Alibaba - Digital Audit
Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships
- No public evidence identified that Alibaba Group itself publicly disclosed licensing, subscription, or internal deployment of the Israeli-origin enterprise-security vendors named in the research scope, and Alibaba’s FY2025 Form 20-F did not surface an Israel-specific vendor disclosure.123 Updated checked filings through FY2026 likewise do not publicly disclose internal deployment of the named Israeli-origin enterprise-security vendors in the source set used for this audit.1234
- Publicly verifiable Israel-linked security relationships in the record are platform-level integrations for Alibaba Cloud customers rather than evidence of Alibaba Group’s own internal procurement.567
- Check Point announced in 2021 that its unified cloud-native platform would support Alibaba Cloud.5
- Palo Alto Networks announced a partnership with Alibaba Cloud in 2018.6
- Wiz announced Alibaba Cloud support in 2022 as part of its cloud security offering.7
- In Israel, Alibaba Cloud’s public go-to-market route is documented through Sela rather than through a publicly identified Alibaba-owned local enterprise-services organization.89
- Sela stated in 2023 that it had been appointed as a supplier of Alibaba Cloud solutions in Israel.8
- Alibaba Cloud’s current partner page lists Sela as a partner and describes service capabilities including consulting, systems integration, application development, and data-security support around Alibaba Cloud.9
- Sela’s current Alibaba Cloud partner materials also describe Sela as an Alibaba Cloud Elite Partner offering migrations, modernization, AI deployment, data integrations, application engineering, and 24/7 technical support around Alibaba Cloud.10
- Within the checked sources, Sela is the clearest verified Israel-facing systems integrator relationship for Alibaba Cloud, and no other Israel-specific integrator deploying Alibaba Cloud was verified in the memo’s source set.89 no public evidence identified in the checked sources that an Israel-facing integrator publicly disclosed mandating or deploying Check Point, Wiz, SentinelOne, CyberArk, NICE, Verint, Claroty, or comparable Israeli-origin tools into Alibaba’s own internal infrastructure.910
- Alibaba also established an Israel-linked venture ecosystem relationship with JVP before 2020. TechCrunch and Reuters reported Alibaba’s strategic investment in JVP in 2015, and JVP later listed Alibaba among strategic partners of JVP Cyber Labs in Beersheba.111213
Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology
- Alibaba’s pre-2020 Israel R&D and acquisition activity was explicitly tied to computer vision, machine vision, augmented reality, machine learning, and new-retail use cases.141516
- TechCrunch reported in 2017 that Alibaba was buying Visualead’s technology and bringing its team into a Tel Aviv R&D center under DAMO Academy.14
- TechCrunch reported in 2019 that Alibaba acquired Infinity Augmented Reality after an earlier strategic partnership and linked the company to work on augmented reality, computer vision, and AI.15
- TechCrunch also reported in 2015 that Alibaba invested in Visualead and entered a strategic agreement to use Visualead’s QR technology across Alibaba properties, extending the documented Israel-linked commercial technology relationship earlier than the 2017 R&D-center reporting.17
- Taken together, the checked sources tie Alibaba’s Israel-linked product and R&D activity to QR, computer vision, augmented reality, and machine-learning-adjacent retail use cases through Visualead and InfinityAR rather than to identified public-sector surveillance deployment.141517
- Calcalist reported in 2022 that Alibaba closed its Israel R&D center and laid off the full local staff, which limits evidence of ongoing in-country deployment activity after that point.16
- No public evidence identified that Alibaba used Israeli-origin facial-recognition or biometric vendors such as AnyVision or Oosto, BriefCam, Trigo, or Trax in its own operations within the checked corporate, NGO-database, and press sources.123 The updated checked FY2026 filing set likewise did not surface such use.4
- No public evidence identified of Alibaba using Israeli-origin predictive-policing, sentiment-analysis, social-media-monitoring, or workforce-surveillance tools in the checked source classes.123 The updated checked FY2026 filing set likewise did not surface such use.4
- No public evidence identified that surveillance or biometric capabilities reached Alibaba indirectly through bundled Israeli-origin suites in the checked source classes.123 The updated checked FY2026 filing set likewise did not surface such use.4
Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation
- Alibaba Cloud’s public regions documentation lists global public-cloud regions and availability zones, and no Israel public-cloud region appears in that listing.18
- Alibaba Cloud’s corporate infrastructure materials describe global coverage but do not identify an Israel cloud region.19
