MongoDB DIGITAL

Target: MongoDB, Inc. Research date: 23 October 2026 Scope: Technology supply chains, Israeli operations, state-sector procurement, cloud infrastructure, data processing, surveillance, defence relationships, artificial intelligence, and digital ecosystem activity.

Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships

Commercial technology platform. MongoDB’s fiscal 2026 Form 10-K describes its database platform and MongoDB Atlas managed cloud offering, including subscription-based software and services supplied to enterprise customers.¹

Cloud technology partners. MongoDB identifies Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud as major cloud-platform partners supporting its Atlas offering; these are material relationships because the platforms supply the infrastructure on which Atlas databases operate.²

Israeli distributor - Matrix. On 11 February 2014 [pre-2020], MongoDB announced the appointment of Matrix as its distributor in Israel, with Matrix’s software division responsible for distributing MongoDB solutions. The announcement identified Matrix as a major Israeli IT services company whose customer sectors included government and defence; whether Matrix remains an authorised MongoDB distributor in October 2026 is unknown.³

Historical integration scope. The 2014 Matrix agreement covered distribution of MongoDB software solutions across Israel; the announcement did not identify a particular military customer, government procurement award, installation, or deployment volume.³

Government customer and direct supplier. Israeli government procurement notices published in 2025 and 2026 identify MongoDB Ltd, supplier identifier IE9793087U, in connection with database licensing, maintenance, and support for the Israeli Ministry of Health.^{4, 5}

Internal use of Israeli-origin cybersecurity vendors. No public evidence identified of MongoDB procuring Check Point, Wiz, SentinelOne, CyberArk, NICE, Verint, Claroty, Palo Alto Networks, or equivalent Israeli-origin products for its own corporate infrastructure.

Other systems integrators deploying Israeli-origin technology. No public evidence identified of a named MongoDB integrator deploying an Israeli-origin cybersecurity or monitoring system into MongoDB’s internal enterprise environment.

Israeli cybersecurity company Sentra - MongoDB Atlas deployment. On 17 December 2025, MongoDB published a customer-success account confirming that cybersecurity company Sentra migrated its sensitive-data security platform from PostgreSQL to MongoDB Atlas. Sentra uses Atlas Search for complex filtering, aggregation, and queries supporting sensitive-data discovery, classification, protection, and threat-detection alerts. MongoDB Professional Services assisted with query optimisation and scaling, reducing search-index sizes by 70% and query execution times from approximately three minutes to one second. MongoDB reported that Sentra expanded from 20 million to more than 1 billion managed assets. A separate MongoDB customer case study corroborates the migration, technical implementation, professional-services involvement, and reported performance improvements. These disclosures establish a substantial commercial technology relationship involving a cybersecurity platform, without independently establishing use for Israeli state surveillance, intelligence, or military operations.^{6, 7}

Sentra - September 2026 MongoDB technology-partner announcement. September–October 2026 - no independently admissible public confirmation identified for Sentra’s specific announcement that it became an official MongoDB technology partner offering an agentless Atlas integration that discovers database clusters and collections, classifies sensitive information, and maps access by users, applications, and AI agents. Sentra’s public corporate website independently describes agentless scanning, sensitive-data discovery and classification, and access governance covering human and AI identities. MongoDB’s partner documentation describes its technology-partner programme and integration ecosystem. However, the accessible pages reviewed do not independently identify Sentra’s specific September 2026 partner appointment or establish that the advertised capabilities are available through a dedicated Atlas integration. The announcement’s specific claims therefore remain unverified under the permitted-source requirements.^{8, 2, 9}

