Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships
Micron Technology, Inc. is a Delaware-incorporated semiconductor company with its principal business address in Boise, Idaho, and filed its fiscal 2025 Form 10-K on 3 October 2025.1
Micron’s authorised-distributor page lists Avnet Israel, Digi-Key, Eastronics, and Mouser Electronics as Israel-based distribution channels for Micron products.2 These listings establish commercial sales channels but do not identify end customers, product destinations, public-sector procurement, deployment in settlements, or use of Israeli-origin enterprise software.2
Micron’s manufacturer-representative page lists CRG Electronics in Karmiel and Petah Tikva, Israel, and characterises it as a manufacturer representative rather than a Micron-operated facility.3
No public evidence identified of Micron licensing, subscribing to, or integrating Check Point, Wiz, SentinelOne, CyberArk, NICE, Verint, Claroty, Palo Alto Networks, or another identified Israeli-origin enterprise-security vendor into its internal technology stack.1, 2, 3
No public evidence identified of a systems-integrator, IT-outsourcing, digital-transformation, or managed-service engagement requiring Micron to deploy Israeli-origin software.1, 2, 3
Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology
No public evidence identified that Micron procured or deployed Israeli-origin facial recognition, biometrics, gait analysis, behavioural analytics, predictive-policing, sentiment-analysis, social-media-monitoring, or workforce-surveillance products.1, 2, 3
No public evidence identified that such surveillance technologies reached Micron through a managed-security provider, platform provider, or bundled enterprise suite.1, 2, 3
The reviewed corporate distribution and representative records concern semiconductor and storage-product commercial channels and do not disclose downstream customer deployments or surveillance functions.2, 3
Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation
Micron’s Q4 2020 global-footprint material identified Be’er Sheva, Israel as “Customer Focus,” without describing a data centre, cloud region, sovereign-cloud service, R&D operation, or government contract.4
The 2020 footprint source does not establish the continuing status of the Be’er Sheva location.4
Israel’s Government Procurement Administration describes Project Nimbus as public-cloud procurement begun in 2019, naming AWS and Google as the selected public-cloud suppliers and describing associated migration, integration, and marketplace arrangements.5
No public evidence identified that Micron participated in Project Nimbus as a cloud supplier, marketplace provider, systems integrator, or named subcontractor.5
No public evidence identified that Micron operates, leases, or co-locates an Israeli data centre, or supplies Israeli data-residency, sovereign-cloud, or resilience services.1, 4, 5
No public evidence identified that Micron centrally processes, routes, hosts, or controls customer or user data in Israeli jurisdiction.1
Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships
No public evidence identified of a verified Micron contract, partnership, or service agreement with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, Israel Defense Forces, Israeli intelligence services, or another Israeli security body.2, 3
Micron’s disclosed Israeli distributor and manufacturer-representative channels do not identify downstream military, intelligence, law-enforcement, government, settlement, or occupied-territory customers.2, 3
No public evidence identified of Micron developing, selling, licensing, or maintaining offensive-cyber tools, zero-day exploits, digital weapons, surveillance platforms, AI/ML systems, or automated tracking systems for Israeli state actors.1, 2, 3
Micron’s fiscal 2025 significant-subsidiary exhibit lists entities in multiple jurisdictions but includes no Israeli entity among the subsidiaries significant in the aggregate.6 The exhibit expressly omits subsidiaries that are not significant in the aggregate, so it does not determine whether any non-significant Israeli entity exists.6
Micron’s fiscal 2015 annual-report material states that restructuring during 2013–14 included winding down 200mm operations in Kiryat Gat, Israel.7 That disclosure supports discontinuation of the identified production operation but does not establish the absence of later Israeli R&D or sales activities.7
No public evidence identified of Micron products or services being provided in or to settlements through a named reseller, tender, delivery record, licensee, franchisee, or disclosed end customer.2, 3
AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems
No public evidence identified that Micron provided AI or machine-learning systems, computer vision, autonomous decision-support, automated tracking, or civilian-population-data systems to Israeli state, military, or security bodies.1, 2, 3
No public evidence identified that Micron platforms or models were trained on Israeli or occupied-territory surveillance data, intercepted communications, or civilian population datasets.1, 2, 3
No public evidence identified of Micron provision of autonomous target-generation, fire-control, or kill-chain systems.1, 2, 3
Micron’s public materials reviewed here identify memory and storage-product commercial channels rather than an Israeli state-security AI system or data-processing service.1, 2, 3
Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint
Micron’s current EMEA careers page states that its Israel team is dedicated to R&D and sales activities.8 The page was accessible in September 2026, establishing that Micron then publicly represented these activities as current, while providing no facility address, headcount, data-centre function, product focus, or military/state-customer role.8
Micron’s 2013 significant-subsidiary exhibit listed Micron Semiconductor Israel Ltd. as organised in Israel.9 Micron’s 2012 significant-subsidiary exhibit also listed that entity.10 These historic disclosures establish a then-listed Israeli subsidiary but do not establish its current legal status, ownership, function, or relationship to the current Israel R&D and sales team.9, 10
Micron’s 2020 global-footprint material included Be’er Sheva among its location clusters, but did not identify which specific function applied to that location beyond the “Customer Focus” label.4
Micron’s fiscal 2025 significant-subsidiary exhibit does not list Micron Semiconductor Israel Ltd. among subsidiaries significant in the aggregate.6 Because the exhibit excludes subsidiaries not significant in the aggregate, it does not resolve the current existence or relationship of a non-significant Israeli entity.6
