Dassault Aviation DIGITAL

Research date: 27 October 2026 Entity: Dassault Aviation SA Jurisdiction: France Domain: Digital Scope: Direct operations, controlling shareholders, material corporate holdings, subsidiaries, digital infrastructure, cybersecurity, surveillance, biometrics, Israeli technology relationships, and attributable technology-related commercial activities.

Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships

Corporate ownership and attributable entities

As of 7 September 2026, Groupe Industriel Marcel Dassault (GIMD) held 67.31% of Dassault Aviation’s equity and 80.41% of its voting rights, while Airbus held 10.72% of equity and 6.40% of voting rights.¹

Dassault Aviation’s disclosed organisation included its wholly owned Dassault Falcon Service, Dassault Falcon Jet, Sogitec Industries, ExecuJet MRO Services and Dassault Aviation Business Services operations, alongside a 51% interest in Dassault Reliance Aerospace Limited and a 27% holding in Thales.¹

The company’s 2024 annual report recorded GIMD holding 66.11% and Airbus holding 10.53% at 31 December 2024, establishing separately dated observations of these two major shareholders.²

The wider Dassault Group identifies Dassault Systèmes, Dassault Aviation, Sogitec and several other businesses in its corporate organisation, while identifying Éric Trappier and members of the Dassault family within its governance structure.³

Dassault Aviation’s 2024 Annual Financial Report identifies its majority shareholder in corporate governance section 1.1 as “Groupement Industriel Marcel Dassault” (GIMD), a Dassault-family-owned company, while other sections of the same filing use “Groupe Industriel Marcel Dassault”.⁴

Dassault Aviation’s shareholding conservation announcement of 2 April 2026 independently uses “Groupement Industriel Marcel Dassault”, while its current ownership chart uses “Groupe Industriel Marcel Dassault”; the cited documents use both descriptions for GIMD.^{1, 5}

Verified enterprise technologies

Dassault Aviation identifies Dassault Systèmes’ 3DEXPERIENCE platform as a core product lifecycle management and digital engineering system used in developing Falcon aircraft and future combat aircraft.⁶

Its 2025 technology disclosure states that 3DEXPERIENCE replaced previously used PLM solutions across civil and military aircraft programmes and supports collaborative engineering, design continuity and operational support.⁶

Dassault Aviation’s information-systems disclosure explicitly names 3DEXPERIENCE and SAP among its structural enterprise software platforms and identifies Git, Jira, Confluence, DevOps practices, containerisation, API management, high-performance computing and hybrid cloud among its technology environment and development practices.⁷

The company also identifies a Security Operations Centre, network segmentation, virtualisation, software-defined networking and cybersecurity practices as components of its internal technology strategy.⁷

Israeli-origin software and cybersecurity vendors

No public evidence identified of a direct Dassault Aviation subscription, licence or deployment involving Check Point, Wiz, SentinelOne, CyberArk, NICE, Verint, Claroty, Palo Alto Networks or an equivalent named Israeli-origin enterprise security vendor.

Dassault Aviation holds approximately 27% of Thales, which completed its acquisition of the US-based cybersecurity company Imperva on 4 December 2023 and announced integration into its cybersecurity business beginning in January 2024.^{1, 8}

The established corporate chain is Dassault Aviation as a minority shareholder of Thales, with Thales as the acquirer of Imperva; the cited acquisition does not identify Dassault Aviation as a customer of Imperva software.^{1, 8}

On 2 November 2025, CTech reported that Thales-owned Imperva retained substantial Israeli development and innovation operations during its organisational integration into Thales.⁹

Procurement and technology integrators

Dassault Aviation identifies Dassault Systèmes as a longstanding strategic technology partner providing engineering and digital-platform capabilities.⁶

Dassault Aviation’s 2026 technology disclosure identifies Bleu, a French venture owned by Capgemini and Orange, as the provider selected in December 2025 for access to Microsoft Azure and Office 365 in an environment designed for European sovereignty requirements.¹⁰

No public evidence identified that the named enterprise partners supplied Israeli-origin cybersecurity or surveillance software to Dassault Aviation under these engagements.

