L3Harris Technologies

Key Findings

• Military: L3Harris’s fuzing business was named among principal contractors in a February 2025 notification of a possible Israeli munitions sale; a June 2026 procurement record separately identifies L3 Technologies for image-intensifier tubes destined for Israel. The first is a proposed-sale authorisation; the second records an award without establishing delivery or operational use.^{1, 2}
• Digital: Historical reporting attributes naval platform-management systems to L3 on Israeli Sa’ar vessels. These incorporate digital control software, but vessel-specific configurations, current operation and Israeli maintenance arrangements remain unresolved.^{3, 4, 5}
• Economic: Corporate announcements document sustained cooperation with IAI/ELTA, including South Korea’s selection of an airborne early-warning programme valued above $2.26 billion. That is the overall programme value, not ELTA’s revenue or an Israeli procurement value.^{6, 7, 8}
• Not found: No public evidence identified of current L3Harris-owned settlement facilities or settlement-specific service contracts. Historical checkpoint-screening allegations require a material qualification: the relevant security-detection business was sold to Leidos in May 2020, and continued L3Harris servicing was not established.^{3, 9, 10}

Target Profile

Executive Summary

L3Harris’s documented Israel/Palestine nexus centres on military equipment, embedded digital systems and cooperation with Israeli defence manufacturers. The strongest government-linked records are the February 2025 notification naming its fuzing business in a possible Israeli munitions sale and the June 2026 award identifying L3 Technologies for image-intensifier tubes destined for Israel. Separately, L3Harris and Israel Aerospace Industries announced a memorandum to pursue Israel’s light-attack aircraft programme through a proposed Blue Sky Warden configuration. These records establish different transaction stages: an authorised possible sale, a recorded procurement award and a programme-pursuit agreement.^{14, 1, 2}

The industrial relationship extends beyond Israeli procurement. L3Harris and IAI’s ELTA Systems collaborated on airborne early-warning and control offerings in 2023, followed by South Korea’s selection of their team in October 2025 for a programme valued above $2.26 billion. Earlier plans included integration and radar testing at an ELTA facility in Israel. L3Harris also markets an electronic-countermeasure pod originally designed by ELTA. These are documented Israeli industrial and technology relationships; the Korean programme’s customer is South Korea, and published figures do not disclose ELTA’s contractual share.^{6, 7, 8, 17}

The digital record includes historical naval platform-management systems and checkpoint scanners. Naval supplier attribution is more specifically corroborated for Sa’ar 6 than Sa’ar 5, while current software operation and Israeli support obligations remain unverified. The naval technology must be classified as integrated platform management, rather than attributed as the vessels’ combat-management system. Checkpoint-screening findings are qualified by the May 2020 sale of the relevant business to Leidos. L3Harris’s reported 2022 discussions concerning NSO surveillance technology were abandoned; no completed acquisition or Pegasus transfer was established.^{3, 9, 4, 5, 18, 19}

No public evidence identified establishes current L3Harris settlement facilities, settlement-specific service contracts, Project Nimbus participation or an Israeli autonomous target-selection platform supplied by the company. General surveillance capabilities, multinational weapons programmes and aggregate political spending cannot independently establish those relationships. The final human-vetted V6.6 result is BRS 694, Tier B (Severe Complicity). This is the corpus’s evidence-based classification, not a judicial determination; the audits identified no final judgment establishing the legality or illegality of the specific procurement relationships examined.^{14, 3, 11, 10, 20, 21, 22}

Timeline of Relevant Events

Corporate Overview

L3Harris is a Delaware-incorporated, publicly traded US technology company headquartered in Melbourne, Florida. Its disclosed business serves government, defence and commercial customers. The January 2026 reorganisation identified three principal operating segments: Space & Mission Systems, Communications & Spectrum Dominance, and Missile Solutions.^{11, 25, 12}

The February 2026 subsidiary schedule includes L3 Technologies and Aerojet Rocketdyne-related entities. The reviewed 2025 and 2026 schedules did not identify an Israeli-incorporated subsidiary; those schedules are not exhaustive registers of every establishment, minority investment or contractual relationship. No public evidence identified of a completed controlling acquisition of an Israeli operating company. IAI and ELTA are documented industrial partners, not established L3Harris-controlled subsidiaries.^{14, 6, 10, 26}

Corporate continuity also matters for naval systems. UK records identify the continuing company numbered 05341813 under successive names, including L3 MAPPS Limited and, from January 2022, L3Harris MAPPS Limited. This supports continuity of the business rather than a documented sale of historical Israeli IPMS installations to an independent purchaser. It does not settle the contracting entity or support obligations for those installations.²⁷

