Ubiquiti

Key Findings

• Economic: Ubiquiti’s own current Israel-filtered distributor directory recognizes two firms - Lantech Systems and Communications Ltd. and Telran Communications (1986) Ltd. - as “Distributors & Master Resellers” and lists six additional resellers. Ubiquiti also provides Israel-specific 6 GHz regulatory support. The audits found no Israel-specific revenue, unit-volume, market-share or direct-webstore-sales figure.^{1, 2}
• Political: Ubiquiti itself issued Israel-specific technical/regulatory communications in 2024 and 2025, including 60 GHz support and radio-regulatory alignment. The audited communications concern product configuration and regulatory compliance; they contain no political endorsement, military-support language, settlement advocacy or Israel/Palestine campaign messaging.^{3, 4}
• Military: An official Israeli Ministry of Defence procurement page specifies UBIQUITI-manufactured transceivers and radio links. The reviewed public record does not disclose the tender date, award, winning supplier, quantity, value, completed supply, deployment location or military unit, so the record establishes procurement interest rather than a verified completed Ubiquiti military supply.⁵
• Not found: No public evidence identified of a completed direct Ubiquiti–IMOD contract or supply, a verified Israeli state deployment of Ubiquiti’s AI/surveillance functions, a purpose-built Israeli military product, or a Ubiquiti-owned settlement operation.^{5, 6, 7}

Target Profile

Key Facts:

• Ubiquiti reported approximately $3.274 billion of FY2026 worldwide revenue and approximately $1.179 billion from EMEA, but it did not separately disclose Israeli revenue.⁸
• Ubiquiti’s own current directory lists two distributors/master resellers and six resellers for Israel.¹
• No Ubiquiti-owned Israeli office, warehouse, factory, data centre or material R&D site was identified in the reviewed corporate disclosures.⁸
• No settlement-specific Ubiquiti operation, contract, branch or manufacturing activity was verified in the reviewed UN and civil-society material.^{7, 10}

Executive Summary

Ubiquiti is a U.S.-incorporated networking-technology company whose documented Israel nexus is primarily commercial and regulatory. The strongest manufacturer-attributable economic evidence is Ubiquiti’s own current Israel-filtered distributor directory, which recognizes Lantech and Telran as distributors/master resellers and lists six additional resellers. Its current technical documentation also supports Israel as a configured 6 GHz market.^{1, 2} Israeli distributors advertise current local inventory, support and warranty services, but the audits distinguish those independent firms from Ubiquiti itself and do not treat their infrastructure, customer lists or sales claims as Ubiquiti-owned operations or manufacturer-level customer relationships.^{11, 12}

The political-domain record is similarly limited to direct corporate conduct of a technical character. Ubiquiti’s May 2024 UniFi Building Bridge release added 60 GHz support for Israel alongside several other countries. Its November and December 2025 Wave releases stated that radio requirements had been aligned for Israel, and a UI-Team response discussed updated Israeli 60 GHz requirements.^{3, 4, 13} These are affirmative, first-party Israel-market communications, but their subject is radio regulation and product operation. The same audit found no public Ubiquiti statement supporting either side of the Israel-Gaza war, no identified Israel-related lobbying, no corporate military-welfare donation, no anti-BDS advocacy and no settlement sponsorship.^{8, 3, 4, 14}

The military record contains one significant but unresolved item. Israel’s Ministry of Defence operates a public procurement portal containing BalamId 1000724341, whose visible description concerns procurement of UBIQUITI-manufactured transceivers and radio links.⁵ That record establishes ministry procurement interest or specification. It does not establish that Ubiquiti contracted directly with the ministry, that an award occurred, which supplier would have fulfilled it, whether equipment was delivered, how much was purchased or where it was deployed. Separate Israeli vendors advertise Ubiquiti equipment while holding Ministry of Defence supplier status, but the audits found no evidence linking those firms to this specific procurement record.^{15, 16}

