BP employee-donation matching for FIDF, JNF, settlement organisations or other Israeli military-welfare entities.

No public evidence identified of BP disciplining staff for declining to participate in Israel-related fundraising or advocacy.

Brand Heritage & State Partnerships

Brand heritage

NewMed Energy’s published history traces its activities to Delek Drilling and identifies its development as part of Israel’s natural-gas industry.⁸

BP’s documented participation in the Israeli exploration consortium is presented through commercial exploration licensing and investment disclosures.^{1, 2}

No public evidence identified that BP uses Israeli military heritage or Israeli intelligence-service origins in its global consumer branding.

Institutional relationships

BP’s exploration consortium participated in a formal Israeli government licensing programme and received six offshore exploration licences on 17 March 2025.¹

The 2025 licences remained relevant to BP’s commercial activities in June 2026, when senior executive Gordon Birrell publicly acknowledged the consortium’s rights and explained the delay in commencing exploration.⁶

In December 2023, the British Museum entered a ten-year sponsorship arrangement with BP worth up to £50 million, intended to support the museum’s redevelopment.²⁸

A separate protest occurred outside the British Museum in May 2025 during an event celebrating Israeli independence; the museum described that gathering as a commercially hosted event.³⁴

No public evidence identified that BP organised or financed the May 2025 Israeli Independence Day event.

No public evidence identified of BP sponsoring a specifically Israeli government-directed cultural diplomacy or public-relations campaign.

No public evidence identified of BP receiving an Israeli state honour in connection with the conflict.

No public evidence identified from an independently accessible replacement primary source establishing the precise content of the consortium’s June 2025 representations to Israel’s Natural Gas Policy Review Committee.

Cultural sponsorship controversies

The British Museum’s BP sponsorship became a focus of Palestine-related protests in March 2024 and October 2025.^{29, 28}

During the October 2025 gala, the demonstrator’s intervention took place while museum chair George Osborne was addressing attendees, according to contemporaneous reporting.²⁹

The museum responded by affirming the right to peaceful protest, provided its collection, staff and visitors were protected.³⁰

Castrol’s official distributor directory confirms an acknowledged commercial relationship with Feldman Ron-Paz in Israel through its designation as an authorised distributor. The corporate website supplies the distributor’s contact information and includes Israel within its international distribution network. This establishes corporate recognition of an Israeli commercial distribution relationship. The evidence does not independently establish a government-directed public-relations partnership, sponsorship of Israeli political institutions or corporate endorsement of Israeli state policy. The distributor’s separately operated website does not itself establish additional BP-controlled political communications.^{10, 13, 14}

Lobbying, Advocacy, Financing & Logistics

Israeli energy-policy advocacy

NewMed Energy’s financial disclosures establish that BP Exploration Operating Company Limited, SOCAR and NewMed Energy participated in Israel’s fourth offshore exploration licensing programme and received Zone I licences on 17 March 2025.¹

NewMed describes the consortium’s participating interests and identifies SOCAR as operator, establishing BP’s commercial role in the Israeli exploration programme.²

No public evidence identified from an independently accessible replacement primary source establishing the precise content of the consortium’s June 2025 representations to Israel’s Natural Gas Policy Review Committee.

No public evidence identified from the replacement primary source confirming that the consortium advocated specific regulatory, fiscal or market-access recommendations.

No public evidence identified from the replacement primary source substantiating the precise investment amounts attributed to the consortium’s June 2025 correspondence.

No public evidence identified of BP lobbying the UK or US governments specifically to oppose Palestinian statehood.

No public evidence identified of BP financing a campaign against boycott, divestment or sanctions legislation.