- Alibaba Cloud does have documented network and service presence touching Israel short of a public region.2021
- Alibaba Cloud’s 2026 CDN global resource-plan documentation lists Israel among Middle East and Africa POP coverage locations.20
- Alibaba Cloud’s 2026 ARMS documentation lists a Tel Aviv monitoring point outside China.21
- These public documents support edge and network reach into Israel rather than an Israel sovereign-cloud or public-region deployment.2021
- Alibaba Cloud’s Israel market entry was publicly announced through Sela rather than through an Alibaba-owned Israel data-center launch.8918
- Alibaba Cloud’s Israel market availability also continues to be publicly presented through Sela’s current Alibaba Cloud partner offering rather than through a publicly identified Alibaba-owned Israel cloud region or Israel data-center launch.810
- No public evidence identified that Alibaba participated in Project Nimbus, and the cited Israeli government materials name AWS and Google as the public-cloud providers for the project.2223
- The Israeli government’s Nimbus materials also state that the project involves the Ministry of Defense and the IDF.2223
- A 2024 Israeli government PDNS tender states that covered services must be provided through the cloud providers that won the Nimbus tender and contemplates transfer of tender data to the engaged provider’s Israeli data center once established, which supports the continued AWS-and-Google structure of that procurement track rather than Alibaba participation.24
- No public evidence identified that Alibaba provided sovereign-cloud, data-residency, or resilience services to Israeli state institutions or military bodies in the checked procurement and corporate source classes.2223 The updated checked 2024-2026 sources do not change that result.24
- Alibaba Cloud publicly states that its China and International websites operate with independent accounts, billing, and data frameworks, which is relevant to data-governance architecture.25
- Alibaba Cloud’s account documentation further states that International Website account data is stored in data centers outside the Chinese mainland.25
- Alibaba Cloud’s current privacy policy states that personal data may be transferred outside the EEA or UK, including to the United States, Singapore, and China.26
- In its Philippines addendum, the same privacy policy states that personal data will be stored in Singapore and may be transferred to or accessed by Alibaba Group affiliates, staff, agents, and third-party service providers in other jurisdictions.26
- Alibaba Cloud’s Security Center documentation states that, for assets in the “Outside Chinese mainland” region, security detection and protection are provided from a Singapore data center and related security data is processed and stored there.27
- Alibaba Cloud’s law-enforcement guide states that it applies to law-enforcement agencies outside Mainland China seeking user information regarding Alibaba Cloud users, and that Alibaba Cloud will not disclose user information without a valid, legally binding request served through proper channels, while reserving the right to reject requests that conflict with PRC or other applicable law.28
- No public evidence identified in the checked sources that Israeli authorities used that law-enforcement request process.28
- No public evidence identified in the checked sources that Alibaba routed Israeli public-sector data through Israeli jurisdictional infrastructure.1825 The updated memo also did not verify that any Alibaba customer-data pipeline touching Israel is stored in Israel or legally accessible specifically through Alibaba-operated Israeli core infrastructure.25282627
- Current public materials do show continued Israel-facing commercial availability after July 19, 2024 and after November 2024 through Sela’s Israel-facing Alibaba Cloud offering and Alibaba Cloud’s 2026 POP and monitoring documentation, but those materials do not, by themselves, identify Israeli state customers, military customers, or settlement customers.202110
Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships
- No public evidence identified of contracts, partnerships, or service agreements between Alibaba and the Israeli Ministry of Defense, the IDF, Israeli intelligence agencies, or Israeli police in the checked procurement, government, and corporate sources.12223 The updated checked 2024-2026 sources do not change that result.244
- No public evidence identified that Alibaba’s commercially available technology was publicly documented as deployed by Israeli state security bodies in Israel or the occupied territories within the checked source classes.1222323 The updated checked FY2026 filing and 2024 procurement materials do not change that result.244
- No public evidence identified that Alibaba developed, sold, licensed, or maintained offensive cyber tools, zero-day exploit tools, or digital weapons systems for Israeli state actors in the checked sources.123 The updated checked FY2026 filing set does not change that result.4
- No public evidence identified.
