Capgemini

Key Findings

• Economic: Altran Israel Limited remains documented within Capgemini’s group through FY2024–25 financial reporting and corporate privacy disclosures updated in November 2025. Its registration and published addresses are established; current staffing, customers, service delivery and financial contribution remain unverified.^{1, 2, 3}
• Economic: Capgemini has documented enterprise-technology relationships involving CyberArk, Claroty, Armis and Israeli-incorporated NiCE. Its June 2026 HMRC announcement assigns Capgemini implementation and support responsibilities for a NiCE-based UK customer-service platform; the disclosed hosting arrangement is UK sovereign cloud.^{4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
• Political: Corporate publications presented Israel as part of Capgemini’s international footprint in 2021 and 2024. The political audit also documents a Russia/Ukraine communications comparison and a continuing employee-union campaign, while finding no official management endorsement of Israeli military operations or settlements.^{9, 10, 11, 12, 13}
• Not found: No public evidence identified of Capgemini supplying the Israeli military, deploying technology for surveillance of Palestinians, or operating in an identified Israeli settlement. Documented international defence work and civilian technology partnerships do not establish those connections.^{1, 4, 7, 14, 15, 16}

Target Profile

Executive Summary

Capgemini’s documented Israel/Palestine nexus centres on corporate affiliation and commercial technology relationships. Its acquisition of the global Altran business brought an Israeli corporate connection into the group. Altran Israel Limited, formerly Aricent Israel Limited, appears in successive subsidiary disclosures and in Capgemini’s 2025 corporate privacy documents. Israeli registry-derived records identify an active company, but neither registration nor a published contact address independently establishes a currently staffed office, identifiable customers or engineering services delivered in Israel during 2025–2026.^{22, 1, 2, 23, 24, 3}

The strongest additional economic evidence concerns enterprise software and integration. Capgemini documents CyberArk identity-security work, Claroty and Armis cybersecurity partnerships, and a June 2026 HMRC programme involving NiCE and Route 101. NiCE identifies itself as incorporated in Israel. The HMRC announcement describes a UK sovereign-cloud deployment; no public evidence identified in the reviewed materials establishes storage, routing or processing of taxpayer information in Israel. Separately, Business Insider reported Capgemini as an AI21 customer, while corporate publications corroborate a technology relationship whose purchased products, licensing arrangements and commercial scope remain unresolved.^{4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 25, 26, 27}

The political record establishes routine corporate presentation of Israel as a business location, alongside a bounded comparison with Capgemini’s public Russia/Ukraine response. It also establishes CGT Capgemini’s Stop Arming Israel campaign and demands for conscientious-objection protections. Union statements are attributable employee-representative positions, rather than management admissions or independently verified proof of Israeli weapons supply. No public evidence identified of official Capgemini endorsement of Israeli military operations, settlement expansion, relevant lobbying or corporate donations to Israeli military or settlement organisations.^{9, 10, 11, 28, 29, 12, 13, 16}

Capgemini’s international defence work is independently documented, including UK Ministry of Defence engagement and commercial relationships with BAE Systems and Airbus. Those relationships do not establish an Israeli military end user. The audits identified no substantiated Israeli military supply, Palestinian-surveillance deployment or settlement operation. The fixed, human-vetted V6.6 assessment is BRS 528, Tier C (Substantial Complicity), with nonzero economic and political scores and zero military and digital scores. That classification must be read with the evidence limits attached to the underlying corporate and commercial findings.^{14, 15, 30, 31, 32, 33}

Timeline of Relevant Events

Corporate Overview

Capgemini’s group combines consulting, technology integration, engineering and operational services. Its disclosed businesses and brands include Capgemini Invent, Capgemini Engineering, Sogeti, frog, Cambridge Consultants and Purpose. These relationships establish corporate attribution, but do not establish that every group business serves the same customers or participates in a particular contract.^{19, 36}

The central Israeli entity is Altran Israel Limited, formerly Aricent Israel Limited. Primary financial reporting identifies it as a fellow subsidiary in FY2022–23 and FY2024–25. Registry-derived records identify company number 514792282, active status and a latest annual-report year of 2025. Records give differing Tel Aviv addresses - 7 Rival Street and 23 Menachem Begin Road - which the accessible extracts do not conclusively reconcile.^{22, 1, 24, 37}

The Bloomberg LEI record identifies Aricent Technologies (Holdings) Limited as direct parent and Capgemini as ultimate parent. Its relationship information was last updated in 2023 and its LEI registration is lapsed. That limits its currency; the lapse does not establish dissolution or inactivity. Capgemini’s own April and November 2025 privacy disclosures independently support continued group inclusion at 7 Rival Street, without proving physical occupation or active service delivery.^{2, 38, 3}