The digital audit found that Ubiquiti itself makes substantial civilian surveillance and physical-security technology, including facial recognition, licence-plate recognition, person and vehicle detection, Face Unlock and other local AI functions.^{6, 17} No public evidence identified, however, that those capabilities were supplied under a verified contract to the Israeli Ministry of Defence, IDF, intelligence services or police. No Project Nimbus participation, Israeli cloud region, Israeli surveillance-technology dependency, offensive-cyber relationship or verified state deployment of these AI capabilities was identified.^{8, 6, 10, 17}

The settlement record is also negative within the reviewed evidence. Ubiquiti was not identified in the reviewed 2025 OHCHR settlement-business database, A/HRC/59/23 or the BDS Movement corporate-priority guide.^{7, 10, 14} Those non-listings are bounded findings rather than proof of universal absence: the OHCHR process itself states that its reviewed universe and statutory categories are limited. The audits therefore conclude only that no settlement-specific Ubiquiti operation, branch, contract, sourcing relationship or deployment was verified.

Timeline of Relevant Events

Corporate Overview

Ubiquiti Inc. is a Delaware corporation headquartered in New York and founded by Robert J. Pera in 2005. Its FY2026 filing describes a global networking business serving enterprise and service-provider markets through UniFi, UISP and related hardware and software. Ubiquiti primarily uses distributors, resellers, systems integrators, online retailers and its own webstores instead of a conventional direct sales force.⁸

That distribution model is central to attribution. A reseller displaying Ubiquiti equipment does not itself prove that Ubiquiti selected, contracted with or knew the reseller’s ultimate customer. The audits therefore separate manufacturer-recognized channel relationships from independent reseller activity and downstream end use.

For Israel, Ubiquiti’s own directory provides the clearest current attribution: Lantech Systems and Communications Ltd. and Telran Communications (1986) Ltd. are listed as distributors/master resellers, with six additional resellers.¹ This confirms formal manufacturer-recognized market participation. It does not establish exclusivity, recurring sales volumes, Israeli revenue, particular end customers or Ubiquiti ownership of those firms.

Telran says it imports, markets, implements, supports and warranties Ubiquiti systems in Israel.¹¹ Lan-Tech describes itself as a distributor/master reseller and advertises Ubiquiti inventory.¹² Local claims exceeding Ubiquiti’s own evidence are treated cautiously: Lan-Tech’s assertion that it is the “sole” distributor is inconsistent with Ubiquiti’s directory simultaneously listing Telran in the same distributor/master-reseller class.^{1, 12}

Ubiquiti’s FY2026 subsidiary exhibit names Ubiquiti Holdings LLC in Delaware and Ubiquiti (Taiwan) Sales Limited in Taiwan while stating that additional non-significant subsidiaries are omitted.⁸ Accordingly, no Israeli significant subsidiary is identified, but the filing cannot prove that no Israeli legal entity of any size exists.

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

The central military-domain evidence is the Israeli Ministry of Defence procurement page for BalamId 1000724341. Its visible Hebrew description specifies procurement of UBIQUITI-manufactured transceivers and radio links.⁵ This is direct evidence that Ubiquiti-branded communications equipment entered an IMOD procurement/specification process.

The public record does not establish a completed physical result. No reviewed source disclosed an award notice, winning supplier, purchase order, contract, invoice, quantity, value, completed delivery, deployment location or military unit.⁵ The date of the procurement record is also unresolved, so the audits could not establish whether the procurement activity occurred before or after the relevant 2024 temporal thresholds.