Bank of Israel - confirmed on-premises MongoDB deployment in core systems. A professional sole-supplier opinion issued by the Bank of Israel’s Information Technology Division on 30 January 2025 explicitly confirms that the bank uses MongoDB databases installed on its own servers in an on-premises configuration. The document identifies multiple core systems, including XBRL, which manages regulatory reporting involving banks, and DATA TAG, which tags findings arising from institutional assessment protocols. The bank stated its intention to continue and potentially expand MongoDB usage. The opinion identifies Matrix IT Software Products Ltd (company number 511072399) as the proposed supplier of MongoDB licensing, maintenance, installation, training and expert services, with an estimated engagement value of US$275,000 plus VAT and an expected term ending 29 February 2028. It explains that MongoDB’s authorised suppliers for Israel’s government sector included Matrix, AWS and Google Israel, but that only Matrix could supply the required on-premises licensing because AWS and Google were authorised to sell cloud configurations. A subsequent Bank of Israel notice dated 26 February 2025 confirms approval of the sole-supplier engagement. This constitutes direct primary-source evidence of MongoDB software operating within an Israeli civilian state financial institution’s core digital infrastructure, through a locally authorised supplier. The documented installation is on bank servers, so it must be distinguished from MongoDB Atlas cloud hosting, MongoDB-operated infrastructure and any assertion that MongoDB itself operates the bank’s systems. The records establish the bank’s use of MongoDB and Matrix’s contractual supply role but do not independently establish the precise division of day-to-day database administration or operational support responsibilities.^{10, 11}

Government of Israel - publicly disclosed MongoDB project presentation. On 3 June 2024, the Tel Aviv MongoDB User Group published an agenda for its June meeting at Microsoft Reactor, identifying a presentation entitled “Using MongoDB in a Complex Government Project” attributed to “GOI” (Government of Israel). MongoDB’s subsequent community recap, published on 19 July 2024, confirms that the meeting took place on 20 June and describes the presentation as delivered by a Government of Israel representative. These primary-source records independently establish publicly acknowledged government-sector use of MongoDB as the subject of a technical presentation. However, neither publication identifies the responsible government ministry, specific application, database architecture, hosting environment, procurement agreement, operational controller, data categories or deployment location. The evidence supports recording a distinct Israeli government technology-use relationship, while leaving the project operator and implementation details unidentified. It does not establish that MongoDB supplied a managed Atlas service, operated the application or hosted government information in an Israeli cloud region.^{12, 13}

Commit - authorised MongoDB professional-services relationship. On 9 August 2026, Israeli technology-services company Commit announced that it had become MongoDB’s only authorised Professional Services Delivery Partner in Israel. Commit states that the appointment permits it to deliver official MongoDB consulting, architecture, migration, optimisation, security and implementation services to Israeli and multinational customers. Commit separately describes substantial Israeli public-sector operations, including cloud projects involving government ministries, municipalities and public institutions, with named examples involving the Israel Antiquities Authority, National Digital Agency and Israeli Employment Service. These disclosures establish Commit’s MongoDB professional-services authorisation alongside an independently documented government technology-services business. They do not establish that MongoDB technology was used in Commit’s named government projects or that Commit operated the MongoDB application described at the June 2024 Tel Aviv meeting. The distinction matters because Commit’s authorisation to provide MongoDB services and its work for government customers cannot independently establish a MongoDB deployment within those particular government systems.^{14, 15}

2024–October 2026 - no public evidence identified: the June 2024 Tel Aviv MongoDB User Group announcement and subsequent recap, Commit’s August 2026 partnership announcement, Commit’s public-sector project descriptions and the Bank of Israel’s January–February 2025 procurement records were examined for further evidence identifying the Government of Israel project’s precise operator, hosting provider, deployment model, technical architecture, procurement counterparty or connection to the Bank of Israel installation. The accessible records establish a separately documented Bank of Israel on-premises deployment and a government-project presentation, but provide no basis for identifying the two as the same project. No publicly documented connection between Commit and either specific MongoDB government deployment was established from these sources.^{10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15}

Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology

Facial recognition and biometrics. No public evidence identified of MongoDB purchasing or operating facial recognition, gait recognition, biometric identification, or Israeli-origin retail analytics products from Trigo, BriefCam, Oosto, Trax, or comparable suppliers.

Predictive analytics and monitoring. MongoDB provides general-purpose database technology that supports application data storage, querying, and processing; the company’s platform description does not itself establish deployment for predictive policing, workforce surveillance, or intelligence monitoring.¹

Israeli surveillance customers. No public evidence identified of a named Israeli surveillance organisation deploying a specified MongoDB product for a verified surveillance programme.