Historical cybersecurity development

On 13 December 2017 [pre-2020], CEA Tech reported that Dassault Aviation used the French research institute’s Frama-C software suite to investigate software security vulnerabilities in an experimental Falcon ground-support application.¹¹

The reported recipient was Dassault Aviation’s aircraft-support development activity, the technology originated from CEA List, the announcement appeared on the CEA Tech website in December 2017, and the subsequent production status of the experimental application was not established by that announcement.¹¹

Named-entity search record

Groupement Industriel Marcel Dassault / Groupe Industriel Marcel Dassault - controlling shareholder; searched Israeli cybersecurity holdings, Israeli technology investments and state-security connections; searched, none found for a documented direct Digital act.^{1, 4, 5}

Airbus SE - shareholder exceeding 10%; searched Israeli technology links relevant to Dassault Aviation and shared digital programmes; no direct Dassault Aviation procurement relationship established through those searches.¹

Dassault Systèmes SE - related Dassault Group technology company; searched Israeli cloud, cybersecurity, technology investment and product deployment; verified Dassault Aviation’s 3DEXPERIENCE relationship, with no identified Israeli hosting for that specific engagement.^{3, 6}

Thales SA - Dassault Aviation’s 27% investee; searched Israeli cyber acquisitions, AI partnerships and Israeli state contracts; verified the Imperva acquisition, direct AI partnership with Dassault Aviation, and attributable Israel Police biometric-system maintenance relationship.^{1, 8, 12, 13}

Thales DIS Israel Ltd - Israeli Thales-group supplier; searched Israeli police biometric procurement; named in the March 2024 Thales maintenance letter and the August 2024 and January 2025 procurement notices.^{14, 15, 16}

Thales DIS USA - Thales-group technology provider identified in the March 2024 letter; searched CABIS 6 products and Israeli maintenance; Thales DIS Israel was identified as its exclusive Israeli maintenance and support provider.¹⁴

Imperva - Thales-acquired cybersecurity business; searched Israeli development, management and operational continuity; 2025 reporting identified continuing Israeli development activity.^{8, 9}

Dassault Falcon Jet - wholly owned subsidiary; searched Israeli technology vendors, defence-cloud contracts and Israeli engineering; searched, none found.¹

Dassault Falcon Service - wholly owned subsidiary; searched Israeli IT suppliers, cybersecurity and surveillance deployments; searched, none found.¹

Sogitec Industries - wholly owned subsidiary; searched Israeli simulation, software and defence-technology partnerships; searched, none found.¹

ExecuJet MRO Services - wholly owned group operations; searched Israeli enterprise technology, aircraft-data services and surveillance; searched, none found.¹

Dassault Aviation Business Services - wholly owned group operations; searched Israeli cloud, software and technology services; searched, none found.¹

Dassault Reliance Aerospace Limited - majority-owned Indian aerospace entity; searched Israeli technology procurement, integration and joint ventures; searched, none found.¹

Israel Aerospace Industries - Israeli aerospace supplier; searched named technology systems and contractual relationships with Dassault Aviation; verified Falcon 10X aerostructures procurement, with no software procurement established by the cited announcement.¹⁷

Act record - enterprise platform

Acting entity: Dassault Aviation SA; recipient/beneficiary: Dassault Aviation’s engineering and aircraft-support operations; technology provider: Dassault Systèmes; channel: corporate disclosures on dassault-aviation.com and dassault-aviation.publispeak.com; earliest reviewed dated observation: 2023 annual report; latest observation: 2026 corporate disclosures; status: continuing as described by the company’s current technology pages; public communication audience: corporate website visitors and annual-report readers; precise first publication date and total exposure duration of the relationship are not established.^{6, 18, 10}

Act record - Imperva ownership chain

Acting entity: Thales SA; recipient: Imperva and Thales’ cybersecurity business; channel: Thales corporate acquisition announcement on cpl.thalesgroup.com; earliest relevant observation: acquisition agreement announced in July 2023; latest verified transaction observation: completion on 4 December 2023; subsequent Israeli operations reported in November 2025; status: acquisition completed, with no divestment established in the reviewed sources; audience: public investors and cybersecurity customers; Dassault Aviation’s involvement consists of its separately disclosed minority holding in Thales.^{1, 8, 9}

Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology

Facial recognition and biometrics

No public evidence identified that Dassault Aviation directly operates Israeli-origin facial-recognition, gait-recognition, biometric identification, retail analytics or frictionless-checkout systems from Oosto/AnyVision, BriefCam, Trigo, Trax or comparable providers.

