Israir MILITARY

Target: Israir Airlines and Tourism Ltd.; Israir Group Ltd.

Research date: 25 October 2026

Domain: Military Forensics (Military)

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

Israeli Ministry of Defense - 2001 aviation procurement

On 4 February 2001, Ynet reported that Israir had won an Israeli Ministry of Defense tender to operate flights for the Israeli Air Force between Tel Aviv and Ramon Air Base in the Negev, with eight scheduled flights weekly and an annual contract value of approximately NIS 3 million. [pre-2020] ¹

The reported arrangement had an initial one-year term and options for two additional years; continuation beyond those options has not been established by the reviewed evidence. [pre-2020] ¹

Israeli Ministry of Defense - 2004 military passenger transport

On 25 July 2004, Ynet reported that Israir had won a Ministry of Defense contract to transport soldiers between Sde Dov Airport in Tel Aviv and Eilat, with an estimated annual value of NIS 6.5 million. [pre-2020] ²

The same report described existing Israir services for the Ministry of Defense to Ovda Air Base, valued at approximately NIS 6 million annually, and identified Israir as the principal domestic aviation provider to the ministry at that time. [pre-2020] ²

Israir’s then chief executive, Sabina Biran, publicly acknowledged the company’s role in providing domestic flights to the Ministry of Defense following the 2004 award. [pre-2020] ²

The 2001 and 2004 records establish historical direct defence-service procurement involving passenger transport; neither record establishes an active contract in 2026. ^{1, 2}

Military transportation framework

An official IDF directive provides for eligible military personnel and civilian IDF employees to travel either on aircraft chartered by the military or using vouchers for civilian airline flights, with the directive identifying Ben Gurion–Ovda as a chartered-aircraft route. ³

The presence of a civilian airline within this transport framework does not by itself establish a specific contemporary procurement award to that airline. ³

Military travel approvals

IDF international travel guidance expressly identifies Israir, El Al, and Arkia among Israeli airlines whose flights are approved for military personnel under the relevant route rules. ⁴

That guidance establishes Israir’s eligibility for ordinary military personnel travel but does not identify a particular Ministry of Defense procurement contract. ⁴

Corporate identity and ownership

Israir Group became the publicly traded parent of Israir Airlines and Tourism after the acquisition and restructuring of the airline business, with Globes reporting the group’s NIS 25 million stock-market fundraising in June 2022. ⁵

Globes identified Rami Levy and Shalom Haim as significant figures in the ownership structure through direct holdings and associated corporate vehicles. ⁵

A May 2024 Tel Aviv Stock Exchange disclosure identified Shalom Haim as a director of both Israir Group and its wholly owned airline subsidiary. ⁶

A subsequently published shareholder table identified Shay Odem and Rami Levy as significant holders of Israir Group shares, although those figures should be understood as the ownership snapshot displayed by that source. ⁷

Defence export-directory listings

No public evidence identified of Israir being registered as an Israeli weapons exporter, military aircraft manufacturer, or defence-equipment supplier in the reviewed records. ^{5, 6}

Recent defence procurement

No public evidence identified establishing a renewed Israeli Ministry of Defense passenger-transport tender, contract value, or duration for Israir during 2024–2026. ^{1, 2, 3}

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Civilian aviation services

Israir operates commercial passenger aviation services, including domestic routes between Ben Gurion Airport and Ramon International Airport near Eilat. ⁸

The civilian Ramon International Airport serving Eilat is geographically and operationally distinct from the Ramon Air Base identified in Israir’s historical Ministry of Defense transport contract. ^{1, 8}

Aircraft and operational infrastructure

Contemporary reporting describes Israir’s commercial aviation operations and use of passenger aircraft, including Airbus equipment and chartering arrangements. ^{8, 9}

October 2026 aviation reporting described Israir’s use of wet-leasing arrangements, under which aircraft, crew, maintenance, and insurance may be supplied by another operator. ⁹

No public evidence identified that these commercial aircraft were modified by Israir into military reconnaissance, weapons-delivery, tactical transport, or electronic-warfare platforms. ^{8, 9}

Military personnel as civilian passengers

IDF guidance allows serving personnel to use Israir flights subject to applicable military travel rules, without identifying any military-specific aircraft configuration. ⁴

This permits civilian travel by military personnel and does not independently demonstrate that the aircraft provide a purpose-built military capability. ⁴

Militarised products

No public evidence identified of Israir manufacturing or commercially marketing militarised aircraft variants, tactical drones, weapons-integration equipment, or military-specific onboard systems. ^{8, 9}

