CGI

Key Findings

• Economic: NiCE’s current partner directory lists CGI as a business partner; NiCE is Israeli-organized, headquartered in Ra’anana, and reports substantial R&D and tax-linked operations in Israel. CGI also currently lists Israeli-incorporated Radware among its alliances, although the audits found no CGI-specific payment flows or contract values attributable to Israel.^{1, 2, 3, 4}
• Political: CGI publicly mobilized US$1 million in humanitarian support for Ukrainians in 2022, while the audit found no comparable CGI corporate statement or humanitarian mobilization for Gaza or Palestinian civilians through the October 2026 cut-off. The audit treats this as a documented communications contrast and does not infer motive from silence.⁵
• Military: The strongest Israel-specific military evidence is historical and indirect: while current CGI director Gilles Labbé was CEO of Héroux-Devtek, its Progressive unit received a 2008 IAI-LAHAV contract for F-15/F-16 structural components. Progressive was sold in 2012, the published contract term ended in 2018, and no post-2018 renewal or residual CGI/Héroux-Devtek contribution was established.^{6, 7, 8, 9}
• Not found: No public evidence identified of a direct CGI Inc./CGI Federal contract with the IDF or Israeli Ministry of Defense, a CGI Israeli settlement operation, Project Nimbus participation, or verified CGI technology provision to an Israeli state or military customer.^{10, 11, 12}

Target Profile

Key Facts:

• CGI’s reviewed current corporate materials did not identify an Israeli principal subsidiary or official Israeli office; the subsidiary disclosure is not exhaustive, and a Red Hat partner page separately labeled Israel as an office country without identifying an address or legal entity.^{10, 19, 20, 21}
• The Israeli company using the name “CGI Group” at cgi.co.il is a separate business. Its Israeli security and intelligence activities are not attributed to CGI Inc.^{10, 22}
• Exact-name checks of the reviewed 2025 OHCHR settlement-business materials and A/HRC/59/23 did not identify CGI Inc. as a named enterprise.^{11, 12}

Executive Summary

CGI Inc. is a Canadian information-technology and consulting group headquartered in Montréal. The four audited domains do not establish a direct CGI corporate military, surveillance, settlement or government-contract presence in Israel. The strongest current Israel-related evidence is economic: NiCE’s current partner finder names CGI as a business partner, while NiCE is organized and headquartered in Israel and reports material Israeli R&D and tax-linked operations. CGI’s current alliances directory also lists Radware, an Israeli-incorporated vendor with substantial Israeli operations.^{1, 2, 3, 4} The audits did not establish CGI-specific payment direction, partner revenue, licence volume, contract value, or a measurable allocation of these relationships to Israeli payroll, R&D or tax receipts.

A further current geographic connection arises through CGI Federal’s work for the U.S. Department of State. USTravelDocs identifies CGI Federal as the contractor assisting with collection and processing of visa-applicant information, while current U.S. government materials direct applicants associated with the Jerusalem post to that service and contain Jerusalem and West Bank-specific instructions.^{15, 16} This establishes a U.S.-government service channel connected to the geography. It does not establish an Israeli-government contract, an Israeli CGI legal entity, settlement operations or Israeli data hosting.

The military record is materially weaker and historical. In 2008, while current CGI director Gilles Labbé was CEO of Héroux-Devtek, Israel Aerospace Industries’ LAHAV division awarded Héroux-Devtek’s Progressive unit a ten-year contract for more than 50 aluminium and titanium structural components used in IAI production of F-15 and F-16 assemblies.^{6, 9} Progressive was sold to Precision Castparts in August 2012, and the published contract term ran only through December 2018.^{7, 8} The audit found no public evidence of a post-2018 renewal, identifiable residual supply, spares, support, installed-base contribution or continuing control attributable to CGI, Héroux-Devtek or Labbé. It was never a CGI contract.

The digital audit similarly did not establish a qualifying Israeli-state or military nexus. CGI has documented relationships with Israeli-origin technology firms and historically managed a Glasgow City Council CCTV software chain involving Qognify/NICE-origin applications, but the reviewed evidence did not establish Israeli data routing, Israeli-government access, facial-recognition deployment by CGI, Project Nimbus participation or CGI provision of surveillance, AI or offensive-cyber capability to Israeli state actors.^{23, 24, 25, 26}

Politically, the audited evidence supports a narrower finding. CGI publicly announced US$1 million in employee/company humanitarian support for Ukrainians in 2022, while targeted searches found no comparable corporate statement or humanitarian mobilization for Gaza or Palestinian civilians.⁵ The Political audit expressly treats this as a communications comparison and does not infer motive. With the separately verified economic nexus, the vetted methodology assigned this posture Political 2.50. Together with Economic 3.50, zero present Military and zero Digital, the fixed result is Complicity Index score 306 - Tier D (Moderate Complicity).

