flydubai DIGITAL

Target: Dubai Aviation Corporation, trading as flydubai Research date: 23 October 2026 Evidence period: 2024–2026 Scope: Enterprise technology, Israeli commercial intermediaries, passenger and crew data disclosure, airline reporting obligations, biometrics, cloud infrastructure, defence-related technology, AI and technology R&D.

Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships

Corporate and operational context

flydubai operates under the chairmanship of Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum, identified in its February 2026 financial announcement. The airline reported AED 13.6 billion in 2025 revenue and 15.7 million passengers.¹

Israeli commercial intermediary

The Israel Airports Authority’s airline directory identifies Open Sky GSA, located at 25 Ben Yehuda Street, Tel Aviv, as flydubai’s Israeli representative. The directory also identifies QAS as the airline’s ground-services provider in Israel.²

Open Sky describes itself as an Israeli airline representation business providing sales, customer service, reservations and ticketing, marketing, IT solutions, business development and financial services. Its published capabilities include functions relevant to the digital distribution and servicing of airline products.³

Open Sky’s corporate website additionally advertises travel technology partnerships, connections to the Israeli technology ecosystem and opportunities involving new technologies. The published description concerns Open Sky’s general capabilities and does not identify a flydubai-specific Israeli software implementation.⁴

Open Sky identifies Ephraim Fortis as its founder and principal shareholder and describes activities including airline representation, technology-related innovation, research and development, and commercial services.⁵

No public evidence identified establishing that Open Sky’s wider technology activities constitute flydubai-directed Israeli technology procurement.^{4, 5}

Named enterprise systems

On 11 March 2024, Accelya announced a multi-year renewal of its FLX Cargo platform relationship with flydubai. The agreement expanded the existing cargo technology relationship to incorporate Offer and Order capabilities, customer self-service and connectivity through supplier APIs.⁶

On 23 September 2025, Accelya announced flydubai’s selection of FLX ONE NDC for airline retail distribution. The stated purpose was to modernise indirect distribution, including content delivery, dynamic offers and personalisation for travel trade partners. The announcement establishes product selection without independently confirming full production deployment.⁷

On 17 September 2025, IBS Software announced production deployment of its cloud-native iLoyal platform for Emirates Skywards, the loyalty programme shared by Emirates and flydubai. The supplier reported a programme serving more than 35 million members and integration with more than 100 brand partners.⁸

On 12 January 2026, Amperity announced a flydubai partnership to unify traveller information across customer touchpoints. The platform is intended to support personalisation and data-driven customer engagement, including identity resolution and customer profile capabilities.⁹

On 19 November 2025, GE Aerospace announced an agreement to deploy its Safety Insight and FlightPulse software solutions across flydubai’s fleet. These SaaS products provide operational safety analytics and pilot performance information.¹⁰

On 31 January 2025, flydubai announced its partnership with Ultramain Systems for ULTRAMAIN ELB electronic technical logbooks. The intended operational functions include electronic aircraft records, pilot-engineer access to technical information and reduced paper processing.¹¹

On 9 January 2026, flydubai announced selection of ZestIoT’s Digital Turnaround Platform for Dubai International Airport and its wider route network. The platform is intended to provide real-time aircraft turnaround visibility, predictive analytics and operational coordination.¹²

On 12 February 2025, flydubai and Boeing announced agreements covering aviation services and digital flight operations tools. The named digital product was Jeppesen FliteDeck Advisor, providing aircraft-specific in-flight optimisation guidance.¹³

Digital cargo distribution - cargo.one

On 9 October 2024, flydubai Cargo announced a partnership with cargo.one to establish its first digital cargo sales channel. The arrangement was intended to enable freight forwarders to access flydubai Cargo capacity through cargo.one’s digital booking platform.¹⁴

The announced integration included access to interline connections through flydubai’s existing agreements with other airlines. The airline stated that it would target cargo.one’s global freight-forwarder community in 121 countries.¹⁴

cargo.one published a corresponding announcement confirming the planned digital distribution relationship and intended international customer reach.¹⁵

