Table of Contents
Hewlett Packard Enterprise is a large-cap US enterprise technology company that emerged from the November 2015 split of Hewlett-Packard Company. It is not a weapons manufacturer, not an Israeli-founded entity, and does not hold verified direct contracts with the Israeli Ministry of Defence or IDF. These facts place its BDS-1000 score well below the thresholds associated with direct military supply or strategic Israeli national infrastructure. However, HPE’s profile is not clean.
Three interlocking factors drive a Tier D score of 396 — a conservative floor that sits four points below Tier C:
First, in the digital domain, HPE is the 100% owner of Zerto, an Israeli-founded disaster recovery software company whose Tel Aviv R&D centre continues to operate as an HPE engineering facility. Zerto technology is embedded as the primary disaster recovery-as-a-service component of HPE GreenLake, HPE’s flagship commercial cloud platform. This is not a vendor alliance or a procurement relationship — it is direct corporate ownership of Israeli-origin technology infrastructure sold globally. HPE’s acquisition of Juniper Networks in March 2024 added a further, less fully documented Israeli engineering presence. Alongside these ownership relationships, HPE maintains technology alliance partnerships with Check Point, CyberArk, Palo Alto Networks, and SentinelOne — all companies with material Israeli R&D or founding connections — integrated at the network security, identity, and endpoint layers of HPE Aruba and ProLiant environments.
Second, in the economic domain, HPE has a physical Israeli office presence spanning decades (inherited from pre-split Hewlett-Packard), documented relationships with Israeli government and security-sector clients in connection with biometric population registry and checkpoint computing infrastructure, and a substantive capital footprint created by the Zerto and Juniper acquisitions. Continuity of the biometric registry and checkpoint IT contracts under the post-2015 HPE legal entity — rather than under HP Inc. — is not confirmed in the available primary documentation, and this attribution gap is the single most consequential open question for the overall score.
Third, in the political domain, HPE publicly suspended operations in Russia following the February 2022 invasion but has issued no equivalent statement, operational adjustment, or contract review in relation to Gaza or the occupied Palestinian territories after October 2023. HPE participates in Cybertech Tel Aviv, an event co-organised with the Israeli Ministry of Economy, and maintains a partnership with the Technion — an institution with formal IDF programme connections. The financial depth of the Cybertech sponsorship and the dual-use character of Technion research deliverables are unconfirmed evidence gaps; resolution of either gap could push the political domain score into the Institutional Legitimation band and lift the composite into Tier C.
In the military domain, HPE scores at the incidental floor: no direct IDF/IMOD contract has been verified, HPE is absent from PAX Netherlands and OHCHR settlement databases, and its product portfolio does not include weapons systems, munitions, or lethal platforms. The Edgeline line has MIL-STD-810 relevant marketing, positioning HPE’s edge hardware as field-deployable, but no confirmed Israeli military deployment has been identified in primary sources.
The 396 score should be understood as a conservative floor, not a ceiling. Resolution of three specific evidence gaps — post-split biometric registry contract continuity, Cybertech sponsorship tier, and Juniper Israel engineering scope — could each independently contribute to a Tier C outcome.
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1939 | Hewlett-Packard Company founded in Palo Alto, California — HPE’s corporate heritage entity |
| c. 2002 | Undivided HP begins supplying the Basel System biometric population registry to the Israeli Ministry of Interior for Palestinian ID management in the West Bank 1 |
| 2008 | HP acquires Electronic Data Systems (EDS), adding legacy Israeli government IT contracts to its portfolio 1 |
| 1 November 2015 | Hewlett-Packard Company splits into HPE (enterprise) and HP Inc. (consumer/printing); pre-split Israeli contracts require contract-level review for post-split attribution 2 |
| 2015 | HPE retains Aruba Networks (acquired by HP in 2015 pre-split); Who Profits subsequently documents Aruba networking equipment in Israeli institutional contexts 3 |
| May 2021 | Project Nimbus — $1.2 billion Israeli government cloud contract — awarded to Google Cloud and AWS; HPE is not identified as a primary or sub-contractor 4 |
| September 2021 | HPE acquires Zerto (Israeli-founded, Tel Aviv R&D) for approximately $374 million; Zerto becomes core HPE GreenLake disaster recovery-as-a-service offering 5 6 |
| February 2022 | HPE publicly suspends sales in Russia and Belarus following the Russian invasion of Ukraine; financial impact disclosed in FY2022 10-K 2 |
| July 2022 – present | BDS and civil society campaigns continue targeting HPE (as HP-lineage entity) for biometric registry and checkpoint computing relationships; no HPE public response specific to these campaigns identified 7 |
| 19 July 2024 | ICJ Advisory Opinion on legal consequences of Israeli occupation issued; no HPE policy change, contract review, or public statement in response identified 2 |
| 9 January 2024 | HPE announces agreement to acquire Juniper Networks for approximately $14 billion, adding Israeli engineering operations to HPE’s footprint 8 |
| March 2024 | HPE–Juniper Networks acquisition closes; Juniper Israel engineering operations become part of HPE 8 |
| June 2024 | PAX Netherlands publishes Companies Arming Israel and Their Financiers; HPE is not named as a primary company 9 |
| 21 November 2024 | ICC arrest warrants issued for Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defence Minister Gallant; no HPE policy response identified 2 |
| 2 July 2025 | UN Special Rapporteur Albanese publishes A/HRC/59/23 (From economy of occupation to economy of genocide); HPE not specifically named in §§36–43 per available training data 10 |
Hewlett Packard Enterprise was incorporated in Delaware and began independent operations on 1 November 2015 following the separation of Hewlett-Packard Company. The separation assigned enterprise technology — servers, storage, networking, software, and services — to HPE, while personal computing and printing went to HP Inc. The post-split entities share a common brand heritage but are legally distinct, and activities predating the split require contract-level review before attribution to either entity.2
HPE’s core commercial portfolio comprises four operating segments: Hybrid Cloud (servers, storage, private cloud), Intelligent Edge (Aruba networking), HPE Financial Services, and Corporate Investments. The Aruba Networks acquisition (2015, retained by HPE) gave the company a leading enterprise wireless and campus networking franchise. The Zerto acquisition (September 2021, ~$374 million) embedded Israeli-origin disaster recovery software into HPE’s GreenLake as-a-service platform.5 The Juniper Networks acquisition (March 2024, ~$14 billion) expanded HPE’s networking portfolio substantially and added Juniper’s Israeli engineering operations.8
HPE’s largest institutional shareholders are Vanguard Group, BlackRock, and State Street — none holding a controlling stake or carrying an Israel-specific investment mandate.11 The company has no Israeli state ownership, no golden shares, and no charter provisions linking its mission to Israeli state objectives. Its Israel operations — operating out of the Ra’anana/Petah Tikva corridor — are a commercial and R&D presence inherited from the pre-split HP entity and expanded through the Zerto and Juniper acquisitions.1
HPE occupies the lowest scoring position of its four domains in the military category, and this outcome is consistent with the available evidence. The company does not manufacture weapons, munitions, kinetic platforms, fire-control systems, guidance electronics, or any lethal hardware. Its published 10-K filings confirm that its business is the supply of enterprise computing infrastructure and services.2 HPE is absent from PAX Netherlands’ June 2024 report naming companies with verified direct arms supply to Israeli military end-users, and it is absent from the OHCHR settlement business database.9 12