- The memo also reports that no primary procurement record, tender award, or official contract was located tying Alibaba to Project Nimbus, Israeli ministries, the IDF, or Israeli intelligence bodies.1222323 The updated memo extends that absence through the 2024 PDNS tender materials and FY2026 SEC filing checks.244
AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems
- No public evidence identified that Alibaba provided AI or machine-learning, computer-vision, or autonomous decision-support systems to Israeli state, military, or security bodies in the checked source classes.12223 The updated checked 2024-2026 sources do not change that result.244
- No public evidence identified that Alibaba’s AI models or platforms were publicly reported as trained on, or given access to, civilian-population data, intercepted communications, or surveillance-derived datasets originating from Israel or the occupied territories.129 The updated checked FY2026 filing set does not change that result.4
- No public evidence identified that Alibaba provided autonomous target-generation, automated threat-detection, or autonomous tracking systems to Israeli military or security forces.12223 The updated checked FY2026 filing set does not change that result.4
- The strongest Israel-linked AI evidence in the memo concerns pre-2020 commercial R&D themes rather than documented public-sector deployment.30141516
- Alibaba’s 2017 DAMO Academy announcement said one of its initial seven labs would be in Tel Aviv with focus areas including machine learning, network security, visual computing, and natural language processing.30
- Visualead and InfinityAR were both publicly tied to Alibaba efforts in visual computing, augmented reality, and related AI-adjacent product development rather than to identified Israeli state-security use.1415
- The updated research memo adds that TechCrunch’s 2015 Visualead report tied Alibaba to QR-code technology deployment across Alibaba properties, reinforcing the commercial product-development character of the Israel-linked activity.17
- PR Newswire reported in 2018 that Alibaba led SQream’s Series B, and SQream stated that the financing expanded a collaboration to offer GPU-database capability to Alibaba Cloud customers.31
- TechCrunch reported in 2023 that Alibaba was a previous backer of Israel-based ThetaRay, an AI anti-money-laundering company, but no public evidence identified in the checked sources that ThetaRay-related activity involved Israeli state, military, or security customers through Alibaba.32
Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint
- Alibaba officially announced in 2017 that DAMO Academy would establish one of its initial seven labs in Tel Aviv.30
- Alibaba said the Tel Aviv lab would focus on machine learning, network security, visual computing, and natural language processing.30
- TechCrunch reported in 2017 that Visualead’s technology and engineering talent formed the basis for Alibaba’s Tel Aviv R&D center under DAMO Academy.14
- Reuters reported in May 2018 that Jack Ma said Alibaba had invested in five companies in Israel and would continue investing there.33
- The same Reuters report said Israel was among three countries being considered for Alibaba offices.33
- TechCrunch reported in 2019 that Alibaba acquired Israeli startup InfinityAR after a strategic partnership dating to 2016.15
- The memo states that later Israeli reporting tied InfinityAR into Alibaba’s Israel machine-vision lab, but that the ongoing status of that local footprint became discontinued or unknown after the 2022 closure.1516
- PR Newswire reported in 2018 that Alibaba Group led SQream’s $26.4 million Series B round.31
- SQream stated that the financing expanded a collaboration to offer GPU-database capability to Alibaba Cloud customers.31
- Calcalist reported in 2022 that Alibaba shut the Israel development center and laid off 60 engineers and researchers.16
- The memo characterizes Alibaba’s Israel R&D footprint as non-current on the checked evidence after that 2022 shutdown.16
- TechCrunch reported in 2015 that Alibaba invested in Israeli QR-code company Visualead and entered a strategic agreement to use Visualead technology across Alibaba properties.17
- TechCrunch and Reuters reported in 2015 that Alibaba made a strategic investment in JVP as its second Israel high-tech partnership and described the relationship as support for Israeli startups.1112
- JVP stated in 2017 that its Beersheba-based JVP Cyber Labs emphasized collaboration with strategic partners including Alibaba and partnerships with Ben-Gurion University to create companies based on university IP.13
- TechCrunch also reported in 2019 that Alibaba’s Israel Machine Laboratory had a partnership with Tel Aviv University focused on video analysis and machine learning, but no primary agreement was located in the checked sources for this run.15
- Alibaba’s FY2026 Directors’ Report discloses current holdings for Chairman Joe Tsai through Joe and Clara Tsai Foundation Limited, Parufam Limited, and PMH Holding Limited, and the same document also discloses Eddie Wu’s beneficial holdings and Mike Evans’s equity awards.34
