INDEX / DIRECTORY / MICRON TECHNOLOGY / MILITARY

Micron Technology MILITARY

MILITARY AUDIT UPDATED 2026-09-22
Military Score 0.00 /10 C Micron Technology - BDS-1000 471
Military 0.00

Evidence-only forensic audit. Scoring happens downstream - see the main dossier for the composite assessment.

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Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

No public evidence identified of a Micron contract, tender award, framework agreement, memorandum, purchase order, or other procurement record with the Israeli Ministry of Defense (IMOD), Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Israel Prison Service, Border Police, Israeli Police, or another Israeli security body in the targeted official, corporate, trade-directory, and public-web searches reviewed.1, 2, 3

IMOD describes its Defense Procurement Directorate as working with the IDF and administering dynamic tenders, but the reviewed material contains no Micron supplier, award, or tender reference.3

The reviewed SIBAT DEFEA 2025 Israeli defence-exhibitor catalogue does not list Micron; this catalogue-specific result does not establish absence from all SIBAT, IMOD, or Israeli procurement records.1

Micron’s FY2025 Form 10-K identifies Micron Technology, Inc. as the consolidated parent, a Delaware corporation with principal executive offices in Boise, Idaho, but contains no text match for “Israel” and does not identify an Israeli government customer or military/security business relationship.2

No public evidence identified of a direct Micron supply, service, logistics contract, tender, or delivery record to IMOD, IDF, police, prison, border, or other Israeli security bodies; this is a public-record finding and not proof that no transaction occurred.1, 2, 3

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Micron markets memory and storage products for aerospace-and-defence applications, including radiation-tolerant NAND and ruggedized products aligned with stated military and space testing standards.4

This marketing establishes a general defence-oriented product line but does not identify an Israeli military or security end user, Israeli weapons programme, Israeli sale, or Israeli platform using Micron products.4

Micron lists Avnet Israel and Eastronics as authorized distributors in Israel, lists Mouser as a consumer/open-market distributor, and identifies CRG Electronics offices in Karmiel and Petah Tikva as manufacturer-representative locations.5, 6

Eastronics publicly offers Micron-branded DRAM, flash, SSD, managed NAND, NOR flash, UFS, e.MMC, CXL, graphics, and high-bandwidth-memory categories, and states that it provides Israeli Micron customers with engineering support.7

The Micron distributor, representative, and Eastronics pages do not identify customer identities, defence programmes, government bodies, delivery locations, contract terms, product serialisation, or final end use.5, 6, 7

Micron’s current end-user-certification process provides for collection of intended end-use, intended end-user, ultimate-destination, and updated-certification information for certain transactions when end use or end user changes.8

No public evidence identified of an Israel-specific Micron end-user certificate, named Israeli military purchaser, export-licence application, export-control decision, or governmental review concerning hardware supplied to an Israeli defence or security end user.8, 9, 10

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

No public evidence identified that Micron equipment, physical products, services, construction, maintenance, engineering, freight, or logistics were used for settlement construction, demolitions, the separation barrier, checkpoints, detention sites, military installations, or other occupied-territory infrastructure.11, 12, 13

No public evidence identified of Micron construction, engineering, maintenance, freight, port-handling, or base-service contracts involving Israeli military or security installations.1, 2, 3

Micron’s 2020 global-footprint document identified Be’er Sheva as an Israeli location, while its current EMEA careers page describes Israeli work as R&D and sales.11, 12

Neither source identifies defence work, settlement operations, activity in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, or Gaza, or activity connected to security infrastructure.11, 12

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

No verified public evidence identified of Micron supplying components, specialist manufacturing services, or licensed technology to Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Rafael, IMI/Elbit Land, or another named Israeli defence prime.4, 14, 15

Micron’s aerospace-and-defence marketing does not identify Israeli defence manufacturers, Israeli weapons programmes, or Israeli defence end users as customers or integrators.4

IAI’s official supplier portal states that active suppliers can access purchase-order, invoice, and performance information through an authenticated system, but does not publish a supplier roster or identify Micron, Avnet Israel, Eastronics, or CRG Electronics as an IAI supplier.15

A report appendix lists “Micron Technology” among electronics companies but supplies no Israel-related transaction, Israeli defence end user, product, contract, or export-licence decision; it is not evidence of Israeli military-industrial supply.16

Avnet’s 1 August 2012 release states that it acquired the operating assets of CRG Electronics’ components-distribution business, which supplied more than 300 customers in networking/datacom, telecom, defence, and industrial segments, and that the acquired business became part of Avnet Israel.17

The Avnet release does not identify Micron as a CRG product line, name a defence customer, or document a Micron component delivered to a defence customer.17

Contemporaneous Techtime reporting stated that Micron was among manufacturers represented by CRG in Israel that Avnet particularly sought to obtain through the transaction, while stating that CRG would thereafter focus on manufacturer representation and Israeli business development.18

