CGI ECONOMIC

Request ID: 70619b9c-9a20-4b06-aa1d-8a77f50e4b8d Evidence cut-off: 8 October 2026 Target: CGI Inc. (cgi.com)

Scope, identity separation and authoritative checks

CGI Inc. is the Canadian IT and business consulting/services company founded in Québec City in 1976; its current SEC filings identify Québec as its jurisdiction and Montréal as its principal executive-office location, and CGI’s 29 July 2026 results identify Tim Hurlebaus as President and CEO.^{1, 2, 3, 4} The Israeli business CGI GROUP at cgi.co.il states that it was founded in 1989 and is led by founder/CEO Zvika Nave; it is a different entity, and none of that company’s intelligence, security, political or Israeli-operating facts are attributed here to CGI Inc.⁵

The 26 September 2025 OHCHR business-enterprise update A/HRC/60/19 and its annex were reviewed by exact target name; CGI was not found in the reviewed material.^{6, 7} The 2025 UN publication page for Special Rapporteur report A/HRC/59/23 was likewise checked and did not surface CGI by name.⁸ These are searched absences, not proof that CGI has no indirect exposure through customers, suppliers, counterparties or third-party investment vehicles.^{6, 7, 8}

CGI’s own history records that its 2010 Stanley acquisition expanded its U.S. federal defense/intelligence footprint, and current CEO Tim Hurlebaus’s profile records prior leadership of CGI Federal and U.S. federal civilian, defense and intelligence business.^{1, 9, 10} No public evidence was identified in the reviewed target-specific searches or reviewed current CGI disclosure/entity materials of a CGI contract with the IDF, Israeli Ministry of Defense, Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael, Israeli police/security bodies, a settlement council or a settlement business.^{3, 11, 12} Generic U.S. defense work is therefore kept separate from an Israeli military or surveillance nexus.^{9, 10}

Israeli-Nexus factual checks

Supply Chain & Sourcing Relationships

Direct supplier relationships

No public evidence identified of CGI Inc. or the reviewed controlled subsidiaries having direct agricultural sourcing relationships with Mehadrin, Hadiklaim, Galilee Export, Agrexco successors or another Israeli produce exporter. CGI’s current corporate disclosures describe an IT/services group rather than a produce-retail supply chain, and the reviewed subsidiary/entity disclosures do not identify an Israeli sourcing subsidiary.^{3, 11}

A separate historical technology relationship was identified in predecessor records. [pre-2020] In December 2005, seven years before CGI acquired Logica, an RNS announcement said LogicaCMG was prime contractor for an Optus deployment using Adamind MediaSpire software and described Adamind as having an R&D centre in Israel.¹⁴ The relationship’s status after CGI’s 2012 Logica acquisition is unknown; the source does not establish that CGI acquired Adamind, owned its Israeli R&D centre or continued the arrangement.^{15, 14}

Importer-of-record structure

No public evidence identified of CGI using a wholly owned subsidiary, joint venture or dedicated import entity as importer of record for Israeli or settlement-origin agricultural/consumer goods.^{3, 11} The current principal-subsidiary and Binding Corporate Rules lists reviewed do not identify an Israeli import entity.^{3, 11}

Seasonal sourcing patterns

No public evidence identified of recurring seasonal procurement by CGI from Israeli agricultural suppliers, including counter-seasonal produce windows.^{3, 11}

Third-party and indirect sourcing

No public evidence identified of Israeli-origin retail goods reaching CGI through distributors, resellers, white-label arrangements or private-label sourcing.^{3, 11} The verified [pre-2020] LogicaCMG–Adamind software relationship is a predecessor technology integration and is not evidence of retail-goods sourcing.¹⁴

Product Origin, Labeling & Regulatory Compliance

Settlement-origin products

No public evidence identified that CGI sold, imported or distributed products labeled “Produce of Israel” that were reported or confirmed as originating in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Jordan Valley or Golan Heights.^{6, 7} CGI’s name was not found in the reviewed 2025 OHCHR business-enterprise materials.^{6, 7}