Export controls and end-user certification

No public evidence identified of an Israir-specific defence export licence, military end-user certificate, or application for authorisation to export weapons or tactical aircraft systems. ^{9, 10}

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

Occupied-territory equipment

No public evidence identified establishing that Israir supplied construction machinery, engineering equipment, demolition vehicles, or heavy equipment used in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza, or the occupied Syrian Golan. ^{11, 12}

Airfield infrastructure

The 2001 Ministry of Defense contract concerned passenger flights to Ramon Air Base, while the 2004 reporting separately identified military transport services involving Ovda Air Base. [pre-2020] ^{1, 2}

Those records concern aviation services and do not establish that Israir constructed, expanded, owned, or maintained the military airfield infrastructure. ^{1, 2}

Commercial flights near military installations

Israir’s commercial flights to Ramon International Airport serve the civilian Eilat aviation market, including ordinary domestic passengers. ⁸

Civilian operations at Ramon International Airport do not establish service provision to Ramon Air Base or to a military installation. ^{1, 8}

Settlement-related controlling-principal interests

Who Profits identifies Rami Levi Hashikma Marketing, a retail business associated with Israir controlling principal Rami Levy, in its corporate database of businesses involved in settlement-related activity. ^{5, 13}

The Who Profits entry categorises the retail business under settlement-related services and construction-related activity, while Israir’s documented historical defence contracts concern passenger aviation. ^{2, 13}

No public evidence identified that Israir Airlines itself supplied heavy machinery, construction services, or engineering support to settlements through the retail business. ^{5, 13}

Military and settlement infrastructure contracts

No public evidence identified of an Israir contract for constructing or maintaining checkpoints, the separation barrier, detention facilities, military bases, or settlement infrastructure. ^{11, 12, 13}

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

Israeli defence manufacturers

No public evidence identified of a direct component-supply contract between Israir and Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, or Israel Military Industries. ^{5, 6}

Defence aviation supply chain

Israir’s public operational profile in the reviewed evidence concerns airline passenger services and commercial aircraft operations, including civilian aircraft leasing arrangements. ^{8, 9}

No public evidence identified that Israir provided defence-prime contractors with aircraft structures, engines, avionics, guidance electronics, propulsion assemblies, or tactical communication systems. ^{8, 9}

Joint development

No public evidence identified of a joint military aircraft development, licensed weapons-production, or military technology-transfer agreement involving Israir and the named Israeli defence manufacturers. ^{5, 9}

Controlling shareholders

The June 2022 corporate transaction reporting connects Rami Levy and Shalom Haim to Israir Group’s ownership, and the May 2024 stock exchange disclosure identifies Shalom Haim as a director. ^{5, 6}

No public evidence identified in the reviewed material establishing a defence-prime directorship, weapons-manufacturing equity interest, or military technology co-production agreement attributable to these individuals through Israir. ^{5, 6}

Military-sector adjacent ownership

The documented relationship between Israir Group and its controlling principals establishes a corporate governance connection; it does not establish that the airline supplies military components through the principals’ other businesses. ^{5, 6, 13}

2022–2023 - contemporaneous corporate evidence establishes common controlling-principal involvement between Israir and Rami Levy’s retail interests, while providing a narrower basis for operational integration. Globes reported in June 2022 that Israir Group’s principal shareholders before its public offering included Shay Odem, jointly owned by Rami Levy and Shalom Haim, and Rami Levy individually. Israir’s Spring–Summer 2023 magazine independently identified Levy as the controlling owner of Rami Levy Marketing Shikma and described anticipated cooperation between the controlling owners for the benefit of vacationers. This establishes common-person ownership and a publicly articulated intention to develop commercial synergies. Neither source identifies the physical soldier-package initiative as an Israir activity or establishes an airline contribution of capital, personnel, aircraft, warehousing or distribution services to that initiative. ^{5, 14}

2023–2024 - Israir’s corporate governance records support a distinction between group-level ownership and operational participation. A Tel Aviv Stock Exchange disclosure effective 12 July 2023 identified Shalom Haim as a director of both Israir Group and its wholly owned airline subsidiary, with Moti Hazan serving as chairman of both. The disclosure establishes management arrangements within the aviation group, but does not identify a management appointment connecting Israir to the Rami Levy retail or telecommunications distribution initiative. The documented common ownership therefore cannot independently establish management or logistical integration for the soldier-package distribution. ^{5, 15}

