INDEX / DIRECTORY / KETER GROUP / DIGITAL

Keter Group DIGITAL

DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE AUDIT UPDATED 2026-09-22
Digital Score 0.00 /10 B Keter Group - Complicity Index 778
Digital 0.00

Evidence-only forensic audit. Scoring happens downstream - see the main dossier for the composite assessment.

Forensic audits like this are reader-funded - no sponsors, no ads. Support OpenIntel →

Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships

Keter Group is an Israeli-founded resin and plastic consumer-products manufacturer. The Sagol family sold the business to BC Partners and PSP Investments in 2016 in a transaction reported at approximately $1.7 billion.1, 2, 3 In the 2024 recapitalisation, senior lenders obtained 100% ownership of Keter Group B.V. and its subsidiaries after a sale process did not yield a buyer; the consensual restructuring was implemented on 29 April 2024.4, 5, 6 Keter’s 2024 Sustainability Report, published in July 2025, states that creditors acquired Keter during 2024 and that Keter Group became a wholly owned subsidiary of UK-based Keter Group Holding Limited.7 Udi Sagi was reported as Keter Group CEO in October 2024 and is recorded as a director of the UK holding company from 31 October 2024.8, 9

Keter Group Holding Limited is an active UK private holding company incorporated on 5 April 2024, with registered office at Beaumont Industrial Estate, Banbury, Oxfordshire, and a stated activity of holding-company operations.10 Its publicly recorded active directors are Pepijn René Dinandt, Gilead Halevy, Jonathan Avram Kolodny, Niraj Patel, Ehud Sagi, Nadav Tiomkin, Itzhak Wiesenfeld, and John Henry Aldworth Wyatt.9 The public register does not establish that those directors are lenders, equity holders, or ultimate controllers.9, 11 The PSC register records an active statement, notified 29 April 2024, that no registrable person or registrable relevant legal entity has been identified; Glas Trustees Limited had recorded rights exceeding 75% of shares, voting rights, and director appointment/removal rights between 5 and 29 April 2024, after which it ceased to be a PSC.11 Two outstanding Bank Hapoalim B.M. charges were created in April 2025, while earlier UBS AG London Branch charges created in April 2024 were satisfied in April 2025; these security filings do not identify equity ownership or governance rights.12

No public filing reviewed identifies the individual beneficial owners, complete creditor group, equity allocations, voting rights, or board-appointment rights of the post-recapitalisation lender owners.4, 5, 7, 11 A 2025 refinancing report identifies CVC, Carlyle, and Sculptor as among the largest holders of the prior term loan, but does not establish their current Keter equity ownership, governance rights, or any Keter digital-sector relationship.13

Keter’s 2021 Form F-1 described extensive reliance on information systems, including data centres, hardware, software, applications, Keter’s global IT team, and service providers, but did not identify operators, vendors, integrators, or system locations.14 Keter’s 2024 Sustainability Report describes information security overseen by a Chief Information Security Officer and privacy overseen by a Compliance Officer, both reporting to the General Counsel; it also describes business-continuity integration, annual cyber-breach drills involving global leadership, annual privacy/cybersecurity training, and ISO 27000-certified global IT systems through corporate offices.7 The report does not identify the applicable ISO 2700x standard, certification body, covered locations, or technology vendors.7

Keter’s US entity is recorded as an SAP ERP ECC 6.0 customer for financial and ERP functions, although the record does not establish implementation date, integrator, deployment scope, current use, or Israeli-origin add-ons.15 no public evidence identified of a Keter licensing, subscription, integration, procurement, or managed-service relationship with Check Point, Wiz, SentinelOne, CyberArk, NICE, Verint, Claroty, Palo Alto Networks, or another identified Israeli-origin enterprise-technology provider.15, 7, 14 no public evidence identified naming a major Keter systems integrator, IT outsourcer, managed-security provider, cloud provider, or a related deployment of Israeli-origin technology.15, 7, 14

A distinct “KeterCloud” VPS/hosting brand and a separate US waste-management business using “Keter Environmental Services” or “Waste Harmonics Keter” appear in general searches as name coincidences; the reviewed corporate-history material does not establish either as part of Keter Group, the plastics manufacturer.1, 2, 3

Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology

Keter’s US privacy policy, last updated 24 June 2025, states that Keter may collect CCTV footage at Keter locations and specified third-party event locations, records of entrances and exits, information from identity-verification systems, and biometric information as a listed category of personal information.16 The policy also states that Keter does not knowingly collect biometric data about customers for sensitive purposes.16 It neither names a CCTV, biometric, facial-recognition, identity-verification, video-analytics, or retail-analytics vendor nor confirms that the described systems perform biometric identification.16

