OpenAI DIGITAL

Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships

OpenAI states that OpenAI Foundation is the nonprofit parent and OpenAI Group PBC is the Delaware public-benefit corporation operating the for-profit enterprise, with the Foundation holding special rights to appoint and remove all Group directors ¹. The Delaware Department of Justice’s recapitalization review likewise records the nonprofit’s sole power to appoint and remove PBC directors ².

OpenAI reported that Microsoft held an approximately 27% as-converted diluted investment in OpenAI Group PBC after the October 2025 recapitalization, alongside certain intellectual-property rights ³. OpenAI’s structure disclosure identifies the Foundation as holding 26%, Microsoft roughly 27%, and current and former employees and investors the remaining 47%, without identifying beneficial holders within that final category ¹.

Canadian privacy regulators identify OpenAI OpCo, LLC as the entity providing OpenAI products to end users and describe it as a Delaware entity headquartered in San Francisco ⁴. A 2026 SEC-filed Amazon exhibit independently identifies OpenAI Group PBC as a Delaware public-benefit corporation and party to February 2026 Series C preferred-stock arrangements ⁵.

No public evidence identified.

No public evidence identified in the reviewed materials of OpenAI licensing, subscribing to, or integrating the named Israeli-origin enterprise vendors reviewed in the research, or of an integrator deploying Israeli-origin technology for OpenAI.

Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology

No public evidence identified in the reviewed sources of OpenAI’s use of Israeli-origin facial recognition, biometric identification, gait analysis, predictive-policing, sentiment-monitoring, social-media-monitoring, or workforce-surveillance products.

Associated Press reported that Israeli military personnel accessed OpenAI models through Microsoft Azure and that Microsoft cloud services were used for transcription, translation, and searching large text collections ⁶. That reporting does not identify an Israeli-origin surveillance product procured by OpenAI or establish that a specified OpenAI model processed a particular surveillance-derived dataset ⁶.

Microsoft stated on 25 September 2025 that its ongoing review supported elements of reporting about Israeli Ministry of Defense use of Azure storage capacity in the Netherlands and AI services, and that it had ceased and disabled specified subscriptions over mass-surveillance concerns ⁷. Microsoft did not identify the unit, subscriptions, models, or whether OpenAI models were among the disabled services ⁷.

The Guardian, +972 Magazine, and Local Call reported that Unit 8200 developed a separate ChatGPT-like model trained on intercepted Palestinian communications, but the investigation does not identify OpenAI as that model’s supplier or developer ⁸.

Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation

Associated Press reported that Israeli military customers purchased advanced OpenAI models through Microsoft Azure and that OpenAI said it had no partnership with Israel’s military ⁶. The reported pathway is indirect Azure-mediated access rather than a publicly confirmed direct OpenAI–Israeli-military contract ⁶.

Israel’s Project Nimbus announcement identifies Google’s local Israeli cloud zone as part of a government cloud initiative ⁹. No reviewed source identifies OpenAI as a Project Nimbus contractor or participant ⁹.

No public evidence identified in the reviewed sources that OpenAI operates, leases, or co-locates a data centre in Israel or offers a separately marketed Israeli sovereign-cloud or data-residency service.

Globes reported in July 2026, citing unnamed sources and noting that OpenAI did not respond, that the company had no Israeli development centre, office, or Israel-specific manager planned and that EMEA-based personnel engaged Israeli startups from abroad ¹⁰. This reporting is not a corporate-registry determination, and no public registry record was identified in the bounded research establishing an OpenAI Israeli subsidiary, branch, office address, or data-centre presence ¹⁰.

Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships

Associated Press reported that Israeli military use of Microsoft and OpenAI technology increased sharply after 7 October 2023 and that advanced OpenAI models were available through Azure ¹¹. OpenAI told AP that it had no partnership with Israel’s military, and the reporting does not document a direct OpenAI contract with the IDF, Ministry of Defense, intelligence services, or another Israeli state body ¹¹.

AP reported Israeli military use of AI for intelligence analysis, intercepted communications, and surveillance, while noting that the internal material it reviewed did not identify which OpenAI models were used for each task ¹¹. The evidence therefore supports reported access to general-purpose OpenAI models through Azure but does not establish an OpenAI-built targeting or weapons system ¹¹.

OpenAI’s October 2024 national-security statement says that potential national-security use cases undergo a formal review process led by Product Policy and National Security teams ¹². The same statement says OpenAI prohibits use of its technology to harm people, destroy property, or develop weapons ¹².

