Samsung MILITARY

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. is the reporting entity considered in this audit, and its 2025 corporate reporting lists three wholly owned Israel-incorporated subsidiaries: Samsung Electronics Israel Ltd. (SEIL), Samsung Semiconductor Israel R&D Center, Ltd. (SIRC), and Corephotonics Ltd. ¹

Samsung classified SEIL as a marketing entity and SIRC and Corephotonics as R&D entities, which does not itself establish military supply or contracting. ¹

In September 2024, reporting stated that Israel’s Ministry of Defense awarded Cellcom - not Samsung - a cellular-services tender worth more than NIS 40 million for approximately 40,000 IDF permanent-service personnel. ²

The reported Cellcom tender included iPhones and unspecified Samsung handset models, but the available reporting does not identify Samsung as bidder, contractor, direct supplier, or contracting party. ^{2, 3, 4}

No public evidence identified of a Samsung Electronics, Samsung C&T, Samsung SDS, or other Samsung-branded entity contract, tender award, framework agreement, or memorandum of understanding with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israel Prison Service, Border Police, or another Israeli security body. ^{1, 2, 3}

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Samsung handset models were reportedly included in Cellcom’s 2024 IDF personnel telecommunications offering. ^{2, 3, 4}

The available sources do not identify the Samsung models, quantities, specifications, manufacturer-to-Cellcom transaction, end-user documentation, or military-specific modification associated with that offering. ^{2, 3, 4}

Samsung describes SIRC as an R&D centre within its component-solutions network, with work involving image sensors, image processing, computer vision, storage technologies, information theory, error-correction coding, AI, signal processing, encryption, and cybersecurity. ⁵

Samsung’s SIRC description does not identify an Israeli defence customer, security-force contract, military end user, or defence-specific deployment for those technologies. ⁵

No public evidence identified of Samsung ruggedised, tactical, mil-spec, or defence-grade variants marketed to or confirmed as supplied to Israeli state-security forces. ^{2, 3, 4}

No public evidence identified of export-licence applications, end-user certificates, or export-control decisions concerning Samsung sales to Israeli military or security end users. ^{2, 3, 4}

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

No public evidence identified of Samsung equipment being used in settlement construction, demolitions, the separation barrier, checkpoints, military installations, or other occupied-territory infrastructure in the reviewed materials. ^{6, 7}

No public evidence identified of Samsung construction, engineering, maintenance, or servicing contracts for Israeli military or settlement infrastructure. ^{6, 7}

Samsung’s reviewed Israeli footprint consists of marketing and R&D entities, while Samsung’s semiconductor location materials place SIRC and Corephotonics in Tel Aviv-Yafo. ^{1, 8}

No public evidence identified in the reviewed subsidiary and location records that SIRC or Corephotonics operates from the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, or another internationally recognised occupied territory. ^{1, 8}

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

No public evidence identified of Samsung supplying components, sub-systems, materials, or specialist manufacturing services to Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael, IMI/Elbit Land, or another Israeli defence prime. ^{5, 2, 3}

No public evidence identified of Samsung–Israeli-defence-prime joint development, co-production, technology transfer, or licensed manufacturing arrangements. ^{5, 2, 3}

The SIRC technology description establishes civilian semiconductor and component R&D capabilities but does not establish integration into an Israeli defence-prime supply chain. ⁵

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

The 2024 procurement described in the available sources was a Cellcom telecommunications-service contract for IDF personnel, with Samsung’s reported connection limited to handset models within Cellcom’s equipment offering. ^{2, 3, 4}

No public evidence identified of Samsung directly providing base services, freight, port handling, transport, fuel, waste management, facilities management, or telecommunications services to Israeli military installations. ^{2, 3, 4}

The tender’s stated three-year term may indicate an arrangement extending into 2027, but the reviewed materials did not independently verify continuing Samsung-device supply or use. ^{2, 3, 4}

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

No public evidence identified of Samsung acting as a supplier or manufacturer of lethal systems, munitions, strategic defence platforms, or critical weapon-specific sub-systems for Israeli forces. ^{5, 2, 3}

Samsung’s reviewed Israeli corporate records identify marketing and R&D operations rather than a defence-manufacturing entity or weapons-system supplier. ^{1, 5}

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

No public evidence identified of export-licence decisions, sanctions or export-control enforcement, or court proceedings concerning Samsung defence supply to Israel. ^{2, 3, 4}

No public evidence identified in the reviewed corporate disclosures of a direct supply relationship between Samsung’s listed Israeli subsidiaries and the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israel Prison Service, Border Police, or an Israeli defence prime. ^{1, 5}

Samsung’s 2026 first-quarter disclosure identifies Samsung Life Insurance as a major shareholder with 8.41% of common shares and records Jae-yong Lee as a related party with 1.65% of common shares and 0.02% of preferred shares, without establishing him as a direct shareholder holding 10% or more. ⁹

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

The supplied civil-society material references Samsung in a profile of Cellcom, describing the 2024 Ministry of Defense/IDF tender as including Samsung devices in Cellcom’s offering rather than identifying Samsung as the military contractor. ⁴

The supplied full-text checks did not list Samsung in the reviewed UN Special Rapporteur report or the OHCHR 2025 settlement-business database, and this document-scoped result does not establish the absence of relationships beyond those materials. ^{6, 7}

No public evidence identified of a Samsung-specific boycott, divestment, exclusion, corporate response, or end-use-monitoring commitment grounded in Israeli defence-sector activity. ^{2, 3, 4}

Samsung Electronics’ current board page identifies Young-Hyun Jun as Vice Chairman and CEO of Device Solutions, Tae-Moon Roh as President and CEO of Device eXperience, and Je-Yoon Shin as Chair and an independent director. ¹⁰

No corroborated public evidence identified in the reviewed board biographies and shareholder disclosures of Israeli defence-industry directorships, Israeli military-board roles, reservist-fund donations, settlement-organisation roles, or public co-belligerency statements by those listed board members or Jae-yong Lee. ^{10, 9}