Nokia

Key Findings

• Economic: Nokia owns Israeli operating entities; IATI describes approximately 150 local staff across functions including software development, product management and engineering.^{1, 2}
• Digital: IATI attributes communications-infrastructure consulting and product supply to unspecified Israeli government entities to Nokia Israel; it identifies no security recipient, surveillance system or data-access arrangement.²
• Military: A 2015 trade-press report described historical Alcatel-Lucent Israel work connected to IDF communications sites, but no underlying procurement record or evidence of a current Nokia contract was located.³
• Political: Nokia Israel described assembling care packages for soldiers. The source does not establish quantities, recipient units, delivery records or a continuing programme.²

Target Profile

Key Facts:

• Nokia Solutions and Networks Israel Ltd. is listed as a Nokia affiliate and at 16 Atir Yeda Street, Kfar Sava.⁸
• Nokia’s 2025 group-company schedule lists both Nokia Solutions and Networks Israel Ltd. and Infinera (Israel) Ltd. as 100%-owned Israeli Group entities.¹
• The reviewed record identifies commercial carrier activity in Israel, but does not quantify Israel-specific revenue, profits, tax paid, dividends, or repatriation.¹

Executive Summary

Nokia is a Finnish public telecommunications and enterprise-network company with an established corporate presence in Israel. Its 2025 annual-report materials list Nokia Solutions and Networks Israel Ltd. and Infinera (Israel) Ltd. as wholly owned Israeli-incorporated Group entities. Nokia also identifies an office at Atir Yeda 16, Kfar Sava, and labour-court reporting provides contemporaneous evidence of employees and management operations at Nokia Solutions and Networks Israel Ltd. in 2025.^{1, 8, 9}

The strongest adjudicated economic nexus is local technical value creation. IATI describes approximately 150 Nokia Israel employees across software development, product management, engineering, commercial, support and logistics functions; this is a mixed-function headcount, not a count of researchers. Nokia also acquired Rapid’s technology assets and R&D unit in November 2024.^{2, 10}

Nokia has a documented commercial telecommunications relationship with Cellcom. Cellcom disclosures describe a framework relationship with NSN Israel, identified as a Nokia Networks Group member, involving LTE/LTE-Advanced equipment, earlier GSM/UMTS-related arrangements, later 4G/5G components, and maintenance eligibility through March 2030. Nokia also announced a 2022 5G Edge Slicing trial with Cellcom in Netanya and previously described a prospective “Sensing as a Service” deployment using Cellcom radio infrastructure. These sources establish a carrier-vendor relationship; they do not establish Nokia access to customer data, state control of the network, deployment at military sites, or deployment in occupied territory.^{6, 11, 12}

The available record contains limited, qualified material concerning Israeli defence communications. A 2015 trade-press report stated that Alcatel-Lucent Israel won a Ministry of Defense procurement related to IDF communications sites. However, the supplied research did not locate an underlying tender, award record, contract, invoice, Nokia confirmation, or evidence that the reported work continued after its stated historical term. A separate 2018 report supports only alleged Alcatel-Lucent participation in a Ministry of Defense request for information; it reported ECI Telecom, not Nokia or Alcatel-Lucent, as the awardee. These materials therefore do not verify a current Nokia defence contract.^{3, 13}

IATI also attributes government-facing communications-infrastructure services to Nokia Israel and records the company’s assembly of care packages for soldiers. The former supports the limited administrative-communications digital assessment, without an inferred security use; the latter is the governing political military-welfare act, assessed as one documented local episode rather than a recurring programme or cash donation.²

The audits also identify important negative findings. No public evidence identified of a verified current Nokia contract with the IDF, Ministry of Defense, intelligence agencies, police, prisons, border authorities, or another named security body; of weapons-system supply; of Project Nimbus participation; or of Nokia offices, equipment, sales, service contracts, or resellers specifically located in settlements, occupied East Jerusalem, or the occupied Golan Heights. Document-scoped checks also found no Nokia mention in specified OHCHR settlement-business updates or the UN Special Rapporteur report; these are not comprehensive clearances.^{7, 14}

Under the fixed, human-vetted V6.5 assessment, Nokia receives a BRS score of 568, placing it in Tier C (Substantial Complicity). The score reflects the materiality and directness assigned by the corpus to Nokia’s continuing Israeli operating presence and telecommunications activity, while preserving the substantial evidentiary limits on alleged military, surveillance, settlement, and state-security involvement.