The dual-use question centres on HPE’s Edgeline Converged Edge Systems line (EL300, EL4000, EL8000), described in HPE product literature as designed for harsh, field-deployed environments.13 Third-party system integrators have invoked MIL-STD-810 compliance in connection with these platforms, indicating awareness of military deployment scenarios. However, this marketing positioning reflects the Edgeline line’s design for industrial and austere-environment use — it does not establish a verified Israeli military end-use relationship. HPE’s broader ProLiant server range (DL360, DL380 Gen10/Gen11) is commercially available hardware used by armed forces globally via downstream system integrators, but HPE itself does not produce a dedicated military-catalogue product line.13
The Aruba Networks division produces enterprise networking hardware deployed in civilian and government contexts globally, including US federal agencies. No specific verified deployment of Aruba hardware at Israeli military installations has been identified in primary sources. Similarly, HPE GreenLake managed services are marketed to government and defence clients in the US and UK, but no verified Israeli military GreenLake deployment appears in public disclosures.2
HPE holds multiple US Department of Defense IT infrastructure contracts — including participation in ITES-SW2, US Navy IT awards, and OASIS task orders — establishing its institutional positioning as a US defence IT vendor.14 HPE participated in the JEDI cloud competition but was not selected as a JWCC prime awardee. These US domestic defence contracts do not implicate Israeli military supply chains and are noted here solely as contextual evidence of HPE’s defence IT market familiarity.14
Israeli government procurement operates in part through whole-of-government ICT framework agreements administered by the Government Procurement Administration (Agra). HPE Israel participates in such frameworks.15 The structural architecture of these frameworks — where security-sector bodies including IMOD, Israel Police, and the Prison Service may draw on shared ICT contracts without generating individually attributable award notices — creates a visibility gap. This opacity does not confirm the existence of defence contracts; it reflects the limited public disclosure architecture of Israeli security procurement.15
No verified direct contract between HPE and the Israeli Ministry of Defence, IDF, Israel Prison Service, Israel Border Police, or any Israeli strategic defence programme (Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow/Hetz, F-35 Israeli variant, Merkava) has been identified in HPE’s SEC filings, SIBAT records, Israeli business press, or NGO investigations.2 16 No verified supply relationship between HPE and Israeli defence prime contractors — Elbit Systems, IAI, Rafael, or IMI Systems — has been identified in corporate disclosures or defence trade press.9
HPE’s standard commercial IT products are predominantly EAR99 or low-ECCN classified, meaning individual export licence filings are not ordinarily a matter of public record for sales to Israeli commercial or government customers. No publicly known export licence applications or end-user certificates specifically pertaining to HPE hardware exports to Israeli defence or security end-users have been identified in any jurisdiction.17
The most significant counter-argument is the structural visibility gap in Israeli government framework procurement. Security-sector ministries can draw on shared ICT frameworks without generating individually attributable public contract notices. The confirmed absence of a named direct IMOD/IDF contract in public records is not equivalent to confirmed absence of any security-sector end-use. HPE hardware reaching Israeli military end-users via commercial resellers and distributors cannot be ruled out from public sources alone — this is a structural limitation common to all commercial IT hardware vendor audits.
The Edgeline line’s MIL-STD-810 adjacent marketing and the pervasive use of commercial server hardware across global defence IT estates means that HPE products may plausibly be deployed within Israeli defence computing infrastructure. However, the distinction between general-purpose commercial hardware incidentally reaching defence IT estates (Incidental/Civilian Parallel, Band 1.0–2.0) and verified direct supply of weapons-system components (Direct Military Supply, Band 3.0+) is analytically critical, and no primary source bridges that gap for HPE in the Israeli context.
The Who Profits Research Center’s coverage of HP-lineage companies historically centres on biometric systems and population control infrastructure rather than weapons or military platforms. The AFSC Investigate profile for HPE does not, per available training data, document direct IDF weapons-system contracts as the basis for inclusion. The BDS campaign’s HP-focused targeting has centred on checkpoint computing and biometric registry relationships — not munitions or lethal platforms.
If future primary-source research confirms direct IMOD/IDF hardware contracts through framework agreement end-user tracing or Israeli MOD procurement disclosures, the Impact and Magnitude scores for this domain would rise from the Incidental band (1.5) toward Direct Civilian Supply (2.1–3.0), with corresponding composite score implications.
| Entity | Type | Relevance | Evidence Quality |
|---|---|---|---|
| HPE (Hewlett Packard Enterprise) | Principal subject | Enterprise IT vendor; no verified direct IDF/IMOD contract | Confirmed — SEC filings 2 |
| HP Inc. | Sibling entity (post-2015 split) | Pre-split HP activities require attribution review | Confirmed — corporate split 2 |
| Edgeline Converged Edge Systems | HPE product line | MIL-STD-810 adjacent marketing; dual-use field-deployment positioning | Confirmed — HPE product literature 13 |
| Aruba Networks | HPE subsidiary | Enterprise networking; no verified Israeli military deployment in primary sources | Confirmed presence; deployment unverified |
| GreenLake | HPE platform | Managed services marketed to government/defence; no Israeli military contract identified | Confirmed platform; no military contract 2 |
| ProLiant (DL360, DL380) | HPE product line | Commercially available servers used by armed forces globally via integrators | Confirmed commercial use |
| Israeli Ministry of Defence (IMOD) | Israeli state body | No verified direct HPE contract identified | Absence confirmed across PAX, OHCHR, SIBAT 9 12 16 |
| IDF (Israel Defence Forces) | Israeli military | No verified direct HPE contract identified | Absence confirmed 2 9 |
| Elbit Systems | Israeli defence prime | No verified HPE supply relationship identified | Absence noted 9 |
| IAI, Rafael, IMI Systems | Israeli defence primes | No verified HPE supply relationship identified | Absence noted 9 |
| PAX Netherlands | NGO | HPE absent from June 2024 named companies report | Confirmed 9 |
| OHCHR Settlement Database | UN body | HPE absent from published database | Confirmed 12 |
| SIBAT | Israeli defence export body | HPE not listed as Israeli defence exporter | Confirmed 16 |
| Government Procurement Administration (Agra) | Israeli procurement body | HPE participates in whole-of-government ICT frameworks; security-sector draw-down unverifiable | Structural gap confirmed 15 |
| AFSC Investigate | NGO database | HPE profiled; basis is IT infrastructure, not direct weapons supply | Confirmed 18 |
| Who Profits Research Center | NGO database | HP-lineage coverage centres on biometrics/population control, not weapons | Confirmed 1 |
The digital domain carries the most analytically complex evidence in this dossier, and the Zerto ownership relationship is its structural anchor. In September 2021, HPE acquired Zerto — an Israeli-founded disaster recovery and continuous data protection software company — for approximately $374 million.5 Zerto’s Tel Aviv R&D centre continued operations post-acquisition as an HPE engineering facility. Zerto co-founders Ziv Kedem and Oded Kedem remained with the company following the acquisition.6 Zerto’s journal-based continuous replication and disaster-recovery-as-a-service technology is now embedded as the primary DRaaS offering within HPE GreenLake — HPE’s flagship commercial as-a-service cloud platform — and is sold globally under HPE branding.5 This is not a vendor alliance or technology procurement arrangement. HPE is the 100% owner and direct operator of the entity performing Israeli-origin software engineering. The R&D output of Zerto’s Tel Aviv engineers becomes HPE product, distributed worldwide.
