L3Harris Technologies DIGITAL

Target: L3Harris Technologies, Inc. Research date: 26 October 2026 Evidence period: Historical records through October 2026. Scope: Digital technology, surveillance, communications, data infrastructure, Israeli technology-sector relationships and relevant activity in occupied Palestinian territory.

Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships

Israeli-origin technology partnerships

On 20 March 2023, L3Harris announced a teaming agreement with Israel Aerospace Industries’ ELTA Systems Group and Korean Air for the Republic of Korea’s Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft programme, combining aircraft mission integration with Israeli-origin radar and surveillance-system technology.¹

On 11 July 2023, L3Harris announced an expanded collaboration with ELTA involving a Bombardier Global 6500 aircraft, ELTA airborne early-warning technology and an ELTA Battle Management Command and Control Suite, with L3Harris responsible for aircraft mission integration.²

On 20 October 2025, L3Harris announced that the Republic of Korea had selected its team with Bombardier, IAI/ELTA and Korean Air for an AEW&C programme valued at more than $2.26 billion, confirming progression of the previously announced partnership to a customer-awarded programme.³

L3Harris markets an Advanced Capability Pod (ACaP) developed with ELTA, which the company identifies as the original designer; the pod incorporates automatic electronic threat prioritisation and radio-frequency countermeasures, and L3Harris reports more than 100 operational pods across multiple international aircraft fleets.⁴

The ACaP corporate product description establishes an ongoing marketed technology collaboration with an Israeli-origin defence-technology supplier but does not identify which countries operate the equipment or establish that the Israeli military purchased the jointly marketed version.⁴

Israeli-origin enterprise software

No public evidence identified establishing L3Harris as a licensee or enterprise customer of Check Point, Wiz, SentinelOne, CyberArk, NICE, Verint, Claroty, Palo Alto Networks or the other named Israeli-origin enterprise software suppliers; the reviewed company disclosures establish specific ELTA collaborations but do not disclose an internal cybersecurity vendor register.^{2, 5}

No public evidence identified concerning the number of endpoints, employees, business units, cloud tenants or networks dependent on Israeli-origin enterprise security software at L3Harris.^{5, 6}

Procurement and systems integration

The 2023 and 2025 AEW&C announcements establish a technology integration relationship in which L3Harris acts as a programme integrator and IAI/ELTA supplies Israeli-origin airborne surveillance, radar and command-and-control technologies for a South Korean customer.^{1, 3}

L3Harris’ October 2025 announcement identifies IAI as an intended integrator of mission equipment and Israeli-specific software for the proposed Blue Sky Warden aircraft configuration, with the Israeli Ministry of Defense and Israeli Air Force involved in anticipated testing and airworthiness activities.⁷

No public evidence identified showing that a third-party enterprise IT outsourcer deployed Israeli-origin cybersecurity software within L3Harris’ internal networks.^{5, 6}

Corporate structure and attribution

The company’s SEC subsidiary exhibit dated 14 February 2025 identifies its consolidated corporate entities, including L3 Technologies and L3Harris Azimuth Security Pty. Limited; the exhibit establishes group relationships without identifying the location of every operating site or contractor.⁸

The corresponding exhibit dated 12 February 2026 provides a later consolidated subsidiary snapshot and does not establish a specifically named Israeli-incorporated subsidiary in the reviewed entries.⁹

On 5 January 2026, L3Harris announced a reorganisation into Space & Mission Systems, Communications & Spectrum Dominance, and Missile Solutions, identifying the operating groups through which its relevant electronic-surveillance and communications businesses were organised at that date.¹⁰