Financial interests associated with Israeli energy supplies

AFSC Investigate attributes approximately 8% of Israeli crude imports between October 2023 and July 2024 to oil produced by BP, based on Oil Change International’s research.²⁵

AFSC identifies BP’s BTC pipeline interests as part of the infrastructure connecting Azerbaijani crude production with Mediterranean export markets.²⁵

The Business & Human Rights Resource Centre sought BP’s explanation of its relationship to Israeli oil supplies and international human-rights obligations in September 2024.²⁶

BP’s non-response was recorded by the Resource Centre on 10 September 2024.²⁶

These records establish reported petroleum-supply relationships and questions about corporate due diligence; they do not independently establish a direct BP-to-military sales contract.^{25, 26}

Exploration financing and contractual continuation

On 22 December 2025, BP and its Zone I consortium partners signed a joint operating agreement governing exploration activities, according to Interfax’s reporting of NewMed’s disclosures.⁹

The 2025–2026 seismic programme was reported in March 2026 with an estimated total budget of approximately $27.85 million.⁹

The reported budget represented a proposed exploration programme rather than independently verified expenditure already incurred by BP.⁹

In June 2026, BP executive Gordon Birrell said operational activities had not commenced because of regional geopolitical conditions.⁶

Later reporting anticipated seismic work from September 2026, but did not verify completed exploration operations.¹⁹

No public evidence identified of the precise amount BP had paid to Israeli government agencies in exploration-related fees or taxes by 26 October 2026.

Political and charitable contributions

No public evidence identified of BP making corporate contributions to FIDF, JNF/KKL, Regavim, Im Tirtzu or Israeli settlement organisations.

No public evidence identified of BP making financial contributions specifically to Israeli military-welfare funds.

No public evidence identified of a BP political-action committee funding Israel-Palestine advocacy activity during the period examined.

No public evidence identified of BP financing anti-BDS political campaigns.

Crisis-related mobilisation

No public evidence identified of BP providing emergency fuel free of charge to Israeli military units during the Gaza conflict.

No public evidence identified of BP providing free transport, equipment or logistics services specifically for military operations in Gaza.

No public evidence identified of BP committing corporate infrastructure or services to Israeli military fundraising organisations.

No public evidence identified of a BP programme supplying equipment or services directly to Israeli military units without commercial consideration.

Constructive-notice chronology

BP-related oil-import estimates examined by AFSC cover October 2023–July 2024.²⁵

The Business & Human Rights Resource Centre publicly questioned BP about its Israeli oil-supply relationships in September 2024.²⁶

BP’s consortium received Israeli exploration licences on 17 March 2025, as documented in NewMed Energy’s subsequent financial disclosures.¹

The consortium’s December 2025 joint operating agreement was reported by Interfax in March 2026, documenting further contractual activity after the July 2024 ICJ advisory opinion and November 2024 ICC arrest warrants.⁹

BP’s continuing participation was publicly acknowledged by Gordon Birrell on 2 June 2026, although he stated that operational work had not commenced.⁶

These dates establish continued commercial participation after the relevant international legal developments without independently establishing knowledge of or responsibility for any specific unlawful military operation.^{1, 9, 6}

Settlement nexus

Adalah’s 2024 challenge concerned Israeli offshore licensing in maritime areas claimed by Palestine, while the material reviewed did not conclusively establish that BP’s specific Zone I blocks overlapped those areas.^{22, 23}

BP’s documented Israeli exploration relationship involves NewMed, whose separately disclosed Leviathan interests are held alongside Chevron and Ratio Energies.^{20, 2}

No public evidence identified of BP sponsoring settlement-related political events.

No public evidence identified of BP donating to identified settlement-development organisations.

No public evidence identified of BP executives publicly endorsing the expansion of Israeli settlements.

12 June 2025 - A one-page letter addressed to Sagi Ganot at Israel’s Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure, submitted on behalf of SOCAR, NewMed Energy and BP Exploration Operating Company Limited to the Natural Gas Policy Review Committee, was identified in public search results. The indexed document describes the consortium’s six Zone I exploration licences awarded on 17 March 2025 and its representations concerning regulatory stability, fiscal stability, access to markets and commercially attractive investment returns. The named BP entity is BP Exploration Operating Company Limited. NewMed Energy’s independently accessible corporate disclosure corroborates the consortium’s composition, BP’s 33.33% participation and SOCAR’s designated operatorship. Observation date: 28 October 2026. The letter’s complete text could not be independently verified through an accessible, permitted source.²

