Palantir

Key Findings

• Digital: Palantir and Israel’s Ministry of Defense announced a January 2024 strategic partnership to use Palantir technology for war-related missions; public reporting did not disclose the product configuration or contract scope.¹
• Economic: Palantir maintains an Israeli subsidiary and Tel Aviv office, while reporting also describes a permanent Palantir desk supporting Gaza aid-delivery data coordination at the CMCC in Kiryat Gat.^{2, 3}
• Political: Palantir publicly states that it “stands with Israel” and has said it supports Israeli defence and national-security missions in other programmes and contexts, while denying involvement in Gospel and Lavender.^{4, 5}
• Not found: No public evidence identified of Palantir manufacturing weapons or munitions, operating in settlements or occupied territory, participating in Project Nimbus, or supplying offensive cyber tools to Israeli state actors.^{6, 7, 8}

Target Profile

Key Facts:

• Palantir Engineering Israel Ltd. is listed as an Israeli incorporated subsidiary in Palantir’s FY2025 subsidiary exhibit.²
• Palantir’s FY2025 filing states that its current Israel-related operations were not material to its financial position or results.⁹
• No public evidence identified of Israeli state shareholding, Israeli government board appointees, or a golden share tied to Israeli state policy.^{9, 10}

Executive Summary

Palantir’s documented Israel/Palestine nexus is principally an enterprise-software, AI, and state-partnership nexus. In January 2024, Palantir and Israel’s Ministry of Defense announced a strategic partnership under which they would use Palantir technology in support of war-related missions. The company and contemporaneous reporting did not publicly identify the specific products, users, sites, contract value, procurement route, or operational workflow.^{1, 12}

The strongest evidence record concerns digital and political involvement. Israel’s National Cyber Directorate listed Palantir under “AI Defense infrastructure” and described strategic cooperation to integrate AI capabilities into the national Cyber Dome, without identifying products, contract value, hosting arrangements, datasets, or agency access.¹³ The UN Special Rapporteur’s July 2025 report stated that there were reasonable grounds to believe Palantir had provided automatic predictive-policing technology, defence infrastructure for military software, and AI-platform support for real-time battlefield data integration and automated decision-making. That assessment is not a released procurement or technical deployment record and does not resolve the particular systems, users, or locations involved.¹⁴

Palantir disputes important allegations. In its September 2025 response to Amnesty International, it said it does not and has not supported predictive-policing workflows in Israel, does not conduct or provide surveillance services, and does not sell software to enable unlawful surveillance. It also denied providing scaled targeting technology for Israel’s use in the conflict, specifically denying Gospel and Lavender involvement, while affirming other Israeli defence and national-security work.⁵ The resulting conflict between company statements and the Special Rapporteur’s assessment remains unresolved in the public materials reviewed.^{5, 14}

Its direct operational footprint includes Palantir Engineering Israel Ltd. and a Tel Aviv office. Reporting also describes a permanent desk at the US-led Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) in Kiryat Gat, where a representative reportedly integrates Gaza aid-convoy and distribution information into Palantir systems; that role has drawn criticism from the Special Rapporteur. This is reported aid-distribution architecture, not evidence of Palantir handling military shipping, freight, or port operations.^{2, 3}

The record does not support several stronger claims sometimes made about Palantir. No public evidence identified of weapons or munitions production; supply to Israeli defence primes; offensive cyber tools; Project Nimbus participation; Israeli data-centre operation; a settlement-specific office, contract, deployment, or customer; or an Israeli procurement record proving deployment of a named Palantir product for target selection, predictive policing, or operations in a specified occupied-territory location.^{6, 7, 8} On the fixed, human-vetted V6.5 framework, this dossier records a BRS of 817, placing Palantir in Tier A (Extreme Complicity).

Timeline of Relevant Events

Corporate Overview

Palantir Technologies Inc. is the SEC reporting registrant and consolidating parent. Its Class A shares trade on Nasdaq as PLTR.⁹ Its listed significant subsidiaries include Palantir USG, Inc., Palantir GSC Inc., Palantir Technologies Holdings LLC, Palantir International Inc., and Palantir Engineering Israel Ltd.; the filing does not provide a full description of the Israeli entity’s activities, personnel, data-processing role, facilities, customer base, or address.²

Palantir Engineering Israel Ltd. is an incorporated Israeli subsidiary, not merely a branch office. Palantir also documents a Tel Aviv office footprint and technical recruitment there. A reported local executive account characterised the local team as focused on client work, particularly with security-sector organisations, rather than as a dedicated R&D centre; this is a reported statement, not a corporate filing.^{2, 19, 20}

No public evidence identified of Palantir acquiring an Israeli operating company, holding Israeli state ownership, operating an Israeli data centre, participating in Project Nimbus, or maintaining documented settlement-specific infrastructure or commercial relationships.^{7, 8} No public evidence identified of a licensing, procurement, subscription, or product-integration relationship between Palantir and the listed Israeli cybersecurity vendors reviewed in the audit.¹³