Labeling compliance

No public evidence identified of a customs, consumer-protection, DEFRA-equivalent or other regulatory enforcement action against CGI concerning country-of-origin labeling for settlement-produced goods.^{3, 11} No reviewed CGI disclosure described a settlement-origin product-labeling compliance programme.^{3, 11}

Corporate labeling / occupied-territory sourcing policy

No public evidence identified of a CGI corporate policy specifically governing sourcing or labeling of goods from Israeli settlements or other occupied/contested territories.^{3, 11} A separate Texas procurement representation concerning boycott of Israel is documented below; it is not a country-of-origin labeling policy.^{16, 17}

Investment, Capital & Financial Exposure

Foreign direct investment

No public evidence identified of a CGI-owned factory, data centre, logistics hub, real-estate asset or controlled operating company in Israel or the occupied Palestinian territories.^{3, 11, 12} CGI’s 2025 Annual Information Form lists its principal wholly owned subsidiaries by jurisdiction without an Israeli entity, its March 2025 Binding Corporate Rules list likewise does not list Israel, and its current locations page did not list an Israel office when reviewed.^{3, 11, 12} The AIF’s principal-subsidiary table is expressly not exhaustive, so the finding is limited to the public evidence reviewed.³

Acquired Israeli subsidiaries / controlling stakes

No public evidence identified of a current Israeli operating company acquired by CGI or held under a controlling CGI stake.^{3, 11, 12} [pre-2020] CGI’s 2012 acquisition of Logica was an acquisition of the Anglo-Dutch Logica group for £1.7 billion plus assumed net debt; the transaction source does not describe Logica as an Israeli company.^{1, 15} [pre-2020] The 2005 Adamind relationship was a LogicaCMG technology partnership and does not establish ownership by Logica or later CGI.¹⁴

R&D and innovation centres

No public evidence identified of a CGI-owned R&D or innovation centre in Israel.^{11, 12} [pre-2020] Adamind’s Israeli R&D centre was identified in the 2005 third-party announcement, but the same source describes Adamind as LogicaCMG’s consortium/technology partner, not a Logica-owned facility; continuation after CGI acquired Logica is unknown.¹⁴

Parent and beneficial ownership flows

CGI Inc. is a Québec-incorporated parent with Montréal principal executive offices.^{2, 3} As of 1 December 2025, CGI’s proxy identified Serge Godin as the only disclosed person at or above the 10% beneficial-ownership/control threshold, with 11.25% of total equity and 55.62% of all voting rights.¹³ no public evidence identified in the reviewed disclosures of an Israeli controlling shareholder or Israeli parent above CGI Inc.¹³

No public evidence identified of a material direct Israeli operating-company investment by Serge Godin or the Godin Family Foundation in the reviewed public records.¹³ CGI’s proxy describes the Foundation’s general charitable activities but does not identify an Israel-specific investment.¹³ This is a searched public-record absence and does not establish the contents of undisclosed private portfolios.¹³

Portfolio and fund exposure

No public evidence identified that CGI Inc. itself publicly disclosed holdings in Israeli sovereign bonds, Israel Bonds, an Israel-focused investment fund, an Israeli arms manufacturer or an OHCHR-listed settlement company as a corporate portfolio asset.^{3, 13, 6, 7} Third-party funds that happen to hold both CGI shares and Israeli issuers were not treated as CGI’s own holdings; CGI’s own reviewed filing and proxy disclosures were the attribution boundary used for corporate portfolio claims.^{3, 13}

Financing the State

No public evidence identified of CGI underwriting or lead-arranging Israeli sovereign debt or war bonds, selling Israel Bonds, providing a disclosed direct lending/trade-finance facility to an Israeli defense prime or an OHCHR-listed enterprise, or underwriting Israeli state/military/settlement insurance.^{3, 13, 6, 7} The reviewed filings describe CGI as an IT/services group, not a financial-sector underwriter or asset manager.³