Timeline of Relevant Events

Corporate Overview

Nokia Corporation is a Finnish public limited-liability company, incorporated in 1896, with its principal executive office and headquarters in Espoo. Its stated objects cover research, development, manufacture, marketing, sale, and delivery of communications- and enterprise-network products, software, and services, together with intellectual-property activity. The available records support a primary commercial mission in communications and enterprise networking rather than a military or state-geopolitical mission.^{4, 17}

Nokia reports a global consolidated group. Its disclosed principal companies include Nokia Solutions and Networks Oy, Nokia Technologies Oy, Nokia of America Corporation, Nokia Solutions and Networks B.V., Nokia Networks France, Nokia Solutions and Networks India Private Limited, Nokia Solutions and Networks Japan G.K., Infinera Corporation, Nokia Arabia Limited, Nokia Shanghai Bell Co., Ltd., Nokia UK Limited, and Nokia Canada Inc. The Israeli entities specifically identified in the FY2025 schedule are Nokia Solutions and Networks Israel Ltd. and Infinera (Israel) Ltd., both listed at 100% Group ownership.^{1, 17}

Nokia’s affiliate and office materials identify Nokia Solutions and Networks Israel Ltd. and its Kfar Sava office. The documented Israeli footprint includes telecommunications infrastructure, software development, product management, sales, solutions engineering, technical support, project execution, and logistics as described in IATI’s profile. The profile also refers to work for major Israeli telecommunications companies and unspecified “government entities,” but it does not name a government recipient, product, contract, value, procurement vehicle, or end use. It consequently cannot establish civilian versus military, police, intelligence, border, prison, occupation, or settlement use for the unspecified work.^{8, 2}

Nokia’s documented Israeli commercial relationship with Cellcom is relevant but bounded. Cellcom’s filings establish a carrier arrangement; they do not identify the geographical footprint of Nokia-supplied equipment, demonstrate deployments in settlements or military installations, or establish Nokia control over the carrier’s customer data. Who Profits reported that Cellcom operated telecommunications facilities in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan as of 2018, but did not establish that Nokia or NSN equipment was installed at those locations.^{6, 18}

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

Nokia markets a mission-critical public-safety mobile-broadband portfolio, including push-to-talk and video, TETRA/P25 interoperability, ruggedised field devices, wireless, IP/MPLS and optical networks, command-and-control connectivity, video analytics, CCTV/IoT integration, and responder tracking. The product material presents these capabilities for public-safety and first-responder use cases, not for identified Israeli end users.¹⁹

The central historical military-related record is a 2015 trade-press report that Alcatel-Lucent Israel won a Ministry of Defense procurement concerning IDF communications sites, reportedly including communications systems linked to military optical-fibre infrastructure. This is not equivalent to a verified current Nokia contract: no underlying tender notice, award record, contract, invoice, official Nokia confirmation, or continuation evidence was located in the supplied research.³

A 2018 report similarly supports only alleged Alcatel-Lucent response to a Ministry of Defense request for information. It reported ECI Telecom as the recipient of the contract. The record does not establish an Alcatel-Lucent or Nokia award, delivery, or ongoing IDF relationship.¹³

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

Nokia’s strongest defence is that the audited record does not verify a current direct procurement relationship with Israeli military or security bodies. No public evidence identified of a verified Nokia, NSN Israel, or Alcatel-Lucent contract with the Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israel Police, Border Police, Israel Prison Service, or another named Israeli security body in the reviewed materials.⁷