Two other businesses were divested: security detection to Leidos in 2020 and Combat Propulsion Systems to RENK in 2021. Their historical activities remain part of the record, but later production, maintenance and replacement cannot automatically be attributed to L3Harris.^{9, 23}

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

The February 2025 DSCA notification names L3Harris Fuzing and Ordnance Systems among principal contractors for a possible Israeli procurement package estimated at $6.75 billion. Requested equipment included bombs, guidance kits and 17,475 FMU-152A/B fuzes. The notice does not assign a company-specific quantity or value to L3Harris. It establishes a formal procurement-authorisation connection, rather than completed delivery of the package.¹

The June 2026 record is more concrete as an award: W91CRB26C5059 names L3 Technologies for image-intensifier tubes destined for Israel under FMS case IS-B-ZMQ, with approximately $1.4 million obligated and a $7.3 million ceiling. The accessible summary does not establish delivered quantities, recipient units or operational use.²

Blue Sky Warden is a proposed military-specific aircraft configuration combining L3Harris’s platform with IAI mission equipment, an open-architecture mission computer and Israeli-specific software. IAI would lead testing and airworthiness work involving Israeli defence authorities. The signed memorandum establishes direct programme cooperation, but not an Israeli aircraft procurement award.¹⁴

CAAT reports that L3Harris manufactures Brighton-made F-35 weapons-release cables, including adaptations enabling Israeli aircraft to carry Israeli-made munitions. This is a company-specific civil-society finding, stronger than generic participation in the international F-35 programme, but its underlying engineering specifications, modification contract and delivery records remain unverified.^{15, 16}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The company’s strongest defence is transaction specificity. The munitions notice concerns a possible sale; the aircraft memorandum concerns programme pursuit; and the image-intensifier award does not prove deployment. Neither the entire $6.75 billion package nor South Korea’s $2.26 billion programme can be represented as Israeli revenue received by L3Harris.^{14, 1, 2, 8}

L3Harris’s substantial participation in the multinational F-35 programme, together with Israeli operation of F-35I aircraft, does not trace an individual component to a named Israeli aircraft. CAAT’s adapted-cable reporting remains attributed reporting. No public evidence identified independently confirming the additional claims concerning L3Harris design authority over the Israeli-manufactured VER-2 rack or certification duties for new weapons on Israeli F-16 aircraft.^{15, 16, 28, 29}

Historical Merkava propulsion attribution is mitigated by the RENK divestiture. Historical naval allegations also require technical correction: platform-management equipment is distinct from combat-management equipment. No public evidence identified of named L3Harris contracts for Iron Dome, David’s Sling or Arrow, autonomous Israeli target generation, or construction and demolition machinery used in settlements.^{3, 23, 4, 30}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

• L3Harris Fuzing and Ordnance Systems; DSCA: named contractor in a possible Israeli weapons sale; company allocation and completed shipments unresolved.¹
• L3 Technologies; US Army: named award for Israeli-bound image-intensifier tubes; delivery and use unresolved.²
• IAI; Israeli Ministry of Defense; Israeli Air Force: proposed aircraft development, integration and testing relationship.¹⁴
• CAAT; Israeli F-35 fleet: attributed finding concerning adapted weapons-release cables; primary engineering and delivery verification incomplete.^{15, 16}
• RENK: purchaser of the historical propulsion business, limiting subsequent L3Harris attribution.²³

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

The clearest current technology partnerships involve IAI/ELTA. The 2023 airborne early-warning announcements combine L3Harris integration with ELTA radar, surveillance and battle-management technology. South Korea’s October 2025 selection advances that relationship to a customer-selected programme. The separately marketed Advanced Capability Pod identifies ELTA as original designer and reports more than 100 operational pods internationally, without identifying an Israeli military purchase of the jointly marketed version.^{6, 7, 8, 17}

Blue Sky Warden adds a proposed Israeli military mission-computing relationship. Its intended IAI computer would host Israeli-specific software, with mission-equipment integration and testing involving Israeli authorities. The announcement does not specify algorithms, training data, autonomous decision functions or operational data residency.¹⁴