Dassault Aviation’s 27% investee Thales has a documented Israeli police biometric-technology relationship through Thales DIS Israel, which was identified in March 2024 as the current service provider for Israel Police’s AFIS and the exclusive Israeli provider of maintenance and support for Thales DIS USA’s CABIS 6 products.^{1, 14}

Israel Police CAFIS Version 6 - verified operations

An official Israel Police document dated 27 March 2025 identifies the existing criminal automated fingerprint-identification system as CAFIS Version 6, states that it was customised for Israel Police, and expressly identifies Thales as its maintenance provider.¹³

The same document states that the system had been operational since January 2014 and that deployment was completed and declared fully operational in January 2016.¹³

Israel Police describes the system as processing, storing, retrieving, comparing, verifying and identifying fingerprint and palm-print information associated with suspects, crime-scene evidence and other identification records.¹³

The described data categories include fingerprint records, latent fingerprints, mugshots, demographic information and associated physical identification data.¹³

The RFI identifies the system’s ability to link crime-scene fingerprints with suspects, undertake biometric identity verification, identify deceased persons and disaster victims, and match fingerprints with biometric identity-card data.¹³

The document also identifies remote and mobile biometric stations, including live-scan terminals, expert workstations, patrol-car fingerprint scanners, portable rapid-identification devices and crime-scene identification equipment.¹³

These functions are described by Israel Police as capabilities of its existing system, separately from the additional technologies requested from prospective future suppliers.¹³

Interfaces and data processing

Section 2.3.9 of the March 2025 police document identifies interfaces with internal Israel Police systems and external organisations, naming the FBI, INTERPOL and Israeli Ministry of Interior as examples.¹³

Section 2.4 describes stations capable of working remotely against central or local repositories, including portable expert terminals and portable live-scan equipment.¹³

The document establishes the described interface architecture and categories of biometric information, but does not disclose actual transfers to each named external organisation, transfer volumes or specific data-centre locations.¹³

No public evidence identified that Dassault Aviation itself collects, stores, receives or processes these police biometric records.

2024–2025 supplier-engagement records

A March 2024 letter signed by Thales executive Antonio Lo Brutto identified Thales DIS Israel as the current Israel Police AFIS service provider and Thales DIS USA’s exclusive Israeli maintenance and support provider for CABIS 6 products.¹⁴

An Israel Police intent-to-contract notice published on 22 August 2024 and updated on 11 September 2024 named Thales DIS Israel Ltd, supplier number 520040031, for AFIS technology adaptation and capability preservation, with a stated value of NIS 60,500,000.¹⁵

The August 2024 notice recorded an intended engagement period beginning 15 September 2024 and ending 31 December 2029, under the sole-supplier exemption provision, regulation 3(29).¹⁵

A subsequent exemption notice published on 5 January 2025 and updated on 28 January 2025 identified the same legal supplier and supplier number for AFIS upgrade and maintenance, again stating NIS 60,500,000 and an end date of 31 December 2029.¹⁶

The January 2025 notice gives an engagement commencement date of 6 November 2024, differing from the September date specified in the earlier intent notice.^{15, 16}

The same supplier, procurement value and end date appear in both notices; the sources do not establish that these amounts represent two independent contracts whose values should be added together.^{15, 16}

2025 RFI and maintenance continuity

The Israel Police’s Preliminary Request for Information 2025/6 is dated 27 March 2025 and describes Thales as the maintenance provider for the existing CAFIS Version 6 installation.¹³

The government procurement portal published the AFIS RFI under notice 4000604280 on 2 July 2025, with subsequent updates through 16 October 2025.¹⁹

The RFI expressly states that the information-request process is neither a tender nor a product-selection process and creates no contractual obligation or commitment to further procurement.¹³

Accordingly, the RFI establishes an official March 2025 description of the incumbent maintenance arrangement but does not itself establish a new contract award, a replacement supplier, or a completed replacement deployment.¹³

The January 2025 procurement notice separately records an AFIS upgrade and maintenance engagement scheduled through 31 December 2029.¹⁶

The March 2024 supplier letter, November 2024 engagement commencement recorded in January 2025, and March 2025 police system description provide separately dated evidence of the maintenance relationship after 19 July 2024 and after the November 2024 ICC arrest warrants.^{14, 13, 16}

The reviewed records establish a scheduled contractual period through December 2029 but do not independently document uninterrupted service performance during every month of 2026, payments received, or a verified later termination.^{13, 16}

Corporate attribution

The identified biometric service provider is Thales DIS Israel Ltd, while the police RFI names Thales as the company maintaining the system.^{14, 13, 16}

Dassault Aviation’s documented relationship is its 27% equity holding in Thales, as disclosed in its September 2026 shareholding chart.¹

No reviewed police document identifies Dassault Aviation SA as the AFIS supplier, developer, contracting party, system operator or maintenance provider.^{14, 15, 13, 16}