No public evidence identified that Nokia supplies lethal platforms, munitions, missile-defence systems, targeting software, fire-control systems, tanks, naval or aircraft systems, or other critical weapons subsystems to Israeli forces. The evidence supports general telecommunications and mission-critical-network capability, not a verified Israeli weapons-system supply relationship.^{19, 20}

No public evidence identified of Nokia-specific Israeli end-user certificates, export-licence applications, export-control decisions, enforcement action, sanctions matter, arms-embargo investigation, base services, or direct telecommunications sustainment to military installations or detention facilities.⁷

Named Entities and Evidence Map

• Nokia Solutions and Networks Israel Ltd.: Nokia affiliate and wholly owned Israeli entity; no verified Israeli defence customer identified.^{1, 8}
• Alcatel-Lucent Israel: Subject of the 2015 historical trade-press report; the report remains unverified by underlying procurement materials.³
• Israeli Ministry of Defense / IDF: Named only in historical trade reporting and a later RFI report; no verified current Nokia award established.^{3, 13}
• Nextcom Group: Who Profits separately lists Nokia Siemens Networks as a general business partner and Israeli security/defence bodies among Nextcom clients or partners, but gives no product category, date, value, or evidence connecting Nokia Siemens Networks to Nextcom’s defence-related work.²¹

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

Nokia has an Israeli legal-entity and R&D/technology footprint. Nokia’s Israeli subsidiary is described by IATI as carrying out software development, product management, sales, solutions engineering, support, project execution, and logistics. The same profile describes engineering work in analytics, AI, network monetisation, and automation for communications-service-provider products worldwide. The engineering description does not identify a state or security customer, data-processing location, or military/intelligence use. Separately, the same profile attributes communications-infrastructure services, from consulting to product supply, to unspecified Israeli government entities. That statement governs the limited administrative-communications Digital score; no specific agency, contract, surveillance or targeting use is established.²

Nokia’s network relationship with Cellcom includes LTE/LTE-Advanced infrastructure, later 4G VoLTE and 4G/5G equipment purchases, and the 2022 Netanya Edge Slicing trial. These materials establish commercial communications infrastructure, rather than a state-recipient relationship. They do not establish Nokia customer-data access, data hosting, state access to the network, or Nokia-operated surveillance infrastructure.^{6, 11}

Nokia acquired Rapid’s technology assets and R&D unit in November 2024. The acquired assets included an API marketplace and enterprise API hub; contemporaneous Israeli reporting described Rapid as an Israeli API company. The evidence identifies no government, military, settlement, or occupied-territory customer or deployment connected to the acquisition.¹⁰

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified of Nokia participation in Project Nimbus; an Israeli Nokia data centre, colocation facility, cloud region, Israel-specific sovereign cloud, data-residency service, or resilience service to Israeli state or military bodies.⁷

No public evidence identified that Nokia uses Israeli-origin facial recognition, biometrics, predictive policing, social-media monitoring, or workforce-surveillance products, or that it supplies Israeli state or security bodies with biometrics, surveillance datasets, population-data training, autonomous targeting, target-generation, fire-control, offensive cyber capabilities, or digital weapons systems.⁷

The IATI reference to unspecified “government entities” is not sufficient to identify a recipient or function. It does not establish whether the work concerned civilian administration, military, police, prison, intelligence, border, occupation, or settlement capability.²

Named Entities and Evidence Map

• Cellcom Israel: Documented commercial carrier customer/partner for NSN/Nokia infrastructure; no data-access or state-recipient inference is established.^{6, 11}
• Rapid: Israeli API company according to contemporary reporting; acquired technology assets and R&D unit, with no evidenced state or military deployment.¹⁰
• Nokia Solutions and Networks Israel Ltd.: Israeli subsidiary conducting listed commercial and technical functions; no named security customer documented.^{1, 2}
• Israeli Innovation Authority: Registry lists Nokia Solutions and Networks Israel Ltd. as a grant recipient, but discloses no date, amount, project, deliverable, or security customer and does not establish procurement or deployment.²²