GCC Business News also reported the announcement, identifying digital cargo sales and access to interline capacity as the partnership’s stated functions.¹⁶

The October 2024 announcements described the launch as forthcoming. No public evidence identified in those disclosures establishing a subsequent production go-live date or completed transaction volumes.^{14, 15}

No public evidence identified establishing that the announced cargo.one integration involves Israeli-origin software, Israeli data hosting or technology provision to Israeli state institutions.^{14, 15}

Israeli-origin enterprise software

No public evidence identified establishing direct licensing or operational deployment by flydubai of Check Point, Wiz, SentinelOne, CyberArk, NICE, Verint, Claroty, Palo Alto Networks or another specifically identified Israeli-origin cybersecurity product. The documented enterprise systems represent a partial supplier inventory and do not disclose the airline’s complete cybersecurity estate.^{6, 7, 9, 10, 17}

Indirect procurement

The Israeli representative Open Sky advertises technology and airline reservation capabilities, while flydubai’s named enterprise suppliers disclose several major platforms. No public evidence identified demonstrating that Open Sky or another named intermediary deployed Israeli-origin enterprise software into flydubai’s infrastructure.^{2, 3, 4, 6, 7}

Government passenger-data technology intermediary

Israel’s 2023 passenger-data legislation establishes a national passenger-data analysis centre within the Israeli Tax Authority and requires covered passenger carriers to transmit passenger and crew information. No public evidence identified in the replacement source establishing that SITA was selected as the Israeli government’s contractor for developing and operating its passenger-information gateway.¹⁸

SITA’s published API/PNR Gateway product description identifies interfaces for Passenger Name Record, departure-control and advance passenger information. No public evidence identified in that description independently establishing that Israel uses those particular SITA interfaces.¹⁹

The Israeli legislation establishes a government passenger-data reporting obligation. No public evidence identified in the replacement sources establishing a flydubai-specific commercial technology procurement contract with SITA or identifying the particular technology contractor operating Israel’s gateway.^{18, 19}

Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology

Facial recognition and biometric identification

On 4 July 2025, Emirates News Agency reported that flydubai had partnered with UAE technology organisation emaratech to implement biometric immigration gates for pilots and cabin crew. The installation was located at the airline’s Airport Operations Centre in Dubai.²⁰

The reported deployment comprises six smart gates using AI-powered facial recognition and real-time integration with operational and immigration systems. The stated purpose is to streamline crew immigration procedures and replace manual identification processes.²⁰

The identified supplier is emaratech. No public evidence identified establishing that the reported installation uses facial recognition products supplied by AnyVision/Oosto, BriefCam, Trigo, Trax or another Israeli-origin technology company.²⁰

Customer identification and behavioural data

The January 2026 Amperity partnership concerns customer identity and behavioural information. The disclosed implementation scope includes combining information from booking, loyalty and customer interactions to support personalised airline services.⁹

The supplier relationship concerns enterprise customer data processing. No public evidence identified establishing that flydubai uses an Israeli-origin behavioural surveillance or predictive policing platform.⁹

Airport and retail technology

The September 2025 Accelya NDC agreement introduces capabilities for dynamic offers, differentiated airline retail content and personalisation across distribution channels.⁷

The January 2026 ZestIoT agreement concerns prediction-based aircraft turnaround management rather than passenger identification or law-enforcement monitoring.¹²

The October 2024 cargo.one agreement introduced an additional planned digital distribution channel for cargo capacity and interline freight bookings.^{14, 15}

Indirect surveillance deployments

No public evidence identified establishing that an Israeli-origin biometric or surveillance product reaches flydubai through emaratech, its airline retailing platforms, cloud providers or another disclosed supplier.^{9, 12, 20}

