CGI MILITARY

Request: e7febec5-1350-4640-905f-d000422d81f8 As of: 8 October 2026 Target: CGI Inc. (Canada; cgi.com)

Target identification, group attribution and Israel boundary

CGI Inc. is the Montreal-based successor to the Quebec company founded in 1976; its 2025 Annual Information Form states that it conducts business directly and through subsidiaries and identifies CGI Federal Inc. among its wholly owned principal subsidiaries.¹ CGI’s 2025 proxy states that the corporation and its related subsidiaries are controlled by founder Serge Godin through his voting position.² Tim Hurlebaus became President and CEO in May 2026; CGI states that he previously served as President of CGI Federal and led programs for U.S. civilian, defence and intelligence clients.^{3, 4}

[pre-2020] CGI completed its acquisition of Logica plc on 20 August 2012 for £1.7 billion plus assumed net debt; the combined group then had approximately 72,000 professionals in more than 40 countries.⁵ The acquisition announcement described a broader Middle East operating region but did not identify Israel.⁵ [pre-2020] CGI also agreed in May 2010 to acquire Stanley Inc., a U.S. defence/intelligence IT contractor; CGI stated that Stanley would become part of CGI Federal and that the combined CGI Federal client mix would be about 55% defence/intelligence and 45% civilian.⁶ Those acquisitions establish group lineage, not an Israel-specific relationship.^{5, 6}

The Israeli company using the name CGI Group at cgi.co.il is a separate target and is not attributed to CGI Inc. Its own site says it was founded in 1989, is based at HaArba’a Street 30 in Tel Aviv, is led by founder/CEO Zvika Nave and President Jacob Perry, and employs former personnel from IDF elite units, Shin Bet and Mossad.⁷ Nothing in the reviewed CGI Inc. corporate filings or CGI Inc. sites established common ownership or control between that Israeli firm and CGI Inc.; all cgi.co.il intelligence/security activity is therefore excluded from this audit.^{1, 2, 7}

Current Israel footprint. CGI’s current office directory did not list an Israeli office in the reviewed page, and CGI’s June 2026 BCR materials state that their appendix lists participating CGI entities controlled or owned by CGI Inc.; the June 2026 appendix did not identify an Israeli participating entity.^{8, 9, 10} These are scoped sources rather than an exhaustive corporate-registry proof: the SEC principal-subsidiary table itself has materiality and holding-company exclusions, while the BCR appendix covers entities participating in the BCR framework.^{1, 9} A current Red Hat partner-catalog page for CGI nevertheless labels Israel as an office country, but gives no Israeli address or legal-entity name; because that third-party listing conflicts with CGI’s own current directory/BCR evidence, it is retained as unresolved contrary evidence rather than proof of an Israeli CGI office.¹¹

Authoritative settlement/corporate reports. The 26 September 2025 OHCHR update lists 158 enterprises involved in specified settlement-related activities; targeted text review did not identify CGI Inc. among the named enterprises.¹² Targeted text review of A/HRC/59/23 likewise did not identify CGI Inc. as a named company.¹³ These non-hits are limited to the reports’ respective scopes and do not prove the absence of every possible Israel/Palestine relationship.^{12, 13}

Commercial Israeli-technology relationships outside Military. [pre-2020] In 2012 CGI announced a global Panaya practice after using Panaya cloud tools for the preceding three years; Panaya currently lists its headquarters in Hod HaSharon, Israel.^{14, 15} In February 2024 CyberArk, issuing its announcement from Newton, Massachusetts and Petach Tikva, Israel, named CGI its 2023 Global Managed Service Protection Partner of the Year.¹⁶ These sources establish enterprise-software/security commercial relationships, but they do not identify an Israeli military end-user, military data set, or purpose-built kinetic function; they are therefore treated as non-Military context.^{14, 15, 16}

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

Ministry of Defence, IDF and state-security contracts

No public evidence identified in the reviewed records of a CGI Inc. or CGI Federal contract, tender award, framework agreement or memorandum of understanding with the Israeli Ministry of Defence, Israel Defense Forces, Israel Prison Service or Israel Border Police.^{1, 12, 13} CGI Federal is a genuine defence contractor, but the verified records reviewed here concern U.S. military bodies rather than Israeli state-security bodies.^{4, 17, 18, 19, 20}

Defence trade directories and procurement registries

No public evidence identified of CGI Inc. being listed as an Israeli SIBAT defence exporter/supplier or as an Israeli defence-procurement awardee in the retrievable material reviewed for this audit.^{12, 13} The absence of a searchable public hit is not treated as proof that no non-public or poorly indexed procurement record exists.^{12, 13}