- An SEC-hosted consortium press release on the 2016 Playtika acquisition states that the acquisition consortium included Yunfeng Capital, described there as a private equity firm founded by Alibaba founder Jack Ma, and that Playtika would continue operating with headquarters in Herzliya, Israel.35
- This Playtika transaction is evidence of founder-linked Israeli investment activity rather than an Alibaba Group acquisition.35
- No public evidence identified in the checked primary and major-press sources linking Joe Tsai’s disclosed vehicles, Eddie Wu, or Mike Evans to Israeli surveillance, cyber, SIGINT, or military-tech firms beyond the historical Jack Ma and Yunfeng-linked Israel investment activity above.34354
- No public evidence identified in the checked sources of patent-licensing or co-development agreements between Alibaba and Israeli universities or research institutions.123
- The updated memo narrows that point further: no public evidence was verified in this run for patent-licensing, formal co-development agreements, or other primary-source university agreements between Alibaba and Technion, Hebrew University, Weizmann Institute, or Tel Aviv University, beyond the secondary-source Tel Aviv University partnership reference above.151234
Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History
- In the authoritative-source checks available for this memo, no target-specific Alibaba finding was verified from the OHCHR settlement-database materials or from A/HRC/59/23.363729
- The memo further reports that its local deterministic full-text pre-scan found no Alibaba hits in the specified OHCHR, UN, and named NGO multi-company reports, and the underlying OHCHR and UN documents inventoried here were checked as lead sources.363729
- The updated memo states that the prompt’s deterministic full-text pre-scan was treated as a lead map rather than as substitute evidence for underlying claims.363729
- No public evidence identified of a target-specific Alibaba company profile in the AFSC Investigate or Who Profits resources checked for this memo.23
- No public evidence identified of organized boycott, divestment, or sanctions campaigns specifically targeting Alibaba for technology provision to Israeli state entities or operations in occupied territories in the checked source classes.363723
- No public evidence identified of regulatory inquiries, export-control actions, sanctions-related probes, or legal challenges specifically involving Alibaba’s technology sales or services to Israeli state entities in the checked source classes.12223 The updated checked 2024-2026 sources do not change that result.244
- The memo identifies an evidence gap in which public evidence is strongest for Alibaba’s Israel R&D and investment footprint from 2015 to 2022 and materially weaker for any post-2022 ongoing commercial or public-sector activity in Israel.89182021
- The clearest current public linkage identified in the memo is Alibaba Cloud availability in Israel through Sela plus network and POP reach, rather than a public Israel cloud region.89182021 The updated memo maintains that this remains the clearest post-2024 public linkage.202110
- The memo also records that no settlement-specific reseller, distributor, or authorized-partner presence for Alibaba was verified in the occupied territories from the checked sources.23
- The updated memo extends that finding to no public evidence identified of settlement-specific reseller, distributor, authorized-partner, or cloud-infrastructure presence for Alibaba in internationally recognized occupied territories.892310
- The memo records that no public evidence was verified for patent co-development or formal research agreements with Technion, Tel Aviv University, Hebrew University, or the Weizmann Institute despite public reporting that Alibaba’s Israel lab drew talent from Israeli academia.3016
- The updated memo also concludes that the checked sources still do not verify internal Alibaba procurement of Israeli-origin security products; the evidence located concerns Alibaba Cloud customer-facing integrations and partner-ecosystem support.567
Footnotes
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https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1577552/000095017025090161/baba-20250331.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15
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https://investigate.afsc.org/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14
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https://www.whoprofits.org/companies/find?Category=4&Type=List ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14
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https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1577552/000119312526231755/baba-20260331.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14