Government passenger-screening infrastructure

Israel’s passenger-data legislation provides for information collected by the national passenger-data analysis centre to be made available to the Population and Immigration Authority for specified border-management purposes. Separate Israeli legislation provides for border-control authorities to notify carriers when passengers are not authorised to travel.¹⁸

SITA’s published gateway description establishes that its commercial technology supports advance passenger-data collection and transmission. No public evidence identified in that source independently establishing the technical infrastructure or message routing used by the Israeli NCPIA and Population and Immigration Authority.¹⁹

No public evidence identified in the replacement sources establishing the technical message structures used by Israel’s government gateway or identifying the implementation of the January 2025 Israeli CUSRES guide.^{18, 19}

The Israeli legislation establishes a passenger-data collection framework. No public evidence identified in the replacement sources establishing the actual transmission method or individual screening decision applied to FZ1073.^{18, 19}

Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation

Core infrastructure

On 14 November 2025, flydubai announced the rollout of a co-located data centre supporting its Modern Airline Retailing platform. The airline stated that the rebuilt platform uses hybrid cloud infrastructure for core booking, ticketing and check-in operations.²¹

The announced migration was associated with a reported 40% improvement in transaction performance and 45% faster data processing. The announcement did not disclose a complete list of cloud regions, data-centre addresses or subprocessors.²¹

AWS partnership

On 15 December 2025, flydubai and Amazon Web Services announced a collaboration covering generative AI, machine learning, data analytics and improvements to airline operations and customer experience.¹⁷

The announcement establishes AWS as a technology partner and describes planned development of production-ready digital and AI use cases. It does not identify the cloud regions used, the categories of data hosted or any Israeli infrastructure participating in flydubai’s cloud environment.¹⁷

Customer-data infrastructure

The Amperity partnership announced in January 2026 is intended to unify customer information across airline systems. Identity resolution and customer-profile functionality are relevant to retrieving and connecting customer records across operational touchpoints.⁹

The published supplier disclosure does not identify the storage location of the customer profile database, international replication arrangements or whether Israeli service providers can access that information.⁹

Israeli representation and passenger-data exposure

The Israel Airports Authority confirms that flydubai has an Israeli commercial representative, Open Sky GSA, in Tel Aviv. Open Sky advertises reservations, ticketing, customer service and IT capabilities as part of its airline representation business.^{2, 3}

These records establish a commercial channel through an Israeli organisation. They do not establish whether that organisation hosts passenger data in Israel, accesses flydubai’s central customer identity platform or processes particular passenger records on flydubai’s behalf.^{2, 3, 9}

Israeli statutory passenger-information collection framework

Israel’s Powers for Collection and Analysis of Passenger Data of Persons Entering or Departing Israel Law, 5783-2023, establishes requirements for the collection of passenger and crew information, including reservation information and advance passenger information. No public evidence identified in the replacement source independently confirming the text or March 2025 revision date of NCPIA Data Submission Policy version 1.1.¹⁸

The legislation establishes the National Passenger Data Analysis Centre within the Israeli Tax Authority and assigns it responsibility for a passenger and crew information database.¹⁸

The legislation was adopted in 2023 and provides the statutory foundation for passenger-information collection. No public evidence identified in the replacement source independently establishing that the March 2025 policy states an effective date of 3 April 2023.¹⁸

The legislation assigns passenger-information reporting obligations to passenger carriers operating covered services.¹⁸

The legislation establishes a passenger-carrier duty to transmit prescribed information. No public evidence identified in the replacement source independently verifying the precise codeshare wording attributed to section 2.6 of the March 2025 policy.¹⁸

No public evidence identified in the replacement source independently establishing the March 2025 policy’s specific allocation of responsibility where travel agents, third-party technology providers or other intermediaries perform data processing.¹⁸

The legislation therefore establishes airline-level regulatory responsibility for passenger and crew information on covered services. It does not identify the particular employee, contracted processor or government entity that physically transmitted FZ1073’s records.^{22, 18}

