INDEX / DIRECTORY / ASM INTERNATIONAL / DIGITAL

ASM International DIGITAL

DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE AUDIT UPDATED 2026-09-07
Digital Score 0.00 /10 C ASM International - BDS-1000 438
Digital 0.00

Evidence-only forensic audit. Scoring happens downstream - see the main dossier for the composite assessment.

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Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships

ASM International N.V. is a Dutch, Euronext Amsterdam-listed holding company and the parent of the ASM group, which designs and manufactures semiconductor wafer-processing equipment and process solutions 1.

ASM’s current affiliate list names an Israeli group entity, “ASM Services Israel,” while ASM’s 2024 annual report identifies the entity as ASM Services and Support Israel Ltd., located in Kiryat Gat and 100% owned at 31 December 2024 2, 3.

The public materials reviewed do not describe the Israeli entity’s services, systems, customers, address beyond Kiryat Gat, personnel, or operational start date 2, 3.

No public evidence identified.

No public evidence identified of ASM licensing, subscribing to, integrating, or receiving managed services involving Check Point, Wiz, SentinelOne, CyberArk, NICE, Verint, Claroty, Palo Alto Networks, or another identified Israeli-origin enterprise-security or analytics vendor 1, 2.

No public evidence identified of a named systems integrator, IT-outsourcing provider, or digital-transformation consultancy deploying Israeli-origin technology for ASM 1, 2.

Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology

No public evidence identified of ASM’s use of Israeli-origin facial recognition, biometrics, behavioural analytics, gait analysis, predictive policing, sentiment monitoring, social-media monitoring, or workforce-surveillance products 1, 2.

No public evidence identified that such products reach ASM indirectly through a named managed-service provider or bundled enterprise suite 1, 2.

ASM’s reviewed corporate reporting characterises its business as semiconductor wafer-processing equipment and process solutions, rather than a surveillance, biometric, retail-technology, AI, defence, or government-services operation 1, 3.

Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation

ASM’s affiliate disclosures confirm an Israeli service-and-support subsidiary but do not identify Israeli data-centre, cloud-hosting, colocation, or data-residency operations 2, 3.

No public evidence identified that ASM operates, leases, or colocates a data centre in Israel, or that its Israeli affiliate provides cloud or data-residency services 2, 3.

No public evidence identified that ASM participates in Project Nimbus or another identified Israeli government cloud programme 1, 2.

No public evidence identified of ASM services marketed or contracted for Israeli state digital sovereignty, data residency, or infrastructure resilience 1, 2.

Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships

A Macquarie inventory listing identifies an ASM International Eagle-12 Rapidfire PECVD tool in Kiryat Gat, Israel, offered by Macquarie Semiconductor and Technology on behalf of Intel Electronics, Ltd. 4.

That listing documents an equipment location and commercial inventory offering, but does not establish the original sale date, ownership, deployment history, continuing service relationship, or a military or state customer 4.

A 2021 Israeli Competition Authority merger-notice record lists ASM International among global competitors in CVD and ALD wafer-fabrication equipment 5.

The competition record is evidence of ASM’s position in the relevant commercial equipment market, not evidence of an Israeli government, military, intelligence, or security contract 5.

No public evidence identified of contracts, partnerships, or service agreements between ASM and the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, intelligence agencies, police bodies, settlement authorities, or other Israeli security bodies 1, 2, 3.

No public evidence identified that ASM equipment or software was deployed for Israeli military, intelligence, law-enforcement surveillance, offensive-cyber, zero-day, digital-weapons, or occupied-territory applications 1, 2, 3.

AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems

No public evidence identified that ASM provided AI or machine-learning systems, computer vision, autonomous decision support, target generation, automated tracking, or other autonomous systems to Israeli state, military, or security bodies 1, 2.

No public evidence identified that ASM models or platforms were trained on, or provided access to, civilian, intercepted, or surveillance-derived data from Israel or the occupied Palestinian territory 1, 2.