Press releases and official announcements

No public CGI/Israeli-government defence-cooperation announcement was identified.^{1, 3, 17} By contrast, CGI publicly identifies current U.S. Army and USSTRATCOM defence work, showing that the company does disclose at least some named military customers and programs when publishable.^{17, 19}

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Militarised product lines

CGI does not present itself in the reviewed sources as a hardware manufacturer, but CGI Federal does market and deliver purpose-built military software/integration services.^{17, 18} Current 2026 CGI material states that it supports HIMARS and MLRS fielding, training and sustainment and works on tactical C2, long-range precision rockets/missiles, rotary-wing platforms and Army Foreign Military Sales integration across more than 30 partner countries.¹⁷ The same page does not name Israel as one of those countries, so no Israeli end-use is inferred.¹⁷

[pre-2020] A January 2012 CGI Federal award from U.S. Army CECOM’s Fires Software Engineering Division was valued at US$89.4 million for a one-year base plus one option year and covered C4ISR lifecycle support, including software development and fielding for artillery support systems.¹⁸ The stated award term is long expired; the reviewed source does not establish continuity of that specific contract after approximately 2014.¹⁸

Civilian-to-military distinction

The Panaya and CyberArk relationships identified above concern ERP/cloud testing and identity security rather than purpose-built targeting, fire-control, precision-guidance or weapons-integration output.^{14, 16} Conversely, CGI’s Army fires/HIMARS work is expressly military and is retained in Military, but no source reviewed tied that work to an Israeli end-user.^{17, 18}

End-user certification and export licensing

No public evidence identified of an export-licence application, end-user certificate or export-control review specifically covering CGI products/services for an Israeli military or security end-user.^{12, 13}

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

Equipment in occupied territories

No public evidence identified that CGI Inc. manufactures heavy machinery, vehicles or construction equipment used in settlement construction, demolitions, the separation barrier, Israeli military installations or other occupied-territory infrastructure.^{1, 3} CGI’s identified business is IT/business consulting and digital services, while its military work in the reviewed sources is software, systems integration, training and sustainment rather than earthmoving or construction equipment.^{1, 17, 18}

Direct versus indirect supply

No public evidence identified of CGI equipment reaching an Israeli occupation-related end-user through an authorised dealer, distributor or secondary-market channel.^{12, 13}

Construction and engineering contracts

No public evidence identified of CGI contracts to construct, maintain or expand Israeli checkpoints, detention facilities, military bases, the separation barrier or settlement infrastructure.^{12, 13}

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

CGI-to-Israeli-prime supply

No verified CGI Inc./CGI Federal supply relationship was identified with Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems or IMI/Elbit Land for components, sub-systems, raw materials or specialist manufacturing services.^{1, 17, 19} No verified CGI-Israeli-prime joint-development, co-production, licensed-manufacturing or technology-transfer arrangement was identified.^{1, 12, 13}

Qualifying controlling-principal / board-member channel: Gilles Labbé

Gilles Labbé is a current CGI director and a member of CGI’s Audit and Risk Management Committee; CGI describes him as Executive Chairman of Héroux-Devtek, and Héroux-Devtek’s own biography says he was its President/CEO from 2000 to 2019 and remains Executive Chairman.^{21, 22} [pre-2020] While Labbé was Héroux-Devtek CEO, IAI-LAHAV awarded Héroux-Devtek’s Progressive unit a ten-year contract on 15 May 2008 to manufacture more than 50 aluminium and titanium structural detail components - including spars, ribs and fitting assemblies - for IAI production of F-15 and F-16 structural assemblies.²³ The release stated an initial approximately US$1 million purchase order, possible total value above US$10–12 million, and a contract end in December 2018.²³

Expansion evidence on ownership and programme continuity. [pre-2020] The ownership chain materially narrows attribution after the award. Héroux-Devtek announced on 31 August 2012 that it had completed the sale of substantially all of its Aerostructure and Industrial Products operations to Precision Castparts Corp.; the sold assets included the Arlington, Texas aerostructure manufacturing site.²⁴ Precision Castparts’ own July 2012 acquisition announcement specifically identified Progressive Machine in Arlington among the aerostructures operations being acquired.²⁵ Current 2026 PCC Aerostructures material likewise describes Progressive as previously part of Héroux-Devtek and now operating within the PCC Aerostructures ADI group.²⁶ Accordingly, while the May 2008 IAI award occurred during Labbé’s tenure at Héroux-Devtek, Progressive ceased to be a Héroux-Devtek business in August 2012. No public evidence identified that Héroux-Devtek or Labbé controlled Progressive’s performance, annual purchase orders or deliveries after that divestment.^{24, 25, 26}

