INDEX / DIRECTORY / OPENAI

OpenAI

AI & Data 71 CITED SOURCES UPDATED 2026-09-07 METHOD V6.5
BDS-1000 Score 364 /1000 D Tier D - Moderate
Military ↗ 0.00 Digital ↗ 3.99 Economic ↗ 2.55 Political ↗ 3.10
OWNERSHIP TREE 2 brands and group businesses View all

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Key Findings

  • Digital: Israeli military users reportedly purchased advanced OpenAI models through Microsoft Azure from August 2023 to July 2024; the evidence supports an Azure-mediated route, not a direct OpenAI–Israeli-military contract.1, 2
  • Economic: The documented paid, recurring model-access pathway supports a foreign SaaS-trade nexus, while no Israeli office, development centre, local operating premises, or settlement operation was identified.1, 3
  • Political: The same commercial access supports a business-as-usual normalisation finding, but not documented political advocacy, direct state partnership, military-welfare financing, or ideological endorsement.1, 4
  • Not found: No public evidence identified of OpenAI supplying physical military goods, weapons systems, targeting products, Israeli sovereign-cloud infrastructure, or settlement-based operations.5, 6

Target Profile

FieldDetail
Company NameOpenAI
JurisdictionUnited States - Delaware. OpenAI, Inc. was incorporated in Delaware in 2015; OpenAI Group PBC is identified as a Delaware public-benefit corporation.7, 8
HeadquartersSan Francisco, California.8
SectorArtificial-intelligence software and language-model services.9
OwnershipOpenAI Foundation controls OpenAI Group PBC through governance rights; At the October 2025 recapitalisation closing, OpenAI reported that the Foundation held 26% of Group equity and Microsoft approximately 27%, with current and former employees and other investors holding the remaining 47%.7
Key Executives / GovernanceFoundation directors identified by OpenAI include Bret Taylor, Adam D’Angelo, Sue Desmond-Hellmann, Zico Kolter, Paul M. Nakasone, Adebayo Ogunlesi, Nicole Seligman, and CEO Sam Altman; David Vélez and Robin Vince were announced as joining both boards in July 2026.7, 10
Israeli-Nexus SummaryThe documented nexus is recurring, Azure-mediated access to general-purpose OpenAI models by Israeli military users during a bounded period, alongside Israeli market engagement from abroad; no direct OpenAI military contract or Israeli operating presence was identified.1, 3

Executive Summary

OpenAI is a U.S.-based AI company whose operating for-profit is OpenAI Group PBC, controlled through governance rights held by the OpenAI Foundation.7 Its principal documented Israel/Palestine nexus is not a direct supply agreement with Israeli state bodies. Rather, Associated Press reporting based on internal material described Israeli military purchases of advanced OpenAI models through Microsoft Azure, including reported GPT-4 purchases from August 2023 and military access during the period from October 2023 to July 2024.1, 2

This record supports a digital and commercial relationship through OpenAI’s documented exclusive Azure channel for stateless APIs. OpenAI and Microsoft stated in February 2026 that Azure remained the exclusive cloud provider for those APIs and that OpenAI first-party products continued to be hosted on Azure.11 That structure supports high strategic proximity in the scoring method, but it does not establish a direct OpenAI–IDF or OpenAI–Ministry of Defense contract.1, 2

The evidence does not establish that OpenAI models hosted Unit 8200’s reported repository of intercepted Palestinian calls, generated targets, trained on Palestinian communications, operated a sovereign cloud in Israel, or supplied an autonomous targeting or weapons system.5, 6 Microsoft’s September 2025 statement that it had ceased and disabled specified subscriptions over mass-surveillance concerns is material to the owner-level Azure scenario, but it neither proves that all Azure services ended nor proves that OpenAI-model access continued after the bounded procurement record.12

OpenAI’s reported enforcement against STOIC, an Israel-origin political-marketing operation, is an action against platform misuse rather than evidence of support for the operation or a state contract.13 Sam Altman’s reported personal investment in Israeli cybersecurity startup Apex is in scope as a CEO-linked act, but the available evidence does not establish its size, continuing ownership, a military or intelligence product, a state customer, or political purpose.14 On the fixed V6.5 evidence-only assessment, OpenAI’s BRS is 364, Tier D (Moderate Complicity).