The NIS 60.5 million figure is the procurement notice’s stated engagement value; the records do not establish the amount paid to Thales, Thales’s profit, or any corresponding investment income received by Dassault Aviation.^{15, 16}

Predictive analytics and monitoring

Dassault Aviation’s 2025 digital-technology disclosure identifies predictive-maintenance analytics and digital-twin technologies used to assess aircraft operation, maintenance requirements and fleet availability.⁶

The identified beneficiary is Dassault Aviation’s aircraft-support activity and its civil and military aviation customers; the disclosure does not identify an Israeli surveillance supplier or an Israeli government customer.⁶

No public evidence identified of Israeli-origin predictive-policing, sentiment-analysis, social-media monitoring or employee-surveillance software deployed by Dassault Aviation.

Third-party deployments

Thales’ acquisition of Imperva created a documented corporate investment link to data-security and application-security technologies, but the acquisition announcement does not establish their deployment as biometric or surveillance tools at Dassault Aviation.⁸

No public evidence identified of Israeli-origin surveillance or biometric products deployed indirectly through Dassault Aviation’s systems integrators, managed security providers or enterprise application suites.

Act record - Israel Police biometric system

Acting entities: Thales DIS Israel Ltd as the named Israeli service provider and Thales as the maintenance provider identified by Israel Police; recipient/beneficiary: Israel Police; technology: AFIS/CAFIS Version 6 and CABIS 6 support; channels: supplier letter hosted on mr.gov.il, official police procurement notices on mr.gov.il, and Israel Police’s official RFI attachment; earliest dated service-provider confirmation: March 2024; latest identified official description: the 2025 RFI published and updated through October 2025; status: maintained by Thales according to the March 2025 RFI, with a separately documented procurement period scheduled through 31 December 2029; independently verified 2026 performance: not established; audience for the publications: government procurement participants, potential suppliers and public readers of the procurement portal; publication persistence: the RFI remained open through October 2025, while a removal date for the archival notices is not established.^{14, 15, 13, 19, 16}

Act record - predictive maintenance

Acting entity: Dassault Aviation SA; recipient/beneficiary: civil and military aircraft operators supported by Dassault Aviation; channel: company technology publication on dassault-aviation.com; observation: 21 June 2025, with related technology described in the 2023 annual report; status: presented as ongoing in the 2025 disclosure; publication audience: general corporate website readers; precise start date of customer deployment and any Israeli customer involvement are not established.^{6, 18}

Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation

Data-centre operations in Israel

No public evidence identified that Dassault Aviation directly owns, operates, leases or colocates data-centre infrastructure in Israel.

Verified cloud platforms

Dassault Aviation’s 2023 annual report describes use of Dassault Systèmes’ sovereign-cloud 3DEXPERIENCE environment for the European Future Combat Air System programme and French military aircraft operational-readiness support.¹⁸

The company’s 2025 technology disclosure continues to identify the sovereign 3DEXPERIENCE environment as a collaborative engineering platform meeting defence cybersecurity requirements.⁶

Dassault Aviation’s 2026 corporate technology disclosure states that Bleu was selected in December 2025 to supply a sovereign environment for Microsoft Azure and Office 365 services.¹⁰

Government cloud programmes

The government beneficiaries expressly identified for the 3DEXPERIENCE defence-cloud arrangement are French defence programmes and European collaborative combat-aircraft development.^{6, 18}

No public evidence identified of Dassault Aviation being awarded an Israeli government cloud contract or participating directly in Project Nimbus.

Data residency and data-exposure examination

Dassault Aviation states that its sovereign engineering environment is intended to meet European and French defence cybersecurity and sovereignty requirements.^{6, 18}

Dassault Systèmes describes a structured cybersecurity programme for 3DEXPERIENCE, including software security governance, vulnerability management and incident-response capabilities.²⁰

The disclosed technology relationship establishes the use of cloud-hosted engineering and aircraft-support systems, but the reviewed publications do not identify an Israeli hosting region, Israeli subcontractor data access or processing of Dassault Aviation’s protected programme data within Israeli jurisdiction.^{6, 18, 20}

No public evidence identified of a verified Dassault Aviation customer-data processing chain reaching Israeli-controlled infrastructure.

