CrowdStrike DIGITAL

Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships

• CrowdStrike’s Falcon platform is hosted through a mix of third-party data centres, primarily AWS, and CrowdStrike data centres hosted in colocation facilities ¹.
• CrowdStrike relies on channel partners for the vast majority of Falcon-platform sales and maintains technology-alliance partnerships, although the reviewed disclosures do not name specified Israeli-origin cybersecurity vendors as internal suppliers or integrations ¹.
• No public evidence identified.
• The reviewed hosting disclosure does not identify the locations of CrowdStrike’s colocation facilities or establish that they are located in Israel ¹.

Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology

• No public evidence identified that CrowdStrike uses Israeli-origin facial recognition, biometrics, gait analysis, retail analytics, predictive policing, sentiment analysis, social-media monitoring, or workforce-surveillance products in its own operations ¹.
• No public evidence identified that these capabilities reach CrowdStrike indirectly through a managed-security provider, platform bundle, or third-party deployment ¹.
• CrowdStrike’s reviewed public disclosures describe cybersecurity and endpoint/workload telemetry capabilities rather than retail-technology or biometric-surveillance products ¹.

Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation

• CrowdStrike states that Falcon ingests endpoint and workload telemetry into its Security Cloud, where data is reused across the platform and to improve AI algorithms ¹.
• The reviewed filings identify AWS and CrowdStrike colocated facilities as hosting components, but do not identify Israeli storage, processing, routing, customer-data residency, or legal-access points ¹.
• CrowdStrike’s FY2025 subsidiary exhibit lists Flow Security Ltd., CrowdStrike Israel R&D Ltd., and Bionic Stork, Ltd. as Israeli-incorporated subsidiaries ².
• The existence of these Israeli entities does not itself establish Israeli data-centre operations or Falcon customer-data processing in Israel ².
• Google Cloud’s Project Nimbus announcement identifies Google Cloud as a public-cloud supplier selected to support the State of Israel’s digital transformation ³.
• No public evidence identified of CrowdStrike participation in Project Nimbus or another publicly identified Israeli government-cloud programme ^{1, 2, 3}.
• No public evidence identified of CrowdStrike services expressly marketed or publicly contracted for Israeli state digital sovereignty, data residency, or infrastructure resilience ^{1, 2, 3}.

Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships

• No public evidence identified of a verified CrowdStrike contract, partnership, or service agreement with the Israeli Ministry of Defence, IDF, Israeli intelligence agencies, or another Israeli state-security body ^{1, 2, 4}.
• No public evidence identified that CrowdStrike products have been publicly documented as deployed by Israeli military, intelligence, or law-enforcement bodies in Israel or occupied territory ¹.
• No public evidence identified that CrowdStrike has developed, sold, licensed, or maintained offensive cyber tools, zero-day exploit tooling, or digital weapons for Israeli state actors ¹.
• CrowdStrike’s FY2026 filing states that it conducts business internationally, including in Israel, but does not identify Israeli government or military customers ⁴.
• CrowdStrike reported cash income-tax payments of $15.512 million in Israel for the fiscal year ended 31 January 2026, which confirms an Israeli tax jurisdiction within its operations but does not establish services to state or security bodies ⁴.

AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems

• CrowdStrike describes Falcon as a cloud-native platform using AI, with its agent streaming high-fidelity data to the Security Cloud for improved AI algorithms and real-time decision-making ¹.
• The reviewed source does not connect these capabilities to Israeli state or security customers, Israeli or occupied-territory datasets, or Israeli legal jurisdiction ¹.
• No public evidence identified of CrowdStrike supplying AI/ML, computer vision, autonomous decision-support, target-generation, or autonomous-tracking systems to Israeli state, military, intelligence, or security bodies ¹.
• No public evidence identified that CrowdStrike models were trained on civilian-population data, intercepted communications, or surveillance-derived data from Israel or occupied territory ¹.
• A document-scoped review found no CrowdStrike mention in UN report A/HRC/59/23, so that report’s discussion of surveillance, AI, cloud services, and Project Nimbus does not evidence a CrowdStrike relationship ⁵.

Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint

• CrowdStrike’s FY2026 filing states that the company maintains R&D centres in Romania, Israel, and India, while not identifying the Israeli site’s location, workforce, customer base, or specific products developed there ⁴.
• CrowdStrike acquired 100% of Flow Security Ltd. on 26 March 2024 for total consideration of $96.9 million, including replacement equity awards, and Flow Security remained listed as an Israeli subsidiary in the FY2025 exhibit ^{1, 2, 6}.
• CrowdStrike acquired 100% of Bionic Stork, Ltd. on 28 September 2023 for total consideration of $239.7 million, including replacement equity awards, and Bionic remained listed as an Israeli subsidiary in the FY2025 exhibit ^{1, 2, 7}.
• CrowdStrike described Bionic’s platform as analysing production application architectures and dependencies to reduce security, data-privacy, and operational risks ⁷.
• CrowdStrike acquired 100% of A.S. Adaptive Shield Ltd. on 20 November 2024 for total consideration of $214.4 million, including replacement equity awards; the FY2026 subsidiary exhibit identifies it as incorporated in Israel ^{1, 8}.
• CrowdStrike stated in December 2022 that Falcon Surface incorporated capabilities from its recent acquisition of Reposify, but the reviewed release does not state Reposify’s incorporation jurisdiction or acquisition date ⁹.
• No public evidence identified of a CrowdStrike patent, licence, or co-development arrangement with an Israeli-domiciled university or research institution ^{1, 2}.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History

• A document-scoped review found no CrowdStrike mention in the reviewed 2023 and 2025 OHCHR settlement-business database materials, which is not a determination of absence outside those editions ¹⁰.
• A document-scoped review found no CrowdStrike mention in the reviewed BDS corporate-priority materials or KLP’s 2024 exclusion list, which is not a general absence finding ^{11, 12}.
• No public evidence identified in the reviewed sources of an organised boycott, divestment, sanctions, regulatory, export-control, or litigation campaign specifically concerning CrowdStrike technology provision to Israeli state bodies or occupied territories ¹.
• CrowdStrike’s FY2025 filing identified George Kurtz as a co-founder and described him as Chairman and President of the CrowdStrike Foundation since November 2017 ¹.
• The reviewed filing describes the CrowdStrike Foundation as a nonprofit supporting cybersecurity and AI talent and research, while no foundation grant-schedule review was completed for this audit ¹.
• Aryon Security’s official About page identifies George Kurtz as a backer and as CrowdStrike’s co-founder and CEO. The page lists Aryon’s operating team separately and does not identify Kurtz as an officer, director, adviser, or employee ¹³.
• Aryon’s two official 10 June 2026 funding pages conflict on whether its Series A total was $25 million or $29 million. Neither page discloses Kurtz’s investment amount, vehicle, stake, date of payment, board right, or operating role ^{14, 15}.
• Aryon’s official materials describe preventive cloud-security software and identify Aryon Security Ltd. as the service provider. The reviewed About, funding, product, and privacy pages do not identify a contract, deployment, data-access arrangement, or operational use by an Israeli state, military, intelligence, police, prison, border, settlement, or occupation body ^{13, 14, 15, 16}. This is a page-set finding, not proof about undisclosed customers.
• CrowdStrike’s 2026 proxy discloses Falcon Fund and Falcon Fund II as minority-equity and convertible-debt investment vehicles for private companies whose applications may contribute to CrowdStrike’s platform. It identifies director Sameer K. Gandhi as an Accel affiliate and states that CrowdStrike made $6.0 million of Falcon Fund II contributions since 1 February 2025, but it does not list investees or identify an Israeli state-security or anti-Palestinian digital result ¹⁷.
• The same proxy’s biographies and ownership disclosures do not provide a complete registry of each director’s private investments. No broader person-level absence is inferred beyond the disclosed roles and the specific Kurtz/Aryon record above ¹⁷.

Dated cross-domain reconciliation

The FY2026 SEC subsidiary exhibit identifies A.S. Adaptive Shield Ltd. as incorporated in Israel, resolving the earlier jurisdiction gap in this audit. That exhibit also lists CrowdStrike Israel R&D Ltd.; the FY2025 exhibit listed Flow Security Ltd. and Bionic Stork, Ltd. The reason for the latter entities’ omission from FY2026 is unresolved. Incorporation and acquisition evidence do not by themselves establish Israeli state-security deployment, offensive cyber capability or Israeli processing of Falcon customer data ^{2, 8}.