Third-party deployment. MongoDB documents its availability through major cloud providers, including Israeli cloud regions, but this platform availability does not identify a specific third-party surveillance application using MongoDB.^{16, 17, 18}

Retail or biometric analytics deployments. No public evidence identified.

Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation

Israeli cloud infrastructure expansion. On 29 February 2024, MongoDB announced that Atlas had expanded to additional cloud regions, explicitly including AWS Tel Aviv and Microsoft Azure Israel Central. MongoDB described data residency, availability, latency, and regulatory requirements as reasons for regional expansion.¹⁹

AWS Israel. MongoDB’s Atlas AWS region documentation identifies il-central-1, Tel Aviv, as an available deployment region, designated IL_CENTRAL_1 within Atlas.¹⁶

Microsoft Azure Israel. MongoDB’s Azure Atlas documentation identifies Microsoft’s israelcentral region as an available Atlas location, designated ISRAEL_CENTRAL.¹⁷

Google Cloud Israel. MongoDB’s Google Cloud Atlas documentation identifies Google’s Tel Aviv region, me-west1, mapped to Atlas region MIDDLE_EAST_WEST_1.¹⁸

Deployment location. MongoDB’s cloud-region documentation explains that customers choose a cloud provider and region when deploying Atlas clusters and that the selected region identifies the physical location of the database cluster.²⁰

Infrastructure ownership. MongoDB’s 2024 regional-expansion announcement describes Atlas as operating across AWS, Google Cloud, and Azure; the documented Israeli deployment capability is therefore based on supported cloud-provider regions, with no accompanying claim that MongoDB owns the underlying Israeli data-centre buildings.¹⁹

Data-exposure pathway. A customer choosing an Israeli Atlas region can place database processing and storage workloads in infrastructure physically located in Israel; the documented customer choice of region does not establish that all MongoDB customer data is routed through Israeli infrastructure.^{16, 17, 18, 20}

Data federation. MongoDB’s Atlas Data Federation documentation lists regional execution locations separately from standard Atlas cluster regions, including locations in Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific, and South America. The documented federation-region configuration must be evaluated separately when determining where a particular federated workload is processed.²¹

Encryption and data access. MongoDB states that Atlas encrypts data at rest using AES-256 and that customers can add database-level encryption using customer-managed keys, including AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, and Google Cloud KMS.^{22, 23}

Operational responsibility. MongoDB’s September 2026 technical-security measures describe its Atlas security controls, while the company documentation distinguishes MongoDB’s platform-security responsibilities from customers’ deployment configuration and data policies.²⁴

Data in transit. MongoDB states that Atlas requires TLS encryption for client connections and communications between cluster nodes.²⁵

Actual customer data residency. No public evidence identified establishing the precise Israeli residency, backup locations, support-access locations, or cross-border replication configuration of specific Israeli government workloads.

Israeli Ministry of Health - 2026 procurement. Israeli government notice 4000607639, published on 30 September 2025, identifies MongoDB Ltd as the intended supplier for database licensing, maintenance, and support covering 1 January–31 December 2026. The notice specifies US$62,100 and supplier identifier IE9793087U.⁴

Israeli Ministry of Health - proposed 2027 procurement. Israeli government notice 4000623025, published on 19 October 2026, identifies MongoDB Ltd as the intended supplier for database licensing, maintenance, and support from 1 January–31 December 2027, at a stated value of US$63,885. The notice specifies an objection deadline of 8 November 2026; consequently, it establishes a published intention to contract as of 23 October 2026, rather than confirmation of a completed 2027 award.⁵

Project Nimbus. The Israeli government procurement portal includes public documentation concerning Project Nimbus government-cloud marketplace procurement, including procurement notice 4000608080; the reviewed notice does not independently identify MongoDB as an awarded Nimbus prime contractor or named subcontractor.²⁶

Government-specific cloud product. MongoDB’s Atlas for Government documentation identifies supported government deployment regions in the United States, including AWS GovCloud and selected US commercial regions; this documentation does not establish a comparable dedicated Israeli sovereign-government offering.²⁷

Israeli military data-sovereignty contracts. No public evidence identified of a MongoDB contract specifically providing sovereign cloud, military data residency, or operational resilience to an Israeli defence or intelligence institution.