This ownership relationship distinguishes HPE’s digital profile meaningfully from a standard commercial IT vendor. The scoring rubric’s Proximity dimension rewards direct ownership and operation most heavily. HPE’s Proximity score for this domain is anchored at the Controller/Architect band (8.5) because of the Zerto relationship — HPE directly controls the R&D function generating the Israeli-origin technology at the core of a major commercial product line.5 6
HPE’s March 2024 acquisition of Juniper Networks for approximately $14 billion added a further Israeli engineering dimension.8 Juniper has historically maintained engineering and R&D operations in Israel covering networking software and ASIC development. Following the acquisition close, these operations became part of HPE’s engineering footprint. The precise scale, headcount, and technical focus of Juniper’s Israeli engineering operations are not fully detailed in public disclosures — this is a confirmed evidence gap — but their existence is documented and their integration into HPE’s ownership structure is confirmed.8
Beyond ownership, HPE maintains a documented technology alliance partner ecosystem that includes multiple Israeli-origin or Israeli-connected security firms. Check Point Software Technologies — Israeli-founded and headquartered in Tel Aviv — maintains a documented technology alliance with HPE covering integration of Check Point security gateways and firewalls into HPE Aruba networking solutions and ProLiant server environments; a joint solution brief was publicly active as of 2023.19 CyberArk — an Israeli-founded privileged access management company with primary R&D in Petah Tikva — appears in HPE’s Technology Alliance Partner Program; an HPE–CyberArk joint solution document was accessible via HPE’s partner portal from 2022 through 2024.20 Palo Alto Networks — co-founded by Israeli national Nir Zuk — maintains a documented technology integration with HPE Aruba covering Security Service Edge and Zero Trust Network Access.21 SentinelOne — founded by Israeli nationals with Tel Aviv R&D operations — appears in HPE’s technology alliance partner directory covering endpoint detection and response integration within HPE server environments.22
These alliance partnerships are commercially significant for HPE’s enterprise customers but operate at the network security, identity management, and endpoint protection layers of HPE deployments. They are modular and third-party rather than architecturally embedded in HPE’s own back-end systems in the manner of Zerto. The distinction matters for proximity scoring: Check Point, CyberArk, Palo Alto Networks, and SentinelOne are HPE’s suppliers and partners, not HPE subsidiaries. Their Unit 8200 alumni network connections and Israeli military intelligence ecosystem links are characteristics of those companies, not direct HPE relationships — though they form part of the technology ecosystem HPE has integrated through its partner programme.23
HPE is not identified as a primary contractor or sub-contractor in Project Nimbus, the Israeli government’s $1.2 billion cloud infrastructure contract awarded in May 2021 to Google Cloud and AWS.4 UN Special Rapporteur Albanese’s A/HRC/59/23 specifically names Google, Amazon, and Microsoft in the context of cloud provision to Israeli state and military bodies in §§36–43; HPE is not named in those sections per available training data.10 No verified named contract between HPE and the Israeli Ministry of Defence, IDF, or Israeli intelligence agencies has been identified in any primary source reviewed.2
HPE Aruba Central, HPE’s AI-powered network management platform, provides automated network operations globally. No public evidence links Aruba Central specifically to Israeli state or military deployments. HPE markets Cray supercomputing systems and GreenLake AI/ML services globally but no Israeli state military contract for these systems has been identified in public disclosures.2 HPE does not publicly develop offensive cyber capabilities, zero-day exploit tools, or lethal autonomous weapons systems.
The central counter-argument to the V-DIG score is the absence of any confirmed named contract between HPE (as distinct from Zerto as a software product) and Israeli state security or military bodies. The 5.5 Impact score is grounded in what HPE owns and produces — Israeli-origin technology at the core of a major commercial platform — not in a confirmed state security contract. Critics of this scoring approach would argue that owning an Israeli R&D centre for a commercial software product is categorically different from providing surveillance infrastructure to a state security apparatus, even if both involve Israeli-origin technology.
The depth of the alliance partner relationships (Check Point, CyberArk, Palo Alto Networks, SentinelOne) cannot be precisely determined from public documentation. The difference between a partner-directory listing and a deep OEM integration relationship matters: the former represents a commercial endorsement, while the latter represents technical dependency. The audit confirms technology alliance partnerships but cannot resolve this depth question from publicly available sources. This is an identified evidence gap, and conservative scoring at 5.5 (rather than 6.0+) reflects it.20 19
The post-2020 OHCHR settlement database has not been comprehensively updated.12 HPE’s absence from the 2020 list cannot be treated as confirmation of current absence. Similarly, Juniper Networks’ Israeli R&D specifics remain undisclosed in public filings — press coverage and LinkedIn data suggest a meaningful engineering presence, but project assignments are not public.8
The most important missing piece is evidence of whether HPE GreenLake sovereign cloud services, Zerto-powered DRaaS, or Juniper-derived networking infrastructure have been specifically contracted by Israeli state security institutions. The geographic footprint of Zerto-based DRaaS deployments is not publicly itemised at the customer or country level. If such a contract were confirmed, the Impact score would rise from 5.5 toward the Intelligence Integration band (7.0+), with a material effect on the composite score.
| Entity | Type | Relevance | Evidence Quality |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zerto | HPE wholly owned subsidiary (acquired September 2021) | Israeli-founded; Tel Aviv R&D; core GreenLake DRaaS technology | Confirmed — acquisition announcement 5 6 |
| Ziv Kedem, Oded Kedem | Zerto co-founders | Remained post-acquisition; Tel Aviv R&D leadership | Confirmed 6 |
| Juniper Networks | HPE wholly owned subsidiary (acquired March 2024) | US-HQ’d; Israeli engineering operations added to HPE footprint | Confirmed acquisition 8; Israeli scale undisclosed |
| Check Point Software Technologies | Technology alliance partner | Israeli-founded Tel Aviv HQ; Aruba/ProLiant security integration | Confirmed alliance; joint solution brief active 2023 19 |
| CyberArk Software | Technology alliance partner | Israeli-founded, Petah Tikva R&D; PAM integration with HPE servers | Confirmed alliance 2022–2024 20 |
| Palo Alto Networks | Technology alliance partner | Co-founded by Israeli national Nir Zuk; SSE/ZTNA integration with Aruba | Confirmed alliance; joint brief active 2023 21 |
| SentinelOne | Technology alliance partner | Israeli-national founding team; EDR integration with HPE servers | Confirmed alliance listing 2023 22 |
| HPE GreenLake | HPE platform | Zerto DRaaS embedded; marketed to government clients including in Israel | Confirmed 5 |
| HPE Aruba Networking | HPE division | Enterprise networking; Check Point, Palo Alto integrations at security layer | Confirmed |
| HPE Pointnext | HPE professional services | Systems integrator for enterprise deployments; active in Israel | Confirmed 24 |
| Project Nimbus | Israeli government contract | HPE not identified as contractor or sub-contractor | Confirmed absence 4 |
| Israeli Ministry of Defence / IDF | Israeli state security | No named HPE contract identified | Confirmed absence in primary sources 2 |
| Unit 8200 alumni ecosystem | Israeli military intelligence | Background characteristic of Check Point, CyberArk, SentinelOne founding ecosystems | Indirect/contextual 23 |
| OHCHR Settlement Database | UN body | HPE absent from 2020 version; not updated comprehensively since | Confirmed 12 |
| UN A/HRC/59/23 | UN Special Rapporteur report | HPE not named in §§36–43; full verification at training-data edge | Partial confirmation 10 |
| AFSC Investigate | NGO database | HPE profiled; basis is IT infrastructure broadly | Confirmed 18 |
| Who Profits Research Center | NGO database | HPE infrastructure-of-control profile; not prominently featured | Confirmed 1 |
The economic domain is the highest-scoring in this dossier and the primary driver of HPE’s composite BDS-1000 score. The V-ECON score reflects a compound finding: HPE has a physical and capital presence in Israel spanning decades, documented relationships with Israeli government and security-sector clients for IT systems that operate within the machinery of occupation, material capital investment in Israeli-origin technology through the Zerto and Juniper acquisitions, and a sustained channel partner and managed-services ecosystem that generates ongoing economic activity in the Israeli market.