Dated corporate records establish continuity of the L3 MAPPS business within the L3Harris corporate structure. The merger of Harris Corporation and L3 Technologies completed on 29 June 2019, creating L3Harris Technologies. UK Companies House records identify the continuing company numbered 05341813 as L-3 Communications Marine Systems UK Limited until 13 April 2018, L3 MAPPS Limited until 7 January 2022, and L3Harris MAPPS Limited thereafter. The company remained active in the registry reviewed through 26 October 2026. These records establish corporate succession and business-name changes, rather than a transfer of the historically installed Israeli IPMS systems to an independent purchaser.^{11, 12}

The continued operation of L3Harris’ naval IPMS business is independently supported by its 14 January 2025 Australian Hunter-class frigate contract announcement and 6 May 2026 Polish Miecznik-class frigate announcement. The latter describes continuing development of IPMS technology and deliveries to nearly 300 vessels across 28 navies. UK Ministry of Defence procurement notices published on 9 March and 4 September 2026 separately identify L3Harris MAPPS Limited as the intended supplier of specified platform-management-system support. The September notice identifies that company as original equipment manufacturer and design authority for the named British platforms, with specialised responsibility for design knowledge, configuration, defect correction, capability development and obsolescence management. These records demonstrate retained IPMS production, integration and support capabilities within the L3Harris business during 2026. They do not identify an Israeli support contract or establish that contractual design authority, source-code ownership or software-licensing obligations for the historical Israeli installations remained with precisely the same corporate entity.^{13, 14, 15, 16}

Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology

Communications surveillance

AFSC Investigate’s company profile, updated through September 2024, identifies L3Harris as a supplier of cell-site simulators, including Stingray and Crossbow, used to identify or locate mobile devices by imitating cellular base stations.¹⁷

AFSC documents historical use of L3Harris surveillance devices by United States immigration enforcement authorities, including a 2022 contract with a potential value of $4.3 million for equipment intended to locate targeted mobile handsets; these records establish surveillance capabilities and US customer relationships, rather than deployment in Israel.¹⁷

CAAT’s L3Harris profile identifies the company’s communications-surveillance and electronic-warfare technologies, including IMSI-catcher capabilities and its Trenchant offensive-cyber business.¹⁸

Biometric and checkpoint screening

AFSC reports that L3 SafeView body scanners were installed at the Qalandia, Bethlehem and Sha’ar Efraim checkpoints in the occupied West Bank, and that SafeView or ProVision systems were installed at the Erez crossing in Gaza; these are historical deployment findings concerning security-screening technology.¹⁷

According to AFSC, L3Harris sold the relevant aviation security business, including SafeView and ProVision, to Leidos in 2020; the documented historical checkpoint deployments therefore do not independently establish present L3Harris ownership or maintenance responsibility.¹⁷

No public evidence identified establishing post-2020 operation, software updates, servicing or licensing of those scanners by L3Harris itself at the named checkpoints.^{17, 18}

Facial recognition and retail analytics

No public evidence identified that L3Harris procured or deployed Israeli-origin facial-recognition, gait-analysis, frictionless-checkout or retail behavioural-analytics platforms from Trigo, BriefCam, AnyVision/Oosto, Trax or comparable suppliers.^{17, 18}

Predictive analytics and workforce monitoring

The company’s electronic-warfare portfolio includes sensor fusion, spectrum monitoring, threat analysis and machine-learning applications; these are documented defence-oriented monitoring capabilities rather than proof of Israeli-origin workforce surveillance software.¹⁹

No public evidence identified establishing that L3Harris uses Israeli-origin predictive-policing, employee-monitoring or social-media sentiment-analysis software within its enterprise operations.^{18, 19}

Indirect deployment

No public evidence identified establishing that the reviewed Israeli-origin facial-recognition or workforce-surveillance products enter L3Harris operations through managed security services, bundled software suites or an undisclosed reseller.^{5, 19}

Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation

Cloud-enabled electronic-warfare infrastructure

On 11 September 2025, L3Harris announced a UK demonstration of its cloud-based Distributed Spectrum Collaboration and Operations (DiSCO) architecture, which combined geographically separated sensor information with Spectrum Server to construct a common electromagnetic-spectrum operating picture.²⁰