2023–October 2026 - no public evidence identified: MongoDB’s company-published product updates, February 2024 regional-expansion announcement, AWS Atlas region documentation and customer-deployment disclosures were examined for an identifiable customer operating a production database in AWS Tel Aviv (il-central-1), Azure Israel Central (israelcentral) or Google Cloud Tel Aviv (me-west1). MongoDB confirms that these Israeli regions became selectable deployment locations, including Google Cloud Tel Aviv in June 2023 and AWS Tel Aviv and Azure Israel Central in February 2024. However, the examined disclosures do not identify an executed customer deployment in those regions, its production status, stored data categories, record counts, processing volumes or replication arrangements. The evidence establishes regional service availability without establishing actual customer data residency in Israel. This leaves both retained frames v_dig:26b34c4f3979 and v_dig:736dcc820601 without the requested deployment-specific confirmation.^{28, 19, 16}

Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships

Named Israeli civilian state-sector relationship. The 2025 Ministry of Health procurement notice identifies MongoDB Ltd as the intended supplier of database licensing, maintenance, and support for the 2026 contractual period; the publisher is the Israeli Ministry of Health, a civilian government institution.⁴

Subsequent procurement activity. The Ministry of Health issued another MongoDB licensing, maintenance, and support intention-to-contract notice on 19 October 2026, proposing a 2027 engagement.⁵

Historical defence-sector sales channel. MongoDB’s February 2014 [pre-2020] distributor announcement stated that Matrix served customers in Israeli government and defence sectors, but did not identify an IDF, Ministry of Defence, or intelligence-agency installation of MongoDB software.³

Israeli Ministry of Defence contracts. No public evidence identified of a directly awarded MongoDB contract with the Israeli Ministry of Defence.

Israel Defence Forces contracts. No public evidence identified of a directly awarded MongoDB contract with the IDF.

Military intelligence or security agencies. No public evidence identified of a named MongoDB contract with Israeli intelligence organisations.

Military operational deployment. No public evidence identified establishing a named Israeli military application, specific MongoDB database deployment, contract value, or military operational function.

Dual-use technology. MongoDB’s 2026 Form 10-K describes broadly applicable database technology, including managed cloud database services; the public product description does not establish use in a named Israeli military or intelligence operation.¹

Offensive cyber capabilities. No public evidence identified of MongoDB producing, licensing, maintaining, or selling zero-day exploitation products, offensive intrusion platforms, or cyber weapons for Israeli state agencies.

Weapons and targeting applications. No public evidence identified of MongoDB supplying a named purpose-built autonomous targeting, fire-control, kill-chain, or lethal decision-support system to Israeli military organisations.

Settlement nexus. No public evidence identified of a named MongoDB deployment, distributor branch, service agreement, or technical installation in an Israeli settlement in occupied territory.

Constructive-notice chronology. MongoDB’s 2025–2026 Israeli Ministry of Health procurement record and its proposed 2027 continuation establish documented civilian state-sector commercial activity after 19 July 2024 and November 2024; the notices do not establish an associated military programme or activity within occupied territory.^{4, 5}

AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems

AI-related database functionality. MongoDB describes Atlas as a developer data platform supporting AI applications, with integrations into AWS, Google Cloud, and Azure technology ecosystems.¹⁹

Voyage AI acquisition. On 24 February 2025, MongoDB announced its acquisition of Voyage AI, whose technology includes embedding and reranking models for information retrieval and AI applications.²⁹

Technology integration. MongoDB described plans to integrate Voyage AI’s retrieval technology into its database platform, allowing AI applications to retrieve information from operational data.²⁹

Israeli government AI provision. No public evidence identified establishing an Israeli state, military, or intelligence contract specifically for MongoDB AI, vector-search, embedding, or reranking services.

