CyberProof MILITARY

Research cut-off: 20 October 2026. CyberProof describes itself as a UST company providing cloud-first, AI-enabled managed security operations, and its current contact page lists an office at 132 Menachem Begin, Tel Aviv.^{1, 2} The findings below distinguish enterprise cybersecurity from purpose-built military systems and distinguish public listings from procurement awards.

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

No public evidence identified of a verified CyberProof contract, tender award, framework agreement or memorandum of understanding with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, Israel Defense Forces, Israel Prison Service, Israel Border Police or another Israeli state security body. CyberProof’s UK Digital Marketplace page makes a cloud/application-security service available through G-Cloud, while CREST records Government/Public Sector as 10% of the company’s stated SOC target-sector mix; neither record identifies a purchaser or contract award.^{3, 4}

CyberProof’s current service descriptions show managed detection and response, SOC operations, threat hunting, incident response, platform management and related enterprise cybersecurity services.^{5, 6} Microsoft documents the CyberProof connector as an incident-management and response integration and specifically lists US Government/GCC, Azure Government and US DoD regions among excluded deployment regions for that connector; this is a technical availability statement, not evidence of a defence procurement relationship.⁷

Current UST leadership identifies Yuval Wollman as President of CyberProof and Tony Velleca as CEO.⁸ CyberProof’s biography for Wollman states that he previously served as Director General of Israel’s Intelligence Ministry and as an IDF Unit 8200 officer.⁹ A [pre-2020] 2019 Globes report described him as then participating in reserve service screening candidates for intelligence units.¹⁰ These records establish personal historical public-sector and military service; they do not identify a CyberProof government contract.

The 20 November 2023 CTech interview reports that 20 of CyberProof’s 95 Israel-based employees were on active reserve duty and states only that “Donations were gathered for military units.”¹¹ The interview does not identify the donor as CyberProof corporate funds versus employees or a workplace collection; it gives no item type, amount, recipient unit, or specific purpose. Exact-phrase and variant searches did not identify independent public corroboration for those missing details. The same interview separately describes a fundraising effort for an impacted kibbutz; Los Angeles Times reporting corroborated CyberProof’s commitment to help Kfar Aza and reported more than $100,000 raised from a variety of donors, which corroborates the civilian fundraising thread rather than the unspecified military-unit donations.^{11, 12}

No public evidence identified of CyberProof appearing in a SIBAT defence-export directory or an Israeli defence procurement registry in connection with a state contract. No official announcement establishing a CyberProof-IDF/IMOD defence cooperation agreement was identified.

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

CyberProof’s 2022 service catalog describes SaaS-delivered SOC services, managed detection and response, endpoint security, threat intelligence/hunting, OT/ICS security, vulnerability management and incident response.⁵ Its current Microsoft Marketplace offer is a 24/7 managed XDR service built around Microsoft Sentinel and Defender.⁶ These public product records do not describe ruggedised hardware, mil-spec equipment, tactical variants, fire-control software, targeting systems, weapons integration, or another product whose designed output is a kinetic effect.

The service catalog highlights staff with nation-state cybersecurity experience and former Unit 8200 personnel.⁵ That describes workforce expertise, not a military-specified product or military end-user. No public evidence identified of a CyberProof civilian product being contract-modified for Israeli security forces, or of end-user certificates, military export licence applications, or export-control reviews tied to an Israeli defence/security customer.

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

CyberProof’s disclosed business is cybersecurity software and services, as described in its corporate materials and service catalog.^{1, 5} no public evidence identified of CyberProof manufacturing or supplying vehicles, construction machinery, demolition equipment or other heavy equipment, or of such equipment being used in settlements, the separation barrier, military installations or occupied territory.

No public evidence identified of CyberProof construction, engineering, maintenance or servicing contracts for checkpoints, detention facilities, military bases, the separation barrier, or settlement infrastructure. The current CyberProof contact page lists Tel Aviv as its Israel office; no settlement or occupied-territory office is identified there.²

CyberProof/UST was not identified by name in the consulted 2024 OHCHR settlement-business database record or A/HRC/59/23.^{13, 14} This is a researched absence from those consulted records, not proof that no private or indirect relationship exists.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

No public evidence identified of CyberProof supplying components, sub-systems, raw materials or specialist manufacturing services to Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems or IMI/Elbit Land, or of joint development, co-production, technology transfer or licensed manufacturing with those defence primes.