Police biometric data and jurisdictional boundaries

Israel Police’s March 2025 RFI identifies CAFIS Version 6 as a system handling fingerprint, palm-print, mugshot and identification information, with domestic and international law-enforcement interfaces.¹³

The supplier and maintenance relationships are attributed to Thales and Thales DIS Israel, with Dassault Aviation participating at the separately disclosed 27% Thales-investment level.^{1, 14, 13}

The reviewed police documents do not establish that Dassault Aviation directly hosts or processes these biometric records or that the police system uses Dassault Aviation infrastructure.^{14, 13}

No public evidence identified of the precise hosting location, external subprocessor arrangements, international transfer volumes or remote database-access privileges associated with the police CAFIS installation.

Related Dassault Group cloud activity

Dassault Systèmes announced participation in the European Sovereign Tech Industry Alliance alongside Airbus, Deutsche Telekom, Orange, OVHcloud and other European technology companies, describing its OUTSCALE cloud business as part of its European sovereignty strategy.²¹

This announcement concerns Dassault Systèmes and its consortium partners; it does not independently establish that Dassault Aviation procured each consortium member’s services.²¹

Act record - sovereign cloud

Acting entity: Dassault Aviation SA; technology provider: Dassault Systèmes; beneficiaries: Dassault Aviation engineering teams and French defence programmes; channel: dassault-aviation.publispeak.com and dassault-aviation.com; earliest reviewed dated observation: 2023; latest: 2026 corporate description; status: continuing in the company’s published technology strategy; exact contract value, named hosting facilities and data-subprocessor list are not public in the reviewed materials.^{18, 10}

Act record - Bleu selection

Acting entity: Dassault Aviation SA; supplier: Bleu, owned by Capgemini and Orange; beneficiary: Dassault Aviation’s enterprise technology operations; underlying products: Microsoft Azure and Office 365; channel: dassault-aviation.com; dated selection: December 2025; latest observed description: 2026 company technology disclosure; status: selected, with exact migration completion and service commencement not established; audience: public corporate website readers.¹⁰

Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships

Israeli defence procurement and supply

On 20 July 2022, Israel Aerospace Industries announced that Dassault Aviation had selected it to design and manufacture composite wing movable surfaces for the Falcon 10X business jet.¹⁷

IAI stated that engineering work was progressing and that a composite aerostructures assembly line would be established to manufacture the components.¹⁷

The announcement identifies Dassault Aviation as the purchaser and IAI as the supplier for a civilian business-aviation programme; it does not identify the Israeli Ministry of Defence or IDF as the customer for that programme.¹⁷

The earliest and latest dated observation in the reviewed primary announcement are both 20 July 2022; the later delivery, payment, maintenance and cancellation status are not established by that record.¹⁷

Military and intelligence service contracts

No public evidence identified of a direct Dassault Aviation contract providing general-purpose software, cloud services, communications infrastructure or cyber-surveillance systems to the Israeli Ministry of Defence, IDF or intelligence agencies.

The separately documented Thales-group Israeli police relationship concerns the Israel Police’s criminal fingerprint-identification infrastructure, with Thales DIS Israel named as supplier and Thales identified as maintenance provider.^{14, 13, 16}

The official RFI describes internal police interfaces and connections to external law-enforcement and government systems, including the FBI, INTERPOL and the Israeli Ministry of Interior.¹³

The cited police documentation does not independently establish a specific IDF or intelligence-service customer, an occupied-territory deployment, or a military operational use of the CAFIS system.¹³

Non-Israeli defence technology relationships

Dassault Aviation and the French Ministry of Defence’s Agency for AI in Defence signed a memorandum of understanding on 18 June 2025 to conduct research and development relating to air-combat AI applications.²²

Dassault Aviation and Thales announced a strategic partnership on 25 November 2025, following signature on 18 November, to develop controlled and supervised AI for defence aeronautics through Thales’ cortAIx initiative.¹²

The named actors in these announcements are Dassault Aviation, the French defence AI agency and Thales; neither announcement identifies an Israeli state institution as recipient.^{22, 12}

Dual-use technology

Dassault Aviation’s information-systems disclosure identifies embedded real-time software, flight-control systems, mission systems, simulation tools, digital support platforms and cybersecurity engineering as elements of its technology operations.⁷

The company’s publicly described dual-use technology capabilities therefore include embedded software and collaborative engineering tools, but the reviewed descriptions do not independently establish Israeli military deployment.⁷

The Thales-maintained Israel Police biometric system has documented identification and law-enforcement functions, including suspect matching and mobile biometric verification; the reviewed documents do not establish its use for a specific military or intelligence operation.¹³

Offensive cyber and digital weapons

No public evidence identified of Dassault Aviation selling or licensing zero-day exploits, offensive intrusion software or cyber-surveillance tools to Israeli state bodies.

