ASM International

Key Findings

• Economic: ASM maintains a wholly owned Israeli service-and-support subsidiary, ASM Services and Support Israel Ltd., identified in Kiryat Gat; public reporting does not disclose its customers, revenue, workforce, installed base, or exact activities.^{1, 2}
• Political: ASM’s disclosed Israeli presence is in Israel proper, while the reviewed materials identified no ASM site, contract, customer location, or service operation in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Golan Heights, or an Israeli settlement.^{1, 3}
• Political: ASM reported zero spending on lobbying, political campaigns, political organisations, candidates, and ballot measures or referendums for each year from 2021–2025; it separately reported aggregate payments to trade associations and tax-exempt groups without naming recipients.⁴
• Not found: No public evidence identified of ASM contracts or supply arrangements with Israeli military, intelligence, police, settlement authorities, or defence primes, or of ASM equipment deployed for military, surveillance, or occupied-territory applications.^{3, 5}

Target Profile

Key Facts:

• ASM International N.V. is the Dutch holding company and ultimate parent of the ASM group.^{6, 10}
• The group reports a single reportable segment and does not disclose Israel-specific revenue, investment, employee, facility, or market figures.⁸
• Historical filings identify Israeli service-and-support entities in Tel Aviv and Kiryat Malachi, but these records do not establish current addresses or operating arrangements.¹¹

Executive Summary

ASM International N.V. is a Dutch-listed semiconductor-equipment group that designs and manufactures wafer-processing equipment and process solutions. Its documented Israel nexus is an Israeli group service-and-support entity: ASM’s FY2023 report identified ASM Service & Support Israel Ltd. at 2 Hazaron Street, Kiryat Gat; its FY2024 reporting listed ASM Services and Support Israel Ltd. in Kiryat Gat as 100% owned at 31 December 2024; and the 2025 Tax Report lists the entity under Israel as part of the consolidated group.^{1, 2, 10} The available disclosures do not identify its customers, contract values, revenue, workforce, installed equipment base, exact services, or end uses.^{1, 2}

A Macquarie listing described an ASM International Eagle-12 Rapidfire PECVD asset located in Kiryat Gat and offered on behalf of Intel Electronics, Ltd. This is evidence of an equipment location and inventory offering, not evidence of ASM as direct seller, the original supply date, a continuing support relationship, equipment ownership, or the customer’s use of the asset.¹² Likewise, a 2021 Israeli Competition Authority document lists ASM among global competitors in CVD and ALD wafer-fabrication equipment; it is a market-competition record, not an Israeli state, military, intelligence, or security procurement record.¹³

The reviewed record does not support a military or digital-security nexus. No public evidence identified of ASM contracts, procurement arrangements, joint development, co-production, licensed manufacture, or technology transfer with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, intelligence agencies, police bodies, settlement authorities, Israeli defence primes, or other security bodies.^{3, 5} No public evidence identified that ASM equipment or software was deployed for Israeli military, intelligence, law-enforcement surveillance, offensive-cyber, digital-weapons, or occupied-territory applications.^{3, 5} Document-scoped checks also found no mention of ASM International in the specified UN and OHCHR settlement-related materials; those no-hit results do not establish absence from all UN reporting, databases, or indirect relationships.^{14, 15}

Politically, bounded searches located no official ASM statement concerning Israel, Palestine, Gaza, the 7 October 2023 attacks, or subsequent hostilities; this is not proof that no such statement exists.⁴ ASM reports zero spending on lobbying, political campaigns, political organisations, candidates, and ballot measures or referendums for 2021–2025, while reporting aggregate payments to trade associations and tax-exempt groups whose recipients are not identified.⁴ No public evidence identified of Israel/Palestine-related lobbying, donations, conflict-relief mobilisation, settlement support, or relevant conduct by the company or its reviewed principals; the individual-record searches were bounded and not registry-wide.^{4, 9}

Under the fixed, human-vetted V6 assessment supplied for this dossier, ASM receives a BRS of 438, placing it in Tier C (Substantial Complicity). The result is driven by the documented Israeli subsidiary and the scoring model’s treatment of direct Israeli operational presence, while the military and digital scores remain zero because the reviewed evidence did not verify those vectors.