[pre-2020] In 2018 UST Global invested in Israeli cybersecurity company XM Cyber and announced a strategic sales and integration agreement under which XM Cyber’s HaXM breach-simulation platform would integrate with CyberProof’s Defense Center; XM Cyber’s own release independently described the same agreement.^{15, 16} The records describe enterprise cyber-risk simulation and managed security. They do not identify XM Cyber as an Israeli defence prime, identify an IDF/IMOD end-user, or establish a defence procurement relationship.

CyberProof’s 2022 catalog lists commercial security-technology partners such as Microsoft, Splunk, CrowdStrike, Claroty, Cybereason, IBM Security, Nozomi Networks and Qualys.⁵ That catalog does not identify Elbit, IAI, Rafael or IMI as a CyberProof supply-chain customer or co-production partner. No public evidence identified of military-specific component categories supplied by CyberProof.

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

No public evidence identified of CyberProof contracts for catering, transport, fuel, waste management, facilities maintenance, telecommunications, freight forwarding, port handling or other physical base/logistics services for Israeli military or security installations.

The 2023 CTech statement that “Donations were gathered for military units” is the only located military-unit support reference specific to CyberProof.¹¹ Because the actor, goods, amount, recipient unit and purpose are undisclosed, the record does not establish a logistics contract, military cargo service, weapons supply, or base-services arrangement. No post-19 July 2024 continuation of this specific donation activity was identified.

The UST case study describing a five-year CyberProof engagement with a multinational chemical company covers IT/OT monitoring, SIEM, digital forensics, threat intelligence, EDR and vulnerability management, but the customer is anonymous.¹⁷ It cannot be treated as evidence of a defence, military-base or state-security customer.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

No public evidence identified that CyberProof is a prime contractor or licensed manufacturer of small arms, artillery, armoured vehicles, tactical drones, naval vessels, ammunition, explosive ordnance, propellants, warhead components or other munitions/precursor materials.

No public evidence identified of CyberProof manufacturing, integrating or maintaining Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, fighter aircraft, Merkava tanks, warships, ballistic missiles, guidance electronics, fire-control systems, radar components, propulsion units or warhead casings. The public product descriptions concern enterprise cybersecurity/SOC services rather than weapons or weapons sub-systems.^{5, 6}

No public evidence identified of CyberProof software purpose-built to produce a targeting decision or weapons effect. Public materials describe threat detection, incident response, security analytics, vulnerability management and network/system protection.^{5, 6}

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

No public evidence identified of a government decision granting, denying, suspending or revoking an arms/export licence for CyberProof products to an Israeli military or security end-user. No public evidence identified of sanctions or arms-embargo enforcement against CyberProof for Israel-related defence trade, or of a judicial review/court challenge concerning such a supply relationship.

CyberProof (UK) Private Limited is an active UK company incorporated in 2016; Companies House records that it was previously named UST Global Investments (UK) Private Limited.¹⁸ The current public product and marketplace records reviewed for the UK entity/group concern cybersecurity services, not controlled munitions or military hardware.^{3, 18}

The absence of a located public enforcement or licence record does not establish that no export-control analysis has ever occurred internally or privately.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

CyberProof was not identified by name in the consulted 2024 OHCHR settlement-business database record or A/HRC/59/23.^{13, 14} A target-name check of AFSC Investigate did not surface a CyberProof company profile during this review, and the current BDS corporate-priority guide does not name CyberProof as a specific priority target.^{19, 20} Targeted live searches of Who Profits, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Al-Haq likewise did not surface a CyberProof-specific military or settlement investigation. No public evidence identified of a CyberProof-specific organised boycott/divestment campaign or institutional divestment decision tied to defence-sector activity.

The BDS guide contains broad category-level positions concerning Israeli companies and named technology/military-security firms, but CyberProof is not individually named in the consulted guide.¹⁹ A broad category statement was not treated as a CyberProof-specific campaign.

No public evidence identified of CyberProof issuing a policy change, contract termination or end-use-monitoring commitment in response to civil-society pressure over a defence supply chain. The 2023 CTech interview documents employee/reservist support and the ambiguous military-unit donation collection, while the independently reported Kfar Aza fundraising concerned civilian community recovery.^{11, 12} No source located converts either record into a verified defence procurement or weapons-supply relationship.