Government data gateway and processing arrangements

No public evidence identified in the replacement sources independently establishing that SITA Advanced Travel Solutions Limited was selected as the contractor responsible for Israel’s government passenger-information gateway.^{18, 19}

SITA’s published API/PNR Gateway product description identifies capabilities for collecting and transmitting PNR, DCS and APIS information. No public evidence identified in that description establishing the configuration or deployment of an Israeli SITA iAPI Gateway.¹⁹

SITA describes manual submission capabilities within its commercial gateway offering. No public evidence identified in the replacement source independently establishing the alternative submission arrangements authorised for carriers under the Israeli NCPIA policy.¹⁹

No public evidence identified in the replacement sources independently verifying the technical specifications of Israel’s January 2025 CUSRES implementation guide.^{18, 19}

The Israeli legislation establishes a channel through which operating airlines must provide passenger information to Israeli authorities. No public evidence identified in the replacement sources establishing which technical implementation was used for flydubai flight FZ1073.^{18, 19}

Continuing reporting requirements

Israel’s 2023 passenger-data legislation requires covered passenger carriers to provide prescribed passenger and crew information for flights entering, departing from or passing through Israel.¹⁸

The legislation establishes advance and departure-related passenger-information reporting requirements.¹⁸

The legislation provides for information submission at specified stages of a flight. No public evidence identified in the replacement source independently verifying the precise 48-hour PNR schedule attributed to the March 2025 NCPIA policy.¹⁸

The legislation covers passenger and crew information. No public evidence identified in the replacement source independently verifying the March 2025 policy’s separate crew APIS implementation requirements.¹⁸

The statutory reporting requirements establish a standing regulatory disclosure obligation for airlines operating covered services to Israel.¹⁸

No public evidence identified in the replacement source establishing flydubai’s individual certification date, the exact technical route used for FZ1073 or a complete history of the airline’s actual submissions.¹⁸

Documented passenger and crew information exchange - September 2026

On 4 October 2026, Associated Press reported that authorities in the United Arab Emirates had shared a passenger and crew list with Israel before flydubai flight FZ1073 departed Dubai for Tel Aviv on 30 September 2026. AP attributed this information to regional officials familiar with the investigation.²³

The reported information included passenger and crew identities and nationalities, including details concerning the flight’s pilots.²³

AP reported that Israeli authorities had raised no concerns about passengers or crew before departure and described disagreements among Israeli authorities over responsibility for passenger screening.²³

On 3 October 2026, The Jerusalem Post reported that the Israeli Tax Authority possessed the complete passenger and crew manifest before the aircraft departed Dubai. The article attributed this information to a source and linked receipt of the manifest to procedures established under legislation adopted in 2023.²²

The two publications therefore report possession of identifiable FZ1073 passenger and crew information by Israeli authorities before departure.^{23, 22}

Israel’s 2023 passenger-data legislation independently establishes that passenger carriers are responsible for supplying mandated passenger and crew information for covered flights.¹⁸

The statutory regulatory duty is attributable to passenger carriers, while the contemporaneous Associated Press account attributes the reported information sharing to UAE authorities.^{23, 18}

No public evidence identified establishing whether the reported UAE government exchange was a separate transmission or corresponded to information supplied through the ordinary airline reporting system.^{23, 22, 18}

No public evidence identified establishing whether flydubai personnel, an airline-contracted provider or a UAE government agency physically transmitted the specific records received by Israel.^{23, 22, 18}

The available reporting and statutory framework do not independently identify the application, network connection, authentication credentials, submission portal or message format used for FZ1073.^{23, 22, 18}

No public evidence identified establishing that the records were transmitted through Open Sky GSA, QAS, Amperity, Accelya, cargo.one or another named flydubai supplier.^{2, 9, 14, 23, 22}

Israeli institutional access to passenger information

The national passenger-data analysis centre is established within the Israeli Tax Authority. The passenger-data legislation provides for relevant information to be made available to the Population and Immigration Authority for specified border-management purposes.¹⁸