Timeline of Relevant Events

Corporate Overview

ASM International N.V. describes itself as the Dutch-law holding company and parent of the ASM group, listed on Euronext Amsterdam. It designs and manufactures semiconductor wafer-processing equipment and process solutions through facilities in the United States, Europe, and Asia.^{6, 7} Its reported governance structure comprises a Management Board, an Executive Committee, and an independent Supervisory Board.⁹

ASM’s 2025 Tax Report states that the group operates through 29 legal entities or branches and that listed group entities are directly or indirectly wholly owned by ASM International N.V. and consolidated line by line.¹⁰ It identifies entities including ASM America Inc., ASM Europe B.V., ASM Netherlands Holding B.V., ASM Microchemistry Oy, ASM Japan K.K., ASM Korea Ltd., LPE S.p.A., ASM IP Holding B.V., ASM Pacific Holding B.V., and ASM Services and Support Israel Ltd.¹⁰

The current affiliate list names “ASM Services Israel.”²⁰ The FY2023 and FY2024 reports identify the relevant entity as ASM Service & Support Israel Ltd. or ASM Services and Support Israel Ltd., in Kiryat Gat, and establish 100% ownership in the FY2024 disclosure.^{1, 2} The sources describe a service/support presence but do not establish an Israeli manufacturing facility, R&D centre, data centre, acquisition, customer base, revenue stream, workforce, or current scope of services.^{1, 2, 8} No public evidence identified of a franchise relationship, Israeli state ownership, government board appointment, golden share, Israeli tax residency, or Israeli-founded corporate identity.^{6, 8, 10}

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

ASM’s stated business is semiconductor wafer-processing equipment and process solutions, rather than a declared defence product or service line.⁷ Its affiliate disclosures establish an Israeli service-and-support presence, but do not identify customers, defence end users, equipment destinations, ownership details beyond the disclosed subsidiary reporting, or activity in occupied territory.^{1, 2, 20}

No public evidence identified of a contract, tender award, framework agreement, memorandum of understanding, or procurement relationship between ASM or its Israeli entity and the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israel Police, Israel Prison Service, Border Police, or SIBAT.^{3, 5} No public evidence identified of ASM supplying Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael, IMI/Elbit Land, or another Israeli defence prime with components, subsystems, manufacturing services, or semiconductor-production equipment.^{3, 5}

No public evidence identified that ASM markets tactical, ruggedised, military-specified, defence-grade, weapons-related, or contract-modified equipment to Israeli security end users; that a standard ASM tool was supplied under an identified Israeli military end-use certificate; or that ASM supplied a critical subsystem for an identified Israeli lethal or strategic weapons system.^{3, 5}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest available defence is that ASM is a civilian semiconductor-equipment manufacturer and that the reviewed evidence did not identify a military customer, contract, licence, procurement relationship, end-use certificate, defence-prime supply relationship, or military application.^{3, 5, 7} The Kiryat Gat entity and the equipment listing demonstrate commercial presence or equipment location, not military deployment.^{1, 12}

The 2021 competition record is not a defence-procurement record and names no defence end user.¹³ Search results concerning Israeli Ministry of Defense suspension of “ASM” export licences concern Ability Security Systems Ltd., a subsidiary of Ability Inc.; attributing those records to ASM International would be a wrong-entity attribution.²¹

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

ASM’s reviewed reporting characterises it as a semiconductor wafer-processing equipment and process-solutions group, not as a surveillance, biometric, retail-technology, AI, defence, government-services, cloud, or data-residency operator.^{7, 2} The disclosed Israeli affiliate does not establish Israeli data-centre, cloud-hosting, colocation, data-residency, AI, surveillance, or R&D operations.^{2, 20}

No public evidence identified of ASM licensing, subscribing to, integrating, or receiving managed services from identified Israeli-origin enterprise-security or analytics vendors; of a named integrator deploying Israeli-origin technology for ASM; or of Israeli-origin facial recognition, biometrics, behavioural analytics, predictive-policing, social-monitoring, or workforce-surveillance products in ASM’s operations.^{5, 20}

No public evidence identified that ASM participated in Project Nimbus or another Israeli government cloud programme, or that ASM equipment or software was deployed for Israeli military, intelligence, law-enforcement surveillance, offensive-cyber, zero-day, digital-weapons, or occupied-territory applications.^{5, 20}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest defence is the absence, in the reviewed record, of a digital-service relationship with Israeli state or security bodies and the civilian character of ASM’s disclosed business.^{5, 7} The Macquarie listing establishes only that an ASM PECVD tool was located in Kiryat Gat and offered on behalf of Intel Electronics, Ltd.; it does not establish original sale, ownership, deployment history, continuing service, military use, or a state customer.¹²

This conclusion is bounded by the reviewed public materials. The absence of a disclosed digital nexus does not demonstrate that no indirect, undisclosed, or downstream use exists.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

The verified economic nexus is ASM’s Israeli service/support affiliate. ASM’s FY2023 report identifies ASM Service & Support Israel Ltd. in Kiryat Gat; its FY2024 report records ASM Services and Support Israel Ltd. there as 100% owned; and its 2025 Tax Report includes the entity in the group’s Israeli entity listing.^{1, 2, 10} A 2021 annual report described the entity as a regional sales/service office.¹⁹

ASM’s reporting places Israel within the group’s operational footprint, including an Israel-specific reporting telephone number in its ethics speak-up arrangements.⁴ Historical records document the Israeli service entity in Tel Aviv and Kiryat Malachi, and a 2015 report referenced an Intel address in Kiryat Gat. These historical records do not establish current office status, a continuing Intel arrangement, or a present customer relationship.^{11, 16, 18}

