INDEX / DIRECTORY / UBIQUITI / MILITARY

Ubiquiti MILITARY

MILITARY AUDIT UPDATED 2026-10-02
Military Score 0.00 /10 D Ubiquiti - BDS-1000 264
Military 0.00

Evidence-only forensic audit. Scoring happens downstream - see the main dossier for the composite assessment.

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Target identity. This audit concerns Ubiquiti Inc. (ui.com), the UniFi/UISP networking manufacturer. Ubiquiti’s FY2026 Form 10-K describes a global networking business serving enterprise and service-provider markets and identifies Robert J. Pera as founder, Chairman and CEO; the 2025 proxy reported Pera beneficially owned 93% of common stock.1, 2

Evidence boundary. Ubiquiti states that it sells primarily through distributors and resellers, does not employ a traditional direct sales force, and has limited visibility into ultimate channel demand.1 Its current procurement guide separately identifies direct UI Store purchasing, authorised distributors and certified installers as procurement routes.3 Accordingly, reseller availability or downstream use is not treated here as evidence that Ubiquiti directly contracted with, selected, or knew a military/security end-user.

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

Israeli defence or security contracts

Date undetermined from the public page; retrieved 2 October 2026. The Israeli Ministry of Defence’s official online procurement system has a tender-description record, BalamId 1000724341, whose visible description is “רכש מקמ”שים ועורקי ת”ר תוצרת UBIQUITI” - procurement of transceivers and radio links manufactured by UBIQUITI.4 This corrects the prior audit’s incomplete statement that no IMOD procurement record had been identified. The publicly visible IMOD page establishes procurement interest/specification for UBIQUITI-branded radio equipment; it does not display a publication or closing date, award status, winning supplier, quantity, value, completed-supply record, deployment location or named military unit.4

Targeted exact-ID, exact-description, supplier-name and award-oriented searches did not identify a separate public award notice, purchase order, contract, invoice, quantity/value schedule or deployment record for BalamId 1000724341. Accordingly, no public evidence identified that this record resulted in an award or completed supply, and no supplier can be attributed to it from the reviewed public record.4

Separate current vendor evidence shows why supplier attribution cannot be inferred from market presence. A Plonter Technologies public quotation dated 7 August 2026 lists Ministry of Defense supplier number 11010575 and a Ubiquiti U7-Lite product,5 while an ADS Computers Ubiquiti product page identifies the seller as an authorised Ministry of Defense supplier under its displayed supplier number.6 Neither page links the vendor to BalamId 1000724341; they establish only supplier eligibility/commercial product availability, not the supplier, award or fulfilment of the IMOD record.5, 6

Current commercial channel presence in Israel is verifiable, but the appointment claims come from the local firms themselves. Lan-Tech states that it is the “sole Distributor & Master Reseller” of Ubiquiti in Israel and the Palestinian Authority; Telran’s Ubiquiti-branded site calls Telran Ubiquiti’s official representative in Israel; SMBIT calls itself an authorised Ubiquiti reseller.7, 8, 9 The reviewed Ubiquiti distributor/partner pages establish that Ubiquiti operates distributor and channel-partner programmes generally, but they did not independently reconcile the competing Lan-Tech/Telran status claims.10, 11 None of those three Israeli pages identifies an IDF, IMOD, Police, Border Police or Prison Service Ubiquiti purchase.7, 8, 9

[pre-2020] Civilian-government counterexample - relationship status unknown. Israeli government tender 622/2019 for supply, installation and maintenance of computers and peripherals includes a communications appendix listing UBNT/UniFi controller and access-point alternatives, including UniFi AC Lite, AC Mesh and nanoHD. The same appendix states that wireless-equipment installation is to follow Ministry of Education guidance.12 This demonstrates civilian state procurement/product availability in 2019; the document is not an Israeli defence or security-force award.12

Defence trade directories and official announcements

No public evidence identified in the reviewed searches of SIBAT/defence-trade material or Ubiquiti’s current corporate disclosures of a Ubiquiti listing tied to an Israeli defence export programme, defence cooperation agreement or military joint venture.1 The IMOD Balam record is instead an official procurement/tender-description record for UBIQUITI-made transceivers and radio links; its public page does not identify an award or contract counterparty.4