The physical foundation of HPE’s Israeli economic presence is the Ra’anana/Petah Tikva office, operated under HPE’s EMEA regional structure and inherited from Hewlett-Packard’s pre-split commercial presence dating to at least the 1990s.1 This is not a nominal registration — it is a live operational hub supporting pre-sales, solutions architecture, customer support, and R&D staff for the Israeli enterprise and government markets. HPE Israel is registered as a legal entity under Israeli corporate law, pays Israeli corporate tax on locally generated income, and participates in the Israeli government procurement system.15
The most consequential economic relationship documented in civil society research is HPE’s (and its predecessor HP’s) involvement in Israeli government IT infrastructure for population control and occupation management. Who Profits has documented that HP supplied the Basel System biometric population registry — used by the Israeli Ministry of Interior for Palestinian ID management in the West Bank — from approximately 2002, and that this relationship, along with checkpoint computing infrastructure, was documented through Who Profits profiles through 2023 without confirmed discontinuation.1 War on Want and Who Profits have documented HP-branded hardware at Israeli military checkpoints.25 AFSC Investigate characterises HPE as having commercial relationships with Israeli defence and security sector customers, including documented ties to border control systems.18
The post-2015 attribution of these relationships between HPE and HP Inc. is a central and unresolved evidentiary question. The 2015 corporate split assigned different product categories to each entity, and specific contracts require contract-level review to determine which legal entity is the current counterparty. Continuation of these relationships under HPE’s name post-2015 has not been confirmed in primary procurement documents available in the research corpus. This is the most significant uncertainty in this domain and is explicitly flagged as an open question. However, Who Profits’ profiles through 2023 document the relationships without noting formal discontinuation, and the commercial architecture — a live Israeli subsidiary with an active government channel — creates the structural conditions for continuation.1 18
The capital footprint created by the Zerto acquisition (~$374 million, September 2021) represents a direct, confirmed, post-split investment by HPE in Israeli-origin technology.5 The R&D facility this investment supports is not ancillary — it is the primary engineering base for Zerto’s continuous data protection software, which is now embedded in HPE GreenLake and sold globally. The Juniper Networks acquisition (March 2024, ~$14 billion) adds Israeli engineering operations to HPE’s ownership footprint, though the precise scale of that Israeli component is not publicly disclosed.8
HPE’s channel partner ecosystem in Israel — including value-added resellers and system integrators serving both commercial and government end-users — generates economic activity beyond HPE’s direct headcount. HPE PointNext professional services operate in Israel through this partner network.24 HPE GreenLake cloud services are actively marketed in Israel, as evidenced by Israeli business press coverage of GreenLake partner launches and ecosystem activities between 2022 and 2024.26
The Israeli-Nexus Floor trigger — which would push the economic domain score to 7.0+ if HPE were Israeli-founded, Israeli-headquartered, or had Israeli beneficial ownership — does not apply. HPE is US-incorporated, US-headquartered, and has no Israeli controlling shareholder.2 11 This is not a structurally Israeli company, and the scoring correctly reflects that distinction. The 5.5 Impact and 8.0 Proximity scores reflect Operational Presence with direct corporate operation — above Sustained Trade (3.1–3.9) because HPE has R&D and professional services functions in Israel, but below Strategic FDI / Core Infrastructure (6.1+) because Israeli operations are a support and R&D function rather than a dominant national sector position.
The Magnitude score of 6.5 (Significant Scale) reflects the compound weight of confirmed capital investments (Zerto, Juniper), a decades-long physical presence, documented government IT supply relationships, and a live channel partner ecosystem. No Israel-specific revenue is disclosed; the score is derived from confirmed anchors rather than financial quantum.2 Departure from the Israeli market would require unwinding Zerto’s engineering infrastructure, Juniper Israel operations, government client relationships, and a channel ecosystem built over decades — the entanglement is structural, not marginal.
The strongest counter-argument is the post-split attribution gap. The specific biometric registry and checkpoint IT relationships that anchor the most serious documented concerns in Who Profits and AFSC research are documented primarily for the pre-2015 undivided Hewlett-Packard entity. HP Inc. — the consumer and printing spinoff — is the entity that nominally retained print and personal computing relationships most directly associated with the checkpoint printers and population registry hardware documented in older NGO reports. HPE, as the enterprise entity, retained servers, storage, and networking — the infrastructure more likely to underlie the Basel System backend — but a clean post-split contract attribution has not been confirmed in primary documents.
If post-2015 continuation of these contracts under HPE specifically were confirmed, the economic domain Impact score would rise from 5.5 toward the Strategic FDI band (6.5+), and the composite BDS-1000 score would likely enter Tier C. Conversely, if contract-level review demonstrated that these specific relationships transferred to HP Inc. and were subsequently terminated, the economic domain score would decline, potentially materially.
A second limitation is the absence of Israel-specific revenue disclosure. HPE’s geographic segment reporting aggregates Israel into the EMEA band without country-level breakout, making it impossible to assess the financial scale of Israeli operations from public filings.2 The Magnitude score of 6.5 is therefore derived from confirmed capital investments and documented relationship scope rather than from a revenue contribution figure. This creates uncertainty about whether the Israeli economic contribution is at the higher end of the Significant Scale band or toward its lower boundary.