Timeline of Relevant Events

DateEvent
August 2023Investigative reporting stated that the Israeli military began purchasing GPT-4 through Azure.2
7 October 2023–July 2024AP reported Israeli military purchase and use of advanced OpenAI models through Azure during this bounded period; it did not establish continuation after July 2024.1
May 2024OpenAI reported disrupting STOIC accounts used for an Israel-origin influence operation.13
June 2024OpenAI appointed retired U.S. Army General Paul M. Nakasone to its board and Safety and Security Committee.15
October 2024OpenAI described review of potential national-security uses and stated that its policies prohibit harm, property destruction, and weapons development.4
May 2025Microsoft described its own standard commercial relationship with Israel’s Ministry of Defense; it did not identify OpenAI as the contracting party.16
September 2025Microsoft stated it had disabled specified subscriptions following its review of mass-surveillance concerns, without identifying models or whether OpenAI models were among them.12
February 2026OpenAI and Microsoft stated that Azure remained the exclusive cloud provider for stateless OpenAI APIs.11
July 2026OpenAI announced that David Vélez and Robin Vince joined both the Foundation and Group PBC boards.10

Corporate Overview

OpenAI’s published structure identifies OpenAI Foundation as the controlling nonprofit parent and OpenAI Group PBC as the operating for-profit. The Foundation has rights to appoint and remove all Group directors.7 OpenAI OpCo, LLC is identified as the contracting entity for customers outside the EEA and Switzerland, while OpenAI Ireland Ltd. serves EEA and Swiss customers.17

The reviewed materials identify affiliates in the United States, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Japan, France, Singapore, and other group entities, but do not establish an Israeli-incorporated OpenAI subsidiary, branch, office, data centre, or Israel-specific manager.3, 17 Israel’s trademark register lists OpenAI OpCo, LLC as proprietor of a software and language-model-services mark; the registration does not itself establish an Israeli subsidiary, tax residence, office, or physical-product origin.9

The Israeli-market reporting describes engagement from OpenAI’s EMEA organisation rather than a local operation. Globes reported, citing unnamed sources and noting that OpenAI did not respond, that OpenAI had no Israeli office, development centre, or Israel-only country manager planned; it described EMEA personnel working with Israeli startups from abroad.3

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

No public evidence identified of OpenAI supplying physical military equipment, weapons systems, munitions, transport, construction, base services, defence-prime components, or purpose-built kinetic products to Israeli bodies.5, 6 The documented pathway concerns general-purpose model access through Microsoft Azure, not physical supply or embedded weapon firmware.1

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest defence is that no direct OpenAI military contract was identified and OpenAI told AP it had no partnership with Israel’s military.1 Reporting does not establish an OpenAI-designed targeting, fire-control, weapons-effect, or Israeli-specific tactical product.5 Under the domain boundary, commercial software and cloud access do not establish Military involvement.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

AP reported that Israeli military personnel accessed advanced OpenAI models through Microsoft Azure and that use of Microsoft and OpenAI technology increased after 7 October 2023.1 The surviving supported frame is repeated provision of general-purpose models to military users through Azure. OpenAI and Microsoft identify Azure as the exclusive cloud provider for stateless OpenAI APIs, creating a documented strategic operational-distribution relationship.11

Microsoft’s substantial equity position in OpenAI Group, reported at approximately 27% at the October 2025 recapitalisation closing, is relevant to structural proximity.7 However, the record does not establish that OpenAI models processed a particular surveillance dataset, hosted the intercepted-call repository reported in connection with Unit 8200, or performed target generation.5, 18

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

OpenAI states it has no partnership with Israel’s military.1 Its policies prohibit weapons development and use, injury, and destruction of property, and describe review of national-security uses.4, 19 Microsoft’s withdrawal of specified subscriptions related to mass-surveillance concerns limits any owner-level intelligence-integration scenario; it cannot be treated as proof that all Azure services, all OpenAI access, or the underlying model-access route ended.12

No public evidence identified of OpenAI operating Israeli data-centre capacity, a sovereign cloud, a Project Nimbus role, an Israeli R&D centre, or a model trained on Palestinian civilian or intercepted communications.5, 6

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

The evidence supports recurring foreign SaaS trade: Israeli military users reportedly purchased advanced OpenAI models through Azure over an established, bounded period.1, 2 This is more than preliminary market interest, but it does not establish Israeli operational presence, direct investment, local infrastructure, or Israel-specific revenue.

OpenAI’s reported Israeli-market activity was managed through EMEA personnel abroad. Reporting described promotion and startup engagement but stated that OpenAI had no Israeli office, development centre, or Israel-only manager.3 The continuing Azure API relationship supports an intermediary commercial channel, not a direct Israeli procurement agreement.11

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified of direct OpenAI investment in Israeli factories, data centres, real estate, Israeli sovereign bonds, Israel Bonds, or Israel-focused funds.7 No public evidence identified of Israeli tax payments, profit repatriation, local workforce disclosures, settlement premises, Israeli sourcing, or physical Israeli-origin products.3, 7

Altman’s reported personal Apex investment is evaluated as an in-scope CEO act with direct principal proximity. The single identified investment has undisclosed size and no established continuing ownership or Israeli-state or defence nexus; it does not displace the documented recurring-trade scenario.14 An SEC index for a Jerusalem-addressed investment vehicle does not, by itself, establish ownership of OpenAI securities or Israeli control of OpenAI.20

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

The Azure-mediated model-access relationship supports a business-as-usual normalisation finding: a corporate product relationship reportedly involved a national military institution for a bounded period.1 It does not establish political advocacy, official state partnership, ideological branding, direct conflict financing, or a political approval specific to Israel or Palestine.