Controlling principals and group attribution

The FY2026 10-K is signed by directors Robert J. Pera, Rafael Torres and Brandon Arrindell, and identifies Pera as founder, Chairman and CEO.1 The filing says its R&D team was located in the United States, Taiwan, China, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Ukraine, Sweden and elsewhere. Exhibit 21.1 names Ubiquiti Holdings LLC (Delaware) and Ubiquiti (Taiwan) Sales Limited (Taiwan), but expressly states that several additional subsidiaries are not named; the exhibit therefore does not disclose an Israeli subsidiary and is not an exhaustive group list.1 The 2025 proxy describes Pera’s pre-Ubiquiti role as a wireless engineer at Apple and gives business/finance/technology backgrounds for the board members then serving; it reports Pera at 93% beneficial ownership.2 Focused searches for Pera, Torres and Arrindell did not identify a defence-industry board role, FIDF/reservist-fund donation, ≥10% holding in an Israeli defence prime, or public co-belligerency statement. No public evidence identified of a qualifying military-channel principal act in the reviewed record.1, 2

The IMOD page does not expose a verifiable procurement date or evidence of award/completed supply, so the reviewed public record does not establish whether BalamId 1000724341 predates or postdates 19 July 2024 or November 2024, nor whether any resulting activity continued after those dates.4 Current 2026 Israeli channel pages establish ordinary commercial distribution, but that alone does not establish fulfilment of the IMOD record or military deployment.7, 8

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Rugged and long-range commercial products

Ubiquiti currently sells products that can be dual-use in the ordinary sense of general-purpose communications hardware. The airFiber 2X is marketed as a point-to-point bridge/network-backhaul radio with a 200+ km stated range, AES encryption, -40 to 55°C operating temperature and “NDAA Compliant” status.13 Ubiquiti’s Outdoor WiFi page markets weatherproof equipment, up to IP68 on selected models, for outdoor campuses, venues and public spaces.14 Its Cloud Gateway catalogue describes Cloud Gateway Industrial as a ruggedised, fanless UniFi gateway for high-density PoE deployments.15

The “Mission Critical” product name is not, by itself, evidence of military design: Ubiquiti’s specification page describes a rack-mount Layer-3 PoE switch with battery-power backup and ordinary networking functions.16 UniFi Access is marketed as a scalable, licence-free PoE door-access system within Ubiquiti’s end-to-end IT management platform.17

No public evidence identified on the reviewed manufacturer pages of a tactical, mil-spec or defence-grade Ubiquiti variant specifically marketed to Israeli security forces.13, 14, 17, 16, 15 “NDAA Compliant” on a commercial specification is treated only as a compliance attribute, not as evidence of Israeli military procurement.13, 16

Civilian-to-military distinction and Israel end-use

Lan-Tech, Telran and SMBIT market the same broad commercial networking families in Israel.7, 8, 9 Telran’s Ubiquiti-branded page also contains a company-wide customer list that includes nationwide guarding centres, but it does not identify which products those customers bought and does not state that Ubiquiti equipment was supplied to a military or state-security body.8 That listing is therefore not treated as verified Ubiquiti security-force supply.

SMBIT likewise markets Ubiquiti networking while separately advertising smart-city, camera, control and remote-shelter services.9, 18 No reviewed SMBIT page establishes that Ubiquiti equipment is used in those shelter or emergency-control solutions; no such link is inferred.9, 18

The IMOD record narrows the earlier general-availability finding by showing that the ministry itself published a procurement/tender description for UBIQUITI-made transceivers and radio links.4 The visible record does not specify a Ubiquiti model, quantity, contract modification, military-specific configuration, awardee or deployment. It therefore supports ministry procurement interest in dual-use communications equipment but does not establish a purpose-built tactical variant or completed military supply.4

Export classification and end-user documentation

Ubiquiti publishes a current ECCN classification resource and current terms that require compliance with U.S. export controls and sanctions; its services terms expressly reference the EAR, ITAR and OFAC regimes.19, 20, 21 no public evidence identified of an Israel-specific Ubiquiti export-licence application, end-user certificate, approval, denial, suspension or revocation for an Israeli military/security end-user.19, 20, 21

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

Ubiquiti’s disclosed business is networking equipment/software rather than heavy construction machinery.1 no public evidence identified of Ubiquiti equipment being documented by a UN body, NGO investigation or procurement record as used to construct or demolish settlements, the separation barrier, checkpoints, military bases or detention facilities.