Purpose-built military systems - Military boundary

Dassault Aviation and Harmattan AI announced in July 2026 that their jointly developed NAMIB electronic warfare payload had been demonstrated in cooperation with a Rafale F4 aircraft.²³

The announcement describes electromagnetic-emission detection, identification and geolocation, transmission of a radar location to the Rafale, and a simulated strike during the demonstration.²³

The disclosed electromagnetic sensing and communication capabilities are relevant to digital technology, while the simulated strike and purpose-built combat integration require separate Military examination; the cited announcement identifies no Israeli military deployment.²³

Act record - IAI aerostructures procurement

Acting entity: Dassault Aviation SA; supplier/recipient of procurement: Israel Aerospace Industries; programme beneficiary: Falcon 10X production; channel: announcement hosted on iai.co.il; earliest and latest verified dated observation: 20 July 2022; contractual status on 27 October 2026: unknown; agreement value, completed deliveries, subsequent performance after July 2024 and cessation evidence: not established; publication audience: public industry and corporate-news readers.¹⁷

Act record - French defence AI cooperation

Acting entity: Dassault Aviation SA; counterparty and beneficiary: French Ministry of Defence AI Agency; channel: dassault-aviation.com; initial dated observation: 18 June 2025; later reference in Dassault Aviation’s 2026 highlights; status: described as a partnership in the subsequent corporate publication; contract value and detailed programme completion: not established; audience: public defence-sector and corporate-news readers.^{22, 24}

AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems

Enterprise and engineering AI

Dassault Aviation states that artificial intelligence, digital twins and predictive analytics support engineering, aircraft maintenance and operational decision-making across its civil and military aircraft businesses.^{6, 7}

The identified technology functions include fleet-data analysis, digital modelling and predictive maintenance, while the cited disclosures do not establish an Israeli government recipient for those services.^{6, 7}

State AI collaboration

The 18 June 2025 AMIAD memorandum of understanding concerns supervised AI research for future air-combat applications involving Dassault Aviation and a French government agency.²²

The 18 November 2025 Dassault Aviation–Thales agreement concerns supervised AI for defence aeronautics, with Thales participating through cortAIx.¹²

No public evidence identified of provision of these AI systems to Israeli state, defence or security institutions.

Autonomous systems investments

On 12 January 2026, Dassault Aviation and Harmattan AI announced a strategic partnership and Dassault Aviation’s participation in Harmattan AI’s $200 million Series B financing.²⁵

Dassault Aviation stated that the partnership would support autonomous technologies in future combat aviation, including unmanned systems, and that Harmattan AI’s wider portfolio covered intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, drone interception and electronic warfare.²⁵

The announcement does not identify Harmattan AI as an Israeli company or state that the partnership supplies Israeli military organisations.²⁵

Police biometric algorithms

Israel Police’s March 2025 RFI identifies existing CAFIS functions involving automated fingerprint and palm-print comparison, matching, verification and identification.¹³

The document separately requests information about possible future capabilities, including AI-assisted reporting and advanced image-processing functions.¹³

These requested capabilities are part of an information-gathering process and do not demonstrate that a new AI system was purchased, installed or supplied by Thales or Dassault Aviation.¹³

Training data

No public evidence identified of Dassault Aviation training AI systems on civilian datasets, intercepted communications or surveillance records obtained from Israel or occupied Palestinian territories.

The Israel Police CAFIS description identifies biometric and demographic datasets handled by the existing police system but does not establish their use as training data for a Dassault Aviation AI model.¹³

Autonomous systems and targeting

Dassault Aviation’s July 2026 NAMIB announcement describes a joint Harmattan AI demonstration involving sensing, geolocation and transmission of an identified radar position to a Rafale aircraft, followed by a simulated strike.²³

The announcement does not identify Israel as a customer, development location or data source.²³

Act record - Thales cortAIx

Acting entities: Dassault Aviation SA and Thales SA; technology partner: Thales cortAIx; intended beneficiaries: their defence-aeronautics development programmes; channel: dassault-aviation.com; signing date: 18 November 2025; public announcement: 25 November 2025; latest reviewed reference: Dassault Aviation’s 2026 technology strategy; status: publicly described as a continuing strategic partnership; precise ownership of resulting models, model-data provenance, contract value and deployment dates are not established; audience: public corporate and defence-technology readers.^{12, 10}

