OpenAI POLITICAL

Corporate Communications & Public Stance

• On 1 May 2024, OpenAI said it banned accounts operated from Israel by STOIC, an Israeli political-campaign-management firm, after finding that its models had been used to generate and edit material for a cross-platform influence operation.¹

• OpenAI described the operation’s content as including anti-Hamas, anti-Qatar, pro-Israel, anti-BJP, and pro-Histadrut material, while stating that most topical campaigns were loosely associated with the Gaza conflict and had little, if any, engagement beyond the network’s own accounts.¹

• This enforcement disclosure documents action against an Israel-linked influence operation rather than an OpenAI statement supporting a party to the conflict.¹

• In October 2024, OpenAI stated that advancing AI with the United States and allied countries in accordance with “democratic values” was essential to its mission, without naming Israel or Palestine.²

• OpenAI stated that its national-security uses are subject to internal review and that its policies prohibit harm to people, property destruction, and weapons development.²

• Effective 29 October 2025, OpenAI’s Usage Policies prohibit weapons development, procurement, or use, and require OpenAI review and approval for national-security or intelligence uses; the public policy page does not disclose customer-specific approvals, enforcement, or exceptions involving Israel or Palestine.³

Operations in Occupied or Contested Territories

• Associated Press reported in February 2025, based on internal company data, documents, and interviews, that the Israeli military purchased advanced OpenAI models through Microsoft Azure between October 2023 and July 2024; continuation after July 2024 was not established by the reviewed sources.^{4, 5}

• AP reported that combined Israeli-military usage of Microsoft and OpenAI AI was nearly 200 times higher in March 2024 than in the week before 7 October 2023.^{4, 5}

• AP reported that a three-year, $133 million contract beginning in 2021 was between Microsoft and Israel’s Ministry of Defense rather than OpenAI, and that OpenAI said it did not have a partnership with Israel’s military.^{4, 5}

• AP stated that the Microsoft data did not specify which OpenAI models were used or connect a particular model to a particular military operation.⁵

• The January 2025 +972 Magazine/Local Call investigation, based on leaked Israeli Defence Ministry and Microsoft Israel records, reported that the Israeli military began purchasing GPT-4 through Azure in August 2023 and that consumption rose twenty-fold after October 2023; its reporting did not establish whether GPT-4 was used in classified air-gapped or internet-connected systems.⁶

• A 2025 Don’t Buy into Occupation report stated, citing AFSC Investigate and +972 Magazine, that Israeli military Azure AI consumption included GPT-4 and described this as approximately one-quarter of average monthly AI-tool consumption during the war’s first year.⁷

• That GPT-4 consumption-share claim remains secondary-report evidence in this record because the underlying procurement material and original reporting were not independently retrieved; AFSC Investigate repeats the account while attributing it to +972 and is therefore not independent corroboration.^{7, 8}

• Microsoft stated in January 2025 that the OpenAI API was exclusive to Azure, ran on Azure, and was available through Azure OpenAI Service, with relevant API exclusivity, IP rights, and revenue-sharing arrangements continuing through 2030.⁹

• Microsoft stated in May 2025 that it worked with Israel’s Ministry of Defense through what it characterized as a standard commercial relationship for software, professional services, Azure cloud services, and Azure AI services, including language translation; that statement did not name OpenAI models.¹⁰

• The Guardian reported in August 2025 that Unit 8200 used a segregated Azure environment for a large repository of intercepted Palestinian calls and reported sources’ assertion that intelligence from it had been used to research and identify bombing targets; the report did not identify OpenAI models as the services used for that repository.¹¹

• Microsoft stated in September 2025 that its ongoing review supported elements of the Guardian reporting, including Israeli Ministry of Defense use of Azure storage capacity in the Netherlands and AI services, and that it had ceased and disabled specified subscriptions over mass-surveillance concerns; Microsoft did not identify the unit, subscriptions, models, or whether OpenAI models were among the disabled services.¹²