The Israeli reseller/integrator evidence does not close that gap. Telran’s page describes nationwide commercial distribution and a broad company-wide client base without attributing a military or settlement project to Ubiquiti.8 SMBIT advertises Ubiquiti networking and, separately, infrastructure/IoT/emergency-shelter services; the reviewed pages do not connect those services to Ubiquiti hardware.9, 18

No public evidence identified of a Ubiquiti construction, maintenance or engineering contract for checkpoints, detention facilities, military bases, the separation barrier or settlement infrastructure.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

No public evidence identified in the reviewed corporate filing, current sales-channel material, or focused searches for Ubiquiti with Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Rafael Advanced Defense Systems or IMI/Elbit Land of a component-supply, subsystem, raw-material, specialist-manufacturing, joint-development, co-production, technology-transfer or licensed-manufacturing relationship.1, 10, 11

The reviewed evidence establishes commercial network-equipment distribution in Israel, not integration into a named Israeli defence-prime platform.7, 8, 9

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

No public evidence identified of a Ubiquiti service contract for an IDF base, training facility, detention centre or Israeli security installation, including telecommunications support, facilities maintenance, transport, fuel, catering or waste services.1, 3

No public evidence identified of a geographically specified Ubiquiti military-base service in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Golan Heights or Negev. Lan-Tech’s stated sales territory of Israel and the Palestinian Authority is a broad commercial territory claim and does not identify a military installation or settlement end-user.7

No public evidence identified of a Ubiquiti shipping, freight-forwarding or port-handling contract for Israeli defence cargo or arms shipments.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

Ubiquiti’s current corporate filing and first-party product materials describe networking, wireless backhaul, enterprise gateways, WiFi, switching and access-control products.1, 13, 14, 17, 16, 15 no public evidence identified that Ubiquiti is a prime or licensed manufacturer of weapons, munitions, tactical drones, armoured vehicles, naval vessels or other lethal platforms supplied to Israeli forces.

No public evidence identified of Ubiquiti supplying ammunition, explosive ordnance, propellants, warhead components or munitions precursors to Israeli defence end-users.

No public evidence identified of a Ubiquiti role in Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, Israeli combat aircraft, Merkava tanks, warships, ballistic missiles, or purpose-built fire-control, targeting, precision-guidance or weapons-integration systems. The reviewed long-range/encrypted networking products remain general-purpose network backhaul products in Ubiquiti’s own marketing.13

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

Current Ubiquiti terms require users to comply with export restrictions and applicable U.S. export laws, while the services terms specifically reference EAR, ITAR and OFAC controls.19, 20 Ubiquiti also publishes ECCN classifications for its products.21 The FY2026 10-K acknowledges that products or firmware can still reach sanctions targets through distributors, resellers or end users despite Ubiquiti’s precautions.1

[pre-2020] Historical sanctions matter - concluded; no Israel nexus identified. On 6 March 2014, OFAC announced that Ubiquiti Networks, Inc. agreed to pay $504,225 to settle potential civil liability for apparent Iran-sanctions violations. The notice describes 2008–2010 conduct involving a UAE distributor with Iran distribution rights and 2009–2011 exports to a Greek distributor where goods were intended for Iran; OFAC also recorded remedial action.22 This is historical export-compliance evidence concerning Iran, not evidence of an Israeli military relationship.22

No public evidence identified of a government decision granting, denying, suspending or revoking an export licence specifically for Ubiquiti products to an Israeli military/security end-user, or of an arms-embargo investigation, court challenge or judicial review concerning a Ubiquiti-Israel defence supply relationship.19, 20, 21

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

The 2025 UN Special Rapporteur report A/HRC/59/23 surveys corporate involvement in the occupied Palestinian territory and states that the entities it names are only a fraction of a wider structure.23 An exact-name search of the retrievable report page did not identify Ubiquiti. That non-appearance is not treated as proof that no downstream product use exists, because the report itself says its named set is not exhaustive.23

No public evidence identified in the reviewed Who Profits, AFSC, UN, Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, Al-Haq, PAX, BankTrack, Don’t Buy Into Occupation and BDS-targeted searches of a published investigation or organised boycott/divestment campaign specifically alleging a Ubiquiti defence-sector relationship with Israel. No public evidence identified of an institutional divestment decision based on such a relationship.