Ubiquiti manufactures long-range, encrypted and ruggedized commercial networking products. These include airFiber point-to-point radio equipment and outdoor networking systems.²¹ Those capabilities are dual-use in the ordinary technological sense, but the audits found no manufacturer documentation showing a tactical, mil-spec or Israel-specific military variant.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest defence is the gap between procurement interest and verified supply. The IMOD page proves that the ministry described a procurement involving UBIQUITI-made equipment, but it does not prove a direct Ubiquiti contract, an award, a shipment or operational deployment.⁵

Ubiquiti’s reseller model further limits attribution. Plonter and ADS Computers separately show that Israeli vendors able to supply Ubiquiti products can also hold Ministry of Defence supplier status, but neither source links those companies to BalamId 1000724341.^{15, 16}

No public evidence identified that Ubiquiti manufactures weapons, munitions, targeting systems, combat drones, armoured vehicles, fire-control equipment or other lethal platforms for Israel. No verified integration with Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael or another Israeli defence prime was identified in the reviewed record.^{8, 5, 10, 21}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

Ubiquiti manufactures substantial digital and physical-security technology. UniFi Protect supports functions including person and vehicle detection, facial recognition, licence-plate logging, audio classification and other AI-assisted analysis on supported hardware.⁶ UniFi Access Face Unlock uses facial features for door-access decisions, with Ubiquiti documenting local processing on the UniFi system.¹⁷

These capabilities are manufacturer-attributable, but the Israeli nexus required for a qualifying digital state/security result was not established. The IMOD procurement record concerns transceivers and radio links rather than AI, facial recognition or surveillance software.⁵

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified that Ubiquiti provided facial recognition, licence-plate recognition, AI surveillance or access-control systems under a verified contract to the IDF, IMOD, Israeli intelligence services or police.^{8, 5, 6, 17}

No public evidence identified participation in Project Nimbus, an Israeli sovereign-cloud contract, an Israeli Ubiquiti data centre or an Israel-specific cloud-storage region. The audits also found no verified licensing or embedded-infrastructure relationship with a specifically Israeli-origin surveillance or cybersecurity company.^{8, 6, 10, 17}

Ubiquiti’s own documentation emphasizes local processing for Protect video and Face Unlock.^{6, 17} General possession of surveillance-capable technology therefore cannot establish an Israeli state deployment without a customer or deployment record.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

The strongest documented Israel nexus is economic market participation through Ubiquiti’s own channel system. The current Israel-filtered directory recognizes two distributors/master resellers - Lantech and Telran - and six additional resellers.¹ This constitutes direct manufacturer evidence that Ubiquiti deliberately maintains a recognized Israeli distribution market.

Ubiquiti separately provides Israel-specific regulatory support. Its current 6 GHz support documentation lists Israel as an enabled jurisdiction with product/software requirements.² Local Telran and Lan-Tech pages show current Ubiquiti product availability, support and warranty infrastructure.^{11, 12}

The evidence does not quantify the economic scale. Ubiquiti reported approximately $1.179 billion of FY2026 EMEA revenue, but Israel is not separately disclosed, and Ubiquiti warns that distributor ship-to destinations can differ from final customer countries.⁸ No Israel-specific revenue, recurring order volume, market share or unit-sales figure was identified.

No Ubiquiti-owned Israeli factory, office, warehouse, logistics hub, data centre or material R&D site was established. No settlement-origin manufacturing or sourcing was verified.^{8, 7}

Current Palestinian downstream use also appears in the record. Jalatech/JalaISP describes use of Ubiquiti AirFiber/AirMax equipment in service areas including Beit Jala, Bethlehem, Beit Sahour and Al-Walaja.²² This is downstream operator evidence and does not establish a direct Ubiquiti contract.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

Ubiquiti’s recognized distributors are independent channel companies rather than demonstrated subsidiaries or Ubiquiti-owned infrastructure. Their branch networks, customer counts, logistics facilities and commercial relationships cannot be attributed to Ubiquiti unless product-specific evidence connects them.

The current direct UI Store country picker did not list Israel in the reviewed audit, and no public evidence identified manufacturer-direct webstore delivery to Israel. The documented mechanism is therefore formal distribution and reseller participation rather than an established direct-to-consumer Israeli webstore operation.^{1, 2}

Historical and current channel evidence also does not establish uninterrupted activity or recurring volume across every intervening year. A 2017 Ubiquiti regulatory/channel discussion and current 2026 directory prove activity at separated points; they do not prove continuous sales of a particular magnitude.^{18, 1}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

The relevant manufacturer conduct consists of recurring first-party Israel-specific technical and regulatory communications.