• In February 2026, OpenAI and Microsoft stated that Azure remained the exclusive cloud provider for stateless APIs providing access to OpenAI models and IP, and that OpenAI’s first-party products would continue to be hosted on Azure; this establishes continued technical integration, not continued Israeli-military use after July 2024.¹³

• No public evidence identified in the bounded sources of an OpenAI office, subsidiary, reseller, direct service point, or contract in an Israeli settlement, East Jerusalem, the West Bank, or the Golan Heights.^{1, 2, 4, 5, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20}

• OpenAI was not named in the supplied full-text checks of the 2023 OHCHR settlement-business database update, the 2025 OHCHR update materials, or the 2025 UN Special Rapporteur report A/HRC/59/23; these are document-scoped findings rather than proof of absence from all relevant sources or activity.^{14, 15, 16}

• No public primary procurement record, tender, customer statement, invoice, or contract identifying OpenAI as a direct supplier to the IDF, Israeli Ministry of Defense, COGAT, or a settlement authority was identified in the bounded review.^{4, 5, 10, 12}

Internal Governance, Content & Retail Policies

• OpenAI stated that proposed national-security partnerships are evaluated through a formal process led by its Product Policy and National Security teams.²

• The STOIC account action is a documented platform-enforcement measure concerning Israel-linked political-influence activity.¹

• +972 and AP reported that OpenAI removed explicit “military and warfare” wording from its terms in January 2024, while OpenAI’s October 2024 statement describes its review process and restrictions on harm and weapons development; the reviewed sources do not establish how these policies were applied to Azure-mediated Israeli military use.^{2, 4, 6}

• No public evidence identified in the bounded sources of OpenAI-specific HR enforcement, employee litigation, union action, independent moderation inquiry, or settlement-product labelling or sourcing policy related to Israel–Palestine.^{1, 2, 4, 5, 14, 15, 16}

• A dedicated bounded employee-relations and platform-policy search reviewed OpenAI’s public raising-concerns policy, its usage and moderation materials, and major-news reporting on Israel-related workplace protests; it identified OpenAI’s general internal reporting channels but no OpenAI-specific Israel–Palestine dismissal, discipline, union action, or adjudicated moderation finding.^{3, 21, 22, 23}

• AP’s April 2025 reporting on workplace discipline and dismissals concerned Microsoft employees protesting Microsoft’s Israel-related contracts, rather than OpenAI employees.²¹

• No public evidence identified in the bounded review of an OpenAI-specific employment case, regulatory action, or independently substantiated finding concerning pro-Palestinian employee speech or Israel–Palestine-related user-content moderation.^{1, 4, 5, 14, 15, 16}

Brand Heritage & State Partnerships

• The reviewed evidence supports an Azure-mediated route through which Israeli military users obtained OpenAI models, but it does not establish a direct OpenAI–Israeli-government or OpenAI–Israeli-military contract.^{4, 5, 7, 6}

• OpenAI’s October 2024 national-security statement refers generally to U.S. and allied efforts and does not identify an Israeli state role, Israeli state-held share, or a mandate tied to Israeli infrastructure or geopolitical objectives.²

• No authoritative corporate filing or registry record retrieved identifies an Israeli state-held share, golden share, government-control right, or parent-company relationship involving an Israeli state body.^{24, 17, 18, 25, 19, 20}

• No public evidence identified in the bounded sources that OpenAI uses Israeli military or state-security heritage in commercial branding, has accepted Israeli state honours, or sponsors a state-backed cultural or public-relations programme.^{1, 2, 4}

• OpenAI was not named in the supplied full-text check of the BDS Movement’s November 2024 corporate-priority-target guide, a document-scoped finding that does not establish absence from other boycott advocacy or informal campaign lists.²⁶