OpenAI’s May 2024 STOIC disclosure documented enforcement against an Israel-origin influence operation that generated pro-Israel and other political content. It is evidence of platform-abuse enforcement, not endorsement.13

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified of OpenAI corporate donations or sponsorships to the IDF, FIDF, JNF/KKL, settlement entities, reservist funds, or military-welfare bodies.21 Reviewed lobbying material did not identify Israel, Palestine, anti-BDS legislation, or an Israel-related foreign principal; OpenAI states it does not maintain an employee-funded PAC.22, 21

No public evidence identified of an OpenAI office, subsidiary, reseller, service point, or contract in a settlement, East Jerusalem, the West Bank, or the Golan Heights.23 OpenAI was not named in the supplied document-level checks of the OHCHR settlement-business database, the UN Special Rapporteur report, or the BDS Movement’s November 2024 corporate-priority guide; these are document-scoped findings, not proof of absence from all sources or activity.23, 24

Named Entities and Evidence Map

BDS-1000 Score

Method: V6.5.

DomainIMPV-Domain Score
Military0.000.000.000.00
Digital4.506.207.803.99
Economic3.505.107.502.55
Political3.506.207.803.10

Digital is the maximum domain because the surviving supported frame is repeated general-purpose OpenAI-model provision to Israeli military users through Azure, coupled with Azure’s documented exclusive operational-distribution role.1, 11 The score does not treat the ceased specified Microsoft subscriptions as proof of a complete cessation of all access, nor does it treat unspecified continuing Azure services as proof that the specific surveillance-related activity continued. The owner-level intelligence-integration scenario no longer governs after the verified withdrawal of those specified subscriptions.12

The V6.5 method is scale-free and evidence-only: it measures documented activity type, scale, and directness after human vetting. It does not convert unverified allegations, wrong-entity activity, or divested/ceased specific operations into established conduct.

Methodology Note

Footnotes

  1. https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-ai-technology-737bc17af7b03e98c29cec4e15d0f108 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21

  2. https://www.972mag.com/microsoft-azure-openai-israeli-army-cloud/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  3. https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-openai-to-manage-israel-operations-from-abroad-1001550880 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  4. https://openai.com/global-affairs/openais-approach-to-ai-and-national-security/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  5. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/06/israel-military-ai-surveillance ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  6. https://www.gov.il/en/pages/_bpress_20102022 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  7. https://openai.com/our-structure/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9

  8. https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-businesses/2026/pipeda-2026-002/ ↩ ↩2

  9. https://trademarks.justice.gov.il/TradeMarkSearch/ReportView?TMCaseNo=361877 ↩ ↩2

  10. https://openai.com/index/david-velez-robin-vince-join-openai-boards/ ↩ ↩2

  11. https://openai.com/index/continuing-microsoft-partnership/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  12. https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2025/09/25/update-on-ongoing-microsoft-review/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  13. https://openai.com/index/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-zero-zeno/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  14. https://tech.yahoo.com/ai/articles/israeli-cyber-startup-apex-gets-125554259.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  15. https://openai.com/index/openai-appoints-retired-us-army-general/ ↩

  16. https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2025/05/15/statement-technology-israel-gaza/ ↩ ↩2

  17. https://openai.com/en-GB/policies/services-agreement/ ↩ ↩2

  18. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/06/microsoft-israeli-military-palestinian-phone-calls-cloud ↩ ↩2

  19. https://openai.com/policies/usage-policies/ ↩

  20. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2130942/000213094226000001/0002130942-26-000001-index.html ↩

  21. https://openai.com/index/our-views-on-ai-policy-and-political-advocacy/ ↩ ↩2

  22. https://lda.senate.gov/filings/public/filing/65af1ec4-3378-4bcf-8409-c2510f503162/print/ ↩

  23. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session31/database-hrc3136/23-06-30-Update-israeli-settlement-opt-database-hrc3136.pdf ↩ ↩2

  24. https://www.bdsmovement.net/sites/default/files/2024-12/Guide%20to%20BDS%20Boycott%20%26%20Pressure%20Corporate%20Priority%20Targeting-30%20Nov%202024-Submitted%20by%20BDS%20movement.pdf ↩