Capgemini owned the entire acquired Altran business following the 2020 squeeze-out. The approximately €5.2 billion enterprise value concerned that global acquisition, rather than a separately valued Israeli transaction. The reviewed documents do not establish Altran Israel’s exact direct ownership percentage, turnover, workforce or local contracts. They also do not establish a franchise relationship or an Israeli parent-level controlling interest.^{1, 20, 23, 39}

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

Capgemini has genuine military-sector capabilities and customers outside Israel. Its defence materials describe logistics, equipment readiness, secure data, communications and command-and-control services. Its UK materials identify British defence work and the Swedish Armed Forces; LAURA supports UK MOD inventory-processing analysis. ADAPT concerns procurement workflows for UK defence commercial teams.^{14, 15, 32}

Independent UK government disclosure confirms a December 2025 Defence Digital meeting about current Capgemini work, accompanied by a call-centre tour. Capgemini’s May 2026 BAE Systems agreement establishes technology-operation and integration services for a defence manufacturer. Neither record identifies Israeli procurement, weapons components or an Israeli programme.^{30, 31}

Against that verified international activity, No public evidence identified of a directly awarded Israeli MOD or IDF contract, supply to Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries or Rafael, Israeli military logistics, weapons-component production, or purpose-built Israeli targeting software. No public evidence identified of military construction or sustainment in occupied territory. These are the military audit’s bounded findings, rather than conclusions drawn from the absence of a company name on a single public page.^{1, 14, 15, 30, 16}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The company’s strongest defence is the missing Israeli end-user connection. General defence capabilities, a BAE relationship and UK MOD work cannot establish delivery to Israel without a documented transaction, programme or supply chain. The Inverness disclosure does not establish that the visited call centre supplied MOD helpdesk, logistics or operational-communications services; its precise function remains undisclosed.^{14, 30, 31}

The Government Solutions sale announcement concerns US federal customers and a subsidiary representing approximately 0.4% of 2025 group revenue. It documents an agreement subject to closing conditions, rather than a verified completed disposal or an Israel-related remedial action. The audit identified no Israeli military connection for that subsidiary.³⁵

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

The digital audit documents commercial enterprise-security and customer-service integration. CyberArk independently lists Capgemini as a systems integrator. A Capgemini telecommunications case study describes privileged-access management, database onboarding and Azure-based disaster recovery. Capgemini also names Claroty and Armis as operational-technology and connected-infrastructure security partners.^{6, 40, 7, 8}

The HMRC announcement assigns Capgemini system design, implementation, workflow integration, support and optimisation responsibilities around NiCE CXone. NiCE’s Israeli incorporation establishes a corporate-jurisdiction nexus. The announced application is UK civilian taxpayer service on a purpose-built UK sovereign cloud.^{4, 5, 41}

AI21 evidence is narrower than a fully disclosed procurement record. Business Insider reported a customer relationship; Capgemini discussed Jamba for financial-services contact centres; AI21’s directory and Partnerbase corroborate a technology partnership. No public evidence identified of a disclosed order, licence, transaction amount, named production deployment or definitive purchased-product list. Discussion of Jamba does not conclusively establish its purchase.^{25, 26, 27, 42}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest defence is the civilian character of the identified deployments and absence of an occupation-related end user. No public evidence identified connecting these Capgemini integrations to Israeli police or intelligence, surveillance of Palestinians, biometric control, offensive cyber operations, military target generation or Project Nimbus. Vendor nationality and general technological capability do not independently establish those applications.^{4, 7, 8, 16, 36}

The HMRC materials do not establish Israeli storage, replication, routing or processing of taxpayer data. They also leave Israeli-based personnel’s possible remote administrative or support access unresolved. Neither an allegation of Israeli data transfer nor an assurance excluding all such access is supported. Capgemini’s own internal use of the documented vendors is likewise insufficiently established.^{4, 5, 6, 7, 8}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

The clearest structural economic nexus is Altran Israel’s continued inclusion in the group. FY2024–25 reporting and privacy documents updated during 2025 establish a relationship extending beyond July and November 2024. Registry-derived active status and corporate contact details strengthen entity identification, while remaining distinct from proof of ongoing business activity.^{22, 1, 2, 3}

Commercial technology relationships provide a separate nexus. The digital audit documents CyberArk, Claroty, Armis and NiCE relationships, and a reported AI21 customer relationship. These findings establish named commercial connections without quantifying Israel-attributable spending or supplier receipts. They should not be expanded into an undisclosed financial contribution.^{4, 6, 7, 8, 25}