These historical sources establish a commercial-chain lead - CRG represented Micron and its distribution operation served a mixed customer base that included defence-sector customers - but do not establish a Micron-to-prime or Micron-to-security-body transaction, delivery, contract, quantity, end-user certification, or weapons programme.17, 18

No public evidence identified that Avnet Israel, Eastronics, or CRG Electronics delivered Micron physical products to Elbit, IAI, Rafael, IMOD, IDF, police, prison, or border-security end users.5, 6, 17, 18, 7, 15

A commercial registry mirror reports that Micron Semiconductor Israel Ltd., company no. 514032986, was voluntarily dissolved, with a dissolution event dated 26 May 2025, and identifies Micron Technology Finance LLC as shareholder and Donald Edward Whitt Jr. as director in data stated current to 4 December 2024.19

That registry-mirror record does not state the former entity’s business activities, location, customers, or security-sector relationship.19

Micron’s 2013 SEC subsidiary exhibit expressly listed Micron Semiconductor Israel Ltd. as an Israeli subsidiary, which is primary evidence of a historic group subsidiary but does not establish the entity’s present status, customers, activity, or military relationship.20

Micron’s FY2025 significant-subsidiary exhibit does not list an Israeli entity, but expressly omits subsidiaries that are not significant in the aggregate and therefore does not establish that Micron has no Israeli subsidiary.21

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

No public evidence identified of Micron providing logistical sustainment, telecommunications, facilities services, shipping, freight forwarding, port handling, or other base-support services for Israeli military or security installations.1, 2, 3

Micron states that suppliers must meet applicable laws, regulations, and contract specifications, but the reviewed supplier-policy page does not state an Israel-specific military end-use-monitoring commitment.22

Micron’s sale terms require customers to obtain required authorisations, restrict transfers for military end uses or end users where restricted by United States law, require relevant end-user certifications on request, and permit Micron to audit customer compliance.9

Those general contractual controls and Micron’s end-user-certification framework are not evidence of a security-logistics service, Israel-specific end-use-monitoring result, or Israeli military transaction.8, 9

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

No public evidence identified that Micron is a prime contractor or licensed manufacturer of lethal platforms, munitions, missile-defence systems, strategic platforms, or specifically calibrated subsystems for Israeli forces.4, 14

Micron’s reviewed defence material supports the narrower finding that it makes memory and storage products marketed for aerospace-and-defence applications.4

The reviewed material does not identify an Israeli weapons system, platform, or end user using Micron products.4

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

No public evidence identified of a public licence grant, denial, suspension, revocation, sanctions-enforcement action, arms-embargo investigation, or court proceeding specifically concerning Micron defence supply to Israel.23, 10

No public evidence identified of an Israel-specific export licence, military end-user certificate, tender, contract, shipment record, customs record, or verified end-use record linking Micron hardware to an Israeli security beneficiary.8, 9, 10

Israel’s Defense Export Controls Agency is the IMOD body administering Israeli defence-export controls, but no public DECA decision located in the reviewed search named Micron; the agency’s general description cannot establish whether non-public licensing records exist.10

In its 20 July 2023 response to the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, Micron stated that it complied with export-control and economic-sanctions laws, conducted distributor due diligence to address diversion, and stopped shipments where it believed unlawful diversion might occur.23

Micron’s 2023 statement specifically discussed Iran, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus rather than Israel.23

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

The supplied deterministic full-text scan found no Micron Technology mention in A/HRC/59/23, the 2023 and 2025 OHCHR settlement-business databases, PAX’s June 2024 report, Al-Haq’s July 2024 report, or the other specified NGO-report corpus.13

This is a document-scoped no-hit and does not establish absence from all UN, NGO, corporate, government, or sector records.13

No public evidence identified of a Micron-specific boycott, divestment, exclusion decision, or corporate response concerning Israeli defence-sector activity.13

Micron’s 25 November 2025 proxy identifies Sanjay Mehrotra as Chairman, President, and CEO; Lynn Dugle as Lead Independent Director; and Vanguard, BlackRock, and Capital World Investors as the disclosed beneficial holders above five percent as of 31 October 2025, with none disclosed at or above ten percent.24

On 9 June 2026, Micron appointed Alexis Black Björlin to its board, bringing the board to nine directors, while continuing to identify Mehrotra as Chairman, President, and CEO and Dugle as Lead Independent Director.25, 14

The proxy records prior U.S. defence-sector roles for Dugle at Raytheon and Linnie Haynesworth at Northrop Grumman, while a Department of Defense biography records Haynesworth’s Defense Business Board service from November 2021 to April 2025.24, 26

Those roles do not establish Israeli defence-sector activity, Israeli military contracting, investment in Israeli defence primes, or an Israel-specific military-channel act by those directors.24, 26