Domain Summaries

Military

Mechanism of Involvement

The January 2024 Ministry of Defense partnership is the central documented military nexus. Palantir and IMOD announced a strategic partnership to use Palantir technology in support of Israel’s war-related missions. Public reporting quoted Palantir EVP Josh Harris as saying the parties had agreed to harness Palantir technology for war-related missions, while further scope was not disclosed.¹ Globes reported a value in the tens of millions of dollars and described Palantir’s reported role as limited IDF logistics and manpower management; that value was not confirmed by either party.²¹

Public sources identify Palantir platforms such as Gotham, Foundry, GAIA, and AIP in discussion of Israeli military or intelligence use, but do not establish a public product-by-product procurement record for the 2024 partnership.^{21, 22} The Special Rapporteur’s July 2025 assessment alleged AI and decision-support involvement, including real-time battlefield-data integration for automated decision-making. It does not identify a deployed model, dataset, system architecture, operational unit, or territorial location of use.¹⁴

The CMCC evidence concerns logistical and humanitarian coordination after the ceasefire-era centre’s establishment, including reported aid-tracking architecture and photographs of Palantir software. It does not establish a shipping, freight, port-handling, munitions, or base-services contract for Israeli military cargo.^{3, 18}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

Palantir is a software company; no public evidence identified of it manufacturing lethal platforms, munitions, guidance electronics, fire-control systems, radar, propulsion, or warhead components. No public evidence identified of supply-chain integration with Elbit, IAI, Rafael, or IMI, or of joint development or technology transfer with those Israeli defence primes.⁶

Palantir directly denies that it provided technology for or was involved with Gospel, and it also denies Lavender involvement.^{5, 22} Reporting further indicates that Unit 8200 and Shin Bet evaluated and declined Palantir’s platform, reportedly in part because of requirements concerning non-Israeli personnel and classified data; this is a reported limitation on the company’s Israeli security footprint, not proof that no other Israeli security use occurred.²¹

No public evidence identified of Palantir-specific export licences, licence denials, licence suspensions, judicial proceedings, or OECD National Contact Point complaints related to Israel. No public evidence identified of Palantir listed in Israel’s SIBAT Defence & HLS Directory.²³

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

Digital involvement is the most substantiated operational vector. Israel’s National Cyber Directorate listed Palantir as “AI Defense infrastructure” and described strategic cooperation to integrate AI capabilities into the national Cyber Dome.¹³ Palantir separately disclosed a strategic partnership with IMOD to supply technology assisting Israel’s ongoing war.^{1, 24}

Palantir has a Tel Aviv office, recruitment footprint, and Israeli subsidiary. Its filings say Israel-related operations were not material to its financial position or results, but this financial-materiality statement does not negate the existence of the documented relationship.^{2, 9} The public record also identifies the reported CMCC aid-data role, where Palantir systems reportedly support tracking delivery and distribution of aid to Gaza.³

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The Cyber Directorate summary does not specify a product, contract value, data location, agency-access arrangement, cloud hosting, datasets, or operational workflow.¹³ No public evidence identified that Palantir operates, leases, or colocates data-centre infrastructure in Israel; that it is a Project Nimbus contractor; or that Israel-related workloads are hosted on Palantir-operated, government-operated, hyperscaler, or on-premises infrastructure.⁷

Palantir says it does not support predictive policing in Israel, does not provide surveillance services, and does not sell software to enable unlawful surveillance.⁵ The Special Rapporteur’s contrary assessment is a serious documented allegation, but the reviewed materials do not include underlying contracts or technical documents resolving that dispute.^{5, 14}

No public evidence identified of Palantir selling offensive cyber capabilities, zero-day exploit tools, autonomous target-generation, fire-control, autonomous tracking systems, or tools trained on civilian-population data, intercepted communications, or surveillance-derived datasets from Israel or occupied Palestinian territory.^{7, 13}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

Palantir’s economic connection is principally direct operations and contract-linked revenue, rather than physical trade or portfolio investment. It maintains a Tel Aviv office and Israeli subsidiary, and its IMOD strategic partnership was reported as worth tens of millions of US dollars, though neither party confirmed the figure.^{2, 21} The company’s reported CMCC desk is a continuing operational presence connected to Gaza aid distribution, rather than a conventional goods-supply chain.³

Storebrand divested roughly $24 million from Palantir in October 2024, citing concerns connected to Israeli AI surveillance and use in occupied Palestinian territory.¹⁷ NBIM did not list Palantir on its exclusion or observation list as of August 2026, but said it would support shareholder proposals seeking an independent human-rights impact assessment and political-spending disclosure.²⁶