Surveillance-derived training datasets. No public evidence identified establishing that MongoDB or Voyage AI trained models on intercepted Israeli or Palestinian communications, surveillance-derived datasets, or civilian population records obtained from occupied territory.

Military decision support. No public evidence identified of a named MongoDB AI deployment for Israeli military logistics, intelligence assessment, predictive policing, or operational decision support.

Autonomous targeting. No public evidence identified of MongoDB developing or supplying autonomous target-generation systems, weapons-effects prediction systems, or automated lethal targeting software to Israeli military forces.

Data confidentiality. MongoDB’s documentation identifies encryption-at-rest, customer-controlled key management, and queryable encryption capabilities relevant to protection of sensitive information in database applications.^{22, 25}

2020–October 2026 - Israeli state-sector beneficiary evidence: the Israeli Ministry of Education’s procurement notice 652166, updated 18 August 2020, explicitly identifies Marvad (מרב”ד) as the national examination-checking centre and documents a government procurement arrangement covering its operation and examination-assessor management. Separately, a Ministry of Education procurement committee protocol dated 10 March 2026 documents the purchase, installation, maintenance, and software integration of scanners used for Israeli matriculation examination booklets, confirming that examination-booklet scanning forms part of the Ministry’s examination workflow. No public evidence identified from the replacement source establishing Milgam as the operator of that scanning system or substantiating the previously reported figure of approximately two million examination booklets processed annually. MongoDB’s Cambium case study identifies its implemented Marvad AI capability as examining scanned Israeli final high-school papers for suspected duplication or plagiarism, describes a national launch, and confirms production operation. These independently documented facts establish that the underlying examination infrastructure serves an Israeli civilian state institution and that Cambium’s AI capability operates within the same nationally administered examination workflow. However, MongoDB does not identify the contractual customer commissioning Marvad AI, expressly name the Ministry of Education as its direct beneficiary, or document an operational integration between Cambium’s AI module and the Ministry’s production examination systems. The state-institution connection is therefore strongly supported at the examination-service level but remains unconfirmed as a direct MongoDB-enabled state deployment. No defence, intelligence or security-agency beneficiary is identified.^{30, 31, 32}

Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint

Israeli corporate entity. Israeli corporate registry aggregator Taagidim identifies MongoDB Israel Ltd, company registration 514926559, as an active Israeli private company, incorporated on 27 May 2013 [pre-2020], with a registered address in Tel Aviv.³³

Tel Aviv office. In a 2022 company article, MongoDB stated that its Israeli office was established in 2019 [pre-2020] and that it had more than 30 employees in customer-facing roles, including customer support serving more than 900 customers across industries.³⁴

Office expansion. MongoDB’s June 2023 corporate article, updated March 2025, states that the company opened a new Tel Aviv office in December 2022 and had more than 50 employees in Israel.³⁵

Engineering and R&D scope. MongoDB’s available descriptions establish a Tel Aviv corporate, customer-facing, and customer-support presence; no public evidence identified establishing a dedicated Israeli military R&D facility, classified development programme, or the size of a distinct Israeli engineering research team.^{34, 35}

Israeli customer and partner ecosystem. MongoDB’s 2014 Matrix announcement establishes an Israeli channel-partner relationship, while its later Tel Aviv office disclosures document customer-support and commercial activities in Israel.^{3, 34, 35}

Acquisitions of Israeli-origin firms. No public evidence identified of a completed MongoDB acquisition specifically involving an Israeli-domiciled military, intelligence, surveillance, or cybersecurity company.

Strategic investments in Israeli defence technology. No public evidence identified of MongoDB making a named strategic investment in an Israeli offensive-cyber, SIGINT, surveillance, or military AI company.

Voyage AI. MongoDB’s February 2025 acquisition announcement identifies Voyage AI as a provider of embedding and reranking models; the reviewed announcement does not establish a direct Israeli military or intelligence technology acquisition nexus.²⁹

Patents and intellectual property. No public evidence identified of a named MongoDB patent assignment, research licensing agreement, or co-development programme with Technion, Hebrew University, Weizmann Institute, or an Israeli defence research institution.