On 10 May 2024 Ubiquiti’s UniFi Building Bridge 3.1.0 release added 60 GHz support for Israel alongside Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Nigeria and Thailand.³ On 13 November 2025 the Wave PTMP/PTP 4.1.0-RC3 release stated that main radio regulatory requirements had been aligned for Israel.¹³ The final 17 December release repeated the change, and UI-Team discussed Israel’s updated 60 GHz requirements with a user.⁴

These communications provide direct evidence that Ubiquiti treats Israel as an actively supported product/regulatory market. Their content is technical rather than political: the reviewed release notes contain no endorsement of Israeli government policy, military activity, settlements or any Israel/Palestine political campaign.^{3, 4, 13}

Historical evidence also shows interaction with Israel’s Ministry of Communications. The 2017 Community thread includes UI-Team statements that Israeli downloads had been blocked amid regulatory discussions and, in another response, following a direct request from the Israeli government.¹⁸ The precise duration and termination date of that restriction remain unknown.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest counter-argument is the ordinary regulatory character of the conduct. Ubiquiti publishes country-specific radio updates for many jurisdictions; Israel-specific regulatory support therefore shows affirmative market servicing without, by itself, establishing ideological support for the Israeli government.^{3, 4}

No public evidence identified an Israel/Gaza political statement by Ubiquiti, Israel-related lobbying, anti-BDS lobbying, corporate donations to the IDF or Friends of the IDF, settlement sponsorship, military-welfare contributions or free post-7 October 2023 equipment supplied by Ubiquiti to Israeli military operations.^{8, 3, 4, 14}

Ubiquiti was not identified in the reviewed 2025 OHCHR settlement-business database, A/HRC/59/23 or BDS Movement corporate-priority guide.^{7, 10, 14} These findings are informative but not conclusive because the UN databases have defined scopes and are not universal inventories of all commercial relationships.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

BDS-1000 Score

BRS Score: 264 - Tier D (Moderate Complicity under the BDS-1000 rubric).

The audited record separates four distinct factual outcomes: no verified completed physical military-supply result; no verified Israeli state/security digital deployment; documented current manufacturer-recognized Israeli market participation; and repeated first-party Israel-specific technical/regulatory communications.

Under the supplied V6.5 methodology, these underlying findings were subjected to an evidence-only review in which Impact represents the type of documented activity, Magnitude addresses its evidenced scale, and Proximity addresses directness of corporate attribution. The military and digital records stop short of the completed-result thresholds described in the audits, while the economic and political records contain affirmative manufacturer-attributable conduct. Numerical complicity scoring and tier labels are evaluative judgments rather than documentary facts; the evidence above preserves the adjudicated factual basis so readers can assess that conduct independently.

Methodology Note

• Evidence-only: The dossier is restricted to facts and qualifications contained in the four supplied domain audits. Reseller assertions, manufacturer evidence and downstream end-user evidence are kept distinct.
• Scale-free structure: The underlying V6.5 framework separates Impact (activity type), Magnitude (documented scale) and Proximity (directness). Missing Israel-specific revenue or unit figures are not converted into assumed scale.
• Temporal discipline: Historical conduct is identified as such. Separate historical and current records are not treated as proof of uninterrupted continuity unless a source establishes continuity.
• Entity attribution: Independent distributor, reseller and downstream-customer conduct is not automatically attributed to Ubiquiti. No transitive attribution is made from a reseller’s broader customer list to Ubiquiti.
• Settlement treatment: A settlement-specific operation would require documentary evidence of the relevant activity. Generic Israeli market availability, Palestinian use or country-level regulatory support is not treated as settlement evidence.
• Negative findings: “No public evidence identified” means the reviewed audit searches did not establish the claimed relationship. It does not assert universal non-existence, and unresolved matters - particularly the IMOD procurement outcome - remain explicitly unresolved.