No public evidence of Israeli state ownership, golden shares, or Israel Innovation Authority PTE status specific to HPE Israel has been confirmed, though IIA preferred enterprise arrangements are common for multinational R&D subsidiaries and individual approvals are not consistently published in English-language accessible sources.27
| Entity | Type | Relevance | Evidence Quality |
|---|---|---|---|
| HPE Israel (Hewlett-Packard Israel Ltd) | HPE subsidiary/affiliate | Ra’anana/Petah Tikva office; commercial and R&D presence | Confirmed 26 |
| Zerto | HPE wholly owned subsidiary | Tel Aviv R&D; $374M acquisition; core GreenLake DRaaS | Confirmed 5 6 |
| Juniper Networks (Israel operations) | HPE wholly owned (post-March 2024) | Israeli engineering operations; precise scale undisclosed | Confirmed acquisition; scale is evidence gap 8 |
| Basel System / BioMOS | Israeli government IT system | Biometric population registry; HP documented as supplier from c. 2002 | Confirmed for pre-split HP; post-split attribution unconfirmed 1 25 |
| Israeli Ministry of Interior | Israeli state body | Operator of Basel System biometric registry | Confirmed as end-user of HP-supplied system 1 |
| IDF checkpoints (West Bank) | Military infrastructure | HP-branded checkpoint computing documented by War on Want/Who Profits | Confirmed for pre-split HP; post-split attribution unconfirmed 25 |
| Who Profits Research Center | NGO | Primary civil society documentation of HP/HPE Israeli government IT relationships | Confirmed ongoing profiles 1 |
| AFSC Investigate | NGO | HPE characterised as technology provider with defence/border control ties | Confirmed 18 |
| War on Want | NGO | Documented HP checkpoint computing and biometric registry; ongoing campaign | Confirmed 25 |
| HPE PointNext | HPE division | Professional services in Israel via channel partner network | Confirmed 24 |
| HPE GreenLake | HPE platform | Actively marketed in Israel; Israeli state contracts unconfirmed | Confirmed marketing; contracts unconfirmed 5 26 |
| Israel Innovation Authority (IIA) | Israeli state body | IIA PTE status for HPE Israel not confirmed or excluded | Evidence gap 27 |
| Vanguard, BlackRock, State Street | Institutional shareholders | Largest HPE shareholders; no Israel-specific investment mandates | Confirmed 11 |
| BDS Movement | Civil society | Long-running campaign targeting HP/HPE for Israeli government IT relationships | Confirmed 7 |
| Norwegian GPFG (NBIM) | Sovereign wealth fund | No confirmed HPE exclusion on Israeli-nexus grounds | Confirmed absence 28 |
| PAX Netherlands (June 2024) | NGO report | HPE referenced in context of Israeli security entity technology relationships | Confirmed 9 |
| UN OHCHR Settlement Database | UN body | HPE absent from 2020 version; updates since 2020 uncertain | Confirmed 12 |
HPE’s political domain profile is defined more by documented omissions than by positive acts of political advocacy. The central finding is a pattern of selective engagement: HPE publicly suspended commercial sales in Russia and Belarus following the February 2022 invasion, with CEO Antonio Neri confirming the suspension and the financial impact disclosed in SEC filings.2 No equivalent public statement, operational adjustment, disclosure, or contract review has been identified in relation to Gaza, the occupied Palestinian territories, or Israeli military operations after October 2023.29 This asymmetry — suspension for one conflict, silence for another — is documented evidence of selective conflict engagement. It is not a neutral position; it is a positive corporate act of treating the two conflicts differently, and it is one of the best-evidenced findings in this domain.
HPE’s formal ESG governance framework includes Global Network Initiative membership and Responsible Business Alliance membership — both creating framework obligations around human rights due diligence.30 31 HPE’s Human Rights Policy Statement articulates general commitments aligned to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. However, none of these frameworks, as applied by HPE, have produced publicly documented outputs specifically addressing HPE’s Israel operations, GNI due diligence on Israeli government client engagements, or human rights assessments of occupation-economy supply chain exposure.29 The frameworks exist but their application to the conflict-affected context is absent from any public disclosure.
HPE participates in Cybertech Tel Aviv, an event co-organised in partnership with the Israeli Ministry of Economy and the Israel Export and International Cooperation Institute.32 This institutional sponsorship carries a Brand Israel and national-promotion dimension distinct from ordinary commercial technology conference attendance. However, the precise sponsorship tier, financial commitment, and years of participation require verification against Cybertech event archives and primary HPE press releases; confirmed financial depth is an evidence gap that constrains movement to the Institutional Legitimation band (6.1+) in Impact scoring.
HPE maintains a partnership with the Technion — Israel Institute of Technology — documented through joint research programmes and HPE’s academic partnership framework.33 The Technion receives significant Israeli government and defence ministry funding and maintains formal collaboration with IDF elite technology units through the Talpiot programme. The specific scope, financial terms, and research topics of HPE’s Technion relationship — and whether any deliverables have dual-use or defence applications — are not confirmed in primary documents reviewed. This constitutes an evidence gap. If Technion research deliverables under the HPE partnership are shown to have defence applications, the political domain score would need reassessment at the Institutional Legitimation level.
HPE participates in Start-Up Nation Central ecosystem activities in Israel — an Israeli government-linked initiative that markets Israeli technology internationally.33 Participation has been at conference and ecosystem level; no formal partnership agreement has been identified in publicly available records.
In lobbying, HPE’s Senate LDA disclosures for 2022–2024 show lobbying on federal IT procurement, semiconductor policy, export controls, and trade policy — none of which specifically reference Israel-Palestine policy, anti-BDS legislation, or settlement-related trade.34 HPE’s PAC (FEC C00628677) makes bipartisan contributions consistent with large-cap US tech company patterns; no PAC disbursements to AIPAC, NORPAC, or explicitly pro-Israel political committees have been identified in FEC records.35
No corporate donations by HPE to the Friends of the Israel Defense Forces, JNF/KKL, Israeli reservist funds, or settlement organisations have been identified. No crisis asset mobilisation (cloud credits, infrastructure, free services) directed to Israeli military or state-aligned NGOs has been identified for the post-October 2023 period, in contrast to documented HPE infrastructure support for Ukrainian government entities after the February 2022 invasion.31
CEO Antonio Neri has issued no public statement, op-ed, or social media post addressing Palestinian civilian casualties, Gaza operations, or conflict-related humanitarian concerns.36 Board members have not been identified as holding personal roles in FIDF, JNF, AIPAC, settlement organisations, or Israeli defence companies. No HPE response to the July 2024 ICJ Advisory Opinion or November 2024 ICC arrest warrants has been identified in any public disclosure, investor communication, or policy statement.2
The scoring of the political domain at Business-as-Usual upper end (Impact 4.0) requires acknowledging the strongest objection: corporate silence on a political conflict is the default for most multinational companies, and singling out HPE for not issuing a Gaza statement when the majority of Fortune 500 companies have also been silent could be characterised as applying an asymmetric standard. The Russia contrast is genuine evidence of selective engagement, but one can argue that Russia presented a clearer case of state aggression triggering sanctions compliance obligations that informed HPE’s business decision, whereas the Gaza situation involves a more complex geopolitical and legal landscape where corporate action was less clearly commercially compelled.
The Cybertech and Technion findings are real but constrained by evidentiary gaps. Cybertech participation is confirmed; financial sponsorship tier is not. Technion partnership is confirmed; dual-use research deliverable is not. These elements create upward pressure toward the Institutional Legitimation band (6.1+) but without confirmed financial quantum or research application they cannot firmly anchor there. The 4.0 Impact score reflects the confirmed upper end of Business-as-Usual while acknowledging the Institutional Legitimation-adjacent character of these two relationships. If either gap is resolved — confirmed material-tier Cybertech sponsorship, or Technion research with confirmed defence application — a re-evaluation at 6.1–6.5 would be warranted.