Timeline of Relevant Events

Corporate Overview

CGI Inc. continues the Canadian IT-services business founded in Québec in 1976. Its SEC filings describe a Québec-incorporated parent headquartered in Montréal, operating directly and through subsidiaries including CGI Federal Inc. and CGI Technologies and Solutions Inc.¹⁰ The 2025 proxy identifies Serge Godin as the controlling shareholder through a multiple-voting share structure, with approximately 55.62% of voting rights as of 1 December 2025.¹³

The audits drew a strict entity boundary around CGI Inc. A separate Israeli company trading as CGI Group at cgi.co.il was excluded because no corporate ownership or control link to CGI Inc. was established. Its Israeli intelligence, security and personnel history therefore does not form part of this dossier.^{10, 22}

CGI’s reviewed official locations, principal-subsidiary disclosures and Binding Corporate Rules materials did not identify a current Israeli principal subsidiary or official office.^{10, 19, 20} These sources have limitations: the SEC principal-subsidiary table excludes some smaller entities, and the BCR material covers participating CGI entities rather than every possible legal entity. A Red Hat partner-catalog entry labeling Israel as a CGI office country was retained in the military audit as unresolved contrary evidence because it supplied neither an Israeli address nor an entity name.²¹

The present Israel-related commercial record instead runs primarily through vendor and alliance relationships. NiCE directly lists CGI as a current business partner.¹ NiCE is organized in Israel, headquartered in Ra’anana and reports substantial Israeli headquarters, R&D and tax-linked activity.² CGI’s current alliances directory also lists Radware, which is incorporated in Israel, maintains its principal offices and principal R&D facilities there, and reported 581 of 1,296 employees and subcontractors in Israel at the end of 2025.^{3, 4}

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

The governing military evidence is an indirect, historical board-member channel. Gilles Labbé is a current CGI director and previously served as Héroux-Devtek President and CEO. In May 2008, during his tenure, IAI-LAHAV awarded Héroux-Devtek’s Progressive unit a ten-year contract to manufacture more than 50 aluminium and titanium structural detail components, including spars, ribs and fitting assemblies, for IAI production of F-15 and F-16 structural assemblies.^{6, 9} The announced initial purchase order was approximately US$1 million, with potential total value above US$10–12 million and a stated term through December 2018.⁶

The vetted scoring treated the specialized physical aircraft components as sufficiently significant to support I=6.60. The current magnitude is nevertheless M=0.00 because the relevant supplier was divested and no current attributable activity was established. Héroux-Devtek sold the Progressive/Arlington aerostructures business to Precision Castparts in August 2012.^{7, 8} The audit found no programme-specific evidence of a post-2018 renewal, current spares/support activity or a traceable residual contribution attributable to CGI, Héroux-Devtek or Labbé. This is a bounded absence of documented attributable continuation, not proof that previously supplied components were removed or ceased to function.^{6, 7, 8} Proximity was fixed at P=5.50, reflecting the indirect connection through a present CGI director’s former executive role rather than a CGI contract. Labbé has been a CGI director since 2010 and remains Héroux-Devtek’s Executive Chairman, so the CGI board tenure overlapped the last two years of Progressive’s Héroux-Devtek ownership. That personnel overlap does not establish CGI ownership or control of the IAI programme.⁹

CGI itself does maintain significant military capability outside Israel. Its current U.S. Army materials describe work involving HIMARS/MLRS fielding, tactical command-and-control, training, sustainment and Foreign Military Sales integration.²⁹ Those records do not identify Israel as an end-user.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest defence is the temporal and corporate separation. The 2008 contract was between IAI-LAHAV and Héroux-Devtek’s Progressive operation, not CGI. Progressive left Héroux-Devtek ownership in 2012, six years before the published contract term ended.^{6, 7, 8} No post-2018 renewal, purchase order, final-delivery record, spares agreement or traceable installed-base support attributable to CGI, Héroux-Devtek or Labbé was identified.