Examiner question 1 - renewal, extension or follow-on after December 2018. No public evidence identified. The 2008 announcement said the agreement continued through December 2018 and contemplated future purchase orders on an annual basis.²³ Targeted expansion searches of Héroux-Devtek, Progressive/PCC and IAI records did not identify a primary announcement, procurement record, purchase order or contract notice renewing or extending that specific F-15/F-16 structural-component agreement after December 2018. An undated PCC recruitment page that remained publicly retrievable during the October 2026 research lists IAI among Progressive’s well-known customers, but supplies no platform, contract number, purchase-order number, product, date or performance period; it therefore does not establish a follow-on to the 2008 agreement.²⁷

Examiner question 2 - actual final delivery or termination. No public evidence identified of a final-delivery certificate, contract-closeout record, termination notice, final purchase order or IAI/PCC announcement documenting the actual physical completion of the 2008 programme.^{23, 24, 25} The identified primary-era announcement establishes only the published contractual term through December 2018.²³ Because Progressive was transferred to PCC in August 2012, any subsequent performance by the Arlington operation during the remaining published term would have occurred under PCC ownership; the reviewed sale records do not identify the IAI contract individually or disclose the allocation or completion of its remaining obligations.^{24, 25} Accordingly, references in this audit to the agreement having “ended by its stated term” mean that the published contractual term expired in December 2018; they are not evidence of a separately documented final delivery or formal termination.

Examiner question 3 - residual installed, supported or supplied use after 2018. No public evidence identified tracing the specific component set from the 2008 agreement by part number, serial number, shipset, aircraft tail number, installed base, spares/support agreement or post-2018 purchase order.²³ PCC currently describes Progressive as a producer of spars, fuselage and wing components and sub-assemblies, but does not identify the 2008 agreement’s component set, downstream installed base, spares, programme dates or delivery volumes.²⁶ The PCC recruitment page naming IAI among Progressive customers likewise lacks platform and timing detail.²⁷ General longevity of the F-15/F-16 fleets or continuing IAI production therefore does not establish that components delivered under the 2008 agreement remained installed, supported, replaced or newly supplied after 2018.

That 2008–2018 award is a Héroux-Devtek/IAI contract, not a CGI Inc. contract.²³ Its stated term ended before the 19 July 2024 ICJ advisory opinion and the 21 November 2024 ICC warrants, and no extension of that specific contract was identified in the reviewed evidence.^{28, 29, 23}

Qualifying board-member channel: Sophie Brochu

Sophie Brochu is a current CGI director and also sits on CAE’s board, which she joined in 2023.^{21, 30} [pre-2020] Elbit Systems stated in November 2016 that it had completed delivery of the Israeli Air Force M-346 Lavi Ground Based Training System center and that Elbit, as prime contractor, developed and delivered the center together with Alenia Aermacchi, CAE and Selex ES.³¹ Elbit stated that the system was selected to qualify IAF pilots and Weapon Systems Operators to progress to F-16, F-15 and F-35 aircraft and that its simulators modeled actual weapons systems and combat scenarios.³¹ This documented CAE participation predates Brochu’s 2023 CAE board appointment, so it is not attributed to Brochu personally and is not a CGI contract.^{30, 31} no public evidence identified in this audit that the specific 2016-documented work continued into her CAE board tenure.^{30, 31}

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

Military-installation services

No public evidence identified of CGI providing catering, fuel, waste, facilities maintenance or similar base services to IDF installations, detention centres or Israeli security facilities.^{12, 13} CGI’s current Army page does verify military sustainment activity - HIMARS/MLRS fielding, training and sustainment, plus wider FMS integration - but it does not identify Israel or an Israeli base.¹⁷

Geographic specificity

No verified CGI military-service performance location was identified in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights or the Negev.^{12, 13} CGI’s 2023 USSTRATCOM data-integration work is identified as being performed at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.¹⁹ The corresponding U.S. Department of Defense contract notice identifies CGI Federal’s USSTRATCOM award at US$49,681,780 and does not connect the CGI award to Israel.²⁰

Shipping, freight and port services

No public evidence identified of CGI providing shipping, freight-forwarding or port-handling services for Israeli military cargo or arms shipments.^{12, 13}

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

CGI’s own role

No public evidence identified that CGI Inc. or CGI Federal manufactures small arms, artillery hardware, armoured vehicles, drones, naval vessels, ammunition, explosives, propellants, warheads or munitions precursor materials.^{1, 17} CGI’s verified military role is principally digital/integration/service work.^{17, 18, 19}