The demonstrated functions included aggregation of communications and radar information from distributed sensors, near-real-time analysis and presentation of electromagnetic-spectrum activity; the announcement identifies a UK demonstration and does not establish an Israeli deployment.²⁰

On 14 April 2026, L3Harris described an autonomous electronic-warfare experiment involving its Deceptor payload and DiSCO ecosystem, in which distributed sensors detected and geolocated radio-frequency threats, combined sensor data and supported electronic jamming during a US Army experiment.²¹

These publicly described capabilities establish that L3Harris develops systems capable of collecting, processing and fusing communications-related sensor information; neither announcement identifies Israeli data centres, Israeli cloud infrastructure or Israeli jurisdiction over the resulting datasets.^{20, 21}

Israeli data centres

No public evidence identified establishing that L3Harris owns, leases or operates a data centre in Israel, or that data collected by its publicly described surveillance and electronic-warfare systems is routinely routed through Israeli-controlled cloud infrastructure.^{9, 20, 21}

The 2025 and 2026 SEC subsidiary exhibits disclose corporate ownership structures but do not provide a complete map of cloud-region selection, colocation facilities, customer-tenancy geography or subcontracted data processing.^{8, 9}

Project Nimbus and government cloud procurement

No public evidence identified establishing L3Harris as a Project Nimbus contractor, subcontractor, reseller, technology provider or customer.^{5, 9}

No public evidence identified establishing that L3Harris provides cloud hosting, data-sovereignty infrastructure or government-cloud resilience services specifically to Israeli public authorities.^{5, 20}

Data residency and legal accessibility

No public evidence identified specifying Israeli storage, processing, model-training or onward-transfer locations for data collected by L3Harris cell-site simulators, electronic-warfare sensors or airborne surveillance platforms.^{17, 20, 21}

The October 2025 Blue Sky Warden announcement describes a planned Israeli-specific mission computer and software configuration but does not specify where operational data would be stored, processed or legally accessible if the proposed programme reached deployment.⁷

Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships

Israel Aerospace Industries and Israeli defence institutions

On 15 October 2025, L3Harris and Israel Aerospace Industries announced a memorandum of understanding to jointly pursue the Israeli Light-Attack Aircraft programme, proposing an Israeli configuration of L3Harris’ Sky Warden platform called Blue Sky Warden.⁷

The proposed aircraft configuration incorporates an IAI open-architecture mission computer intended to host Israeli-specific software and capabilities, with IAI responsible for integrating mission equipment and leading testing and airworthiness activities involving the Israeli Ministry of Defense and Air Force.⁷

The October 2025 document establishes a direct announced technology-development partnership intended for Israeli military procurement; it does not itself demonstrate that Israel placed a production order or received operational aircraft.⁷

The same announcement identifies Sky Warden as L3Harris’ commercial designation for the OA-1K Skyraider II aircraft developed for US Special Operations Command, while describing the proposed Israeli mission-computer and ISR integration separately.⁷

The airborne ISR, communications and general-purpose mission-computing elements fall within this digital-technology audit; the aircraft’s purpose-built light-attack and kinetic weapons capabilities are matters for separate Military analysis.⁷

Israeli naval and platform-management systems

AFSC reports that L3 supplied management systems installed aboard Israeli Sa’ar 5 and Sa’ar 6 naval vessels, documenting a historical technology relationship involving integrated ship-management infrastructure.¹⁷

The AFSC account does not establish the exact present software version, the current maintenance provider, or the date and terms of the latest system-support agreement.¹⁷

Historical checkpoint technology

AFSC documents the use of L3-manufactured security-scanning equipment at checkpoints in occupied Palestinian territory, including locations in the West Bank and at the Gaza crossing; the relevant security-screening business was sold in 2020.¹⁷

These historical installations constitute a documented territorial deployment of surveillance and screening technology, while the reviewed sources do not establish continuing L3Harris control after the divestiture.¹⁷