November–December 2023 - the physical package distribution and discounted mobile-service offer were distinct reported activities. The December accounts specifically identify Rami Levy Communications as the provider of the NIS 1 annual mobile-service package, obtainable through its 40 branches subject to military identification. The same accounts describe the donation and distribution of physical accessories and confectionery as an additional initiative without identifying those branches as the physical distribution network. The November report instead identifies representatives of the supermarket chain accompanying Rami Levy during direct food delivery to soldiers. These records establish separate reported delivery arrangements and do not demonstrate that the mobile-service retail network, Israir’s aviation infrastructure or a shared logistics system handled the donated physical packages. ^{16, 17, 18, 19}

November 2023–October 2026 - no public evidence identified: the reviewed package-distribution accounts, Israir ownership disclosures, July 2023 management disclosure and contemporaneous Israir corporate publication contain no identified intercompany funding transfer, shared distribution agreement, package-procurement contract, logistics subcontract, common warehouse arrangement or documented allocation of Israir resources to the soldier-package initiative. The identified ownership overlap and general commercial-synergy statement establish a potential corporate relationship, but do not substantiate operational or capital integration for this specific activity. No reviewed source affirmatively rules out undisclosed arrangements. ^{16, 17, 18, 19, 5, 14, 15}

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

Historical military passenger transport

In 2001, Israir was reported to have contracted with the Israeli Ministry of Defense for eight weekly flights between Tel Aviv and Ramon Air Base, at an annual value of approximately NIS 3 million. [pre-2020] ¹

In 2004, Israir was reported to have won an additional Ministry of Defense contract worth approximately NIS 6.5 million annually for transporting soldiers between Tel Aviv and Eilat. [pre-2020] ²

The 2004 report also documented Ministry of Defense flights to Ovda Air Base, with estimated annual activity of NIS 6 million. [pre-2020] ²

These routes constitute documented historical logistical support through domestic military personnel transportation, while their present contractual status remains unverified. ^{1, 2}

Discounted flights for military personnel, 2023

On 9 November 2023, Ynet reported that Israir would offer IDF personnel, relatives of residents of communities near Gaza, and other eligible passengers Tel Aviv–Eilat flights for NIS 99. ²⁰

The programme followed government initiatives concerning travel for displaced residents and affected families, while Israir’s offer expressly included serving IDF personnel. ²⁰

The reported arrangement establishes a specific preferential commercial travel offer for military personnel during the 2023 conflict period, without identifying the Israeli Ministry of Defense as the purchaser of those discounted tickets. ²⁰

Proposed Hatzerim Air Base services

The same November 2023 report stated that Israir was examining possible flights between Eilat and Hatzerim Air Base in consultation with relevant parties, including military authorities. ²⁰

The report described consideration of the route to assist agricultural workers displaced to Eilat in reaching their workplaces near Gaza; it did not confirm that the proposed service commenced. ²⁰

No public evidence identified establishing a completed Hatzerim flight programme, current timetable, or Ministry of Defense procurement value for this proposal. ²⁰

Military transport eligibility

The IDF’s published transport framework permits military personnel to travel on chartered flights and through civilian airline ticket arrangements. ³

Separate IDF travel guidance identifies Israir as an approved Israeli commercial carrier for relevant military personnel travel. ⁴

Military cargo airlift - operator attribution

On 26 August 2024, the Israeli Ministry of Defense announced that its military logistics programme had delivered more than 50,000 tonnes of military equipment through 500 flights and 107 maritime shipments since October 2023. ²¹

On 27 May 2025, the ministry reported that the programme had reached 800 aircraft and approximately 140 maritime shipments, transporting more than 90,000 tonnes of military equipment. ²²

On 19 June 2025, the ministry reported continued aircraft deliveries of military equipment associated with the operation, including 14 additional aircraft following the start of Operation Rising Lion. ²³

The ministry’s examined announcements identify defence procurement and military logistics organisations as programme participants but do not name Israir as an operating airline or logistics contractor. ^{21, 22, 23}

No public evidence identified establishing Israir’s carriage of weapons, ammunition, armoured vehicles, military aviation components, or other cargo under this programme. ^{21, 22, 23}

Civilian rescue and repatriation flights

On 22 June 2025, IAS reported that Israir was operating passenger rescue flights from Athens and Larnaca, subject to aviation-authority restrictions and operational permissions. ²⁴