No public evidence identified of a Ubiquiti public statement, contract termination or Israel-specific end-use-monitoring commitment made in response to civil-society pressure about an Israeli defence supply chain. Ubiquiti’s public compliance materials instead state general export-control and sanctions obligations.19, 20, 21

The presently verified Israel evidence therefore consists of (a) commercial channel presence, (b) the [pre-2020] civilian-government tender described above, and (c) an official IMOD procurement/tender-description record for UBIQUITI-made transceivers and radio links.7, 8, 9, 12, 4 The IMOD record is material military-procurement-interest evidence, but the reviewed public sources do not identify its date, award status, supplier, quantity, value, completed supply or deployment; those fields remain unresolved rather than being inferred.4, 5, 6

Footnotes

  1. Ubiquiti Inc., Form 10-K for fiscal year ended 30 June 2026, filed 21 August 2026, official Investor Relations copy. https://ir.ui.com/sites/ubiquiti-ir/files/2026-08/ui-06-30-2026-10k-2026.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11

  2. Ubiquiti Inc., 2025 Definitive Proxy Statement, filed 24 October 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1511737/000151173725000063/ubnt-20251024.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  3. Ubiquiti Help Center, “UniFi Procurement Guide.” https://help.ui.com/hc/en-us/articles/39396140656023-UniFi-Procurement-Guide ↩ ↩2

  4. Israel Ministry of Defence online procurement system, “תאור מכרז” for BalamId 1000724341, visible description “רכש מקמ”שים ועורקי ת”ר תוצרת UBIQUITI”. https://www.online.mod.gov.il/Online2016/Pages/General/Balam/BalamHeaderText.aspx?BalamId=1000724341 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9

  5. Plonter Technologies Ltd., public quotation for Ubiquiti UniFi 7 Lite, dated 7 August 2026; page displays Ministry of Defense supplier number 11010575. https://web.plonter.co.il/priceoffer_product.tmpl?cart=17581464628217306&lang=heb&sku=U7-Lite ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  6. ADS Computers, Ubiquiti UAP-AC-LR product page; page displays an authorised Ministry of Defense supplier number. https://adscomp.co.il/he/product_h.php?idn=48510 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  7. Lan-Tech, “Ubiquiti.” https://www.lan-tech.co.il/en/ubiquiti/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  8. Telran Communications, “About Us / Ubiquiti in Israel.” https://ui.telran.co.il/?page_id=415 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  9. SMBIT, “UBIQUITI-WIFI.” https://www.smbit.co.il/ubiquiti-wifi?lang=en ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  10. Ubiquiti, “Find Distributor.” https://www.ui.com/distributors/ ↩ ↩2

  11. Ubiquiti, “UniFi Partner Hub.” https://ui.com/partner-hub ↩ ↩2

  12. Israel Government Procurement Administration, Tender 622/2019 communications appendix / clarification response. https://mr.gov.il/ilgstorefront/he/p/attachment/005056BF65EB1EDC92F12DEC479AC12F/%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%A0%D7%94%20%D7%9C%D7%A9%D7%90%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%AA%20%D7%94%D7%91%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%94 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  13. Ubiquiti Store, “airFiber 2X Radio.” https://uk.store.ui.com/uk/en/products/af-2x ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  14. Ubiquiti, “UniFi Outdoor WiFi Access Points.” https://www.ui.com/uk/en/wifi/outdoor ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  15. Ubiquiti Store, “Cloud Gateways” (including Cloud Gateway Industrial). https://uk.store.ui.com/uk/en/category/all-cloud-gateways ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  16. Ubiquiti Tech Specs, “UniFi UPS PoE Switch / USW Mission Critical.” https://techspecs.ui.com/unifi/switching/usw-mission-critical ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  17. Ubiquiti Help Center, “Getting Started with UniFi Access.” https://help.ui.com/hc/en-us/articles/17452334269975-Getting-Started-with-UniFi-Access ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  18. SMBIT, company/solutions homepage. https://www.smbit.co.il/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  19. Ubiquiti, “Terms of Service.” https://www.ui.com/legal/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  20. Ubiquiti, “Ubiquiti Services General Terms and Conditions.” https://www.ui.com/legal/services-terms/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  21. Ubiquiti, “ECCN.” https://www.ui.com/compliance/eccn/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  22. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Ubiquiti Networks, Inc. Settles Potential Civil Liability for Apparent Violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations,” 6 March 2014. https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/13476/download?inline= ↩ ↩2

  23. United Nations, A/HRC/59/23, “From economy of occupation to economy of genocide,” 16 June 2025. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/a-hrc-59-23-from-economy-of-occupation-to-economy-of-genocide-report-special-rapporteur-francesca-albanese-palestine-2025/ ↩ ↩2