Offensive cyber capabilities

CAAT describes L3Harris’ Trenchant business and the acquisition of Azimuth and Linchpin capabilities in 2018 [pre-2020], associating the acquired businesses with vulnerability research and surveillance-exploit technologies; the reviewed material does not document a specific Israeli state customer for these capabilities.¹⁸

The 2025 SEC subsidiary exhibit identifies Azimuth-related corporate entities within the wider L3Harris group, providing a separate corporate-disclosure reference for the group’s involvement in that technology area.⁸

In July 2022, The Guardian reported that L3Harris had abandoned discussions to acquire Israeli spyware developer NSO Group’s surveillance technology after US government objections.²²

The Register separately reported on 11 July 2022 that L3Harris had told US officials it planned to end its attempt to acquire NSO Group following opposition to the proposed transaction, while noting conflicting accounts that negotiations might resume.²³

The US Bureau of Industry and Security had added NSO Group to its Entity List on 4 November 2021, citing the development and supply of spyware subsequently used against journalists, activists and other targets.²⁴

The reported acquisition discussions establish commercial interest in Israeli offensive-surveillance technology during 2022 but do not establish an acquisition, licensing agreement, operational deployment or transfer of Pegasus technology to L3Harris.^{22, 23}

Additional military communications technology

L3Harris’ electronic-warfare portfolio includes electronic-support measures, communications-related intelligence collection, sensor fusion, countermeasures and software-defined spectrum operations; its corporate materials do not identify an Israeli end user for every listed product.¹⁹

No public evidence identified establishing Israeli deployment of L3Harris’ Deceptor or DiSCO systems, notwithstanding their documented operation in US and UK demonstrations during 2025–2026.^{20, 21}

L3Harris’ manufacturer documentation identifies its Integrated Platform Management System (IPMS) as a ship automation and control system covering propulsion, electrical power, auxiliary machinery and damage control. It is distinct in function from a combat-management system (CMS), which integrates tactical sensors, weapons and command-and-control capabilities. Elbit Systems independently identifies its naval command-and-control technology as operational aboard Israeli Sa’ar 5 corvettes. These primary manufacturer records support the existing audit statement under “Israeli naval and platform-management systems” that L3 supplied integrated ship-management infrastructure, while clarifying that the described L3 technology should be classified as platform management rather than combat management. They do not establish that L3 supplied both categories of system.^{25, 26}

Through 26 October 2026 - no public evidence identified: the reviewed L3Harris manufacturer documentation and published naval customer portfolio do not explicitly identify Sa’ar 5 or Sa’ar 6 by name as recipients of L3Harris IPMS equipment. Consequently, the manufacturer records establish the system’s technical classification but do not independently verify the vessel-specific supply claim for both classes. The existing attribution remains supported by the previously cited AFSC investigation, with separate secondary reporting specifically identifying L3 MAPPS as the Sa’ar 6 IPMS supplier.^{25, 27, 28}

The AFSC investigation attributes ship-management systems aboard Israeli Sa’ar 5 and Sa’ar 6 corvettes to L3, while Giovanni Martinelli’s 10 November 2021 analysis in Analisi Difesa independently names L3 MAPPS as the Sa’ar 6 Integrated Platform Management System (IPMS) supplier. Martinelli describes the IPMS as controlling the ship’s platform and separately discusses its integrated bridge, electronic-warfare equipment and proposed Elbit ENTCS combat-management system. These vessel-specific accounts establish a historical supplier attribution for integrated platform-control capability, but neither identifies the installed software release, source-code components, individual automation routines or licensed modules. The Sa’ar 6 attribution is more specifically corroborated than the Sa’ar 5 attribution in these sources.^{17, 28}