The Jerusalem Post reported that Mossad also has access to passenger manifests, while indicating that the agency generally does not review such lists.²²

The article presents this as a general statement concerning access to manifests. It does not report a confirmed Mossad review, download, analysis or operational use of the particular FZ1073 records.²²

The passenger-data legislation establishes statutory conditions for collecting and using passenger information. It does not establish that Mossad accessed the FZ1073 manifest.¹⁸

The Indian Express reported uncertainty about whether the Israeli Transport Ministry had reviewed the flight’s passenger list, including a refusal by the ministry to confirm whether it had performed that screening.²⁴

No public evidence identified establishing that Mossad accessed or used the FZ1073 manifest, or identifying any individual intelligence officer who reviewed the records.^{22, 18, 24}

Temporal status and constructive-notice dates

Israel adopted the passenger-data legislation in 2023, before both 19 July 2024 and November 2024. The legislation establishes recurring passenger and crew information reporting duties for covered carriers.¹⁸

The documented FZ1073 incident occurred on 30 September 2026, after both dates.^{23, 22}

The reported receipt of the flight manifest establishes a specific post-November 2024 instance of information held by Israeli authorities in connection with commercial aviation operations.^{23, 22}

The Israeli Airports Authority’s accessible airline listing continued to identify flydubai’s Israeli representative when reviewed in October 2026.²

Contemporaneous reporting described suspension of flydubai’s Israel flights following the September 2026 incident. The public airline directory does not independently establish whether scheduled operations resumed after that suspension.^{2, 24}

No public evidence identified establishing a complete sequence of passenger-data transfers after 30 September 2026 or the date of any subsequent flight-specific submission.^{22, 18, 24}

In-flight communications

On 18 November 2025, flydubai announced a SpaceX agreement to introduce Starlink satellite internet connectivity across its Boeing 737 fleet. Installations were scheduled to cover approximately 100 aircraft during 2026.²⁵

Starlink’s disclosed role concerns in-flight communications connectivity. No public evidence identified establishing that flydubai’s Starlink traffic is routed through Israeli ground infrastructure or stored within Israeli jurisdiction.²⁵

In-flight digital services

On 19 November 2025, flydubai announced selection of Panasonic Avionics’ Astrova entertainment platform for 30 Boeing 787-9 aircraft on order. The agreement also identifies digital services including ZeroTouch content delivery and Converix passenger engagement capabilities.²⁶

The announcement concerns future fleet installations and does not establish an operational Israeli-based passenger data-processing facility.²⁶

Cargo distribution data

The October 2024 cargo.one partnership introduced a planned digital booking channel through which international freight forwarders could obtain access to flydubai Cargo capacity and interline connections.^{14, 15}

Neither reviewed announcement identifies the geographic location of cargo.one’s flydubai-specific booking records, the platform’s hosting arrangements or an Israeli processor involved in the integration.^{14, 15}

Government cloud and data sovereignty

No public evidence identified establishing flydubai participation in Project Nimbus, provision of cloud infrastructure to Israeli government institutions or operation of an Israeli data centre. The disclosed infrastructure relationships concern flydubai’s airline operations, hybrid cloud foundation and AWS collaboration.^{21, 17}

No public evidence identified establishing a flydubai contract specifically supplying data sovereignty or resilience infrastructure to Israeli military, intelligence or civilian government bodies.^{21, 17}

Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships

Israeli military and intelligence contracts

The Israel Airports Authority identifies flydubai’s Israeli commercial representative and airport ground-services provider. Its published listing concerns commercial airline operations and passenger services, without identifying a military or intelligence technology contract.²

No public evidence identified establishing a technology supply agreement between flydubai and the Israeli Ministry of Defence, Israel Defense Forces or Israeli intelligence services.^{2, 3}

Passenger information provided to Israeli authorities

Associated Press reported on 4 October 2026 that UAE authorities had shared flydubai flight FZ1073 passenger and crew information with Israel before the aircraft’s 30 September departure.²³