The economic audit’s broad sourcing review did not establish a named Israeli software product in a customer deliverable; the digital audit supplies more specific affirmative evidence, including CyberArk and NiCE integrations. Those specific findings are retained alongside their civilian-use limits. No public evidence identified of settlement-origin goods, settlement facilities, Israeli sovereign-debt underwriting or quantified transfers from Altran Israel to the wider group.^{1, 4, 7, 43}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

Capgemini’s strongest defence is that legal affiliation is better documented than operational substance. The reviewed record does not establish a currently staffed Israeli office, current engineering contracts, customers, recruitment attributable to the identified company, turnover, payroll or tax contribution. A registered active company may remain legally extant without the documents proving the scale or nature of its operations.^{22, 1, 2, 38, 3}

The global Altran purchase price cannot be treated as investment specifically in Israel. Likewise, group ownership creates no evidentiary basis for assuming Israeli military or settlement customers. No public evidence identified of a named settlement location, settlement-security contract, Israeli factory or designated national-infrastructure role.^{1, 23, 39, 14}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

The affirmative communications record consists principally of ordinary geographic presentation. The 2021 annual report listed Israel/Tel Aviv–Jaffa; a 2024 Capgemini Japan presentation again included Israel in the group footprint. Later privacy documentation identified Altran Israel and its address. These records serve different purposes: international contact information, market presentation and privacy governance respectively.^{3, 9, 10}

The reviewed political audit compares those records and the absence of an identified Israel/Palestine management position with Capgemini’s explicit 2022 Russia/Ukraine communications. Its Russian discontinuation announcement cited service-continuity circumstances and employee protections; subsequent quarterly and half-year communications repeated the intention. The comparison establishes different documented communication choices, without establishing equivalent operating circumstances or endorsement through silence.^{11, 28, 29}

CGT Capgemini’s December 2025 article and October 2026 strike announcement establish organised labour scrutiny and demands for conscientious objection. The December article characterised listed arms-industry businesses as potential customers in the relevant passage. Its reports of employees resigning rather than undertaking weapons-related work were not independently verified.^{12, 13}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest defence is that routine geographic disclosure is not an advocacy message. No public evidence identified of an official statement endorsing Israeli military operations or settlements, relevant corporate lobbying, military or settlement donations, executive-directed crisis support, or a corporate mandate advancing Israeli state policy. The communications finding remains bounded by the reviewed corpus.^{21, 20, 16, 43}

The detailed country-directory format disappeared from the 2022–2025 annual reports. That change does not establish an Israel-specific removal or withdrawal. Conversely, the surviving 2021 report and later country reference do not establish substantial readership, persuasive impact or active operations. KSE’s classification of Russian activity as suspended or reduced also requires separating Capgemini’s announced intention from independently monitored implementation.^{9, 10, 34, 44, 45, 46, 47}

Union campaigning cannot be attributed to management. No public evidence identified of a resulting contract cancellation, boycott decision or adopted conscientious-objection policy. Capgemini’s Airbus, Thales and other industrial relationships require their own transaction-specific attribution; the audit does not establish Israeli end use through those associations.^{12, 13, 33, 16}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Complicity Index Score

Method: V6.6 - final human-vetted scores

• V_MAX: 6.10 Avg_OTHERS: 1.17
• BRS Score: 528 Tier: C (Substantial Complicity)

The fixed economic score supplies V_MAX, against an audited record of Israeli corporate affiliation and commercial technology relationships; the political score accompanies the bounded geographic-publication, communications and scrutiny record described above.^{1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 12} The zero military and digital scores preserve the absence of an established qualifying Israeli military, surveillance or occupation-related deployment despite documented international defence and civilian technology work.^{7, 14, 30, 31} The resulting BRS 528/Tier C classification is reproduced unchanged under the scale-free, evidence-only, human-vetted method; no separate numerical rationale was supplied, so no additional derivation is asserted.

Methodology Note

• This dossier synthesises only the four supplied domain audits. Affirmative findings, negative checks and unresolved questions retain their audited scope.
• Impact (I) concerns activity type; Magnitude (M) concerns scale; Proximity (P) concerns directness. Company size alone does not determine impact.
• Temporal attribution distinguishes historical relationships, continuing disclosures and verified current activity. Exited or divested operations receive mitigation; a conditional sale announcement is not treated as completed.
• Entity attribution requires a documented connection. Subsidiary membership, partnerships, board affiliations and supplier nationality do not create transitive responsibility for unrelated conduct.
• A verified settlement operation would be considered in both Economic and Political. No public evidence identified of such an operation here.^{1, 3}
• “No public evidence identified” records a negative result within the reviewed evidence, rather than proof that an activity cannot exist. Registration, addresses, commercial scope and data-access questions remain separately qualified.