The same policy describes potential processing or receipt of web-interaction data by Google, Microsoft, Facebook, and other advertising partners, establishing advertising-platform involvement but not Israeli-origin surveillance technology, Israeli-hosted advertising infrastructure, or biometric retail analytics.16 It also identifies categories of providers that may support on-site or cloud databases, CRM, ERP, data security, backup, access control, call-centre operations, analytics, payments, and customer ticketing, without naming the providers.16

No public evidence identified of Keter using Trigo, BriefCam, AnyVision/Oosto, Trax, or comparable facial-recognition, gait-analysis, behavioural-analytics, predictive-policing, social-monitoring, sentiment-monitoring, or workforce-surveillance technology.16 no public evidence identified that such technologies reach Keter indirectly through a named managed-security provider or bundled enterprise suite.16, 7

Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation

Keter’s English/UK consumer privacy policy states that Keter headquarters are in Israel and that its website is hosted in Israel.17 The policy states that personal data is transferred to, stored, and processed in multiple global locations, including Israel, the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and the EEA, for purposes including storage or backup, customer service, compliance, group operations, and protection against damage.17 The policy identifies data categories including contact details, credentials, purchase and warranty records, payment and delivery information, social-media information, IP, device and browser data, clickstream data, web-session interactions, and A/B-testing or personalisation data.17

Keter’s separate US policy states that affiliates and subsidiaries may be located in the European Union, Israel, Canada, and elsewhere, and that personal information may be shared with affiliates and third-party providers for operations, analytics, IT support, fraud prevention, and marketing.16 These disclosures establish an Israel-connected website-hosting and data-processing node, but do not identify the hosting provider, cloud vendor, Israeli data-centre operator, exact database locations, retention periods, content-delivery network, routing architecture, or government-access arrangement.17, 16

No public evidence identified that Keter operates or leases a dedicated Israeli data centre distinct from the disclosed Israel-hosted website.17, 16 no public evidence identified of Keter participation in Project Nimbus or a comparable Israeli government-cloud initiative.17, 16, 7 no public evidence identified that Keter provides data-sovereignty, data-residency, hosting, or infrastructure-resilience services to Israeli state institutions or military bodies.17, 16, 7

Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships

No public evidence identified of contracts, partnerships, procurement awards, or service agreements between Keter and the Israeli Ministry of Defence, IDF, Israeli intelligence agencies, Israel Prison Service, police, or another Israeli state-security body.4, 5, 16, 7 no public evidence identified that Keter’s IT systems, websites, consumer-data operations, commercial technology, or physical products are deployed for military, intelligence, or law-enforcement surveillance.17, 16, 7

B’Tselem’s August 2024 report and Palestine Information Center reporting describe an Israel Prison Service tactical or “Initial Reaction Force” unit codenamed “Keter” operating inside Israeli prisons against Palestinian detainees.18, 19 The available sources support this as a Hebrew-language codename for a prison-service unit, not as a demonstrated connection to Keter Group’s corporate entity, funding, naming, or equipment.18, 19

No public evidence identified of Keter developing, selling, licensing, or maintaining offensive-cyber capabilities, exploit tools, zero-day tools, digital weapons, or related maintenance activity.4, 5, 7

AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems

No public evidence identified of Keter supplying AI/ML, computer vision, automated decision support, automated tracking, autonomous systems, or civilian-data-trained models to Israeli state, military, intelligence, or security bodies.17, 16, 7 no public evidence identified that Keter systems have been trained on, or granted access to, civilian population data, intercepted communications, biometric data, or surveillance-derived datasets from Israel or the Occupied Palestinian Territory.17, 16, 7

No public evidence identified of Keter providing autonomous target generation, automated threat detection, target tracking, fire-control, or other systems whose primary designed output is kinetic targeting.4, 5, 7

Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint

Keter’s 2024 Sustainability Report describes consumer-insight-led product development, global manufacturing, and factories in Israel, but does not identify a dedicated Israeli digital R&D centre, software-development operation, engineering lab, innovation accelerator, or technology-incubation programme.7 The 2021 Form F-1 stated that Keter then had main administrative offices in Israel, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Poland, the United States, and the United Kingdom, alongside warehouses and distribution centres including two in Israel; this is historical operational disclosure rather than confirmation of the current footprint.14