The Jerusalem Post separately reported Israeli Tax Authority possession of the manifest and described its receipt as part of established inbound-flight procedures.²²

Israel’s 2023 passenger-data legislation establishes the national passenger-data analysis centre within the Israeli Tax Authority and assigns reporting obligations to passenger carriers operating covered services.¹⁸

The legislation establishes that these reporting requirements concern civil aviation passenger and crew information, including information used for immigration and border-management purposes.¹⁸

The Jerusalem Post’s statement concerning Mossad access addresses passenger manifests generally and does not establish operational use of FZ1073 information by that agency.²²

No public evidence identified establishing a separate flydubai contract to supply surveillance technology, intelligence software, military data infrastructure or analytical services to Israeli security institutions.^{23, 22, 18}

General-purpose and dual-use software

GE Aerospace’s Safety Insight and FlightPulse products provide commercial aviation safety and pilot performance analytics. Their disclosed flydubai application is civil airline operations.¹⁰

Boeing’s Jeppesen FliteDeck Advisor provides flight optimisation information, including flight-profile and fuel-efficiency guidance. The disclosed flydubai agreement concerns commercial airline flight operations.¹³

Ultramain’s electronic technical logbook agreement concerns aircraft technical records and engineering workflows. No Israeli military application was disclosed in the flydubai announcement.¹¹

Offensive cyber and weapons systems

No public evidence identified establishing development, licensing, sale or maintenance of offensive cyber tools, exploit platforms, military surveillance systems or digital weapons by flydubai.^{10, 11, 13}

Technology provision to settlements

The Israeli Airports Authority records flydubai’s representative in Tel Aviv. No settlement-based office, technology deployment or digital-service contract is identified in that record.²

No public evidence identified establishing that flydubai operates digital platforms for settlements or supplies technology to settlement authorities.^{2, 3}

Continued operations after July–November 2024

The Israeli aviation authority’s accessible airline listing identifies flydubai’s representative in Israel but does not provide a transaction history sufficient to determine which individual commercial services continued after July or November 2024.²

Israel’s 2023 passenger-data legislation establishes continuing reporting obligations for passenger carriers operating covered flights to and from Israel.¹⁸

The 30 September 2026 flight incident documents a subsequent commercial aviation operation involving passenger and crew information reportedly transmitted to Israeli authorities.^{23, 22}

flydubai’s disclosed 2025 and 2026 enterprise technology agreements concern commercial airline systems. No Israeli military technology recipient or settlement-specific deployment is identified in those agreements.^{7, 10, 17}

AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems

Commercial AI development

The 15 December 2025 AWS collaboration identifies generative AI, machine learning and advanced analytics as development priorities for airline operations and customer experience. The announcement describes a framework for developing and scaling operational applications.¹⁷

The January 2026 Amperity relationship concerns customer data management and identity resolution, including unified customer profiles supporting marketing, customer experience and operational functions.⁹

The January 2026 ZestIoT announcement identifies predictive analytics and AI-supported operational coordination as features of the selected aircraft turnaround management platform.¹²

Flight operations analytics

GE Aerospace’s November 2025 agreement includes Safety Insight and FlightPulse. Safety Insight provides operational risk indicators, while FlightPulse supplies pilot performance analytics relevant to aircraft operation and flight efficiency.¹⁰

The February 2025 Boeing agreement includes Jeppesen FliteDeck Advisor, a digital aviation product delivering flight optimisation guidance.¹³

The June 2026 publication of flydubai’s inaugural sustainability report was reported by Emirates News Agency. The airline described digital tools, AI and data analytics as elements of its aviation efficiency and environmental improvement activities.²⁷

Biometric AI

The July 2025 emaratech deployment uses AI-powered facial recognition to authenticate airline crew during immigration processing at flydubai’s Airport Operations Centre.²⁰

