Rapyd🇮🇱

Key Findings

• Economic: Rapyd operates Israeli payment-services entities and, in April 2026, Rapyd Israel Payments Ltd. completed connection to Israel’s SHVA retail payment-card system.^{1, 2}
• Political: Rapyd’s October 2023 “Kulanu” initiative arranged funeral and shiva logistics for relatives of people killed; the reviewed report did not identify an IDF unit, military beneficiary, recipient organisation, or monetary amount.³
• Political: Rapyd’s Chief Global Regulation Officer reportedly directed screening of terms including “Gaza Now” after 7 October 2023 to prevent platform funding of Hamas; the report does not establish government direction or security-agency access to Rapyd systems or data.⁴
• Not found: No public evidence identified of Rapyd defence contracts, security-sector technology deployment, Project Nimbus participation, or settlement-specific operations in the reviewed materials.^{1, 5, 6}

Target Profile

Key Facts:

• Rapyd Payments Israel Ltd. is identified as an Israeli Securities Authority-regulated payment-services licensee, registration no. 516003837, at 132 Begin Street, Tel Aviv.¹
• Rapyd’s public group disclosures list affiliates and operating entities across Israel, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Dubai, the United States, Iceland, and Hong Kong.⁸
• The record identifies regulated entities in Iceland, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, Singapore, Israel, and the United States.¹

Executive Summary

Rapyd is a global payments and embedded-finance group with an established Israeli corporate, operational, and regulatory presence. Its documented Israeli nexus includes Rapyd Financial Network (2016) Ltd., Rapyd Payments Israel Ltd., a Tel Aviv office, Israel-specific product and privacy documentation, and the Israeli regulated entity’s connection to the SHVA-operated retail payment-card system in April 2026.^{1, 2, 7, 9} Rapyd describes its core business as payment processing, acquiring, payouts, card issuing, business accounts, multi-currency services, and related financial infrastructure.¹⁰

The principal documented economic vector is therefore ordinary commercial participation in Israel’s payment-services market. Rapyd’s Israel-acquiring documentation describes domestic Israeli card acquiring through SHVA and instalment functionality settled in Israeli shekels. The Bank of Israel characterized the additional payment-system connections as supporting competition and innovation, but did not quantify Rapyd’s market share, Israeli revenues, taxes, investment, employment, or profitability.² The evidence does not identify Rapyd operations in settlements, East Jerusalem settlements, the Golan Heights, or Gaza.

The principal political record consists of conflict-period corporate activity and compliance-related reporting. Mako reported that Rapyd created the “Kulanu” initiative during 9–18 October 2023 to arrange funeral and shiva equipment and catering for relatives of people killed.³ Separately, CTech reported that Dr Shlomit Wagman directed screening of terms including “Gaza Now” to prevent funding of Hamas. That report does not establish a particular affected account, government direction, a formal underlying policy, or a mechanism by which IDF personnel accessed Rapyd systems or data.⁴ No public evidence identified in the focused review of a Rapyd statement addressing Palestinian civilian harm, a ceasefire, or Gaza humanitarian relief.¹⁴

The military and digital audits found no public evidence identified of defence procurement, contracts with Israeli security bodies, military end-user products, military or intelligence technology deployment, Project Nimbus participation, security-sector technology relationships, or a settlement-specific Rapyd service operation.^{5, 6, 15} The relevant non-mentions in specified UN and OHCHR documents are document-scoped findings, not proof of absence from every public record.¹⁶

On the fixed, human-vetted V6.5 assessment, Rapyd receives a BRS score of 603, Tier B (Severe Complicity). That result is driven by the documented economic significance and directness of its Israeli financial-market operations and by the political-domain record, while the final military and digital scores remain zero because the reviewed evidence does not substantiate those nexuses.

Timeline of Relevant Events

Corporate Overview

Rapyd publicly describes itself as a group of regulated payment-services entities and operating affiliates, rather than as a single operating company.²¹ Its disclosed activities include payment processing, cross-jurisdictional transactions, card issuing, consumer-credit services, acquiring, payouts, business accounts, and embedded-finance capabilities.^{10, 21}

The reviewed group disclosures identify Israeli affiliates Rapyd Financial Network (2016) Ltd. and Rapyd Payments Israel Ltd.; other named group entities include Rapyd Payments Limited, Neat Limited, Rapyd Holdings Pte Ltd., CashDash UK Limited, and Rapyd Europe hf.^{8, 22} Rapyd’s public materials identify regulated operations in Iceland, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, Singapore, Israel, and the United States.¹ The disclosures do not establish ownership percentages, an ultimate parent, a definitive group legal domicile, beneficial owners, or a complete legal-entity chart.^{8, 23}

Rapyd Payments Israel Ltd. is the specifically identified Israeli regulated payment-services entity. Rapyd states that it is supervised by the Israeli Securities Authority, holds Payment Services License registration no. 516003837, and is located at 132 Begin Street, Tel Aviv.¹ Rapyd’s Israel documentation describes payment processing, money transfer, domestic card acquiring, and related services, including integration with SHVA.^{2, 24}