Lobbying, Advocacy, Financing & Logistics

• The available evidence identifies paid Azure-mediated access to OpenAI models by Israeli military users, rather than free OpenAI credits, physical logistics, a direct conflict-specific support package, or a direct Israeli military contract.^{4, 5, 7, 6}

• Al-Haq’s December 2025 submission repeats the AP account of Israeli military use of Microsoft and OpenAI services, but does not provide a separate OpenAI procurement record.²⁷

• A/80/78 includes an April 2025 civil-society submission naming OpenAI in discussion of U.S. commercial AI used in Israel’s wars and citing AP; its inclusion records the submission, not an independently verified UN finding concerning OpenAI.²⁸

• No public evidence identified in the bounded sources of OpenAI corporate donations or sponsorships to the IDF, FIDF, JNF/KKL, settlement entities, reservist funds, or military-welfare bodies.^{1, 2, 4}

• Dedicated bounded searches of Federal Election Commission contribution data, Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act filings, OpenAI’s political-advocacy statement, and the OpenAI Foundation’s 2024 Form 990 were completed.^{20, 29, 30, 31}

• The reviewed OpenAI lobbying filing described artificial-intelligence legislative and regulatory issues and did not identify Israel, Palestine, anti-BDS legislation, or an Israel-related foreign principal; OpenAI separately states that it does not maintain an employee-funded PAC.^{30, 31}

• No public evidence identified in the bounded review of an OpenAI-specific OECD National Contact Point case, UN communication, regulatory order, court proceeding, parliamentary finding, or verifiable primary-record organized boycott, divestment, or sanctions campaign concerning Israel–Palestine.^{4, 5, 14, 15, 26}

Corporate Structure & Primary Mission

• OpenAI states that its nonprofit is the OpenAI Foundation and its for-profit entity is OpenAI Group PBC, with the Foundation holding special voting and governance rights, appointing all Group directors, and retaining the ability to replace them.²⁴

• The Delaware Department of Justice described OpenAI, Inc. as a Delaware nonprofit corporation incorporated in 2015 and stated that the nonprofit retained control over the PBC following the 2025 recapitalization review.³²

• Delaware’s 28 October 2025 conditional non-objection records representations that the nonprofit retains control and oversight while it holds Class N common stock, including sole power to remove PBC directors; it also records that the PBC mission would be identical to the nonprofit’s and that directors must consider the mission on enterprise safety and security issues rather than stockholders’ pecuniary interests.¹⁷

• OpenAI states that its mission is to ensure that artificial general intelligence benefits all humanity, and the Delaware Attorney General described the nonprofit’s mission as the safe development and distribution of AGI for humanity’s benefit.^{24, 32}

• OpenAI states that it created a for-profit subsidiary in 2019 and that the nonprofit has always governed and controlled it.²⁴

• At the October 2025 recapitalization closing, OpenAI reported that the Foundation held 26% of OpenAI Group equity plus a valuation-linked warrant, Microsoft held roughly 27%, and current and former employees and other investors held the remaining 47%.²⁴

• OpenAI’s April 2025 sub-processor disclosure identified OpenAI OpCo, LLC, OpenAI, LLC, OpenAI Ireland Ltd., OpenAI UK Ltd., and OpenAI Japan Ltd. as affiliates providing technical and operational support.³³

• The same disclosure listed OpenAI Global, LLC as parent of OpenAI OpCo, LLC, OpenAI OpCo as parent of OpenAI, LLC, and OpenAI, LLC as parent of the Ireland, UK, and Japan entities.³³

• OpenAI’s Services Agreement identifies OpenAI OpCo, LLC as the contracting entity outside the EEA and Switzerland, OpenAI Ireland Ltd. for EEA and Swiss customers, and OpenAI Public Sector, LLC where designated on an order form.³⁴

• OpenAI Foundation’s 2024 Form 990 Schedule R identifies OpenAI GP LLC as a California-domiciled disregarded entity directly controlled by the Foundation; it also identifies OpenAI Holdings LLC, OpenAI Global LLC and its disregarded single-member LLCs, and Aestas LLC as research-and-technology related organisations controlled by OpenAI GP LLC.²⁰