AI provision to Israeli state institutions

No public evidence identified establishing that flydubai develops or supplies AI, machine learning, computer vision or algorithmic decision-support systems to Israeli government, military or intelligence organisations.^{9, 20, 17}

The October 2026 passenger-manifest reporting does not identify an AI system used by flydubai to generate or analyse the information transmitted to Israeli authorities.^{23, 22}

Training data and surveillance-derived datasets

The Amperity and AWS announcements identify airline customer information and operational analytics as intended application areas. Neither announcement identifies training datasets originating from surveillance operations in Israel or occupied Palestinian territories.^{9, 17}

No public evidence identified establishing that flydubai trains AI models on intercepted communications, military intelligence information or datasets derived from surveillance of Palestinians.^{9, 17}

Autonomous military systems

No public evidence identified establishing that flydubai develops or provides autonomous target-generation systems, automated military threat detection, weapons-control software or AI systems designed for kinetic targeting.^{10, 12, 17}

Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint

Israeli commercial technology ecosystem

The Israel Airports Authority identifies Open Sky GSA as flydubai’s Israeli representative.²

Open Sky describes technology partnerships and connections with the Israeli travel technology ecosystem, alongside airline representation and digital marketing services.⁴

The Open Sky Group identifies research, development and innovation services among its business capabilities. Its disclosures do not identify a flydubai-owned Israeli R&D centre or a flydubai-funded Israeli startup investment.⁵

Israeli R&D facilities

No public evidence identified establishing that flydubai directly operates an engineering office, software development centre, technology accelerator or research laboratory in Israel.^{2, 5}

Acquisitions and investments

No public evidence identified establishing acquisition by flydubai of an Israeli technology company or investment in an Israeli cybersecurity, surveillance, AI or military technology startup.^{1, 5}

The existence of an Israeli representative with innovation-related activities does not establish a flydubai equity interest in the representative’s technology investments.^{2, 4, 5}

Controlling principals

Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum was identified as flydubai’s Chairman in the airline’s February 2026 financial announcement, while Open Sky identifies Ephraim Fortis as its founder and principal shareholder.^{1, 5}

No public evidence identified establishing a direct personal investment by these named principals, or by flydubai’s identified technology leadership, in NSO Group, Cellebrite, Carbyne, Check Point, Wiz, Palantir or comparable Israeli defence and surveillance technology companies.^{1, 5}

Digital development outside Israel

In September 2026, flydubai announced plans to modernise its Holidays digital platform, including improved navigation, mobile responsiveness and customer booking management. The announcement did not identify an Israeli development contractor.²⁸

The October 2024 cargo.one partnership concerned digital freight distribution and international sales-channel development. The reviewed announcements do not identify an Israeli research centre, Israeli software developer or Israeli venture investment associated with the arrangement.^{14, 15}

Patent and intellectual property relationships

No public evidence identified establishing patents, technology licensing or joint development arrangements between flydubai and Technion, Hebrew University, the Weizmann Institute or another Israeli research institution.^{5, 28}

Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History

Commercial presence in Israel

The Israel Airports Authority’s public airline directory identifies flydubai’s Tel Aviv representative, Open Sky GSA, and its Israeli airport ground-services provider, QAS.²

Open Sky advertises commercial airline representation, reservations, ticketing, customer service, digital marketing and technology-related capabilities in Israel.^{3, 4}

Corporate disclosure

On 30 June 2026, flydubai announced publication of its inaugural sustainability report for 2025. The associated reporting describes a five-year sustainability strategy and identifies investment in digital tools and operational technology.²⁹

The Emirates News Agency’s coverage of the sustainability report identifies AI and data analytics as areas of flydubai’s operational technology development and refers to the airline’s AWS and Starlink partnerships.²⁷

Passenger information disclosure - October 2026 reporting

Associated Press reported on 4 October 2026 that UAE authorities had transmitted passenger and crew information to Israel before flydubai flight FZ1073 departed on 30 September. The account attributed the information to regional officials familiar with the investigation.²³