OpenAI’s usage policy, updated 29 January 2025, prohibits using its services to develop or use weapons, injure others, or destroy property ¹³. No public evidence identified in the reviewed sources of OpenAI developing, selling, licensing, or maintaining offensive cyber tools, zero-day exploits, or digital weapons for Israeli state actors.

OpenAI appointed retired U.S. Army General Paul M. Nakasone to its board and Safety and Security Committee in June 2024, identifying him as former head of U.S. Cyber Command and former Director of the National Security Agency ¹⁴. OpenAI’s current governance materials list Nakasone among Foundation directors, while a July 2026 announcement added David Vélez and Robin Vince to both boards ^{1, 15}.

AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems

AP reported that the IDF said its analysts used AI-enabled systems to assist in identifying and independently reviewing targets, while separately reporting Israeli military access to OpenAI models through Azure ⁶. AP did not establish that OpenAI models performed target generation or autonomous targeting, nor identify a direct OpenAI contract for that activity ⁶.

No public evidence identified in the reviewed sources that OpenAI trained models on Palestinian civilian data, intercepted communications, or surveillance-derived datasets from Israel or the occupied Palestinian territory.

No public evidence identified in the reviewed sources of OpenAI providing an autonomous target-generation, fire-control, or autonomous-tracking system to Israeli military or security bodies.

OpenAI reported disrupting accounts associated with an Israel-origin influence operation it labelled “Zero Zeno,” which it said used its models to generate personas and pro-Israel and anti-Hamas content ^{16, 17}. This was an enforcement action against reported malicious use and is not evidence of an Israeli state contract or deployment ^{16, 17}.

Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint

No public evidence identified in the reviewed sources of an OpenAI-operated Israeli R&D centre, engineering office, accelerator, Israeli-company acquisition, corporate venture investment, or co-development or patent arrangement with Israeli research institutions.

Reuters reported that Israeli cybersecurity startup Apex received an undisclosed investment from OpenAI CEO Sam Altman ¹⁸. The report does not establish an OpenAI corporate investment, procurement relationship, investment size, or continuing ownership ¹⁸.

A dedicated name-based review covered OpenAI’s current directors, CEO Sam Altman, President and co-founder Greg Brockman, and the original founding group identified by OpenAI ^{1, 15, 19, 20}. It identified Altman’s personal Apex investment and OpenAI’s reported 2023 consideration of Israeli investment opportunities, but no completed OpenAI corporate investment was established ^{18, 21}.

Former co-founder Ilya Sutskever’s later company, Safe Superintelligence, lists a Tel Aviv office; because Sutskever left OpenAI before founding that separate company, the presence is not attributed to OpenAI ^{19, 22}. No public evidence identified in the completed bounded searches of an Israeli surveillance, SIGINT, cyber, or military-technology investment by Greg Brockman, Bret Taylor, Adam D’Angelo, Sue Desmond-Hellmann, Zico Kolter, Paul M. Nakasone, Adebayo Ogunlesi, Nicole Seligman, David Vélez, Robin Vince, Wojciech Zaremba, or John Schulman ^{15, 19, 23, 20}.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History

The supplied document-level review found no mention of OpenAI in the 2023 OHCHR settlement-business database ²⁴. This is a document-scoped finding and does not establish the absence of all settlement-related commercial activity ²⁴.

The supplied review likewise found no mention of OpenAI in the UN Special Rapporteur’s A/HRC/59/23 report, including its discussion of cloud, surveillance, AI, Project Nimbus, and Palantir ²⁵. The report therefore does not itself substantiate an OpenAI-specific relationship finding ²⁵.

The UN Special Committee reported that an IDF official said in August 2024 that the Israeli army used company-provided cloud storage and AI services for military operations, without naming OpenAI ²⁶. Human Rights Watch documented general Israeli military use of surveillance, AI, and digital tools in Gaza without naming OpenAI as a supplier ^{27, 28}.

No public evidence identified in the focused searches of a regulatory inquiry, export-control enforcement action, sanctions investigation, court proceeding, or parliamentary proceeding directed at OpenAI concerning technology sales or services to Israeli state entities ²⁹.

No supportable evidence identified in the checked canonical BDS corporate-priority list or supplied DBIO materials that OpenAI was a named campaign target ³⁰. A BankTrack/DBIO publication identifying GPT-4 as a lead requires verification of its underlying sources before its characterization can be treated as established beyond the Azure-mediated access reported by AP ³⁰.