The reviewed materials describe ASM as a semiconductor wafer-processing equipment company and did not identify a user-data collection or processing pipeline requiring a data-exposure analysis 1, 3.

Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint

ASM’s 2023 annual report identifies an Israeli subsidiary and classifies Israel on its global-footprint map as a corporate, sales, or service-office presence, without identifying an Israeli R&D or manufacturing facility on that map 6.

ASM’s current affiliate list similarly confirms “ASM Services Israel” but does not characterise it as an R&D centre, engineering office, innovation lab, or accelerator 2.

No public evidence identified of an ASM acquisition of an Israeli-origin technology company, strategic investment in an Israeli technology startup or fund, or co-development or licensing arrangement with Technion, Hebrew University, or the Weizmann Institute 1, 2.

The Kiryat Gat equipment listing is not evidence of ASM-operated R&D or manufacturing in Israel 4.

ASM reports facilities across the United States, Europe, and Asia, while the reviewed Israeli-specific disclosures do not establish the function, customer base, or current operational status of its Israeli subsidiary 1, 2, 3.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History

The supplied document-scoped review found no full-text mention of ASM International in the UN Special Rapporteur report A/HRC/59/23 7.

The supplied document-scoped review also found no full-text mention of ASM International in the OHCHR 2023 settlement-database report or the 2025 update 8, 9.

These are document-scoped no-hit findings and do not establish absence from all UN reporting, the full historical settlement database, or all Israeli-sector activity 7, 8, 9.

No public evidence identified in the reviewed corporate, UN, civil-society, Israeli-government, and targeted procurement materials of a technology-specific boycott or divestment campaign, regulatory inquiry, export-control action, sanctions-related investigation, court action, or parliamentary action concerning ASM technology provision to Israeli state entities or operations in occupied territory 1, 7, 8, 9, 3.

ASM’s governance structure comprises a Management Board of executive directors, an independent non-executive Supervisory Board, and an Executive Committee established in 2022 10.

ASM identifies Hichem M’Saad as Chair, President and CEO and Paul Verhagen as CFO and a Management Board member 10, 11.

ASM identifies Pauline van der Meer Mohr, Marc de Jong, Didier Lamouche, Tania Micki, and Adalio Sanchez as current Supervisory Board members 10, 12.

ASM’s 2025 shareholder table lists BlackRock, FMR, Norges Bank, Tokyo Electron, and WCM Investment Management as disclosed holders above the Dutch 3% notification threshold as of 31 December 2025, and does not identify a shareholder with 10% or more of voting rights 1.

A 2006 SEC Schedule 13D reported that founder Arthur H. del Prado, individually and through Stichting Administratiekantoor ASM International, held 21.9% of then-outstanding common shares, but this historical filing does not establish a current stake, control position, or current relationship 13.

Footnotes

  1. https://www.asm.com/media/3skhiimk/asm-2025-annual-report.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17

  2. https://www.asm.com/special-pages/affiliate-list ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17

  3. https://www.asm.com/downloads/232221-annual-interim-reports/annual-report-2024 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10

  4. https://www.macquarie.com/my/en/about/company/commodities-and-global-markets/specialised-and-asset-finance/electronics/inventory/semiconductor-fabrication/pecvd - chemical-vapor-deposition-/227369.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  5. https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/legalinfo/2021-000638/he/mirsham_2021-000638.pdf ↩ ↩2

  6. https://www.asm.com/media/1fcpm1px/asm-annual-report-2023.pdf ↩

  7. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/59/23 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  8. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/53/22 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  9. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/60/19 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  10. https://www.asm.com/investors/corporate-governance-principles ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  11. https://www.asm.com/investors/corporate-governance-principles/management-and-supervision/management-board-biography ↩

  12. https://www.asm.com/investors/corporate-governance-principles/management-and-supervision/supervisory-board-bios ↩

  13. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/351483/000119312506103645/dsc13d.htm ↩