No public evidence identified of Keter acquisitions of Israeli software, AI, data, cyber, or surveillance companies; material strategic investments in such companies or funds; or patent, licensing, or co-development arrangements with Technion, Hebrew University, the Weizmann Institute, or another Israeli research institution.7, 14

The preserved record identifies Keter Chairman Tzachi Wiesenfeld with external roles at ACRE Security and iLOQ, while primary Keter and UK-company sources refer to an Itzhak Wiesenfeld; the reviewed materials do not authoritatively resolve whether those names refer to the same individual and they should not be merged for principal-investment attribution.20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 7, 9 ACRE is described as a Dallas/Dublin-based physical- and digital-security company owned by Triton Partners since March 2021, while iLOQ is a Finland-based digital/mobile smart-locking and access-management company backed by Nordic Capital.20, 21, 22, 23, 24 iLOQ announced that Wiesenfeld stepped down as chair effective 16 September 2026 and would remain an adviser and mentor.25

Neither the ACRE nor iLOQ materials establish Israeli domicile, Israeli state, military, or settlement customers, shared capital, shared IT infrastructure, shared customer data, common R&D, common procurement, or technology integration with Keter.20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 no public evidence identified that Keter and ACRE, iLOQ, Triton Partners, Nordic Capital, or Wiesenfeld share a digital platform, technology assets, customer-data pipeline, operating-control structure, or strategy sufficient for group attribution.20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 7, 25

Nadav Tiomkin is recorded as a Keter Group Holding Limited director and is described by Community Fund as a partner working on global opportunistic-credit mandates; Community Fund describes itself as a York Capital spinoff focused on distressed credit, strategic equities, and private financings in the United States and Israel.9, 26 Those sources do not identify Community Fund as a Keter lender or identify an investment by Community Fund in an Israeli surveillance, cyber, cloud, biometric, data, or military-technology company.9, 26

No public evidence identified that the unidentified senior-lender ownership group, the UK holding company, its named directors, Sami Sagol, Yitzhak Sagol, Udi Sagi, Pepijn Dinandt, Gilead Halevy, Jonathan Kolodny, Niraj Patel, Nadav Tiomkin, Itzhak Wiesenfeld, or John Wyatt provides, owns, or invests in an Israeli surveillance, cyber, cloud, biometric, data, or automated-control business through a relationship attributable to Keter.4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 26 The opaque creditor ownership structure prevents a complete investor-by-investor assessment.4, 5, 11

No public evidence identified of shared management, capital deployment, infrastructure, technology strategy, customer-data pipeline, or operating integration between Keter and an owner-linked Israeli digital-capability business sufficient for group attribution.4, 5, 7, 9, 11

Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History

Who Profits documented Keter’s operation of a manufacturing facility in the Barkan Industrial Zone settlement in the West Bank.27, 28 When queried by European NGOs in 2014, the company denied owning “any facility or operation in what the UN defines as the occupied territories,” while Who Profits reported photographing two Keter trucks in the closed Barkan factory yard on 21 March 2014.27, 28 Who Profits reported no commercial movement, signs, or trucks at the site in November 2016 and concluded that Keter had ceased Barkan operations; this was consistent with boycott pressure including a June 2013 United Church of Canada campaign.28, 29 No post-2020 source reviewed independently establishes either resumption or current status of the former Barkan facility.27, 28

CJPME and the Stop the Palestinian Genocide boycott tracker cite Human Rights Watch-documented labour conditions affecting Palestinian workers at Barkan-zone facilities generally, including allegations of sub-minimum wages and restricted unionisation, together with environmental-contamination claims concerning Al-Matwi valley.30, 31 These claims are attributed to the Barkan industrial zone broadly and are not independently verified as Keter-specific findings in the cited material.30, 31

OHCHR maintains a database of business enterprises connected with Israeli settlements pursuant to Human Rights Council resolutions 31/36 and 53/25.32, 33 The reviewed 2023 and 2025 OHCHR database materials, and Francesca Albanese’s 2 July 2025 report to the Human Rights Council, did not identify Keter; this is document-scoped and does not establish absence from every database iteration or source.32, 33, 34, 35 no public evidence identified of a post-19 July 2024 or post-November 2024 Keter digital-service provision to settlements, Israeli state bodies, military bodies, security bodies, or Project Nimbus participants.17, 16, 7, 35

Sami Sagol’s documented post-2016 activity includes philanthropic life-sciences and neuroscience initiatives through the Sagol Network.36 no public evidence identified of personal or family-office investment by Sami Sagol or Yitzhak Sagol in Israeli surveillance, cyber, AI, SIGINT, or military-technology firms.1, 36, 7, 11