Current U.S. consular-services / data-processing channel

CGI states that its visa and international-credentials work supports more than 60 U.S. consular sections and millions of visa applications, while its CGI Atlas360 description includes appointment scheduling, fee processing, call-centre support, document delivery and related consular functions.^{18, 19} USTravelDocs’ privacy statement says the U.S. Department of State contracted CGI Federal Inc. to assist with collection and processing of visa-applicant information, including personal and biometric data, and permits necessary sharing with subcontractors, vendors and suppliers.²⁰

The U.S. Department of State’s Embassy Jerusalem immigrant-visa page, last updated 14 September 2026, directs applicants to the Israel-locale USTravelDocs service for appointment functions and gives Jerusalem/West Bank-specific applicant and medical instructions.²¹ Read together, these sources establish a current U.S.-government consular service/data-processing channel connected to the Jerusalem post, not an Israeli-government contract or CGI Israeli legal entity.^{18, 19, 20, 21} no public evidence identified in these sources of an Israeli CGI subcontractor, an Israel-specific CGI contract value, or physical data hosting in Israel.^{18, 19, 20, 21}

A State Department notice dated 27 February 2026 separately discussed visa-service disruption at the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem and Branch Office in Tel Aviv while those posts remained part of the visa process.²² CGI’s 22 October 2024 announcement of three GSS 2.0 task orders identified 25 countries across Europe and Asia and a combined potential value of US$137.3 million, but it did not identify Israel; that value is therefore not attributed here to Israel or Jerusalem.²³

Operational Presence & Market Activity

Physical footprint

No current CGI office in Israel was identified on CGI’s official locations page reviewed for this audit, and no Israeli CGI legal entity appears in the March 2025 Binding Corporate Rules entity list.^{11, 12} This does not negate the separate U.S.-government visa-service mechanism connected to the U.S. Embassy Jerusalem through USTravelDocs and CGI Federal.^{20, 21}

The Embassy Jerusalem page also contains instructions specific to applicants in the West Bank and lists medical-exam arrangements in Jerusalem and the West Bank.²¹ Those facts concern applicant geography and U.S. consular processing; the cited material does not establish that CGI has an office, customer or commercial operation in an Israeli settlement.²¹

Employment and tax contribution

No public evidence identified of CGI’s Israel-specific employee headcount, payroll, Israeli tax registration, tax payments or Preferred Technology Enterprise status.^{2, 3, 11, 12} The reviewed current entity/location materials do not identify an Israeli CGI entity or office from which such figures could be derived.^{11, 12}

Market positioning and revenue

No Israel-specific revenue amount or Israel reporting segment was identified in CGI’s FY2025 Annual Information Form.³ The filing reports geographic/operating segments such as Canada, U.S. Federal, U.S. Commercial and State, and several European regions, but does not separately present Israel as a disclosed reporting segment.³ no public evidence identified of CGI characterising Israel in the reviewed annual disclosure as a strategic growth market, regional hub or material standalone market.³

State / government customer activity relevant to the geography

The verified current Jerusalem mechanism is work for the U.S. Department of State, not evidence of an Israeli-government customer.^{20, 21} no public evidence identified in the reviewed target-specific searches or reviewed current CGI disclosure/entity materials of a direct CGI contract with the Israeli government, IDF, Ministry of Defense, Israeli police/security services or a settlement authority.^{3, 11, 12}

[pre-2020] The State Department service lineage predates the current arrangement: in September 2010, Stanley - by then a wholly owned CGI Federal subsidiary - received a US$9.2 million Global Support Strategy task order under a contract with a US$2.8 billion ceiling for visa-processing work at specified Asian posts.²⁴ That historical source does not identify Israel, and its task-specific status is historical/unknown rather than evidence of a current Israeli contract.²⁴

Corporate Structure & Foundational Ties

Founding and incorporation history

CGI was founded in Québec City in June 1976 by Serge Godin and André Imbeau.¹ Its 2025 Annual Information Form states that CGI Inc. was incorporated under Québec law on 29 September 1981 and continued the original business begun in 1976.³ no public evidence identified of Israeli founding or original Israeli incorporation.^{1, 3}