No public evidence identified of a CGI Inc. or CGI Federal contract with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israel Prison Service or Border Police, nor of CGI supplying Israeli defence primes with military components or systems. The audits also found no CGI settlement-linked military infrastructure operation.^{11, 12} For those reasons the historical military evidence produces a zero present Military domain score despite its higher activity-type Impact assessment.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

CGI has several verified relationships with Israeli-origin or Israel-linked technology vendors, but the vetted Digital review found no qualifying Israeli-state, military or occupied-territory digital frame. CyberArk named CGI its 2023 Global Managed Service Protection Partner of the Year, and CGI’s 2024 cybersecurity guide placed CyberArk within its security-alliance ecosystem.^{27, 28} NiCE also currently lists CGI as a partner.¹

A more technically concrete deployment existed in Glasgow. Glasgow City Council’s 2023 internal audit described a public-space CCTV/PSIM environment using Situator and NiceVision, developed and managed by Qognify, with Qognify contractually managed by CGI.²³ A 2025 Scottish Information Commissioner decision recorded the Council’s evidence that its previous provider’s Qognify contract had been novated to CGI and that CGI was responsible for obtaining and maintaining relevant licences.²⁴

The lineage requires qualification. NICE sold its Physical Security business in 2015, and Hexagon later acquired Qognify and integrated it into its physical-security business.^{25, 26} The Glasgow deployment therefore carried NICE/Qognify technological lineage but was a UK municipal customer deployment rather than verified provision to Israel.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified that Glasgow CCTV data was stored, routed or processed in Israel, or that Israeli authorities had technical or legal access to it.^{23, 26} The primary Glasgow records did not establish facial-recognition or biometric-identification deployment. The audits likewise found no CGI participation in Project Nimbus, no Israeli sovereign-cloud or data-residency service, no offensive-cyber provision to Israeli actors and no CGI AI or autonomous-targeting system supplied to an Israeli military or security customer.

Glasgow’s general CGI ICT relationship was extended from 1 April 2025, but the reviewed record does not establish that the particular Qognify/NICE subcontract continued after that date.³⁰ The Gaza Genocide Emergency Committee ran a local campaign over the Glasgow CGI/Qognify chain; its stronger military/intelligence characterisation was not verified by the primary Council records. The narrower searched absence of a broader campaign specifically targeting CGI Inc./CGI Federal must not be described as absence of all relevant civil-society pressure.^{23, 24, 31}

Vendor origin alone was therefore not treated as a qualifying Digital outcome. CGI’s CyberArk, NiCE and other technology relationships establish commercial integration or partnership, but they do not establish an Israeli-state surveillance effect. The vetted result is I=0.00, M=0.00, P=0.00, Digital=0.00.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

The economic domain contains the strongest current nexus. NiCE’s current business-partner finder directly lists CGI.¹ NiCE’s 2025 Form 20-F establishes that the company is organized in Israel, headquartered in Ra’anana, maintains a substantial Israeli headquarters and conducts significant R&D in Israel, with Israeli Innovation Authority and tax-program linkages.²

That evidence supports the vetted I=3.50 for sustained trade. The scoring panel fixed M=7.00 because the documented relationship is current and sustained at the activity level; it did not require undisclosed transaction value to be invented. P=7.50 reflects a direct named partner relationship with an Israeli-organized company. At the same time, the audit expressly found no public evidence allocating CGI-related NiCE revenue to Israeli payroll, R&D, tax receipts or any specific Israeli entity.

Radware provides additional current corroborative economic context. CGI’s current alliances directory lists Radware, while Radware’s filing establishes Israeli incorporation, Tel Aviv principal offices, substantial Israeli R&D and a large Israeli workforce.^{3, 4} CGI’s 2024 cybersecurity guide also documented relationships with CyberArk, Check Point and SentinelOne.²⁸ For Check Point and SentinelOne, CGI-specific continuation into October 2026 was not independently verified. CyberArk’s 2026 acquisition by Palo Alto Networks similarly means the earlier CGI-CyberArk relationship should not be presented as independently confirmed current after the acquisition.

CGI Federal also supports U.S. consular visa processing. USTravelDocs identifies CGI Federal as the U.S. Department of State contractor assisting with collection and processing of applicant information, while the current Jerusalem post instructions connect that service with applicants in Jerusalem and the West Bank.^{15, 16} This is a U.S.-government commercial channel connected to the geography, not an Israeli-government contract.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

CGI’s own reviewed corporate disclosures did not identify an Israeli operating subsidiary, owned data centre, factory, logistics facility, investment asset or official office.^{10, 19, 20} No Israel-specific revenue segment, employee count, payroll or tax contribution was identified.