L3Harris’ technical documentation establishes that IPMS is a distributed real-time digital control system containing substantive software functions. Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) acquire and validate sensor readings, detect limit violations, execute automatic control sequences and issue actuator commands. The manufacturer explicitly locates automatic propulsion-control, electrical-power-management and other machinery-control software in these units. Operator consoles provide graphical human-machine interfaces, while the system’s software records timestamped sensor changes and control commands, manages alarms and communicates over a redundant network. Accordingly, the supplier attribution concerns a product incorporating embedded control software, operator-interface software and automated machinery-management logic, as well as physical electronic equipment. The available vessel-specific reporting does not establish precisely which standard functions or software configurations were commissioned aboard the Israeli vessels.^{17, 28, 25}

The manufacturer’s catalogue additionally describes optional Battle Damage Control System functionality, including automated casualty-response sequences, compartment isolation, ventilation control, incident plotting and ship-stability calculations. It describes condition-based maintenance using sensor analysis and expert-system software, digital video monitoring, and an On-Board Training System incorporating simulated machinery models and emulated control sequences. Its separate training documentation identifies Orchid software for dynamic simulation and instructor-controlled exercises. These are documented capabilities of the wider IPMS product family, but the Israeli installation reports do not confirm procurement, installation, activation or continuing licensing of those optional modules. In particular, generic descriptions of automated damage control, predictive maintenance and simulation cannot establish their operation on Sa’ar 5 or Sa’ar 6 vessels.^{25, 29, 30}

The 2026 British procurement records demonstrate that L3Harris MAPPS continued providing or being selected for specialist lifecycle support for platform-management systems, including technical support, post-design services and management of obsolescence. Such support can depend upon manufacturer-specific configuration knowledge and compatibility with installed systems. However, the identified contracts concern British naval platforms. They provide evidence of the company’s continuing capability to maintain and evolve IPMS installations, without establishing corresponding maintenance, software updates, licence renewals, remote access or technical assistance for Israeli Sa’ar vessels.^{15, 16}

Through 26 October 2026 - no public evidence identified: the reviewed AFSC investigation, Sa’ar 6 technical reporting, L3Harris manufacturer documentation, subsequent naval contracts and UK corporate records do not identify a dated Israeli IPMS removal, replacement, migration or decommissioning event; a vessel-specific software-maintenance agreement; a support termination notice; or confirmation of the exact operational status of the historically installed L3-origin software. The historically documented installation therefore remains attributable as a potential residual installed digital contribution, but continued live execution through the cutoff cannot be independently verified from these sources. Equally, the absence of a published Israeli support agreement does not demonstrate cessation of maintenance, licensing or other supplier responsibilities. Historical installation, continuing operation and new supply remain separate evidentiary questions.^{17, 28, 25, 13, 14, 15, 16}

AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems

Electronic-warfare automation

L3Harris’ April 2026 US Army experiment demonstrated autonomous detection and geolocation of radio-frequency threats, integration of information from multiple sensors, and coordinated electronic-warfare activity involving Deceptor and DiSCO.²¹

The company describes the experiment as using AI-enabled sensing and effects, establishing a documented artificial-intelligence application to electromagnetic-spectrum monitoring and threat processing.²¹

The company’s wider electronic-warfare portfolio describes machine-learning applications for recognising and responding to changing electromagnetic threats, including automated and reconfigurable systems.¹⁹

No public evidence identified demonstrating provision of Deceptor, DiSCO or their AI functionality to Israeli military or security bodies.^{19, 21}

Airborne surveillance and command-and-control systems

The 2023 L3Harris/ELTA partnership identifies Israeli-origin airborne early-warning technology and an operationally proven Battle Management Command and Control Suite as elements of a proposed international AEW&C offering.²

The South Korean government’s October 2025 programme award, as described by L3Harris, confirms the team’s participation in a contracted airborne early-warning programme incorporating Israeli-origin ELTA technology.³