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https://www.checkpoint.com/tw/press-releases/check-point-software-technologies-expands-its-unified-cloud-native-platform-to-support-alibaba-cloud/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/blog/2018/09/partnership-announcement-alibaba-cloud/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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https://www.wiz.io/blog/wiz-extends-cnapp-leadership-with-protection-for-alibaba-cloud ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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https://selacloud.com/news/alibaba-cloud-one-of-the-top-three-worldwide-cloud-services-providers-arrives-in-israel/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8
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https://www.alibabacloud.com/fr/partner/sela?_p_lc=1 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8
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https://selacloud.com/partners/alibaba-cloud/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6
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https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0%2C7340%2CL-4640490%2C00.html ↩ ↩2
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https://jvpvc.com/newsroom/building-leading-cyber-1-innovators/ ↩ ↩2
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https://techcrunch.com/2017/12/01/alibaba-visualead-tel-aviv-rd-center/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6
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https://techcrunch.com/2019/03/24/alibaba-acquires-israeli-vr-startup-infinity-augmented-reality/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9
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https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/syloesp95 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7
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https://techcrunch.com/2015/01/19/alibaba-visualead/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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https://www.alibabacloud.com/help/en/ecs/user-guide/regions-and-zones ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
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https://www.alibabacloud.com/help/en/cdn/user-guide/configure-global-resource-planning ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7
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https://www.alibabacloud.com/help/en/arms/cloud-dial-test-2-0/pc-client-monitoring-points-outside-china ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7
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https://www.mr.gov.il/ilgstorefront/en/news/details/111222 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9
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https://www.gov.il/en/pages/_bpress_20102022 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9
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https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/pdns_280124/he/pdns_tender_17_9_2024_clean_version_english_2_1.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7
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https://www.alibabacloud.com/help/en/account/aliyun-vs-alibaba-cloud ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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https://www.alibabacloud.com/help/en/legal/latest/alibaba-cloud-international-website-privacy-policy ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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https://www.alibabacloud.com/help/en/security-center/what-is-security-center ↩ ↩2
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https://www.alibabacloud.com/help/en/legal/latest/user-information-legal-enquiry-guide-user-information-legal-enquiry-guide ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/HRC-59-23.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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https://www.alibabagroup.com/en-US/about-alibaba-memorabilia-1494029069296074752 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
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https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/sqream-raises-264m-in-strategic-series-b-funding-round-led-by-alibaba-group-684033931.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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https://techcrunch.com/2023/09/05/thetaray-nabs-57m-for-ai-tools-to-id-and-fight-money-laundering/ ↩
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https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0%2C7340%2CL-5250390%2C00.html ↩ ↩2
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https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1577552/000119312526274928/d133513dex991.pdf ↩ ↩2
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https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1575879/000119312516665619/d236359dex991.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/OHCHRDATABASEOPT_300630.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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https://www.un.org/unispal/document/business-database-26sep25/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4