Separately and unrelated to Keter Group, Al-Haq’s advocacy documentation, drawing on Citizen Lab and Amnesty International forensic work, records NSO Group Pegasus spyware infections on devices of Al-Haq staff and other Palestinian human-rights defenders, first detected in July 2020 with additional devices confirmed through 2021 forensic analysis.37 No evidence identified connects Keter Group to that spyware ecosystem.37

Keter Group temporarily paused retail and commercial operations in Russia according to the Leave Russia tracker; this is a general corporate-conduct data point rather than an Israel-technology finding.38 The Don’t Buy Into Occupation 2025 report references Keter’s export product list in connection with the historical settlement-manufacturing campaign rather than a technology-specific campaign.39 no public evidence identified of an organised boycott, divestment, regulatory, export-control, sanctions, court, or parliamentary action directed at Keter’s technology provision; the available boycott material concerns historical physical settlement manufacturing rather than digital services.28, 30, 31, 29, 39

Footnotes

  1. https://www.investpsp.com/en/news/bc-partners-and-psp-investments-to-acquire-keter-group-from-the-sagol-family/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  2. https://www.law360.com/articles/822975/bc-partners-psp-investments-acquire-israel-s-keter-group ↩ ↩2

  3. https://www.timesofisrael.com/uk-based-company-said-set-to-buy-keter-plastics-for-1-7-billion/ ↩ ↩2

  4. https://www.milbank.com/en/news/milbank-advises-senior-lenders-to-keter-group-on-transfer-of-ownership.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  5. https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/article/-/view/sourceId/13088465 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  6. https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcy-law/keter-creditors-to-take-over-company-after-sale-process-failed ↩

  7. https://ketergroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Keter_Sustainability_Report_2024.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23

  8. https://www.jpost.com/business-and-innovation/all-news/article-836621 ↩

  9. https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/15619417/officers ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  10. https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/15619417 ↩

  11. https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/15619417/persons-with-significant-control ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  12. https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/15619417/charges ↩

  13. https://9fin.com/insights/keter-tlb-bank-refi ↩

  14. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1866907/000119312521274987/d145497df1.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  15. https://www.appsruntheworld.com/customers-database/purchases/view/keter-united-states-united-states-selects-sap-erp-ecc-6-0-for-erp-financial ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  16. https://ketergroup.com/privacypolicy/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17

  17. https://www.keter.com/en-gb/privacy-policy.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11

  18. https://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files/publications/202408_welcome_to_hell_eng.pdf ↩ ↩2

  19. https://english.palinfo.com/o_post/Keter-unit-raids-cells-of-prisoners-in-Negev-jail/ ↩ ↩2

  20. https://acresecurity.com/blog/acre-security-enhances-focus-on-growth-and-innovation-with-leadership-updates ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  21. https://www.triton-partners.com/portfolio/acre-security ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  22. https://www.triton-partners.com/media/news/triton-acquires-acre/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  23. https://www.iloq.com/en/investors/governance/board-of-directors/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  24. https://www.nordiccapital.com/portfolio-cases/investments/iloq/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  25. https://news.cision.com/capnor-weasel-bidco-oyj/r/inside-information - iloq-appoints-oskar-sorensson-as-ceo-and-johan-ek-as-chairman,c4396651 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  26. https://comllp.com/nadav-tiomkin-2/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  27. https://www.whoprofits.org/companies/company/4060 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  28. https://www.whoprofits.org/publications/report/133 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  29. https://unjppi.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/unsettling-goods-factsheet-keter.pdf ↩ ↩2

  30. https://www.cjpme.org/fs_249 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  31. https://palestiniangenocide.org/boycott/companies/keter/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  32. https://www.ohchr.org/en/business/bhr-database ↩ ↩2

  33. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session31/database-hrc3136/23-06-30-Update-israeli-settlement-opt-database-hrc3136.pdf ↩ ↩2

  34. https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5923-economy-occupation-economy-genocide-report-special-rapporteur ↩

  35. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/un-human-rights-office-updates-database-businesses-involved-israeli ↩ ↩2

  36. https://www.afar.org/about-sami-sagol ↩ ↩2

  37. https://www.alhaq.org/advocacy/19188.html ↩ ↩2

  38. https://leave-russia.org/keter-group ↩

  39. https://dontbuyintooccupation.org/reports/dont-buy-into-occupation-report-2025/ ↩ ↩2