ASM’s 2025 annual report presents the group as a single reportable segment and provides no Israel-specific investment, revenue, employee, facility, market, tax, profit, dividend, intercompany-payment, or repatriation-flow disclosure.⁸ No public evidence identified of Israeli sovereign-debt holdings, Israel Bonds, Israel-focused funds, an Israeli acquisition, an Israeli factory, a separately disclosed Israeli R&D centre, consumer-brand ownership, real-estate investment, or infrastructure investment.⁸

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

ASM’s strongest defence is that the reviewed evidence verifies only a modestly specified corporate service/support presence, not the scale or economic consequences of that presence. There is no disclosed Israel-specific revenue, workforce, investment, taxation, procurement, manufacturing output, customer base, installed base, or profit contribution.^{1, 2, 8} The record therefore does not support claims about the material scale of ASM’s Israeli economic activity.

No public evidence identified of settlement-origin product sales, Israeli consumer-goods sourcing, an Israeli importer-of-record, settlement construction involvement, or Israeli operations in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Golan Heights, or settlements.^{3, 8} The entity’s confirmed location is Kiryat Gat, Israel, as described in the reviewed sources.^{1, 2}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

ASM reports zero spending on lobbying, interest representation or similar activity, political campaigns, political organisations, political candidates, and ballot measures or referendums in every reported year from 2021 through 2025.⁴ The same disclosure reports payments to trade associations and tax-exempt groups of €76,000 in 2021, €207,000 in 2022, €200,000 in 2023, €200,000 in 2024, and €186,000 in 2025, but does not identify recipients.⁴

Bounded searches located no official ASM statement concerning Israel, Palestine, Gaza, the 7 October 2023 attacks, or subsequent hostilities; this is not evidence that no such statement exists.⁴ No public evidence identified of ASM donations, crisis logistics, free services, equipment transfers, or other resource mobilisation for the IDF, FIDF, JNF/KKL, settlement organisations, Israeli reservist funds, or state-aligned conflict-relief organisations.^{4, 5}

No public evidence identified in the reviewed materials of an ASM site, reseller, service location, equipment contract, or customer location in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Golan Heights, or an Israeli settlement.^{1, 2, 3, 10} No public evidence identified of an OECD National Contact Point complaint, regulatory action, court case, organised BDS or boycott campaign, or sanctions campaign concerning ASM’s Israel operations.^{14, 15}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest defence is that ASM’s own disclosures show no reported political spending in the enumerated categories and the reviewed evidence did not verify Israel/Palestine-related lobbying, public advocacy, donations, military-welfare support, settlement support, or state partnership.^{4, 5} The trade-association and tax-exempt-group payments are aggregated and unnamed; recipient identity and any Israel-related advocacy cannot be inferred from those totals.⁴

The company maintains a global Government Affairs programme, but the disclosure does not identify activities, recipients, or jurisdictions.⁴ Similarly, bounded searches of executives, directors, founder Arthur del Prado, and potential associated vehicles did not verify relevant conduct, but direct individual-record searches of all relevant registries were not completed. This is not a registry-wide absence finding.⁹

Named Entities and Evidence Map

BDS-1000 Score

Method: V6.

• V_MAX: 5.10 Avg_OTHERS: 0.75
• BRS Score: 438 Tier: C (Substantial Complicity)

The maximum domain score is Economic, reflecting the documented Israeli service/support subsidiary and operational presence, despite the absence of disclosed Israel-specific financial, workforce, customer, or activity data.^{1, 2, 8} Military and Digital remain zero because the audits did not verify military, security, surveillance, cloud, or Israeli-state digital contracts or deployments.^{3, 5} The V6 method is scale-free, evidence-only, and human-vetted; the fixed scores are not a substitute for claims beyond the documentary record.

Methodology Note

• This dossier uses only the four supplied domain audits and their cited source record; it does not infer facts from sector, nationality, association, or downstream possibility.
• Impact (I) assesses documented activity type; M assesses documented scale; P assesses documented directness.
• The assessment is scale-free: a score reflects the V6 evidentiary model, not a measure of revenue, market value, moral culpability, or undisclosed activity.
• Divested, exited, historical, or superseded operations are treated as mitigating or unresolved unless current continuation is documented. Historical Tel Aviv, Kiryat Malachi, Intel-address, and founder-shareholding records are not treated as proof of current arrangements.^{11, 16, 18}
• Entity attribution is limited to the documented company or affiliate. The Ability Security Systems export-licence material is excluded as a wrong-entity attribution.²¹
• Settlement operations, if documented, would be relevant to both Economic and Political; no public evidence identified of such ASM operations in the reviewed record.³
• “No public evidence identified” means the bounded audit checks did not locate evidence; it does not establish universal absence. UN and OHCHR no-hit findings are document-scoped only.^{14, 15}