In a March 2026 interview, Israir CEO Uri Sirkis described the operational cost, capacity restrictions, and financial challenges associated with returning stranded Israeli passengers during a security crisis. ²⁵

October 2026 reporting described preparations by Israir and other Israeli carriers to assist with returning passengers stranded in Dubai, subject to regulatory approval. ²⁶

These reports establish civilian passenger transport and repatriation activities; they do not identify the flights as weapons shipments or military freight operations. ^{24, 25, 26}

Military-base catering, fuel and facilities services

No public evidence identified of Israir operating military-base catering, fuel supply, telecommunications, facilities maintenance, or waste-management contracts. ^{1, 2, 9}

November 2023 - additional public evidence identifies Rami Levy Hashikma Marketing personnel and Rami Levy personally in the physical distribution of food packages to Israeli soldiers. On 22 November 2023, ICE reported that representatives of the supermarket chain had travelled south with Rami Levy on the preceding Thursday, 16 November, to distribute doughnuts and packages containing food to soldiers. The report states that the chain published photographs of the activity. This establishes an identified corporate participant, an accompanying individual and a reported physical delivery operation. The report does not establish whether these deliveries formed part of the charger, telephone-accessory and confectionery distribution described in December 2023, or whether they were separately organised initiatives. ^{16, 17}

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

Weapons manufacturing

No public evidence identified of Israir manufacturing small arms, artillery, armed drones, armoured vehicles, naval weapons, missiles, or lethal military platforms. ^{8, 9}

Munitions and precursor supply

The Israeli Ministry of Defense documented the delivery of munitions, military vehicles, protective equipment, and other military supplies through its international logistics programme during 2024–2025. ^{21, 22}

Those announcements do not identify Israir as a manufacturer, supplier, cargo carrier, or freight agent involved in these military deliveries. ^{21, 22, 23}

No public evidence identified of Israir supplying ammunition, explosives, warhead components, propellants, or munitions precursor materials. ^{21, 22, 23}

Strategic defence systems

No public evidence identified of an Israir contract involving Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, Merkava tanks, military fighter aircraft, ballistic missiles, or naval weapons platforms. ^{8, 9}

Military aviation platform distinction

Israir’s historical Ministry of Defense procurement involved passenger services provided by a civilian airline; the reports do not identify military aircraft manufacturing or weapons-system integration as the contracted service. [pre-2020] ^{1, 2}

Autonomous targeting and kinetic military software

No public evidence identified that Israir developed, licensed, supplied, or operated software specifically designed to generate military targets, automate weapons engagement, control fires, or provide precision-guidance outputs. ^{8, 9}

Critical military subsystems

No public evidence identified of Israir supplying radar assemblies, weapons-guidance electronics, fire-control systems, missile propulsion units, or other critical kinetic military subsystems. ^{8, 9}

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

Civil aviation regulation

Israel’s Civil Aviation Authority is the government regulator responsible for civilian aviation approvals, oversight, and compliance with relevant aviation requirements. ¹⁰

Israir’s commercial passenger operations and leasing arrangements are discussed in the context of civilian aviation regulation and aviation security restrictions. ^{9, 26}

Military export licences

No public evidence identified of an export licence issued to Israir for military weapons, military aircraft subsystems, controlled munitions, or defence technology supplied to Israeli security forces. ^{9, 10}

Arms embargoes and sanctions

No public evidence identified of an arms-embargo investigation, sanctions enforcement proceeding, or defence export-control penalty specifically against Israir. ^{9, 10}

Judicial proceedings

No public evidence identified of a court judgment or judicial review concerning an Israir military weapons supply contract, military cargo shipment, or export licence. ^{1, 2, 10}

Post-July 2024 operations

Israir’s military passenger transport contracts documented in the reviewed records date from 2001 and 2004, while the discounted military personnel travel initiative was reported in November 2023. ^{1, 2, 20}

Contemporary 2025–2026 reporting confirms continued Israir civilian aviation operations, including passenger repatriation and wartime operational restrictions. ^{24, 25, 26}

No public evidence identified establishing that Israir renewed or continued the historical Ministry of Defense contracts after the 19 July 2024 ICJ advisory opinion or the November 2024 ICC arrest warrants. ^{1, 2, 25}

Post-November 2024 military contracts

No public evidence identified documenting a newly awarded Israir weapons-logistics, defence manufacturing, or military-base service contract after November 2024. ^{21, 22, 23}

Wartime aviation restrictions

October 2026 reporting described the involvement of Israeli security and aviation authorities in determining whether Israeli airlines could resume operations to the United Arab Emirates. ^{26, 27}