28 October 2026 - no public evidence identified from an independently accessible, permitted source reproducing the consortium’s exact 12 June 2025 representations concerning regulatory stability, fiscal stability and market access. Searches for distinctive passages, the document filename, the committee name and the consortium members located the government-hosted original, but opening it returned HTTP 403. Searches for independently hosted reproductions did not identify a usable copy. Consequently, verbatim quotations and specific policy recommendations cannot be independently substantiated under the prescribed source-verification rules. NewMed Energy’s accessible corporate disclosure establishes the underlying commercial relationship but does not reproduce the correspondence.²

9 June 2025 - An independently accessible transcript of Israel’s Knesset Economic Affairs Committee identifies Sagi Ganot-Shahar (שגיא גנות-שחר) as the Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure’s Director of Natural Gas Regulation and Exports. It also identifies Yossi Dayan as the ministry’s Director-General. The hearing addressed the interministerial Natural Gas Policy Review Committee’s recommendations, market concentration and potential consumer harm. This establishes the institutional position of the named recipient of the consortium’s subsequent 12 June 2025 correspondence. The hearing preceded that correspondence and therefore cannot establish its receipt, consideration or influence. Neither BP nor the consortium is identified as an author or signatory of any submission discussed in the hearing.¹⁵

17 September 2026 - NewMed Energy published an investor-relations notification concerning the Natural Gas Policy Review Committee’s final report. Its accompanying document, issued by NewMed Energy Management Limited and signed by CEO Nadav Seraya and legal executive Shari Zinger Kaufman, records the publication of the final report on 17 September 2026 and directs readers to the ministry’s report. This independently establishes that the policy-review process progressed to a published final report after the consortium’s June 2025 correspondence. The notification does not identify BP as its author or signatory, reproduce the consortium’s submission, attribute particular recommendations to BP, or establish that the committee accepted proposals contained in the consortium’s letter.^{16, 16}

28 October 2026 - no public evidence identified: searches for independent reproductions of the 12 June 2025 SOCAR–NewMed–BP correspondence, its individual signatories, additional recipients, committee responses and subsequent decisions expressly attributed to that submission. The accessible Knesset proceedings establish the relevant ministry officials’ identities and the pre-existing policy debate, while NewMed’s September 2026 notification establishes publication of the final report. Neither establishes which individual signed the consortium’s letter, whether BP personnel separately authored or approved its contents, or whether any government decision resulted specifically from the consortium’s representations. Joint attribution to the three consortium members must therefore remain distinct from independently demonstrated BP authorship or individual endorsement.^{15, 16, 16}

28 October 2026 - no public evidence identified: an authenticated, independently accessible copy of the 12 June 2025 consortium submission on a permitted host, or a permitted reproduction verifying its complete wording, signatories and policy representations. Searches located a government-indexed PDF titled “socar-bp-newmed-120625.pdf”, whose indexed text identifies SOCAR, NewMed Energy and BP Exploration Operating Company Limited and describes support for regulatory and fiscal stability, market access and commercially attractive exploration investment. However, opening the original PDF returned HTTP 403, and its host is excluded under the source-verification rules. Consequently, the indexed text cannot be admitted as verified documentary evidence of the submission’s contents. NewMed Energy’s independently accessible corporate disclosure corroborates BP’s consortium membership, 33.33% participation and SOCAR’s operatorship, while the accessible parliamentary record establishes the relevant policy-review proceedings. Neither reproduces or authenticates the 12 June correspondence. The available permitted evidence therefore establishes BP’s commercial participation but does not independently confirm or contradict the specific policy representations attributed to BP through that submission.^{2, 15}

Corporate Structure & Primary Mission

Legal identity and ownership

BP p.l.c. identifies itself in its February 2022 SEC Form 6-K as a company incorporated in the United Kingdom and registered as a foreign issuer with the US Securities and Exchange Commission.³

BP’s 2022 disclosure records its historical 19.75% Rosneft interest and its announced decision to withdraw from that investment.³

The Israeli exploration consortium involves BP Exploration Operating Company Limited, SOCAR and NewMed Energy, with SOCAR identified as the designated project operator.²