Act record - Harmattan AI

Acting entity: Dassault Aviation SA; recipient and partner: Harmattan AI; financing: participation in a $200 million Series B round; technology programme: controlled autonomy for future combat aviation; channel: dassault-aviation.com; first announcement: 12 January 2026; subsequent identified activity: NAMIB demonstration announced 13 July 2026; status: documented cooperation in July 2026, with no subsequently verified termination; Dassault Aviation’s exact investment amount and ownership percentage are not established by the announcement; audience: public investors, defence-industry participants and corporate-news readers.^{25, 23}

Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint

Corporate research infrastructure

Dassault Aviation identifies software engineering, high-performance computing, embedded software development, modelling, collaborative engineering and AI as components of its technology development activities.⁷

The company’s 2026 strategy and highlights identify AMIAD, Thales and Harmattan AI as named collaborators in defence AI and supervised-autonomy research.^{26, 24}

Israeli research centres

No public evidence identified of a Dassault Aviation-owned software engineering centre, AI laboratory, cyber research facility or technology accelerator in Israel.

Israeli industrial engineering

IAI’s July 2022 announcement identifies Israeli engineering and production work planned for composite Falcon 10X wing surfaces, including an aerostructures assembly facility.¹⁷

That evidence concerns engineering performed by an Israeli supplier; it does not establish a Dassault Aviation-owned Israeli R&D centre.¹⁷

Acquisitions and investments

Dassault Aviation’s 2026 ownership disclosure confirms a 27% shareholding in Thales, while Thales’ December 2023 announcement confirms its completed acquisition of Imperva.^{1, 8}

The relevant group-linked cybersecurity investment chain is therefore Dassault Aviation’s minority holding in Thales and Thales’ ownership of Imperva, subject to separate legal-entity attribution.^{1, 8}

Dassault Aviation’s January 2026 investment in Harmattan AI is a directly documented AI-sector investment, with an accompanying strategic development partnership.²⁵

No public evidence identified of Dassault Aviation directly acquiring an Israeli-domiciled cybersecurity, AI, surveillance or digital-infrastructure company.

Imperva Israeli development operations

On 2 November 2025, CTech reported that Thales-owned Imperva was completing its organisational integration while retaining Israeli technology operations.⁹

The report identified Tal Tikotzki as the incoming Israeli development and innovation leader and Einat Leham-Livnat as the Israeli site manager.⁹

CTech reported that the Israeli operation retained global product, customer-support and sales leadership positions and remained a major Thales cyber-division hub.⁹

The report described the integration as an organisational transition without changes to operational scope, workforce or work plans during that period.⁹

Patents and intellectual property

Dassault Aviation’s information-systems disclosure states that it undertakes patent filing and collaborates with technology publishers, research programmes and educational institutions.⁷

No public evidence identified of a specific technology patent-licensing or co-development agreement between Dassault Aviation and Technion, Hebrew University, Weizmann Institute or another named Israeli research institution.

Named controlling principals

Marcel Dassault - historical founder; searches concerned technology-sector holdings, Israel-related investment activity and historical corporate control; no qualifying personal Israeli Digital investment identified in the reviewed materials.¹⁰

Éric Trappier - Dassault Aviation Chairman and CEO and Dassault Group president; searched Israeli cyber investments, military technology holdings and state-security affiliations; no qualifying personal Israeli technology investment identified.^{3, 27}

Olivier Costa de Beauregard - Dassault Group CEO; searched Israeli defence technology, surveillance and cybersecurity holdings; searched, none found.³

Thierry Dassault - Dassault Group executive and family principal; searched Israeli technology investments and relevant governance connections; searched, none found.³

Laurent Dassault - Dassault Group family principal; searched Israeli cybersecurity and AI investments; searched, none found.³

Helena Meilhan-Dassault - Dassault Group supervisory governance; searched Israeli technology investments; searched, none found.³

Marie-Hélène Habert - Dassault Group supervisory-board member; searched Israeli technology and relevant philanthropic links; searched, none found.³

Benoît Habert - Dassault Group executive; searched Israeli digital-security and technology investments; searched, none found.³

Julien Dassault - Dassault Group supervisory-board member; searched Israeli cyber and military-technology investments; searched, none found.³

Adrien Dassault - Dassault Group supervisory-board member; searched Israeli surveillance and technology investments; searched, none found.³

Patrice Caine - Thales Chairman and CEO; searched direct Israeli cyber investments and security-technology affiliations; the verified relevant corporate acts include Thales’ acquisition of Imperva and its police biometric-system relationship, with no separate personal holding established.^{8, 14, 13}