The October 2025 Blue Sky Warden proposal identifies an IAI mission computer intended to run Israeli-specific software, but does not specify the algorithms, model architecture, training datasets or exact autonomous decision-making functionality intended for the system.⁷

Training data and population surveillance

No public evidence identified that L3Harris trained AI models using intercepted Palestinian civilian communications, checkpoint biometric records or population datasets collected within Israel or occupied Palestinian territory.^{7, 17, 21}

No public evidence identified of a contract granting L3Harris access to Israeli military intelligence databases for general-purpose AI-model training.^{7, 21}

Autonomous targeting and lethal systems

The October 2025 Blue Sky Warden announcement concerns an aircraft capable of both intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance activity and light-attack operations, but does not establish deployment of autonomous target-generation software to Israeli forces.⁷

No public evidence identified establishing an Israeli contract for a L3Harris autonomous target-selection algorithm or kill-chain automation platform distinct from the general-purpose mission-computing and surveillance technologies described in the reviewed records.^{7, 21}

Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint

Israeli technology development partnerships

The March and July 2023 announcements document L3Harris cooperation with Israel Aerospace Industries’ ELTA Systems Group in airborne surveillance, radar integration and battle-management technology.^{1, 2}

The October 2025 Blue Sky Warden memorandum identifies further proposed integration of IAI-developed Israeli-specific software and mission equipment into an L3Harris aircraft, with planned coordination involving Israeli state defence institutions.⁷

The October 2025 South Korean AEW&C contract establishes continuation of the L3Harris/IAI/ELTA partnership after 19 July 2024 and after November 2024, although the named customer was South Korea.³

Israeli research and engineering facilities

The 2025 and 2026 SEC subsidiary exhibits list consolidated corporate entities across multiple jurisdictions but do not establish the existence of a specifically named Israeli-incorporated L3Harris research subsidiary in the reviewed material.^{8, 9}

No public evidence identified establishing the address, staffing level or research budget of an L3Harris-operated engineering centre or laboratory in Israel.^{8, 9}

Acquisition and investment activity

L3Harris’ 2022 discussions concerning NSO Group surveillance technology were reported as terminated, with no completed acquisition established by the contemporaneous reporting.^{22, 23}

The 2018 acquisition history [pre-2020] of Azimuth and Linchpin, described by CAAT, concerns offensive-cyber capabilities associated with Australia and wider Western intelligence markets and does not independently establish an Israeli-origin acquisition.¹⁸

No public evidence identified establishing a completed L3Harris acquisition of an Israeli-domiciled cybersecurity company or a disclosed direct corporate venture investment in the named Israeli spyware and enterprise-security firms.^{8, 9, 22}

Controlling principals

The company’s leadership disclosure identifies its directors and executives, including Lewis Hay III and other board members, while the January 2026 reorganisation announcement records the executive responsibilities prevailing at that date.^{31, 10}

No public evidence identified in the reviewed corporate and transaction records establishing that a controlling L3Harris principal personally acquired a reportable stake in NSO Group, IAI, ELTA, Wiz, Cellebrite, Check Point, Verint or the other named Israeli cyber and surveillance companies.^{31, 22, 23}

Patent and university relationships

No public evidence identified establishing a material patent-licensing, joint intellectual-property ownership or formal co-development agreement between L3Harris and Technion, Hebrew University, Weizmann Institute or another named Israeli university.^{8, 9}

Post-July 2024 activity

L3Harris publicly announced its proposed Blue Sky Warden collaboration with IAI on 15 October 2025 and its South Korean AEW&C programme award involving IAI/ELTA on 20 October 2025, establishing Israeli aerospace-technology collaboration announced after both July and November 2024.^{7, 3}

The company disclosures do not establish that those programmes involved the transfer of digital surveillance datasets from occupied Palestinian territory or the provision of operational surveillance infrastructure to a settlement.^{7, 3}

Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History

Specialist civil-society investigations

AFSC Investigate identifies L3Harris as a company supplying technology and military components to systems used by Israeli forces, and specifically documents historical checkpoint scanners, naval platform-management systems, electronic-surveillance technology and military supply-chain components.¹⁷

CAAT identifies L3Harris’ electronic-surveillance and offensive-cyber capabilities and describes the company’s technology and weapons-component relationships with Israeli military platforms.¹⁸

The AFSC Investigate occupations database includes L3Harris among companies examined for commercial involvement connected to Israeli occupation-related activities.³²

These NGO records distinguish historical checkpoint equipment, divested businesses and continuing corporate military technology operations, rather than establishing that every previously supplied system remains under present L3Harris ownership.^{17, 18}

Boycott and divestment activity

AFSC Investigate identifies L3Harris as appearing on its BDS divestment shortlist and documents earlier student divestment activity involving predecessor L-3 Communications.¹⁷

AFSC reports that McGill University student activists voted in favour of a relevant divestment measure in February 2016 [pre-2020], while also recording that the measure was subsequently nullified through an online vote.¹⁷

AFSC additionally records a 2017 [pre-2020] University of Wisconsin–Madison student resolution targeting corporations associated with border-security infrastructure, including L-3 Communications.¹⁷

No public evidence identified establishing a specific corporate response by L3Harris to the reviewed NGO allegations concerning Israeli digital surveillance and checkpoint technology.^{17, 18}

NSO Group regulatory history

On 4 November 2021, the US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security announced the addition of NSO Group and other companies to the Entity List over malicious cyber activities and spyware-related concerns.²⁴

The Guardian and The Register reported in July 2022 that US government national-security objections contributed to the abandonment of L3Harris’ proposed NSO surveillance-technology transaction.^{22, 23}

The reviewed records establish regulatory action against NSO and the reported end of L3Harris’ acquisition discussions; they do not establish a separate enforcement penalty against L3Harris arising from the proposed transaction.^{24, 22}

UK export-control policy

On 2 September 2024, the UK government announced suspension of selected export licences for military items assessed as potentially usable in operations in Gaza, while retaining a defined exception for the multinational F-35 programme and restricting relevant direct exports to Israel.³³

The associated government notice formally implemented licence suspensions and specified the affected categories of open general export licences.³⁴

The UK government’s July 2025 management-information release documented the continued licensing framework and identified non-suspended licences covering civilian goods, components for re-export, military equipment for specified uses and the multinational F-35 programme.³⁵

The UK government’s April 2026 publication covering licences as of 28 February 2026 recorded 203 extant military licences involving Israel, including categories associated with re-export, commercial activity and government end users; those aggregate totals were not attributed to L3Harris.³⁶

No public evidence identified within these aggregate government publications establishing that a specified L3Harris digital-technology shipment breached UK export-control restrictions.^{33, 35, 36}

Settlement-specific digital provision

AFSC’s documentation of historical SafeView and ProVision checkpoint deployment identifies surveillance and screening technology installed at sites in occupied Palestinian territory during the period when the relevant business belonged to L3/L3Harris.¹⁷

No public evidence identified confirming that L3Harris currently provides cloud services, communications-network administration, settlement-specific digital identity systems or post-2024 maintenance of the historical screening installations to an Israeli settlement authority.^{17, 9}

Constructive-notice chronology

The documented UK export-control measures began on 2 September 2024, and L3Harris subsequently announced Israeli aerospace-technology collaboration with IAI in October 2025; the announcements establish the respective dates but do not establish a violation of those controls.^{33, 7}

The October 2025 IAI partnership and the October 2025 South Korean AEW&C award both occurred after 19 July 2024 and November 2024; their published descriptions establish programme participation without identifying settlement-specific digital deployments.^{7, 3}

Other legal proceedings

No public evidence identified in the reviewed company, government or NGO records establishing a final judicial finding against L3Harris specifically for supplying digital surveillance technology to an Israeli state agency or settlement operator.^{17, 18, 33}