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

The governing economic vector is local technical value creation. IATI describes approximately 150 Nokia Israel employees across software development, product management, engineering, sales, support, project execution and logistics, including analytics, AI, network monetisation and automation work. Nokia’s acquisition of Rapid’s technology assets and R&D unit supplies additional evidence of technical-development activity. These findings support the adjudicated R&D framing without implying all local staff are researchers or that Nokia is nationally critical to Israel.^{2, 10}

Nokia also has controlling ownership of Israeli operating companies. At year-end 2025, Nokia listed Nokia Solutions and Networks Israel Ltd. and Infinera (Israel) Ltd. as Israeli-incorporated entities with 100% Group ownership. This establishes operating ownership rather than a passive portfolio holding.¹

Nokia maintains an office in Kfar Sava. A Norwegian foreign-enterprise record gives the same address and categorises Nokia Solutions and Networks Israel Ltd.’s activity as wired, satellite, and wireless telecommunications. Histadrut’s 2025 report evidences employees and management operations at the entity.^{8, 9, 23}

Nokia’s documented market activity includes the Cellcom framework relationship, the proposed 2019 sensing arrangement, the 2022 Netanya trial, and an undated Nokia case study describing 4G LTE and 5G AirScale small-cell deployment with Cellcom at Bloomfield Stadium in Tel Aviv. The cited 2019 and 2022 materials do not independently establish completion, current operation, or continuation after July 2024 of the specific arrangements they describe.^{6, 11, 12, 24}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified of Israeli sovereign-debt or Israel-Bonds activity, portfolio holdings, insurance underwriting, lending, or investment by Nokia or its controlling principals in the reviewed materials.²⁵

No public evidence identified of Israel-specific revenue, profit, tax paid, dividends, repatriation flows, manufacturing locations, market share, or separately reported Israeli R&D expenditure. IATI reports approximately 150 Nokia Israel staff across mixed functions; the annual-report schedule does not provide a separate Israel headcount.² The record therefore establishes local entities and activity, but not the economic contribution retained in Israel or remitted to the Nokia Group.¹

No public evidence identified of direct procurement from Israeli agricultural suppliers; Israeli-origin or settlement-origin product labelling; a policy specifically addressing occupied-territory sourcing or labelling; or operations, contracts, sales, resellers, or revenue specifically in West Bank settlements, East Jerusalem settlements, or the Golan Heights.²⁵

Named Entities and Evidence Map

• Nokia Solutions and Networks Israel Ltd.: 100%-owned Israeli operating entity with a Kfar Sava office and documented employment operations.^{1, 8, 9}
• Infinera (Israel) Ltd.: Listed as a 100%-owned Nokia Group entity at year-end 2025; the reviewed schedule supplies no local financial or operating detail.¹
• Cellcom Israel: Long-standing telecommunications customer/partner; filings establish commercial network arrangements, not occupied-territory deployment.⁶
• Bloomfield Stadium / Tel Aviv: Nokia case study location for small-cell deployment; it does not establish state, security, or settlement use.²⁴

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

The governing political act is Nokia Israel’s publicly described assembly of care packages for soldiers. Under the rubric’s stated-purpose rule, this is corporate military-welfare support. The record establishes one local episode, without quantities, recipient units, delivery records, recurrence or an institutional recipient. It does not establish a cash donation or continuing programme.²

Nokia’s continuing Israeli corporate and commercial presence provides additional political context without being summed with the governing welfare-support scenario. Nokia owns Israeli entities and has supplied commercial carrier infrastructure to Cellcom. IATI describes Nokia Israel’s work as supporting communications continuity during war and national emergencies, but does not identify the unspecified government entities it references or establish a security, military, or occupation-related end use.^{1, 6, 2}