Rapyd acquired or announced acquisitions of companies outside Israel, including Neat in Hong Kong, Valitor in Iceland, and PayU GPO. The evidence does not identify these as Israeli operating-company acquisitions.^{18, 20, 25} Rapyd’s Valitor materials state that Valitor hf. and Rapyd Europe hf. were to merge with Valitor hf. as the surviving entity, subsequently renamed Rapyd Europe hf.²⁶ A distinct UK company, RAPYD LTD, is recorded as an IT-consultancy company, but the reviewed evidence does not establish whether it belongs to the wider Rapyd group.²⁷

No public evidence identified of a Rapyd office, warehouse, merchant operation, reseller, customer-support centre, or payment-service operation in a West Bank settlement, East Jerusalem settlement, or the Golan Heights.⁶ No public evidence identified of Israeli state ownership, a golden share, government board appointments, a critical-national-infrastructure designation, or governance arrangements structurally tying Rapyd to Israeli state policy.²³

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

No public evidence identified of a Rapyd contract, tender, framework agreement, memorandum, or announced cooperation with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, intelligence agencies, Israel Police, Border Police, Israel Prison Service, or another Israeli security body.⁵ The reviewed SIBAT / Ministry of Defense directory did not yield a verified Rapyd procurement or supplier record.²⁸

Rapyd’s public offering is payment and embedded-finance infrastructure, not industrial production or defence-systems supply.¹⁰ No public evidence identified of tactical, ruggedised, mil-spec, targeting, weapons-integration, or other defence-specific product variants; defence-export licences; military AI; weapons-system supply; or services to Israeli defence primes.⁵

The Bank of Israel’s reported SHVA connection concerns civilian retail payment-card infrastructure. It does not demonstrate a military-logistics, defence-procurement, or security-sector relationship.²

A March 2024 Walla report stated that dozens of Rapyd employees joined other organisations to pack more than 4,000 Purim parcels for soldiers, war-wounded people, elderly people, and children facing social difficulties.²⁹ The report described volunteer activity and did not state that Rapyd funded it, supplied the IDF, or held a security-body contract.²⁹

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

Rapyd’s strongest defence is that its documented products and regulatory authorisation are civilian financial-services activities. The Israeli payment-services licence is not evidence of a defence export licence or security procurement relationship, and the SHVA connection is a supervised retail-payments function.^{1, 2}

No public evidence identified of defence contracts, defence-prime supply-chain relationships, military facilities contracts, military end-user certification, arms-export decisions, weapons manufacture, or military AI in the reviewed materials.⁵ The employee volunteer report should not be treated as proof of corporate military support, financing, procurement, or IDF contracting.²⁹

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

Rapyd’s disclosed technology stack includes AWS, Kyndryl, Datadog, Google, Ever C, and AU10TIX as sub-processors or providers for specified functions.⁸ The disclosures identify cloud, monitoring, analytics, website-verification, identity-verification, and AI-support functions, while not specifying deployment scope, exclusivity, data volumes, or contract duration.⁸

Rapyd states that it processes payment, transaction, identity, contact, financial, KYC/KYB, compliance, and fraud-related information; it may also use machine-learning and AI techniques for research and market insights.²² Its disclosures identify Rapyd Financial Network (2016) Ltd. and Rapyd Payments Israel Ltd. as Israeli affiliates that may be engaged as sub-processors with access to personal data.⁸

Rapyd has a Tel Aviv office and R&D roles. A current Director–Proprietary Domains vacancy describes leadership of product-engineering teams and collaboration across Tel Aviv and Dubai.³⁰

No public evidence identified of Rapyd participation in Project Nimbus, sovereign-cloud provision, Israeli government cloud programmes, security-sector technology contracts, facial recognition, predictive policing, spyware, offensive cyber capabilities, military targeting, automated target generation, or technology deployed for military, intelligence, law-enforcement surveillance, or digital-weapons purposes.^{15, 31}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

Rapyd’s strongest defence is that the disclosed systems are commercial fintech, compliance, identity-verification, and cloud operations. Neither its AI disclosures nor its Israeli data-processing arrangements identify an Israeli state, military, intelligence, or security customer.^{8, 22}

The public record does not provide a system-by-system data-residency map, details of access permissions, routing, storage locations, or data volumes associated with Israeli affiliates or Ever C.^{8, 22} AU10TIX is identified as an identity-verification sub-processor with United States processing, but the disclosure does not specify whether its service uses biometric matching, facial recognition, document authentication, or another method.⁸ These limitations do not establish a harmful deployment.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

Rapyd has a direct, regulated commercial presence in Israel through Rapyd Payments Israel Ltd., which it identifies as an Israeli payment-services entity at 132 Begin Street, Tel Aviv.¹ Rapyd’s country-specific privacy terms identify that entity as controller for personal data processed through its local Israeli business.³²

On 26 April 2026, the Bank of Israel reported that RAPYD Israel Payments Ltd. completed connection to the SHVA-operated payment-card system under code 75.² Rapyd’s documentation states that its Israel-acquiring service integrates with SHVA, supports domestic Israeli card acquiring, and provides instalment functionality settled in Israeli shekels.²