• The same 2024 Form 990 identifies OpenAI LLC, OAI Corporation, OpenAI International Inc., OpenAI Ireland Limited, OAI Singapore Pte Ltd, OpenAI France SAS, and OpenAI Japan Ltd. as research-and-technology related organisations, while not establishing their post-recapitalization status.²⁰

• Companies House records OPENAI UK LTD as an active private limited company incorporated on 21 September 2022, with its registered office at Suite 1, 7th Floor, 50 Broadway, London SW1H 0BL and SIC code 63990.¹⁸

• Companies House lists Robert Wu and OpenAI, L.L.C. as active directors of OpenAI UK Ltd.; Jason Kwon is recorded as having resigned on 12 March 2024.³⁵

• Companies House states that OpenAI UK Ltd. has no registrable person or registrable relevant legal entity, a UK register statement that should not be read as a group-wide ownership conclusion.²⁵

• Ireland’s CRO Gazette records the incorporation of OPENAI IRELAND LIMITED, company number 737350, on 24 March 2023.¹⁹

• A 2025 federal-court pleading names additional OpenAI-related entities, including OpenAI L.P., OpenAI GP, L.L.C., OpenAI Global, LLC, OAI Corporation, OpenAI Holdings, LLC, and Startup Fund-related entities, but this litigation party list is not a complete current group chart.³⁶

• The reviewed corporate-governance materials describe a general AGI and public-benefit mandate and do not make OpenAI’s purpose contingent on advancing Israeli, Palestinian, or another state’s geopolitical goals.^{24, 32, 34, 17}

Executive & Leadership Footprint

• As of OpenAI’s 28 October 2025 structure announcement, the Foundation directors were Bret Taylor, Adam D’Angelo, Sue Desmond-Hellmann, Zico Kolter, Paul M. Nakasone, Adebayo Ogunlesi, Nicole Seligman, and CEO Sam Altman.²⁴

• OpenAI stated that all of those directors except Zico Kolter would also serve on the OpenAI Group PBC board, with Kolter serving as a non-voting observer.²⁴

• On 21 July 2026, OpenAI announced that David Vélez and Robin Vince joined the boards of both the OpenAI Foundation and OpenAI Group PBC; their continuing status after that announcement was not independently re-confirmed in the reviewed material.³⁷

• A bounded name-based review of the listed principals across FEC data, public foundation and philanthropy records, and event programmes identified Sam Altman’s general Giving Pledge commitment and his inclusion in a Jerusalem Post “50 Most Influential Jews” event programme, but those records do not establish an Israel-related donation, defence or cyber investment, settlement-organisation role, or advocacy-group office.^{29, 38, 39}

• No public evidence identified in the completed bounded searches of an Israel-related donation, foundation grant, defence or cyber investment, settlement-organisation support, or pro-Israel or anti-BDS organisational role by Bret Taylor, Adam D’Angelo, Sue Desmond-Hellmann, Zico Kolter, Paul M. Nakasone, Adebayo Ogunlesi, Nicole Seligman, David Vélez, or Robin Vince.^{37, 29, 38, 39}

• The founder and executive review also covered President and co-founder Greg Brockman and OpenAI’s original founding group.^{40, 41} It identified Altman’s personal investment in Israeli cybersecurity startup Apex, OpenAI’s reported 2023 consideration of Israeli investment opportunities, and former co-founder Ilya Sutskever’s post-OpenAI company with a Tel Aviv office; the latter is a separate post-departure enterprise and is not attributed to OpenAI.^{42, 43, 44}

• No public evidence identified in the completed bounded searches of an additional Israel-related investment, advocacy office, military-welfare role, or settlement-organisation role by Greg Brockman, Wojciech Zaremba, or John Schulman.^{29, 40, 41}