A full ProPublica/IRS TEOS search for foundations linked to current HPE board members has not been conducted and constitutes an identified evidence gap. Before this domain scoring is finalised in any subsequent review cycle, that search should be completed. The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and David and Lucile Packard Foundation are legally separate from HPE and are excluded from the executive footprint analysis.
The BDS campaign’s conflation of HPE and HP Inc. under a unified “HP” brand — reflected in BDS materials, Electronic Intifada coverage, and civil society reporting — creates interpretive difficulty when assessing the political targeting of HPE specifically. Campaign materials that do not cleanly distinguish post-split entities cannot be straightforwardly interpreted as evidence about HPE’s specific political positioning.
| Entity | Type | Relevance | Evidence Quality |
|---|---|---|---|
| Antonio Neri | HPE CEO | No public Gaza/OPT statement identified; confirmed Russia suspension disclosures | Confirmed 2 36 |
| HPE Board (FY2024) | Governance body | No members identified with FIDF/AIPAC/settlement roles | Confirmed absence 11 |
| Cybertech Tel Aviv | Industry event | Co-organised with Israeli Ministry of Economy; HPE participation confirmed; sponsorship tier unconfirmed | Confirmed participation 32 |
| Technion — Israel Institute of Technology | Israeli university | HPE partnership documented; scope/dual-use character unconfirmed | Confirmed partnership; research scope is evidence gap 33 |
| Start-Up Nation Central | Israeli government-linked initiative | HPE ecosystem participation at conference level | Confirmed 33 |
| Global Network Initiative (GNI) | Industry framework | HPE member; no Israel-specific due diligence outputs identified | Confirmed membership 30 |
| Responsible Business Alliance (RBA) | Industry framework | HPE member; no OPT-specific outputs identified | Confirmed membership 31 |
| HPE Human Rights Policy Statement | Corporate policy | General UNGP commitments; no conflict-specific provisions | Confirmed 29 |
| HPE Living Progress Report (2023, 2024) | Corporate ESG disclosure | No OPT/Gaza/settlement reference identified | Confirmed 31 |
| BDS Movement (“Boycott HP”) | Civil society campaign | Longstanding campaign; does not cleanly separate HPE from HP Inc. | Confirmed campaign 7 |
| Who Profits (Aruba Networks profile) | NGO | Documents Aruba networking equipment in Israeli institutional contexts | Confirmed 3 |
| War on Want | NGO | Documents checkpoint computing and biometric registry for undivided HP | Confirmed 25 |
| Electronic Intifada | Civil society media | Multiple articles (2012–2024) on HP Israeli military/biometric role | Confirmed; HPE/HP Inc. not always separated 37 |
| Tech Workers Coalition | Civil society | Sector-wide open letters (November 2023); HPE not named as respondent | Confirmed absence 38 |
| HPE PAC (FEC C00628677) | Political committee | Bipartisan contributions; no AIPAC/NORPAC disbursements identified | Confirmed 35 |
| LDA Senate Lobbying filings | Regulatory record | No Israel-related lobbying topics identified 2022–2024 | Confirmed 34 |
| ICJ Advisory Opinion (July 2024) | International law | No HPE response identified | Confirmed absence 2 |
| ICC Arrest Warrants (November 2024) | International law | No HPE response identified | Confirmed absence 2 |
| William & Flora Hewlett Foundation | Separate legal entity | Legally separate from HPE; excluded from analysis | Confirmed separation |
| David & Lucile Packard Foundation | Separate legal entity | Legally separate from HPE; excluded from analysis | Confirmed separation |
Across all four domains, the most consequential unresolved question is the post-2015 corporate split attribution of the biometric population registry and checkpoint computing relationships. The pre-split Hewlett-Packard entity’s documented involvement in the Basel System and checkpoint IT infrastructure is well-evidenced in civil society research. Whether those specific contracts transferred to HPE (enterprise) or HP Inc. (consumer/printing) post-2015, and whether they remain active under the post-split entity, is analytically critical for both the V-ECON and V-POL domains, and indirectly for V-DIG. This is not a peripheral detail — it is the difference between a score anchored at the upper end of Operational Presence and one that reaches Strategic FDI/Core Infrastructure. Contract-level primary document review of Israeli government procurement records for the post-2015 period is the minimum necessary to resolve this question.
A second cross-domain limitation is the structural opacity of Israeli security procurement. The framework contract architecture used by Israeli government procurement agencies means that security-sector ministries may consume shared ICT contracts — potentially including HPE hardware and software — without generating individually attributable public procurement notices. This gap affects V-MIL (potential direct IDF/IMOD hardware supply), V-DIG (potential GreenLake or Zerto DRaaS deployment by Israeli security bodies), and V-ECON (scale of government IT relationships). No single public data source can close this gap; it would require access to Israeli government procurement records beyond those publicly indexed.
Third, the training-data edge on UN A/HRC/59/23 (July 2025) means that the Special Rapporteur’s most recent report cannot be fully verified at the paragraph level for HPE-specific findings. The report falls marginally outside the period for which comprehensive training coverage is confirmed. Direct reading of the published document is necessary before characterising HPE’s status in relation to that report with confidence.
Finally, the Juniper Networks Israel engineering specifics remain undisclosed. The March 2024 acquisition materially expanded HPE’s Israeli technical footprint, but the scale, headcount, and project assignments of Juniper’s Israeli operations are not publicly documented beyond press coverage and professional network data. This affects V-DIG (digital footprint scale) and V-ECON (economic magnitude) simultaneously.