Rapyd’s August 2023 PayU GPO announcement described the combined business as having 1,700 employees across 22 offices and listed Tel Aviv among office locations, without assigning an Israel-specific workforce figure.²⁰ The Bank of Israel described the payment-system connections as measures promoting competition and innovation in Israel’s payments market, rather than providing a quantified Rapyd market-share figure.²

No public evidence identified of Rapyd operating a physical goods supply chain, importing or retailing Israeli-origin goods, handling settlement-origin merchandise, underwriting Israeli sovereign debt or Israel Bonds, financing Israeli defence primes or OHCHR-listed enterprises, or holding a disclosed portfolio of Israeli sovereign bonds, arms companies, or settlement-active companies.³³

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

Rapyd’s strongest defence is that the documented nexus is civilian payments-market participation, not military supply, physical-goods commerce, or settlement-specific activity. Its SHVA integration is described as domestic card acquiring and retail payment infrastructure, rather than an operation tied to occupied territory or state security.²

No public evidence identified of Israel-specific revenues, profitability, tax paid, preferred-technology-enterprise status, workforce size, investment amount, or profit repatriation flows.³⁴ No public evidence identified of a Rapyd payment-service operation, reseller, merchant operation, or physical site in a West Bank, East Jerusalem, or Golan settlement.⁶ The documented Israeli commercial presence nevertheless supports the fixed Economic score because it is a direct operational nexus, not because the record proves settlement activity or defence financing.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

Mako reported that Rapyd’s Kulanu initiative operated during 9–18 October 2023 and arranged equipment and catering for funerals and shiva observances for relatives of people killed. The reported logistics included transport, tents, tables, chairs, and refreshments.³ The reviewed material does not identify an IDF unit, settlement entity, recipient organisation, monetary amount, or military-welfare beneficiary.³

CTech reported that Dr Shlomit Wagman, then identified as Rapyd’s Chief Global Regulation Officer, directed screening of terms including “Gaza Now” on 7 October 2023 to prevent Rapyd being used to fund Hamas.⁴ The same report described continued account blocking and enforcement updates by Rapyd and other fintech firms, but did not identify a specific Rapyd account, formal government direction, underlying policy, or a mechanism by which IDF personnel accessed Rapyd systems or data.⁴

Rapyd announced Wagman’s appointment in July 2023, noting her prior role as Director-General of Israel’s Money Laundering and Terror Financing Prohibition Authority and head of Israel’s FATF delegation.¹⁹ The appointment documents professional and regulatory experience; it does not itself document a state partnership, government contract, defence relationship, or conflict-related activity.¹⁹

No public evidence identified in the focused review of corporate donations to the IDF, Friends of the IDF, JNF/KKL, settlement organisations, reservist funds, or military-welfare bodies; corporate political lobbying, PAC activity, or formal anti-BDS advocacy; or a company statement addressing Palestinian civilian harm, ceasefire, or Gaza humanitarian relief.¹⁴

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

Rapyd’s strongest defence is that the documented Kulanu activity was civilian bereavement and funeral support rather than an identified military, settlement, or government programme.³ Likewise, the reported screening decision is described as financial-crime and anti-Hamas compliance activity, not as a demonstrated security-agency arrangement.⁴

The reviewed corporate “About” and Israel-market pages did not contain statements addressing Gaza, the West Bank, settlements, or the conflict, but this is source-scoped and does not establish that no such statement exists anywhere.^{10, 35} No public evidence identified of state ownership, a golden share, a founding legal mandate, a corporate charter, or a disclosed primary mission tying Rapyd to Israeli state geopolitical objectives.²³

Named Entities and Evidence Map

BDS-1000 Score

Method: V6.5.

• V_MAX: 7.00 Avg_OTHERS: 1.17
• BRS Score: 603 Tier: B (Severe Complicity)

V_MAX is driven by the direct, documented Israeli payment-services operation and integration with Israel’s domestic retail payment-card infrastructure. The political score reflects the documented October 2023 initiative and reported compliance intervention, while retaining the audits’ limits concerning military recipients, government direction, and security access. This is a scale-free, evidence-only, human-vetted assessment; it does not infer military or digital complicity from Israeli corporate presence alone.

Methodology Note

• This dossier relies only on the four supplied domain audits and cites their documented source record.
• Impact assesses activity type rather than company size; M assesses scale; P assesses directness.
• Scores are fixed final V6.5 human-vetted scores and are not recalculated from the narrative.
• Divested, exited, or discontinued operations are mitigating rather than automatically treated as current involvement.
• Entity attribution is specific: a group affiliate, historical investor, employee volunteer activity, or similarly situated third party does not establish transitive guilt for the wider company.
• Settlement operation may be relevant to both Economic and Political where supported; here, no public evidence identified of a Rapyd settlement-specific operation.
• “No public evidence identified” reports the result of the relevant bounded checks; document-scoped non-mentions do not prove universal absence.