Headquarters and domicile

CGI’s current SEC filing identifies Québec, Canada, as the jurisdiction and Montréal as the principal executive-office location.² No dual or legacy Israeli headquarters was identified in CGI’s current entity, location or annual-disclosure materials.^{3, 11, 12}

Acquisition lineage and attribution limits

[pre-2020] CGI completed the Logica acquisition in August 2012 for £1.7 billion and assumed Logica net debt; CGI’s history characterises Logica as Anglo-Dutch.^{1, 15} The verified 2005 LogicaCMG–Adamind Israel-R&D relationship predates that acquisition by seven years and has unknown continuation into CGI ownership.¹⁴

[pre-2020] CGI completed the Stanley acquisition in August 2010, after which Stanley became part of CGI Federal and expanded CGI’s U.S. federal, defense and intelligence footprint.^{1, 10} That lineage is evidence of U.S. federal capability, not by itself of Israeli defense activity.^{9, 10}

[pre-2020] CGI’s May 2004 AMS acquisition announcement states that AMS became wholly owned by CGI while the U.S. assets of the AMS Defense and Intelligence Group were concurrently purchased by CACI.²⁵ Those divested U.S. defense/intelligence assets are therefore not attributed to post-acquisition CGI.²⁵

State and institutional linkages

No public evidence identified of Israeli state ownership in CGI, an Israeli government-appointed CGI director, or designation of CGI as Israeli critical national infrastructure.^{2, 3, 13} CGI does have extensive U.S. public-sector contracting, including the State Department visa work described above.^{18, 19, 20, 23}

Texas DIR lists CGI Technologies and Solutions Inc. as the vendor on active contract DIR-CPO-6079, with a start date of 30 October 2025.¹⁶ The associated RFO states that, by executing the contract, the respondent represents and warrants that it does not and will not boycott Israel during the contract term and provides a corresponding subcontractor certification.¹⁷ This is a Texas procurement-law representation made in connection with a CGI contract; the cited documents do not establish an Israeli investment, purchase, sale or tax contribution.^{16, 17}

Structural governance features

CGI’s 2025 proxy states that Serge Godin controlled 55.62% of the voting rights as of 1 December 2025 through CGI’s share structure.¹³ no public evidence identified in the reviewed governance materials of an Israeli state golden share, Israeli government veto, Israeli founder-control mechanism or charter provision tying CGI’s mission to Israeli state policy.¹³

Profit Repatriation & Economic Contribution

Revenue attribution

No public Israel-specific revenue amount was identified in CGI’s FY2025 Annual Information Form.³ The current consular-service evidence shows a U.S. federal service channel connected to Jerusalem, but the reviewed CGI and State Department materials do not allocate contract revenue to Israel or Jerusalem.^{18, 19, 20, 21, 23}

Profit flows

No public evidence identified from the reviewed filings of profits generated by an Israeli CGI subsidiary being repatriated to Canada, because no current Israeli CGI operating subsidiary was identified in the reviewed entity/location disclosures.^{3, 11, 12} Likewise, no public evidence identified that CGI’s global profits flow into Israel through Israeli-domiciled controlling ownership.¹³

Economic ecosystem role

No public evidence identified of an Israeli government or industry body designating CGI as a key Israeli employer, national sector anchor, critical-infrastructure provider or dominant domestic market participant.^{3, 11, 12} No Israel-specific workforce or tax contribution was identified.^{3, 11, 12}

Cross-cutting attribution, timing and settlement checks

Controlling principals

CGI’s 2025 proxy identifies Serge Godin as its disclosed controlling shareholder at the relevant threshold and describes the Godin Family Foundation’s broad charitable activity.¹³ no public evidence identified in the reviewed sources of a material direct Israeli company investment, Israel-focused family-office vehicle or Israel-specific corporate investment by Godin or the Foundation.¹³ No such activity is inferred from absence of disclosure.