| Entity | Domain(s) | Role | Evidence Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE) | All | Principal subject | High |
| HP Inc. | All | Post-2015 sibling entity; pre-split activities require attribution review | High |
| Hewlett-Packard Company (pre-2015) | All | Heritage entity; Basel System, checkpoint IT, Israeli government relationships | High (pre-split); attribution gap post-split |
| Antonio Neri | V-POL | HPE CEO; selective silence on Gaza; Russia suspension confirmed | High |
| Zerto (HPE subsidiary) | V-DIG, V-ECON | Israeli-founded DRaaS; Tel Aviv R&D; core GreenLake product | High |
| Juniper Networks (HPE subsidiary) | V-DIG, V-ECON | US HQ; Israeli engineering operations post-March 2024 | Confirmed acquisition; Israeli scale low confidence |
| Aruba Networks (HPE division) | V-MIL, V-DIG, V-POL | Enterprise networking; documented in Israeli institutional contexts | Confirmed |
| Check Point Software Technologies | V-DIG | Israeli-founded alliance partner; Aruba/ProLiant security integration | Confirmed (2023) |
| CyberArk Software | V-DIG | Israeli-founded alliance partner; PAM integration | Confirmed (2022–2024) |
| Palo Alto Networks | V-DIG | Alliance partner; SSE/ZTNA integration with Aruba | Confirmed (2023) |
| SentinelOne | V-DIG | Alliance partner; EDR integration | Confirmed (2023) |
| Basel System / BioMOS | V-ECON, V-POL | Biometric population registry; HP documented as supplier from c. 2002 | High (pre-split); post-split attribution gap |
| Israeli Ministry of Interior | V-ECON | Basel System operator | Confirmed as end-user |
| Israeli Ministry of Defence (IMOD) | V-MIL | No verified direct HPE contract | Absence confirmed in public sources |
| IDF (Israel Defence Forces) | V-MIL, V-POL | No verified direct HPE contract | Absence confirmed |
| Elbit Systems | V-MIL | No verified HPE supply relationship | Absence noted |
| Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) | V-MIL | No verified HPE supply relationship | Absence noted |
| Technion — Israel Institute of Technology | V-POL | HPE partnership; scope and dual-use character unconfirmed | Confirmed partnership; research scope gap |
| Cybertech Tel Aviv | V-POL | Israeli Ministry of Economy co-event; HPE participation confirmed | Confirmed participation; sponsorship tier gap |
| Start-Up Nation Central | V-POL | Israeli government-linked ecosystem; HPE participation | Confirmed |
| BDS Movement | V-ECON, V-POL | Long-running “Boycott HP” campaign targeting HP-lineage entities | Confirmed |
| Who Profits Research Center | All | Primary civil society documentation of HP/HPE Israeli government IT | Confirmed |
| AFSC Investigate | V-MIL, V-DIG, V-ECON | HPE profiled; IT infrastructure and government/defence relationships | Confirmed |
| PAX Netherlands | V-MIL, V-ECON | HPE not named in June 2024 weapons supply report; referenced in technology context | Confirmed |
| Al-Haq | V-MIL, V-DIG | Technology companies in OPT context; HPE not primary military subject | Confirmed |
| OHCHR Settlement Database | All | HPE absent from 2020 version; updates uncertain | Confirmed (2020); gap post-2020 |
| War on Want | V-ECON, V-POL | Checkpoint computing and biometric registry documentation | Confirmed |
| Amnesty International | V-MIL, V-DIG | Apartheid report (2022); contextual; HPE not named in military supply | Confirmed contextual |
| Human Rights Watch | V-MIL | A Threshold Crossed (2021); contextual; HPE not named in military supply | Confirmed contextual |
| B’Tselem | V-MIL | Apartheid documentation (2021); HPE not named | Confirmed contextual |
| Government Procurement Administration (Agra) | V-MIL, V-ECON | Israeli government ICT frameworks; HPE participates; security draw-down unverifiable | Structural gap confirmed |
| SIBAT | V-MIL | Israeli defence export body; HPE not listed | Confirmed |
| Global Network Initiative (GNI) | V-POL | HPE member; no Israel-specific due diligence outputs | Confirmed membership |
| Responsible Business Alliance (RBA) | V-POL | HPE member; no OPT-specific outputs | Confirmed |
| Norwegian GPFG (NBIM) | V-ECON | No confirmed HPE exclusion on Israeli-nexus grounds | Confirmed absence |
| Israel Innovation Authority (IIA) | V-ECON | PTE status for HPE Israel not confirmed or excluded | Evidence gap |
| HPE PAC (FEC C00628677) | V-POL | Bipartisan contributions; no AIPAC/NORPAC disbursements | Confirmed |
| Domain | I | M | P | V-Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| V-MIL | 1.50 | 1.50 | 1.50 | 0.07 |
| V-DIG | 5.50 | 4.50 | 8.50 | 3.54 |
| V-ECON | 5.50 | 6.50 | 8.00 | 5.11 |
| V-POL | 4.00 | 4.50 | 9.00 | 2.57 |
BDS-1000 Composite Score: 396 — Tier D (200–399)
V-ECON is the dominant domain (V_MAX = 5.11). The composite formula weights V_MAX at full value and the sum of the remaining three domains at 20%, divided by 16 and scaled to 1000. V-MIL’s incidental-band scores produce a near-zero domain contribution (0.07) due to the multiplicative structure of the formula, reflecting the confirmed absence of direct military supply relationships. V-DIG (3.54) and V-POL (2.57) contribute meaningfully to the Sum_OTHERS term.
The 396 score is a conservative floor. Three confirmed evidence gaps — post-split biometric registry contract continuity (V-ECON Impact), Cybertech sponsorship financial tier (V-POL Impact), and Juniper Israel engineering scope (V-DIG Magnitude) — each carry realistic potential to shift the composite into Tier C (400–599) if resolved against HPE. The score should not be read as a ceiling.
High confidence findings:
– HPE owns and operates Zerto’s Tel Aviv R&D centre (confirmed acquisition, ~$374M, September 2021); Zerto technology is core to GreenLake DRaaS 5 6
– HPE acquired Juniper Networks (March 2024, ~$14B), adding Israeli engineering operations 8
– HPE publicly suspended Russia operations (February 2022); no equivalent Gaza/OPT action identified 2
– HPE is absent from PAX Netherlands June 2024 named companies list and from the OHCHR settlement database (2020 version) 9 12
– No verified direct contract between HPE and IDF, IMOD, or Israeli intelligence agencies identified in any primary source 2
– Technology alliance partnerships with Check Point, CyberArk, Palo Alto Networks, and SentinelOne confirmed as of 2022–2023 19 20 21 22
– HPE participates in Cybertech Tel Aviv and maintains a Technion partnership 32 33
Moderate confidence findings:
– Who Profits documents the biometric registry and checkpoint IT relationships without confirmed discontinuation through 2023; post-split attribution between HPE and HP Inc. is unconfirmed 1 25
– Juniper Israel engineering operations exist and are now HPE-owned; scale is undisclosed 8
– Alliance partner OEM depth (Check Point, CyberArk) vs. directory listing cannot be determined from public sources 19 20
Open questions requiring primary-document resolution:
1. Do the Basel System biometric registry and checkpoint IT contracts continue under HPE (rather than HP Inc.) post-November 2015? Contract-level review of Israeli government procurement records is required.
2. What is HPE’s sponsorship tier and financial commitment at Cybertech Tel Aviv? Primary review of Cybertech event archives and HPE press releases required.
3. What are the scale, headcount, and project assignments of Juniper Israel engineering operations under HPE? Post-acquisition integration reporting is required.
4. Has the OHCHR settlement database been updated to include HPE since 2020? Live database access required.
5. Does the full text of UN A/HRC/59/23 (July 2025) name HPE in any section? Primary document review required.
6. Do Technion research deliverables under the HPE partnership have dual-use or defence applications? Primary review of Technion annual reports and HPE grant disclosures required.
7. What is the current IIA PTE status of HPE Israel, if any? IIA records review required.
8. Do current HPE board members hold personal roles in FIDF, JNF, or comparable organisations? Full ProPublica/IRS TEOS search for board member foundations required.
Recommendations are graduated by the validated score, evidence strength, and uncertainty level. They are not legal conclusions.
Immediate due diligence (Tier D, high-confidence evidence base):
– Investors, procurement officers, and institutional allocators should request HPE’s formal written position on: (a) whether the Basel System biometric registry relationship continues post-2015 under HPE or any HPE subsidiary; (b) what end-use monitoring procedures govern HPE hardware sales to Israeli government clients through framework contracts; and (c) whether GreenLake or Zerto DRaaS services have been contracted by Israeli security-sector bodies. The absence of public disclosure on these questions, combined with the documented history, creates a reputational exposure that standard commercial due diligence should surface.
Engagement before divestment (evidence gaps constrain threshold assessment):
– The 396 score is a conservative floor in a Tier D band, and three evidence gaps constrain a Tier C determination. Before divestment decisions anchored to this score, institutional investors should commission primary-document research to resolve the post-split attribution gap (biometric registry/checkpoint IT) and the Cybertech sponsorship tier. Resolution of either could shift the composite into Tier C, materially strengthening the threshold for divestment consideration.