CGI nevertheless has verified software/integration involvement around weapons and strategic military missions outside Israel: current CGI material describes HIMARS/MLRS fielding and sustainment, tactical C2 and long-range precision-rocket/missile FMS integration, while the 2012 CECOM award covered artillery-support C4ISR software.^{17, 18} In 2023 USSTRATCOM awarded CGI Federal a five-year contract to develop and maintain data-integration hardware, systems and software in its Global Data Integration environment.^{19, 20} None of those sources names Israel as the end-user of CGI’s work.^{17, 18, 19, 20}

A current 2026 USAspending record also shows a Defense Finance and Accounting Service award to CGI Federal for enterprise funds-distribution software and cloud modernization.³² That is military-administration IT, not a purpose-built kinetic system under the audit’s domain boundary, and the record does not identify an Israeli end-user.³²

Principal-associated military platforms

[pre-2020] The strongest Israel-specific military-platform evidence connected to a current CGI board member is the separate Héroux-Devtek/IAI F-15/F-16 structural-component contract during Gilles Labbé’s CEO tenure, stated to run through December 2018.^{22, 23} [pre-2020] CAE’s separate participation in the Elbit-led IAF M-346 ground-based training system, documented by Elbit in 2016, is also Israel-specific military-program evidence, but it predates Sophie Brochu’s CAE directorship and is not attributable to CGI.^{30, 31}

Expansion clarification. Progressive, the actual supplier named in the 2008 IAI agreement, left Héroux-Devtek ownership when the Arlington aerostructures operation was sold to Precision Castparts in August 2012.^{24, 25, 26} The remaining published contract period from that divestment through December 2018 therefore cannot be treated as continuing Héroux-Devtek ownership or control merely because the agreement had originally been awarded while Labbé was CEO. No public evidence identified of a post-2018 renewal of that specific programme.^{23, 24, 25, 26, 27}

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

Export-licence decisions

No public evidence identified of a government decision granting, denying, suspending or revoking an export licence for CGI Inc./CGI Federal products or services to an Israeli military/security end-user.^{12, 13}

Arms-embargo and sanctions compliance

No public evidence identified of an investigation, citation or enforcement action against CGI Inc. concerning arms embargo, defence-export-control or sanctions compliance involving Israel.^{12, 13}

Legal challenges and judicial review

No public evidence identified of a court action or judicial review against CGI Inc., CGI Federal or a government specifically concerning CGI defence supply to Israel.^{12, 13}

Constructive-notice timing

The ICJ delivered its advisory opinion on the legal consequences arising from Israel’s policies and practices in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, on 19 July 2024.²⁸ The ICC announced arrest warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant on 21 November 2024 in the Situation in the State of Palestine.²⁹ No verified direct CGI Inc./CGI Federal Israeli military or settlement-linked activity was identified that could be shown from the reviewed evidence to have continued after either date.^{12, 13, 28, 29} The identified Héroux-Devtek/IAI contract ended by its stated term in 2018.²³ The separate CAE participation in the IAF M-346 ground-based training system documented in 2016 predates Sophie Brochu’s CAE board service, and this audit did not establish continuation of that specific work after 2023.^{30, 31}

The primary transaction records establish the transfer of the historical supplier from Héroux-Devtek to PCC in August 2012.^{24, 25} The undated PCC customer profile mentions IAI among customers but does not establish a continuing F-15/F-16 programme or trace the specific component set after the transfer.²⁷ No reviewed programme-specific primary record establishes a post-2018 continuation or residual installed-base contribution attributable to CGI, Héroux-Devtek or Gilles Labbé. This is a bounded evidence gap, not proof that the delivered components were removed or ceased to function.^{23, 24, 25, 26, 27}

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

UN, NGO and academic scrutiny

The 2025 OHCHR settlement-business database update does not provide a target match for CGI Inc. in the reviewed text, and the reviewed text of A/HRC/59/23 likewise did not identify CGI Inc. as a named company.^{12, 13} Targeted searches were also run against Who Profits, AFSC Investigate, Al-Haq, PAX, Don’t Buy Into Occupation, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch; no public evidence identified in those searches of a target-specific report alleging CGI Inc. military/security supply to Israel or settlement activity. The result is treated as a searched absence, not as evidence that every NGO archive is complete or fully indexed.^{12, 13}

Boycott and divestment campaigns

No public evidence identified of an organised boycott, divestment or institutional-exclusion campaign specifically targeting CGI Inc. for Israeli defence-sector activity.^{12, 13} Campaign material concerning other firms was not transferred to CGI merely because a current CGI director also serves on another company’s board.^{21, 30}

Corporate response and policy statements

No public evidence identified of CGI announcing an Israel-defence contract termination, Israel-specific military end-use restriction, Israel-specific defence divestment, or policy change in response to civil-society pressure.^{3, 12, 13} The reviewed Panaya and CyberArk relationships are enterprise-technology relationships and do not by themselves establish a military end-use requiring such a response.^{14, 16}