AFSC attributes ship-management systems on Sa’ar 5 and Sa’ar 6 vessels to L3; Analisi Difesa specifically corroborates L3 MAPPS’s Sa’ar 6 IPMS role. Manufacturer documentation describes substantive embedded software for sensor acquisition, automatic control sequences, propulsion and electrical management, alarms and operator interfaces. The installed contribution therefore concerns digital control capability as well as physical equipment.^{3, 4, 5}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

IPMS manages machinery, power and damage-control functions. It must not be relabelled as the vessels’ tactical combat-management system. Primary manufacturer records do not independently confirm vessel-specific L3 installations for both classes, and the Sa’ar 6 attribution is better corroborated than Sa’ar 5. Optional damage-control automation, simulation and maintenance modules cannot be presumed installed on Israeli vessels.^{4, 5, 30, 31}

L3Harris retained IPMS production and support capabilities through 2026, demonstrated by Polish and British records. These concern other customers. No public evidence identified establishes a dated Israeli removal or replacement, current software execution, an Israeli maintenance agreement, licence renewal or remote support. Historical installation remains a potential residual digital contribution; neither continued operation nor cessation is independently verified.^{3, 4, 5, 32, 33}

AFSC’s checkpoint-scanner reporting is historical, and the business was sold to Leidos in 2020. No public evidence identified of subsequent L3Harris updates or servicing at the named crossings. Reported NSO negotiations were abandoned; they do not establish ownership of NSO, Pegasus licensing or deployment. Likewise, US and UK demonstrations of Deceptor and DiSCO do not establish Israeli provision.^{3, 9, 18, 19, 21, 22}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

• IAI/ELTA: documented radar, surveillance, command-and-control and countermeasure partnerships; customer and programme distinctions remain essential.^{6, 7, 8, 17}
• L3 MAPPS/L3Harris MAPPS; Sa’ar vessels: historical platform-management attribution; precise configurations and present support unresolved.^{3, 4, 5, 27}
• Leidos; SafeView/ProVision: purchaser of the relevant screening business; historical checkpoint installations do not establish current L3Harris control.^{3, 9}
• NSO Group: discontinued acquisition discussions, with no completed technology transfer established.^{18, 19}

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

Economic involvement is documented through industrial collaboration rather than established Israeli ownership of L3Harris. The March 2023 Korean programme plan assigned initial aircraft modifications to Texas and subsequent integration and radar testing to an ELTA facility in Israel. The October 2025 selection confirms ELTA’s participation in the selected international programme, while leaving its revenue and workshare undisclosed.^{6, 8}

The Advanced Capability Pod relationship provides another documented route for international commercialisation of Israeli-origin defence technology. Blue Sky Warden separately proposes Israeli mission-system integration and flight-testing activity for Israel’s domestic military requirement. These identify economic mechanisms without establishing their annual contribution to Israeli employment, tax receipts or GDP.^{14, 17}

Weapons-component reporting and the Israeli-bound procurement award add supply-chain and customer exposure. Nevertheless, programme ceilings, possible-sale totals and group-wide production cannot be converted into verified Israel-specific turnover or profit.^{1, 2, 15, 16}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest limitation is the absence of quantified Israeli economic attribution. No public evidence identified establishes annual Israeli customer revenue, payments to ELTA, Israeli payroll or tax payments, or royalties under the pod partnership. South Korea’s programme value belongs to the whole programme; the original plan for work at ELTA’s facility does not establish L3Harris ownership of that facility.^{6, 8, 17}

No public evidence identified of an L3Harris-owned Israeli manufacturing plant, permanent office or R&D centre, a completed controlling acquisition of an Israeli business, Israeli sovereign-bond holdings or settlement-specific capital expenditure. The subsidiary schedules’ silence is qualified by their scope and does not prove that every possible establishment or minority interest is absent.^{10, 26}

No public evidence identified of settlement-origin sourcing, settlement customers or country-of-origin labelling enforcement. Defence cooperation with an Israeli company cannot itself establish that a supplier operates in a settlement. Historical equipment attribution must also respect the Leidos and RENK divestitures.^{3, 9, 23, 10}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

• ELTA: named industrial partner and planned Israeli integration site; financial allocation undisclosed.^{6, 8}
• IAI: proposed local mission-system and testing partner for Blue Sky Warden; completed procurement and payments unestablished.¹⁴
• Advanced Capability Pod: internationally marketed ELTA-origin technology; partner revenue and Israeli purchases undisclosed.¹⁷
• L3Harris group entities: disclosed multinational structure, without an identified Israeli-incorporated subsidiary in the reviewed schedules.^{10, 26}