Laurent Bendavid - Dassault Aviation Chief Digital Officer; searched named Israeli enterprise software deployments and procurement; no qualifying relationship identified.²⁷

Pascale Lohat - Dassault Aviation engineering executive; searched Israeli AI partnerships and defence R&D; verified involvement in the French AMIAD agreement, with no Israeli counterparty established.^{22, 27}

Bruno Coiffier - Dassault Aviation procurement executive; searched Israeli enterprise technology procurement and supplier arrangements; no qualifying personal or direct digital-sector investment identified.²⁷

Entity coverage and limitations

The corporate ownership disclosure identifies GIMD and Airbus as the holders exceeding 10% of Dassault Aviation shares; it does not provide a complete beneficial-ownership inventory of every natural person holding an indirect economic interest through those entities.¹

The wider Dassault Group’s governance publication identifies family members and executives, while Dassault Aviation maintains a separate operational executive committee; the two bodies should not be treated as interchangeable.^{3, 27}

Act record - technology investment and research

Acting entity: Dassault Aviation SA; recipient: Harmattan AI; channel: Dassault Aviation corporate announcement on dassault-aviation.com; initial financing and partnership announcement: 12 January 2026; later public programme milestone: 13 July 2026; status: documented cooperation through July 2026, with no verified cessation; exact shareholding and initial disbursement date: not established in the cited publications.^{25, 23}

Act record - Israeli cybersecurity development

Acting entity: Thales-owned Imperva; beneficiary: Thales’ cybersecurity business and its global product-development activities; channel: CTech reporting on calcalistech.com; dated observation: 2 November 2025; status: Israeli development and operational functions reported as continuing during the corporate integration; no verified later cessation; exact corporate allocation of research expenditure, Israeli-only revenue and employee count are not established by the report; publication audience: public technology and business-news readers.^{8, 9}

Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History

UN and civil-society scrutiny

No public evidence identified in the reviewed materials of an OHCHR settlement-business database entry specifically naming Dassault Aviation as a supplier of digital products or surveillance infrastructure to settlements.

No public evidence identified of a specialist Who Profits, AFSC Investigate, Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch investigation establishing a named Dassault Aviation Israeli military cloud, biometric-surveillance or settlement-technology contract.

Settlement nexus

The official Israel Police CAFIS description establishes a national police biometric-identification system with mobile equipment and external interfaces, but does not identify a named settlement, checkpoint or occupied-territory deployment.¹³

The procurement documents identify Israel Police as the beneficiary of the Thales-group biometric services, without specifying the geographic locations of all operational endpoints.^{14, 15, 13, 16}

No public evidence identified establishing that Dassault Aviation directly supplied digital infrastructure, cloud services, surveillance technology or biometric systems to an Israeli settlement.

No public evidence identified establishing that Thales’s documented CAFIS services were used at a specific settlement installation or checkpoint.

Boycott and divestment campaigns

No public evidence identified of a documented organised boycott or divestment campaign specifically challenging Dassault Aviation’s provision of enterprise IT, cloud hosting, surveillance software or AI platforms to Israeli state bodies.

Technology-related regulatory action

No public evidence identified of a completed regulatory enforcement action, export-control finding, court judgment or sanctions designation specifically concerning Dassault Aviation’s provision of digital technologies to Israeli state entities.

Post-July and post-November 2024 observations

IAI’s July 2022 procurement announcement establishes an Israeli supplier relationship before the 19 July 2024 ICJ advisory opinion and November 2024 ICC arrest warrants.¹⁷

That announcement is insufficient to establish that Dassault Aviation continued making payments, receiving deliveries or maintaining the IAI arrangement after either date.¹⁷

The Thales-group police biometric relationship has later documentary observations: the August 2024 intent notice, November 2024 engagement commencement recorded in January 2025, the January 2025 exemption publication, and the March 2025 RFI identifying Thales as maintenance provider.^{15, 13, 16}

The January 2025 procurement notice states an engagement end date of 31 December 2029; neither that prospective date nor the RFI establishes actual service performance in every subsequent month.^{13, 16}

Dassault Aviation’s directly documented 2025–2026 AI partnerships concern named French counterparties, Thales and Harmattan AI, without an identified Israeli government beneficiary in the cited announcements.^{22, 12, 25}

Additional corporate disclosure

Dassault Aviation publishes corporate technology and financial disclosures through its annual-report archive, including a 2025 report and preceding annual reports.²⁸

The existence of that publication archive does not establish the completeness of third-party procurement, beneficial ownership, cloud-subprocessor or downstream technology-customer records.²⁸