Nokia has made public statements and business decisions concerning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: it condemned the invasion, supported de-escalation, created a crisis-management team, supported affected Ukrainian employees, suspended Russian deliveries and new business, and announced its exit from Russia. The bounded review did not verify a comparable official Nokia statement addressing Palestinian civilian harm, Israeli military operations, occupation, settlements, the July 2024 ICJ advisory opinion, or the November 2024 ICC arrest warrants.^{26, 27}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The care-package statement does not establish a formal state partnership, a current verified IDF/Ministry of Defense contract, cash transfers, recurring contributions, or operational military delivery. Separate lobbying, PAC, donor and conflict-response procurement records were not verified in the bounded review; this does not negate the documented care-package assembly.²

No public evidence identified of Nokia offices, equipment, sales, service contracts, or resellers specifically in settlements, occupied East Jerusalem, or the occupied Golan Heights. The document-scoped searches finding no Nokia mention in specified UN and civil-society materials do not establish absence from all external records.¹⁴

Nokia is Finnish, not Israeli state-owned, and the reviewed materials do not identify Israeli state control, Israeli government-appointed directors, a golden share, or an Israeli shareholder meeting Nokia’s 10% disclosure threshold. Its supplier relationship with Cellcom demonstrates commercial operations, not a formal state partnership.^{4, 25}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

• Solidium Oy: Nokia’s largest shareholder registered in Finland at year-end 2025, holding 5.66%; this is Finnish state-holding-company ownership, not Israeli ownership or control.⁴
• Cellcom Israel: Commercial carrier relationship with NSN Israel/Nokia; no formal state partnership evidenced.⁶
• Israeli Ministry of Defense / IDF: No verified current Nokia contract identified; historical reports are qualified above.^{3, 13}
• Nokia leadership: The focused principal screen found no confirmed relevant personal investment, donation, board or operational technology act. Timo Ahopelto’s 2013 commentary discussed Israel’s investment ecosystem but documented no personal transaction, ownership or digital outcome.²⁸

BDS-1000 Score

Method: V6.5.

• V_MAX: 6.10 Avg_OTHERS: 3.59
• BRS Score: 568 Tier: C (Substantial Complicity)

V_MAX is driven by Economic, reflecting local development/engineering value creation and the mixed-function Israeli footprint, supported by the Rapid R&D acquisition. Political is governed by the company’s stated military-welfare care-package episode, Digital by administrative government communications, and Military by the qualified historical physical military-site report.^{2, 10, 3} The other domains retain material scores while the dossier preserves the absence of verified current security contracts, verified settlement operations, and demonstrated surveillance or weapons-system supply.

The V6.5 method is scale-free, evidence-only, and human-vetted. The fixed figures above are not a claim that every alleged nexus has been verified; they are the final corpus scores after verification, attribution, and temporal review.

Methodology Note

• Evidence is limited to the four supplied domain audits and the sources identified in their end notes; unsupported allegations are excluded.
• Impact (I) evaluates the type of documented activity, scale (M) evaluates its evidenced scale, and proximity/directness (P) evaluates the relationship to the relevant conduct or beneficiary.
• Scores are scale-free and are not measures of moral intent, criminal liability, corporate nationality, or the conduct of every affiliate, customer, shareholder, or employee.
• Divested, exited, or historical operations are temporally mitigated. Historical Alcatel-Lucent reports are therefore presented as qualified evidence and not converted into a verified current Nokia defence contract.
• Entity attribution is specific: a customer’s activities, a partner’s client list, or a director’s employer role is not transitive evidence of Nokia’s activity without an evidenced Nokia link.
• Settlement-related operation is assessed in both Economic and Political where established. Here, no public evidence identified of Nokia operations specifically located in settlements; “No public evidence identified” records completed, bounded checks and is not a universal absence claim.