Supply-chain screening:
– Procurement officers in public institutions with conflict-sensitive purchasing policies should note that HPE GreenLake services are delivered via Zerto-powered infrastructure developed at an Israeli R&D centre. For institutions with policies requiring disclosure of Israeli-origin technology in procured services, this relationship warrants flagging.
Advocacy and engagement targets:
– HPE’s GNI membership creates a formal framework for stakeholder engagement on freedom of expression and privacy due diligence. Civil society organisations with standing to engage GNI member companies should request that HPE produce a published due diligence assessment of its Israeli government client relationships under the GNI Principles, specifically addressing whether HPE has assessed whether its products and services may enable surveillance or privacy violations in the occupied territories.
– The selective silence finding — Russia suspension confirmed, no Gaza/OPT equivalent — is the most clearly evidenced political domain finding and the most tractable engagement point for institutional shareholders. A shareholder resolution requesting a board-level human rights risk assessment of HPE’s Israeli operations, benchmarked against the methodology applied to the Russia suspension decision, would be consistent with HPE’s stated GNI and UNGP commitments.
Watch-list status:
– Given the 396 conservative-floor score and the identified gap structure, HPE warrants placement on an active watch list pending: (a) resolution of the post-split attribution question; (b) the next OHCHR database update; and (c) the full-text availability of UN A/HRC/59/23 for paragraph-level verification. The score should be re-evaluated if any of these inputs materially change.
Who Profits Research Center — HPE company profile — https://whoprofits.org/company/hewlett-packard-enterprise ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
HPE SEC filings — Annual reports (10-K) — https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001645590&type=10-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=10 ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
Who Profits Research Center — Aruba Networks profile — https://whoprofits.org/company/hewlett-packard-aruba-networks/ ↩↩
Reuters — Google and Amazon win Project Nimbus — https://www.reuters.com/technology/google-amazon-win-12-billion-israeli-government-cloud-contract-2021-05-02/ ↩↩↩
HPE newsroom — Zerto acquisition announcement — https://www.hpe.com/us/en/living-progress/news/hpe-acquires-zerto.html ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
Zerto — About page — https://www.zerto.com/company/about/ ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
BDS Movement — Boycott HP campaign — https://bdsmovement.net/act/actions/boycott-hp ↩↩↩
HPE newsroom — Juniper Networks acquisition announcement — https://www.hpe.com/us/en/newsroom/press-release/2024/01/hewlett-packard-enterprise-to-acquire-juniper-networks.html ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
PAX Netherlands — Companies Arming Israel and Their Financiers (June 2024) — https://paxforpeace.nl/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/PAX-Companies-Arming-Israel-and-their-Financiers-June-2024.pdf ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
UN Special Rapporteur A/HRC/59/23 — Economy of occupation to economy of genocide — https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g25/136/85/pdf/g2513685.pdf ↩↩↩
HPE SEC filings — Proxy statements (DEF 14A) — https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001645590&type=DEF+14A&dateb=&owner=include&count=10 ↩↩↩↩
OHCHR — Database of business enterprises, HRC Resolution 31/36 — https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session31/database-hrc3136 ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
HPE Edgeline IoT systems product page — https://www.hpe.com/us/en/servers/edgeline-iot-systems.html ↩↩↩
USASpending.gov — Federal procurement data — https://www.usaspending.gov/search/ ↩↩
Israeli Government Procurement Administration — https://www.mr.gov.il/ ↩↩↩↩
SIBAT — Israeli Defence Export and Defence Cooperation Directorate — https://www.sibat.mod.gov.il ↩↩↩
EU Export Controls information — https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/help-topics/export-controls_en ↩
AFSC Investigate — HPE company profile — https://investigate.afsc.org/company/hewlett-packard-enterprise ↩↩↩↩↩
Check Point — HPE technology partnership — https://www.checkpoint.com/partners/technology-partners/hpe/ ↩↩↩↩↩
CyberArk — HPE partner solution — https://h20195.www2.hpe.com/v2/getpdf.aspx/a00127169enw.pdf ↩↩↩↩↩
Palo Alto Networks — HPE Aruba technology partnership — https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/partners/technology-partners/hpe-aruba ↩↩↩
SentinelOne — Technology alliance partners — https://www.sentinelone.com/partners/technology-alliance/ ↩↩↩
Start-Up Nation Central — Israeli tech ecosystem — https://startupnationcentral.org/ ↩↩
HPE Pointnext services — https://www.hpe.com/us/en/services/pointnext.html ↩↩↩
Who Profits Research Center — Financing the Land Grab report — https://whoprofits.org/publication/financing-land-grab/ ↩↩↩↩↩↩
Globes — Israeli business press, HPE Israel coverage — https://en.globes.co.il/ ↩↩↩
Israel Innovation Authority — https://www.innovationisrael.org.il/en/ ↩↩
Norges Bank Investment Management — Exclusion of companies — https://www.nbim.no/en/responsible-investment/exclusion-of-companies/ ↩
HPE Human Rights Policy Statement — https://h20195.www2.hpe.com/v2/getpdf.aspx/a00110841enw.pdf ↩↩↩
Global Network Initiative — HPE membership — https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/member/hewlett-packard-enterprise/ ↩↩
HPE Living Progress Report — https://www.hpe.com/us/en/living-progress/report.html ↩↩↩↩
Globes — HPE Israel Technion and Start-Up Nation activities — https://en.globes.co.il/en/hewlett-packard ↩↩↩↩↩
Senate LDA — HPE lobbying filings — https://lda.senate.gov/filings/public/filing/search/?registrant=hewlett+packard+enterprise ↩↩
FEC — HPE PAC Committee C00628677 — https://www.fec.gov/data/committee/C00628677/ ↩↩
Antonio Neri LinkedIn profile — https://www.linkedin.com/in/antonio-neri-hpe/ ↩↩
Electronic Intifada — Hewlett-Packard coverage — https://electronicintifada.net/tags/hewlett-packard ↩
Tech Workers Coalition — https://techworkerscoalition.org/ ↩
UN Special Rapporteur A/HRC/55/73 — Anatomy of a Genocide — https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/ahrc5573-anatomy-genocide ↩
Al-Haq — Business and Human Rights in the OPT (2024) — https://www.alhaq.org/publications/22401.html ↩
Amnesty International — Israel’s Apartheid Against Palestinians (2022) — https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde15/5141/2022/en/ ↩
Human Rights Watch — A Threshold Crossed (2021) — https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution ↩
OECD Watch — NCP complaints register — https://www.oecdwatch.org/complaints/ ↩
War on Want — Corporate complicity in Israeli violations — https://www.waronwant.org/resources/corporate-complicity-israeli-violations ↩
Don’t Buy Into Occupation — 2024 company list — https://www.dontbuyintooccupation.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/DBIO_2024_company-list.pdf ↩
BDS Movement — Hewlett-Packard target page — https://bdsmovement.net/target/hewlett-packard ↩
Crunchbase — Zerto organisation profile — https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/zerto ↩
OpenSecrets — HPE political spending summary — https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/hewlett-packard-enterprise/summary?id=D000067274 ↩