AP reported that Israeli authorities had not raised concerns about passengers or crew and described conflicting accounts concerning governmental screening responsibilities.²³

The Jerusalem Post reported on 3 October 2026 that the Israeli Tax Authority held the passenger and crew manifest before departure.²²

The Jerusalem Post additionally described general Mossad access to passenger manifests while indicating that the agency does not normally review them. The article did not establish that Mossad accessed or analysed the particular FZ1073 manifest.²²

The Indian Express reported uncertainty about whether the Israeli Transport Ministry had checked the manifest, including the ministry’s refusal to confirm that such a check had occurred.²⁴

Airline reporting responsibilities under Israeli law

Israel’s Powers for Collection and Analysis of Passenger Data of Persons Entering or Departing Israel Law, 5783-2023, establishes that passenger carriers are responsible for transmitting required passenger and crew information for covered services.¹⁸

No public evidence identified in the replacement source independently verifying the March 2025 NCPIA policy’s specific provisions concerning third-party technology providers, travel agents or other intermediaries.¹⁸

No public evidence identified in the replacement sources independently establishing SITA’s selection as the Israeli government’s technology contractor for its passenger-information gateway.^{18, 19}

The published legislation independently establishes the relevant regulatory responsibilities and statutory passenger-data collection framework. It does not provide a flight-specific audit record identifying the entity that submitted FZ1073 information.¹⁸

Official FZ1073 investigation

On 1 October 2026, the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the UAE Attorney-General had ordered an investigation into the incident involving flydubai flight FZ1073, which was diverted to Saudi Arabia.³⁰

The ministry identified the UAE’s jurisdiction over the incident on the basis that the aircraft was registered in the UAE.³⁰

The announcement concerned the circumstances and causes of the in-flight incident and did not identify a passenger-data transmission system or confirm which organisation supplied records to Israeli authorities.³⁰

NGO and academic investigations

No public evidence identified in the researched material establishing that flydubai is specifically named for supplying surveillance technology, military AI, settlement-related digital infrastructure or cybersecurity services to Israeli state institutions.^{2, 3, 20, 17}

Boycott and divestment campaigns

No public evidence identified establishing an organised campaign specifically targeting flydubai for technology provision to Israeli military institutions, Israeli surveillance operations or settlements.^{2, 3}

Regulatory actions

No public evidence identified establishing a regulatory penalty, technology export-control enforcement action or sanctions investigation concerning flydubai’s digital services supplied to Israeli state bodies.^{2, 3, 29}

The October 2026 reporting described an aviation security investigation following flight FZ1073. It did not establish a completed regulatory finding against flydubai concerning unlawful technology provision or passenger-data processing.^{23, 22, 30}

Technology-related litigation

Open Sky’s airline representation website contains a notice referring to Dubai Aviation Corporation trading as flydubai and Omer Bergman in Israeli court file 68269-05-20. The accessible notice does not establish the subject matter, outcome or existence of a technology-related cause of action.³¹

Data-protection and supplier transparency

The publicly announced Amperity customer-data partnership, AWS cloud collaboration and hybrid cloud migration identify important components of flydubai’s digital infrastructure. These disclosures do not provide a complete data-processing geography, customer-data subprocesser inventory or supplier-level assessment of Israeli jurisdictional exposure.^{9, 21, 17}

The October 2026 FZ1073 reporting adds evidence of identifiable passenger and crew information reportedly being provided to Israeli authorities in connection with an international flight.^{23, 22}

Israel’s 2023 passenger-data legislation supplies additional evidence of a standing statutory reporting framework assigning responsibility to passenger carriers and establishing the national passenger-data analysis centre within the Israeli Tax Authority. No public evidence identified in the replacement sources independently verifying the particular technology gateway described in the March 2025 NCPIA policy or January 2025 CUSRES guide.^{18, 19}

No public evidence identified establishing the actual sender, individual message channel, storage location, retention arrangements or intelligence-agency use of FZ1073 information.^{23, 22, 18, 19}