Corporate leadership. MongoDB announced on 28 September 2026 that Chirantan Desai had stepped down as CEO, Dev Ittycheria had become interim CEO, and Tom Killalea was serving as board chairman.³⁶

Controlling-principal investments. No public evidence identified establishing a direct personal or family-office investment by the named executive leadership in NSO Group, Cellebrite, Carbyne, Oosto, Verint, NICE, Wiz, Check Point, or another specified Israeli military or surveillance technology company.

Other major shareholders. No public evidence identified in the reviewed material establishing a MongoDB controlling shareholder’s specific investment in an Israeli defence, intelligence, or settlement-related technology enterprise.

Reservist policies. No public evidence identified describing MongoDB Israel’s specific salary-subsidy or compensation arrangements for employees performing Israeli military reserve service.

Charitable matching. No public evidence identified establishing that MongoDB’s corporate donation-matching programme has financed a specified Israeli military organisation, settlement organisation, or related beneficiary.

Israeli office establishment - February 2014 primary-source evidence. MongoDB’s earliest identified public announcement explicitly dates the opening of a local Israeli office to 3 February 2014 [pre-2020]. Its press release, titled “MongoDB Expands Presence in Israel with Local Office and Israeli Managers”, announces the opening of an Israeli office alongside the appointments of Koby Lif and Sharon Elkayam. This establishes a documented local office presence by February 2014, five years before the establishment date stated in MongoDB’s 2022 corporate article. The finding qualifies the existing “Tel Aviv office” statement: the reported 2019 establishment date is accurately attributed to the 2022 article, but cannot represent MongoDB’s earliest documented Israeli office opening. The 2014 announcement provides stronger contemporaneous evidence for the historical start of local office operations.^{37, 34}

Distinguishing the three office milestones. MongoDB’s February 2014 documentation comprises an explicit office-opening announcement dated 3 February, followed by announcements on 11 February concerning local executive appointments and the Matrix distribution agreement. Its 21 July 2022 interview with Israeli Regional Vice President Gabriella Cohen subsequently states that the Tel Aviv office was established in 2019, without explaining the relationship between that date and the documented 2014 office opening. MongoDB’s 14 June 2023 article, updated 18 March 2025, separately reports that a new Tel Aviv office space opened in December 2022 at WeWork Midtown, explicitly acknowledging an earlier presence in Tel Aviv. The evidence therefore establishes three distinct documentary milestones: an announced local office opening in February 2014, a retrospectively reported 2019 establishment date whose precise organisational significance remains unexplained, and a new physical office space opening in December 2022. The finding confirms the existing “Office expansion” statement while qualifying the chronology implied by “Tel Aviv office”; neither 2019 nor December 2022 can be treated as the earliest publicly documented Israeli office opening.^{37, 34, 35, 38, 3}

Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History

Civil-society investigations. No public evidence identified in the reviewed material of a MongoDB-specific Who Profits, AFSC Investigate, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, or Al-Haq investigation establishing a particular MongoDB deployment supporting Israeli settlement activity or military surveillance.

UN reporting. No independently verified MongoDB-specific finding was established from the UN OHCHR settlement-business database or Special Rapporteur material reviewed through public web searches.

Organised boycott or divestment campaigns. No public evidence identified of a named, organised campaign specifically targeting MongoDB for a verified Israeli military, intelligence, or occupied-territory technology contract.

Corporate response to campaigns. No public evidence identified of a MongoDB statement responding to a MongoDB-specific boycott campaign concerning Israeli defence or settlement-related technology.

Regulatory investigations. No public evidence identified of an export-control investigation, sanctions enforcement proceeding, or regulatory penalty specifically involving MongoDB’s technology provision to Israeli security agencies.

Court proceedings. No public evidence identified of a court ruling establishing MongoDB liability for technology supplied to Israeli military operations or settlement activities.

Current corporate disclosure. MongoDB’s Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending 31 January 2026 provides its corporate business, financial, and operating disclosures; the reviewed filing does not independently establish a named Israeli military or settlement-specific technology contract.¹