Constructive-notice dates

The International Court of Justice issued its advisory opinion in case 186 on 19 July 2024.²⁶ The International Criminal Court announced arrest warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant on 21 November 2024.²⁷ The Embassy Jerusalem/USTravelDocs service linkage is documented in sources current through September 2026, after both dates.^{20, 21} The Texas DIR contract began on 30 October 2025 and therefore also post-dates both events.^{16, 17} This timing statement does not convert either U.S. visa processing or the Texas procurement representation into evidence of settlement or military support.^{20, 21, 16, 17}

Settlement nexus

No public evidence identified of CGI maintaining a settlement office, sourcing settlement goods, selling a documented service to a settlement municipality/business, listing settlement properties, financing a settlement enterprise, or operating a settlement-specific distribution channel.^{6, 7} CGI was not found by exact target-name search in the reviewed 2025 OHCHR business-enterprise update and annex.^{6, 7}

The Embassy Jerusalem visa instructions refer to West Bank residents, Palestinian identity documentation and medical-exam arrangements.²¹ These references establish applicant geography in a U.S. consular process, not a CGI commercial presence in settlements.²¹

Targeted economic addendum - 9 October 2026

1. CGI–CyberArk: what commercial mechanism is actually established?

CyberArk’s 13 February 2024 announcement named CGI Global Managed Service Protection Partner of the Year for 2023 and also named CGI among its Canada regional award recipients; CyberArk said its partner awards assessed matters including revenue contribution, adoption of CyberArk solutions and certifications, but disclosed no CGI-specific amount or contract term.²⁸

CGI’s 2024 Canada cybersecurity buyer guide separately places CyberArk in CGI’s “Security Alliances” ecosystem and says CGI uses partners’ cloud and on-premises solutions in customer security offerings, while describing CGI managed-detection-and-response services elsewhere in the same guide.²⁹

Taken together, those primary records establish a managed-security / systems-integration partner context in which CGI could deliver services using CyberArk technology, but they do not establish whether CGI bought licences for itself or customers, acted as reseller of record, received referral or resale margin, paid or received revenue share, subcontracted to CyberArk, or operated under another specific billing mechanism.^{28, 29}

No public evidence identified in the reviewed primary material discloses a CGI-specific master agreement, purchase order, licence-of-record clause, reseller margin, referral commission, revenue-share percentage, subcontract, invoicing route or payment direction for CyberArk.^{28, 29}

2. CGI–CyberArk: continuation after the 2023 award and through October 2026

The CGI guide shows that CyberArk remained represented in CGI’s Security Alliances material in 2024, after the 2023 award period.²⁹

Palo Alto Networks completed its acquisition of CyberArk on 11 February 2026, and its current Idira page states that Idira is built on CyberArk’s legacy and that existing CyberArk customers can continue using the platform under the new branding.^{30, 31}

The previously cited CGI Njoyn vacancies are therefore not used here as proof of 2026 continuity, and no independently retrievable current primary record identified in this review names CGI as a CyberArk/Idira partner after the February 2026 acquisition; CGI-specific continuity through 9 October 2026 is consequently unverified rather than established.^{29, 30}

3. CGI–CyberArk: payments, licence flows, scale and duration

CyberArk’s award release says its 2023 partner program had its highest percentage of partner-assisted business to date and that revenue contribution was one award criterion, but it gives no CGI-specific revenue, payment, customer, licence, subscription or contract quantity.²⁸

No public evidence identified in the reviewed primary sources establishes CGI-specific payments to CyberArk or Palo Alto Networks, payments in the opposite direction, licence/subscription quantities, resale revenue, referral revenue, customer volumes, minimum commitments, contract value, currency, renewal terms, enterprise scale or duration.^{28, 29, 30}

4. Current CGI–NiCE relationship

NiCE’s current 2026 business-partner finder lists CGI as a business partner.³²

NiCE’s 360 Partner Program describes multiple commercial partner models - including solution partners, global system integrators and communication service providers - so a directory listing alone does not identify which model applies to CGI.³³

The live CGI entry does not state the NiCE products covered, whether CGI resells or merely implements/supports them, who buys licences from whom, whether leads or referral fees are involved, payment direction, revenue sharing, contract value, start date, minimum duration or geographic scope.^{32, 33}