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

The strongest Israel-specific political evidence is official corporate endorsement of a named military programme. The October 2025 announcement presents Blue Sky Warden as tailored to Israel’s operational and industrial requirements. Jon Rambeau spoke in his executive capacity supporting the programme; IAI’s Boaz Levy described its responsiveness to Israeli defence requirements. This supports attribution of a favourable corporate position toward that procurement pursuit.¹⁴

The company also maintains a formal political-advocacy structure. Its disclosures assign lobbying and political contributions to Government Relations under board oversight. Public-record compilations identify 2025 lobbying concerning FMS and DCS congressional notifications, including H.R. 3613, and continued arms-sales notification lobbying in the first half of 2026. These activities concern international arms-sales procedures, with no identified recipient-country instruction.^{20, 34}

The BDS Movement lists L3Harris among institutional divestment targets. That establishes organised campaign scrutiny rather than independent verification of every campaign allegation. A separate shareholder solicitation challenged lobbying transparency; it is a shareholder’s argument, not a regulatory finding.^{35, 36}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

Commercial support for a military programme does not establish endorsement of settlement expansion, displacement or a particular military operation. No public evidence identified of Israel-specific instructions behind the notification-threshold lobbying or advocacy for a named Israeli transfer. CRS explains Israel’s existing preferential review treatment, but general threshold legislation’s possible relevance to Israel does not establish L3Harris’s country-specific motive.^{14, 34, 37}

The FEC records approximately $2.24 million in PAC contributions to other committees for January 2025–September 2026. The company describes the PAC as voluntarily funded by eligible participants. No public evidence identified ties a specific payment to settlement advocacy; aggregate PAC spending cannot serve as a proxy for such activity.^{20, 38}

No public evidence identified of verified corporate donations to Israeli military-welfare or settlement organisations, Palestine-specific employee discipline, or current leaders personally endorsing settlement expansion. Mehta and Hay took office after the October 2025 memorandum; the records do not establish that they personally initiated or authorised it. Kubasik’s subsequent governance investigation was described as unrelated to customer relationships and was not linked to Israel-Palestine activity.^{14, 13, 20}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

• Jon Rambeau; IAI; Israeli defence authorities: official programme advocacy and institutional cooperation.¹⁴
• Government Relations; L3Harris PAC: documented political infrastructure; Israel-specific spending attribution unestablished.^{20, 38}
• H.R. 3613; FMS/DCS procedures: documented lobbying subjects, without verified Israel-specific instructions.^{34, 37}
• Sam Mehta; Lewis Hay III; Christopher Kubasik: dated leadership succession; no automatic personal attribution of earlier corporate decisions.¹³
• BDS Movement; shareholder John Chevedden: campaign listing and disclosure challenge, distinct from independently established misconduct.^{35, 36}

Complicity Index Score

Method: V6.6. Final human-vetted scores.

• V_MAX: 7.50 Avg_OTHERS: 4.13
• BRS Score: 694 Tier: B (Severe Complicity)

Military drives V_MAX through the named Israeli procurement record, proposed munitions relationship, military-aircraft partnership and qualified weapons-integration reporting.^{14, 1, 2, 15, 16} The remaining fixed values reflect documented digital and industrial relationships and corporate programme advocacy, while retaining the audits’ limits concerning current deployments, economic allocation and Israel-specific lobbying.^{8, 4, 5, 20, 34} The resulting tier follows the supplied scale-free, evidence-only, human-vetted V6.6 assessment; this dossier preserves those values without inventing a retrospective numerical derivation or treating the classification as a legal verdict.

Methodology Note

• This dossier compiles only the four supplied domain audits, with research cutoffs of 25–26 October 2026. Primary disclosures, procurement records, secondary reporting and civil-society findings retain their different evidentiary status.
• V6.6 is scale-free: Impact (I) concerns activity type, Magnitude (M) concerns scale, and Proximity (P) concerns directness. The supplied final scores remain unchanged.
• Temporal attribution distinguishes historical supply, current operation and new procurement. Divested or exited operations are mitigated; later activity is not automatically attributed to the former owner.
• Entity attribution excludes transitive guilt: shared platforms, partners’ conduct and NSO’s lobbying do not establish L3Harris transactions or responsibility without a specific evidentiary link.
• Verified settlement operation dual-counts in Economic and Political. This methodological rule does not supply missing evidence of settlement operations here.
• “No public evidence identified” records the outcome of reviewed checks, not proof of universal absence. Unresolved configurations, support obligations, deliveries and allegations remain explicitly qualified.