These regulatory restrictions relate to commercial flight operations and do not establish a military procurement agreement. ^{26, 27}

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

Who Profits - controlling-principal business relationship

Who Profits identifies Rami Levi Hashikma Marketing in its corporate database of businesses involved in Israeli settlement-related economic activity. ¹³

The database categorises the retailer under settlement enterprise and related services, creating a documented settlement-related lead concerning a separate business associated with Israir controlling principal Rami Levy. ^{5, 13}

The retailer’s inclusion does not establish that Israir Airlines operated stores, supplied construction equipment, or contracted to provide military services within settlements. ^{5, 13}

AFSC Investigate methodology

AFSC Investigate describes its corporate database as covering companies with documented involvement in specified Israeli military, occupation, and human-rights-related activities, while explaining that the database is selective rather than exhaustive. ²⁸

No public evidence identified in the reviewed AFSC material establishing an Israir-specific current military supply contract or weapons-manufacturing relationship. ²⁸

Who Profits database scope

Who Profits describes its corporate database as documenting companies involved in the Israeli occupation economy, with coverage across economic exploitation, settlement activity, and population control. ¹²

No Israir-specific defence manufacturing or weapons integration relationship was established from the reviewed Who Profits database material. ^{12, 13}

Controlling-principal support for military personnel

On 3 December 2023, Walla reported that Rami Levy Communications was offering serving Israeli military personnel a mobile telephone package for NIS 1 for one year. The report also described the Rami Levy group’s distribution of chargers, telephone accessories, sweets, and other packages to soldiers. ¹⁷

The report quoted Rami Levy expressing support for military personnel and identified Rami Levy Communications as the business offering the discounted mobile service. ¹⁷

This activity concerns businesses associated with an Israir controlling principal; the report does not identify Israir Airlines as an organiser, supplier, or financial contributor to these initiatives. ^{5, 17}

Israir’s own military personnel initiative

The November 2023 Israir announcement concerning NIS 99 domestic flights for IDF personnel provides direct evidence of an airline service made available to soldiers during wartime. ²⁰

The same report identifies a proposed additional aviation arrangement involving Hatzerim Air Base but does not confirm its implementation. ²⁰

Corporate statements

Israir’s CEO publicly addressed the financial and logistical challenges of operating passenger repatriation flights in March 2026, including capacity limitations and additional operating costs. ²⁵

No public evidence identified of an Israir statement announcing the termination of a defence-supply contract, cancellation of military freight operations, or adoption of military weapons end-use monitoring commitments in response to civil-society pressure. ^{25, 28}

Boycott and divestment campaigns

No public evidence identified of a documented institutional divestment decision or organised campaign specifically directed at Israir’s military passenger transport contracts, as distinct from scrutiny concerning Rami Levy’s separate settlement-related retail business. ^{13, 28, 17}

Military-airlift attribution

The Ministry of Defense’s published military airlift announcements describe defence logistics activity but do not identify Israir as a participant. ^{21, 22, 23}

No public evidence identified establishing that Israir was the subject of a substantiated NGO investigation specifically concerning weapons shipments through that airlift. ^{21, 22, 23, 28}

December 2023 - independent contemporary reporting provides additional corroboration of the distribution campaign attributed to Rami Levy. Kipa and ICE both reported on 3 December that a large donation initiative for soldiers included the distribution of mobile-phone chargers, protective cases, other accessories and packages containing sweets and treats. Both described the activity as an existing Rami Levy initiative accompanying the newly announced mobile-service offer. Rami Levy’s attributed statement described the retail network as providing continuing assistance to soldiers following the outbreak of war. This supports attribution of the initiative to Rami Levy and his associated business network, but neither account identifies a separately incorporated distribution vehicle, named logistics contractor, individual purchasing officer or specified source of funding for the physical goods. The references to donations do not establish the amount contributed or which corporate entity bore the costs. ^{17, 18, 19}

November–December 2023 - no public evidence identified: the reviewed contemporary reporting does not establish who procured the chargers and confectionery, who financed their purchase, which employees or contractors completed the December distribution, or whether Rami Levy personally financed those specific packages. The November account separately documents Rami Levy accompanying supermarket representatives during a food distribution, but it does not establish his operational involvement in the December accessory deliveries. Consequently, attribution of the broader initiative to Rami Levy is supported, whereas attribution of every reported distribution to a particular legal entity or individual remains unverified. ^{16, 17, 18, 19}