A commercial Israeli company-information page records an active entity, “Micron Technology Israel Ltd.”, company no. 516067196, incorporated on 6 August 2019, registered at Derech Begin 23 in Tel Aviv-Jaffa, and stated to have filed an annual report in 2026.27

The same registry mirror lists Micron Semiconductor Asia Pte. Ltd. as an “Option Holder,” rather than shareholder, and cautions that its English translations and consolidated data may contain errors; it therefore does not independently establish ownership or operational integration with Micron Technology, Inc.27

Open Budget’s registry-and-procurement-data mirror likewise identifies company no. 516067196 as an active Israeli private company at the Tel Aviv-Jaffa address and displays no quantified government payments or documented engagements for the preceding three years.28

Open Budget states that its data draw on public and government databases but may contain errors and should be checked against relevant authorities; it provides no tender, agency, end user, or contract record and cannot support an absence finding concerning procurement.28

Historic secondary reporting stated that Micron employed approximately 1,200 people at Fab 12 in Kiryat Gat in 2013 and that Intel subsequently announced plans to take over the flash-memory fab.29, 30

The reviewed sources do not independently establish the current status or ownership of that historic facility.29, 30

No public evidence identified in the reviewed entity records of an Israeli defence-prime directorship, Israeli military-equity holding, FIDF or reservist-fund donation, public co-belligerency statement, or activity in occupied territory by Mehrotra, the current board, or disclosed holders above five percent; this is a bounded record-and-governance-search finding rather than an exhaustive principal-level investigation.24, 27, 25, 14

Footnotes

  1. https://www.sibat.mod.gov.il/Exhibitions/DEFEA/Documents/ISRAEL%20at%20DEFEA%202025%20updated.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  2. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723125/000072312525000028/mu-20250828.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  3. https://mod.gov.il/en/departments/defense-procurement-directorate-dpd ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  4. https://www.micron.com/markets-industries/industrial/aerospace-defense ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  5. https://www.micron.com/sales-support/sales-network/authorized-distributors ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  6. https://www.micron.com/sales-support/sales-network/find-a-manufacturer ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  7. https://www.easx.co.il/manufacturers/micron/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  8. https://www.micron.com/app-settings/euc-form ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  9. https://www.micron.com/content/dam/micron/global/public/corporate/legal/terms-conditions/terms-conditions-sales.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  10. https://exportctrl.mod.gov.il/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  11. https://investors.micron.com/static-files/4e804fd6-fc0f-440a-b8d4-9f0c16215aa2 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  12. https://www.micron.com/about/careers/emea ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  13. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/59/23 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  14. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723125/000110465926071845/tm2617112d1_ex99-1.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  15. https://www.iai.co.il/suppliers/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  16. https://www.business-humanrights.org/documents/39649/Challenges-of-Export-Controls-Enforcement.pdf ↩

  17. https://ir.avnet.com/static-files/865bb940-22e8-41d8-8bd0-b6479ec49fdb ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  18. https://techtime.co.il/2012/08/02/%D7%90%D7%91%D7%A0%D7%98-%D7%99%D7%A9%D7%A8%D7%90%D7%9C-%D7%A8%D7%9B%D7%A9%D7%94-%D7%90%D7%AA-%D7%9B%D7%9C-%D7%A4%D7%A2%D7%99%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A4%D7%A6%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%9B%D7%99%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  19. https://www.checkid.co.il/company/%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%A1%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%93%D7%95%D7%A7%D7%98%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%99%D7%A9%D7%A8%D7%90%D7%9C-%D7%91%D7%A2~%D7%9E-514032986 ↩ ↩2

  20. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723125/000072312513000228/a2013q4ex211subsidiariesof.htm ↩

  21. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723125/000072312525000028/a2025q4ex211-subsidiarieso.htm ↩

  22. https://www.micron.com/about/company/suppliers ↩

  23. https://media.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/Micron_Response_to_BHRRC_07.20.23.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  24. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723125/000072312525000038/mu-20251125.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  25. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723125/000110465926071845/tm2617112d1_8k.htm ↩ ↩2

  26. https://dbb.defense.gov/Portals/35/Documents/Nominees/Haynesworth%20-%20bio%20for%20website.pdf?ver=SZSH3dkFyjiJT3fAgkssKA%3D%3D ↩ ↩2

  27. https://en.checkid.co.il/company/MICRON%2BTECHNOLOGY%2BISRAEL%2B%2BLTD-1aVNgJ2-516067196 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  28. https://next.obudget.org/i/org/company/516067196 ↩ ↩2

  29. https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-1000823922 ↩ ↩2

  30. https://electronics360.globalspec.com/article/4206/intel-selects-israel-for-6-billion-manufacturing-upgrade ↩ ↩2