More importantly, the audits did not infer payment flows that public evidence does not disclose. The NiCE and Radware records establish partner/alliance status, but not whether CGI acts as reseller, implementer, referral partner or licence purchaser in any particular transaction; they disclose no CGI-specific revenue, payment direction, volume or contract value.^{1, 4}

No public evidence identified of CGI sourcing settlement goods, operating a settlement office, financing a settlement enterprise, contracting with a settlement municipality or appearing by exact target name in the reviewed 2025 OHCHR settlement-business database.¹¹ This materially limits the economic finding to documented commercial relationships with Israeli-linked technology companies and the separate U.S. consular-service channel.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

The governing political frame is the audited contrast in CGI’s public humanitarian communications. On 11 May 2022 CGI announced US$1 million in employee/company humanitarian support for Ukrainians and described cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross.⁵ Targeted searches through the October 2026 cut-off found no comparable CGI Inc. corporate statement or humanitarian-mobilization announcement for Gaza or Palestinian civilians.

The audit explicitly treats this as a communications comparison and does not infer intent from silence. Under the fixed V6.5 adjudication, the positive economic nexus means the target did not qualify for the rubric’s strict-neutrality treatment, and the documented contrast supported the Double Standard/Selective Silence band at I=2.50. The corporate-level posture remained current through the audit cut-off, supporting M=7.00 and P=9.00.

A separate political record exists in Texas procurement. CGI Technologies and Solutions Inc. entered active Texas DIR contract DIR-CPO-6079 beginning 30 October 2025.¹⁷ The associated terms require the successful respondent either to qualify for an exemption under the relevant Texas law or to certify that it does not and will not boycott Israel during the contract.¹⁸ The public package reviewed does not show which branch CGI relied upon.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The Ukraine/Gaza comparison establishes different public corporate responses, but not the reason for that difference. The audit found no CGI statement endorsing Israeli military action, settlement expansion or anti-Palestinian policies, and no public evidence of CGI corporate funding for the IDF, Friends of the IDF, settlement organizations or comparable military-welfare bodies.

CGI Norge’s June 2024 Transparency Act disclosure did discuss the Gaza Strip in a subsidiary-specific supply-chain assessment prompted by the Norwegian regulator. It said the then-current investigation did not indicate sourcing impact and called for continuing follow-up. This limits the political absence finding: it concerns comparable public Palestinian-civilian humanitarian mobilisation, not an absence of every CGI reference to Gaza or a conclusion about private motives.³²

The Texas provision likewise cannot be characterized as proof that CGI voluntarily adopted an ideological anti-BDS policy. The contract language contains an exemption-or-non-boycott alternative, and the reviewed public record does not establish which certification path CGI used.^{17, 18}

No public evidence identified of CGI lobbying for Israeli military aid, settlement policy or Israel-specific sanctions measures, or of its controlling principal and named senior leaders publicly campaigning against BDS. CGI was also not identified in the reviewed OHCHR settlement-business materials or the reviewed A/HRC/59/23 report.^{11, 12}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Complicity Index Score

Method: V6.5. The final scores below are the fixed human-vetted results.

• V_MAX: 3.50 Avg_OTHERS: 0.83
• Complicity Index score: 306 Tier: D (Moderate Complicity)

Economic drives V_MAX because the current NiCE relationship establishes the strongest sustained, directly documented Israel-linked activity, while Political contributes the audited corporate-communications contrast. Military falls to zero because its qualifying activity is historic with present Magnitude fixed at zero, and Digital has no qualifying frame. The method is scale-free and evidence-only: the vetted scores are based on activity type, scale and directness rather than company size or unverified allegations.

Methodology Note

• Evidence is restricted to findings established in the four audited domains. Allegations or associations not verified there are excluded.
• Impact measures the type and consequence of the documented activity; Magnitude measures its documented scale or persistence; Proximity measures how directly it is attributable to the target.
• Verified, concrete divestment or exit changes the current attributable relationship; no numerical time-decay formula is applied. Physical residual effects count where established, and absence of traced residual use is not proof of physical removal. Historical conduct is not treated as current merely because a past contract or product once existed.^{6, 7, 8}
• Entity attribution is bounded: subsidiaries, counterparties, directors and predecessor companies are attributed only where the audits establish the relevant corporate, temporal or governance link. There is no transitive guilt from an unrelated company, board role or technology vendor.
• Settlement operations, where verified, can engage both Economic and Political under the methodology. No qualifying CGI settlement operation was established in these audits.¹¹
• “No public evidence identified” is used where targeted checks found no qualifying public evidence. It describes the reviewed record and does not claim proof of universal absence.