Accordingly, the defensible current finding is partner status, not a specific resale, licensing, referral or managed-service payment mechanism.^{32, 33}

5. Israeli economic footprint during the confirmed relationships

CyberArk’s 2024 Form 20-F reports 3,793 employees and subcontractors at 31 December 2024, including 1,062 in Israel, and states that research and development was conducted primarily in Israel, while also describing Israeli Innovation Authority-supported activity and Israeli preferred-technology tax treatment.³⁴

Palo Alto Networks’ FY2026 Form 10-K states that its business operations and employee base in Israel meaningfully expanded as a result of the CyberArk acquisition and that it intended to continue growing its presence there.³⁵

Those records establish a material Israeli operating, R&D, employment and tax-linked footprint at the CyberArk supplier group during the period relevant to the CGI relationship, but they do not trace any CGI-specific payment to an Israeli entity, project, payroll or tax receipt.^{28, 29, 35, 34}

NICE Ltd.’s 2025 Form 20-F states that it is organized in Israel, identifies Ra’anana as its principal executive-office location, describes an approximately 148,000-square-foot Israeli headquarters, and says R&D is conducted primarily in Israel, India and the United States with some programs supported by the Israel Innovation Authority.³⁶

The same filing describes Israeli preferred-technology tax programs; this addendum does not assign a commencement date or infer a CGI-specific tax receipt from those general disclosures.³⁶

NiCE’s current CGI partner listing therefore coexists with a material Israeli headquarters, R&D and tax footprint, but no public evidence identified allocates CGI-related NiCE licence, service or partner revenue specifically to Israeli operations, payroll, R&D or tax receipts.^{32, 36}

6. Other comparable CGI relationships: Check Point, Radware and SentinelOne

CGI’s 2024 Canada Security Alliances grid explicitly displays Check Point, Radware and SentinelOne alongside CyberArk, so the earlier statement that no comparable SentinelOne evidence was found was incorrect.²⁹

CGI’s current global alliances directory also lists Radware, providing current primary evidence that CGI still publicly presents Radware as an alliance relationship in 2026, although the directory supplies no CGI–Radware contract terms, product scope, licence mechanics, payment direction, customer volumes or financial scale.³⁷

Radware Ltd. is incorporated in Israel, has its principal offices in Tel Aviv and states that its principal manufacturing and R&D facilities are in Israel; at 31 December 2025 it reported 581 of 1,296 employees and subcontractors located in Israel.³⁸

The combination of CGI’s current alliance listing and Radware’s filing therefore establishes a current CGI alliance-directory relationship with an Israeli-incorporated vendor having substantial Israeli operations, but not a measurable CGI-specific payment flow into Israel.^{38, 37}

Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. is incorporated in Israel, identifies Tel Aviv as its headquarters and Israel as the location of its principal R&D facilities, and reported 2,944 of 6,825 employees in Israel at 31 December 2025.³⁹

CGI’s 2024 guide confirms the dated CGI–Check Point alliance representation, but no independently retrievable 2026 CGI-specific primary record identified in this review establishes that the same relationship remained active at the 9 October 2026 cut-off or discloses its payment mechanics or scale.^{29, 39}

SentinelOne, Inc. is a Delaware-incorporated U.S. parent headquartered in Mountain View, California, not an Israeli-incorporated parent, while its FY2026 Form 10-K says R&D employees are located primarily in Israel, India and the Czech Republic and describes a Tel Aviv office and Israeli subsidiary/tax matters.⁴⁰

CGI’s 2024 guide therefore establishes a dated CGI–SentinelOne alliance representation with a U.S.-incorporated vendor that has substantial Israeli R&D operations, but no independently retrievable 2026 CGI-specific primary record identified in this review establishes continuation, a current agreement or CGI-specific payments.^{29, 40}

For the bounded correction to question 6, Radware is the additional relationship for which current 2026 CGI primary evidence was identified; Check Point and SentinelOne are confirmed in CGI’s 2024 guide but their CGI-specific 2026 continuation remains unverified on the primary evidence reviewed.^{29, 37}