No public evidence identified of a Micron acquisition of an Israeli technology company, strategic investment in an Israeli technology startup or fund, or co-development or patent arrangement with an identified Israeli research institution, including Technion, Hebrew University, or the Weizmann Institute.1, 6, 8
A 2017 Avnet product brief documented Micron memory support for NXP platforms and included an Israeli Avnet contact, establishing an Israel-facing distribution/support channel at that time rather than a Micron acquisition, R&D centre, defence contract, or state relationship.11
Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History
No public evidence identified of a boycott, divestment, sanctions campaign, regulatory action, export-control action, or legal challenge specifically concerning Micron technology provision to Israeli state bodies or operations in occupied territory.1, 2, 3
The supplied document-scoped review found no mention of Micron Technology in A/HRC/59/23, the 2023 and 2025 OHCHR settlement-database updates, or the specified civil-society materials, including 2024/2025 Don’t Buy Into Occupation materials.12, 13, 14 That bounded result does not establish database-wide, sector-wide, or future-report absence.12, 13, 14
As of 31 October 2025, Micron’s proxy identified Sanjay Mehrotra as Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer and Lynn A. Dugle as Lead Independent Director, with both assuming those leadership roles in January 2025.15
In June 2026, Micron appointed Dr. Alexis Black Björlin to its board.16 Micron’s current governance and leadership pages list Mehrotra, Dugle, Björlin, Steven Gomo, Linnie Haynesworth, Mark Liu, Christie Simons, Robert Swan, and MaryAnn Wright in board or governance roles.17, 18
The 2025 proxy identified The Vanguard Group, BlackRock, and Capital World Investors as known beneficial owners exceeding 5%, at 8.4%, 7.6%, and 6.3% respectively, and identified no known beneficial owner at or above 10% as of 31 October 2025.15 Capital World Investors’ 14 May 2026 Schedule 13G/A reported 42,208,309 Micron shares, or 3.7% of the class, as of 31 March 2026.19
No public evidence identified in the reviewed SEC disclosures, Micron biographies, governance materials, and targeted live searches of a disclosed direct, controlling, or otherwise non-passive equity interest, board role, or personal/family-office investment by Sanjay Mehrotra in an Israeli surveillance, cyber, AI, SIGINT, or military-technology firm.15, 18 The proxy’s disclosure of two Sangeeta Mehrotra trusts concerns Micron-share holdings and does not establish investments by those trusts in Israeli technology firms.15
No public evidence identified in the reviewed proxy, current board biographies, and targeted live searches that Dugle, Björlin, Gomo, Haynesworth, Liu, Simons, Swan, Wright, or the named executive officers hold a disclosed direct, controlling, or otherwise non-passive equity interest or board role in an Israeli surveillance, cyber, AI, SIGINT, or military-technology firm.15, 20, 16, 17, 18
No public evidence identified in the reviewed ownership disclosures and targeted live searches that Vanguard, BlackRock, or Capital World Investors, through a disclosed attributable investment vehicle connected to their Micron ownership, hold a direct, controlling, or otherwise non-passive interest in an Israeli surveillance, cyber, AI, SIGINT, or military-technology firm.15, 20, 19 The reviewed Micron ownership disclosures establish their Micron holdings only and do not establish external portfolio holdings or control.15, 19
Because no qualifying principal-linked interest was identified in this review, no technology or documented Israeli state/security downstream result is established on that attribution basis.15, 20, 19, 16 These conclusions are limited to the reviewed public disclosures, corporate biographies, and targeted searches; they are not comprehensive determinations of private holdings, global fund portfolios, or beneficial-ownership registries.15, 20, 19, 16
Footnotes
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https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723125/000072312525000028/mu-20250828.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14
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https://www.micron.com/sales-support/sales-network/authorized-distributors ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16
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https://www.micron.com/sales-support/sales-network/find-a-manufacturer ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15
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https://investors.micron.com/static-files/4e804fd6-fc0f-440a-b8d4-9f0c16215aa2 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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https://www.mr.gov.il/ilgstorefront/he/news/details/111222 ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723125/000072312525000028/a2025q4ex211-subsidiarieso.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
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https://investors.micron.com/static-files/007ae015-401b-4392-bdee-d034b1a83fdf ↩ ↩2
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https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723125/000072312513000228/a2013q4ex211subsidiariesof.htm ↩ ↩2
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https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723125/000072312512000156/a2012q4ex21-1.htm ↩ ↩2
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https://my.avnet.com/wcm/connect/5948ac91-6cf2-4c20-9241-7a0c8df37031/AVS_Micron%2Bmemory%2Bsupport%2BNXP_product%2Bbrief.pdf?CVID=lKKh9M2&MOD=AJPERES ↩
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https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/un-human-rights-office-updates-database-businesses-involved-israeli ↩ ↩2
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https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723125/000072312525000038/mu-20251125.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9
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https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723125/000110465926071845/tm2617112d1_ex99-1.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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https://www.micron.com/about/sustainability/corporate-governance ↩ ↩2
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https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723125/000142284926000099/xslSCHEDULE_13G_X02/primary_doc.xml ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
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https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723125/000072312525000033/mu-20251113.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4