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

Palantir is a software and data-analytics company, not a producer, importer, or retailer of physical goods. No public evidence identified of Israeli agricultural sourcing, produce importation, settlement-origin goods, country-of-origin labelling issues, or goods-distribution arrangements involving Palantir.^{22, 27}

No public evidence identified of Palantir holding corporate portfolio positions in Israeli companies, Israeli sovereign bonds, or Israel-focused funds; underwriting Israeli debt, war bonds, or insurance; or acting as an Israeli economic “sector anchor” or key employer.^{27, 9} The audit also records chair Peter Thiel’s investment in ChemomAb and Mithril’s investment in Epistema, alongside a reported Palantir company-scouting partnership with Kinetica.^{28, 29, 30} These are distinct from direct Palantir corporate holdings, but controlling-principal conduct is within the rubric’s scope. They were considered during review; the record did not establish a stronger current economic relationship than the directly maintained operating footprint.

Palantir’s filings do not separately quantify Israel revenue, and state that Israel-related operations are not material to the company’s financial position or results.⁹ This limits precision about the contract’s economic scale.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Political

Mechanism of Involvement

Palantir’s corporate public stance is explicit. Its November 2023 update stated that it “stands with Israel,” and its February 2024 update said it was “proud to stand alongside Israel.”^{4, 12} In its May 2025 letter to the UN Special Rapporteur and September 2025 response to Amnesty, Palantir stated that it had been vocal in support of and solidarity with Israel after 7 October 2023, described work in civil, defence, and intelligence mandates, and acknowledged that work could continue or expand in defence contexts.^{5, 31}

The board’s Tel Aviv meeting and the contemporaneous IMOD partnership gave that stance a documented institutional expression.^{1, 12} Karp’s reported public statements also defend the company’s Israel work, including remarks acknowledging employee departures connected to his pro-Israel stance.³²

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

Political support statements and the strategic partnership do not establish a settlement-operating presence, financing of Israeli military-welfare organisations, or lobbying activity. The audited record did not establish a separate donation, military-welfare financing or physical-support programme for the IDF, FIDF, JNF/KKL, settlement organisations or reservist funds. This scoped absence does not negate the commercial software partnership or the reported digital logistics role.^{5, 21, 25}

No public evidence identified in the reviewed record of Palantir-specific anti-BDS lobbying, FEC/PAC donations, US or UK lobbying filings, charity grants, settlement-event sponsorship, or military-welfare donations. No public evidence identified of a Palantir-specific judgment, regulatory enforcement action, OECD NCP proceeding, or parliamentary inquiry on Israel-Palestine.^{23, 25}

No public evidence identified of an office, branch, reseller, customer contract, service site, or disclosed operating presence in Israeli settlements, East Jerusalem settlements, the West Bank, Gaza, or the Golan Heights. Palantir’s absence from the reviewed OHCHR settlement-business database materials does not establish that no settlement-linked activity exists outside those documents.^{8, 33}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

BDS-1000 Score

Method: V6.5.

• V_MAX: 9.00 Avg_OTHERS: 4.03
• BRS Score: 817 Tier: A (Extreme Complicity)

The fixed V6.5 result is driven by the high documented political score, including Palantir’s repeated public solidarity statements and institutional partnership with IMOD, and by the high digital score attached to documented AI/defence infrastructure relationships and unresolved but serious UN findings. Military remains 0.00 in the vetted scoring record: the dossier does not convert software-linked allegations or an undisclosed partnership into proof of weapons manufacture, munitions supply, or a verified named military-system deployment.

The scores are fixed, reviewed outputs derived from the cited evidence, not a claim of legal liability or a finding that every allegation is established. The BRS and Tier reflect the rubric’s weighted domain assessment, including evidence limits and exculpatory findings.

Methodology Note

• This dossier uses only the supplied Military, Digital, Economic, and Political audits and their cited source record.
• Impact (I) assesses the documented activity type; magnitude (M) assesses evidenced scale; proximity (P) assesses directness of the relationship. These are rubric dimensions, not legal conclusions.
• The analysis is scale-free: it does not infer magnitude from company size, public controversy, or reputation where the audit record does not substantiate it.
• Divested, exited, or historically superseded operations are mitigated rather than treated as continuing conduct; Storebrand’s divestment is therefore recorded as an investor action, not a Palantir divestment.
• The rubric includes relevant conduct by controlling principals and integrated group entities. Separate investment vehicles are not automatically excluded: the review assesses the principal’s role, the documented act, present relationship and appropriate proximity. Unsupported transitive associations do not establish a governing score.
• Settlement-linked operations would be considered in both Economic and Political where established; here, the audits found no public evidence identified of a settlement-specific Palantir operation, while preserving the limited scope of the OHCHR database check.
• “No public evidence identified” means the stated audit checks did not locate public support for the proposition. It does not prove that the activity never occurred.