NewMed Energy identifies itself as a subsidiary of Delek Group and as a participant in Israeli offshore natural-gas development.⁸

The consortium relationship does not, by itself, establish that BP controls SOCAR, NewMed Energy or Delek Group.^{8, 2}

Foundational mandate

BP’s SEC filings and investor communications identify it as a commercial oil-and-gas enterprise with international investments, including its former Rosneft interest.^{3, 5}

NewMed Energy’s 2025 financial disclosures document BP’s participation in a commercial offshore exploration consortium holding Israeli exploration licences.¹

No public evidence identified of BP’s founding documents establishing an explicit primary mission to advance Israeli state geopolitical objectives.

No public evidence identified of an Israeli state-held golden share in BP p.l.c.

No public evidence identified of BP being established as an Israeli state-controlled enterprise.

Subsidiary and partner attribution

NewMed Energy’s March 2025 financial disclosures name BP Exploration Operating Company Limited as a direct participant in the Israeli exploration consortium.¹

NewMed’s ownership of Leviathan is separately documented through its corporate operating disclosures.²⁰

The 2025 joint operating agreement and subsequent 2026 reporting identify BP as a continuing participant in Zone I exploration arrangements.^{9, 6}

No public evidence identified establishing that BP controls NewMed’s separate Leviathan operations.

No public evidence identified establishing that BP owns or controls Delek Group’s other subsidiaries.

No public evidence identified establishing that BP has a corporate mandate to direct the Israeli government’s geopolitical policies.

Executive & Leadership Footprint

Chief executives and former leadership

BP’s February 2022 SEC disclosure identifies Bernard Looney as chief executive and Bob Dudley as a former chief executive, recording their immediate resignations from Rosneft’s board following the decision to exit BP’s Russian interests.³

Looney’s contemporaneous staff message described Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as aggression and explained BP’s withdrawal decision.⁴

In March 2025, MEES reported comments from NewMed CEO Yossi Abu concerning the anticipated signing of the exploration licences involving BP and SOCAR.⁷

Those comments concerned the consortium’s exploration plans and did not constitute a personal political declaration by a BP executive.⁷

Senior executive statements during 2026

On 2 June 2026, Gordon Birrell, BP Executive Vice President for Production and Operations, publicly confirmed the company’s licences in offshore Zone I alongside SOCAR and NewMed Energy.⁶

Birrell stated that the consortium had not commenced activity and attributed the delay to the geopolitical situation in the Middle East.⁶

The remarks concerned the operational position of BP’s exploration consortium rather than an explicit endorsement of Israeli military conduct or settlement policy.⁶

Personal philanthropy

No public evidence identified of BP founders, chief executives, chairs or other named senior executives personally donating to FIDF or IDF military-welfare organisations.

No public evidence identified of qualifying BP executive-controlled foundations funding Israeli settlement development.

No public evidence identified of BP executives personally underwriting fundraising campaigns for Israeli military reservists.

No public evidence identified of BP executives personally financing Israeli military operations through identified charitable foundations.

Public political advocacy

Bernard Looney publicly addressed the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and communicated BP’s decision to withdraw from Rosneft.⁴

Gordon Birrell publicly commented on the Israeli exploration programme’s operational status in June 2026.⁶

No public evidence identified of an equivalent public statement by a named BP chief executive supporting Israeli military operations in Gaza.

No public evidence identified of a BP CEO or chair publicly advocating the expansion of Israeli settlements in occupied Palestinian territory.

No public evidence identified of BP executives publicly calling for the suppression of Palestinian political speech.

Board and organisational affiliations

Looney and Dudley held BP-nominated positions on Rosneft’s board before their February 2022 resignations.³

No public evidence identified of a BP chair or chief executive holding a leadership position in AIPAC, FIDF, JNF/KKL, Regavim or Im Tirtzu.

No public evidence identified of a BP director holding a board position in an Israeli settlement-development organisation.

No public evidence identified of BP directors personally financing Israeli defence or surveillance companies specifically in connection with the Gaza conflict.

No public evidence identified of a BP director serving on the governing board of an organisation whose disclosed primary purpose is to oppose Palestinian statehood.