INDEX / DIRECTORY / NOKIA / MILITARY

Nokia MILITARY

MILITARY AUDIT UPDATED 2026-09-11
Military Score 3.14 /10 C Nokia - BDS-1000 568
Military 3.14

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Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

Nokia Corporation is a Finnish corporation headquartered in Espoo, and its consolidated group includes Nokia Solutions and Networks Israel Ltd. as a listed affiliate in Israel 1, 2.

Nokia’s 2025 annual-report materials identify “Mission Critical Enterprise & Defense” as a global market category, including militaries, but do not identify an Israeli defence customer, contract, programme, or revenue source 3.

No public evidence identified of a verified Nokia, Nokia Solutions and Networks Israel, or Alcatel-Lucent contract award, framework agreement, memorandum, or direct procurement relationship with Israel’s Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israel Police, Border Police, Israel Prison Service, or another Israeli security body.

The reviewed corporate and civil-society materials do not establish that Nokia Defense, referenced in Nokia’s 2025 Corporate Governance Statement, has an Israeli customer, product, legal form, or military-contracting role 4.

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Nokia markets a public-safety mobile-broadband portfolio that includes mission-critical push-to-talk and video, TETRA/P25 interoperability, ruggedised field devices, wireless, IP/MPLS and optical networks, command-and-control connectivity, video analytics, CCTV/IoT integration, and real-time responder tracking 5.

The portfolio is presented for public-safety and first-responder use cases, including mobile command-and-control centres, but the product page does not identify Israel, the IMOD, IDF, Israeli police, or another Israeli security end-user 5.

Nokia’s annual-report materials also describe mission-critical and defence markets globally, without identifying evidence that a tactical, military-specified, or contract-modified Nokia product was supplied to an Israeli military or security customer 3.

No public evidence identified of Nokia-specific Israeli end-user certificates, export-licence applications, or export-control decisions for Israeli military or security end-users.

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

Nokia’s documented relevance in the reviewed material concerns telecommunications infrastructure rather than heavy machinery, construction equipment, demolition equipment, or civil-engineering services 1, 3.

Cellcom Israel’s 2015 annual report records an April 2014 framework agreement with NSN Israel for LTE/LTE-Advanced network equipment and related services, alongside earlier GSM/GPRS/EDGE and UMTS-related arrangements, with annual maintenance available until March 2030 6.

That filing characterises the relationship as a telecommunications-operator arrangement and does not state that NSN Israel supplied the IDF, supported military installations, or deployed equipment in occupied territory 6.

Who Profits reported that Cellcom had telecommunications facilities in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan as of March 2018, while identifying NSN Israel as a long-term Cellcom partner 7.

The Who Profits report does not establish that Nokia or NSN equipment was installed at Cellcom’s reported occupied-territory sites 7.

No public evidence identified of Nokia equipment or services being used for settlement construction, demolitions, checkpoints, the separation barrier, military installations, or other occupied-territory infrastructure.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

No public evidence identified of Nokia supplying components, communications subsystems, specialist manufacturing services, licensed production, or weapons-related development to Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael, IMI/Elbit Land, or another Israeli defence prime.

Who Profits lists Nokia Siemens Networks among Nextcom Group’s general business partners and separately lists IMOD, Rafael, Elbit, Israel Prison Service, Israel Police, and IAI among Nextcom’s clients or partners 8.

That profile provides no product category, contract date, value, or evidence that Nokia Siemens Networks supplied Nextcom’s defence-related work, so it does not verify a Nokia supply relationship with Israeli defence primes 8.

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

Nokia’s 2020 annual-report materials list Nokia Solutions and Networks Israel Ltd. among group entities, while Nokia’s current affiliate list continues to identify that entity as a Nokia affiliate 9, 2.

Nokia’s August 2025 legal-entities document identifies Nokia Solutions and Networks Israel Ltd. as Israeli company number 51-289721-6, located at 16 Atir Yeda Street, Kfar Saba 10.

A January 2025 IATI booklet attributes to Nokia Israel’s Head of Charging and Mediation Products a statement that Nokia provides communications-infrastructure consulting and products to major Israeli telecommunications companies and “government entities,” and supports national continuity during war and emergencies 11.

The attributed statement does not name a government customer, security body, site, contract, service value, or military end use 11.

No public evidence identified of Nokia providing base services, freight, port handling, transport, fuel, catering, facilities maintenance, or telecommunications sustainment directly to Israeli military installations, detention facilities, or security sites.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

Nokia’s disclosed business groups at the end of 2025 were Network Infrastructure, Cloud and Network Services, Mobile Networks, and Nokia Technologies 1.

No public evidence identified that Nokia manufactures, integrates, maintains, or supplies lethal platforms, munitions, missile-defence systems, fire-control systems, guidance systems, targeting software, tanks, naval systems, fighter-aircraft systems, or other critical weapon subsystems for Israeli forces.

The reviewed materials support a finding of telecommunications and mission-critical network capability, not a verified Israeli weapons-system supply relationship 5, 3.

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

No public evidence identified of a published governmental grant, denial, suspension, revocation, enforcement action, judicial proceeding, sanctions matter, or arms-embargo investigation concerning Nokia defence supply to an Israeli military or security end-user.

Nokia’s 2025 annual report identifies the company and its consolidated-subsidiary perimeter, but the reviewed filing does not disclose an Israeli defence-export licence, contract, or security end user 1.

The available evidence does not establish whether the historical Cellcom framework agreement remained active after 2020, despite the agreement’s stated maintenance option through March 2030 6.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

The supplied document review found no Nokia mention in the UN Special Rapporteur’s 2025 report A/HRC/59/23, and this finding is document-scoped rather than a claim of database-wide or sector-wide absence 12.

The identified civil-society evidence linking NSN Israel to Cellcom is Who Profits’ 2018 telecommunications report, whose description of the Nokia-group/Cellcom commercial relationship is consistent with Cellcom’s own 2015 filing 7, 6.

The 2025 IATI booklet attributes to Nokia Israel a statement that the company assembled care packages for soldiers and supported employees undertaking reserve duty through company and state benefits 11.

That statement does not identify recipient units, military funds, charity recipients, financial amounts, or a connection to a defence-procurement contract 11.

Nokia’s governance materials identify Timo Ihamuotila as Board Chair and Justin Hotard as President and CEO, while the Group Leadership Team is responsible for operative management under the Board’s instructions 13.

Nokia’s shareholder table for shares registered in Finland listed Solidium Oy as the largest disclosed holder at 5.66% as of 30 June 2026, while noting that the table is limited to shares registered in Finland 14.

No public evidence identified in the reviewed entity-level materials of an Israeli defence-prime subsidiary, Israeli joint venture, or a Nokia Israeli entity other than Nokia Solutions and Networks Israel Ltd. 1, 10, 2, 4.

No public evidence identified of a Nokia-specific boycott, divestment, exclusion, corporate-response, end-use-monitoring campaign, or documented investigation specifically substantiating an Israeli defence-supply relationship 3, 12.

Footnotes

  1. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/924613/000162828026015034/nok-20251231.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  2. https://www.nokia.com/privacy/notices/affiliates/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  3. https://www.nokia.com/system/files/2026-03/nokia-annual-report-2025.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  4. https://www.nokia.com/sites/default/files/2026-03/nokia-corporate-governance-statement-2025.pdf ↩ ↩2

  5. https://www.nokia.com/industries/public-safety/mobile-broadband-transformation/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  6. https://mayafiles.tase.co.il/rpdf/1025001-1026000/P1025014-00.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  7. https://www.whoprofits.org/writable/uploads/old/uploads/2018/09/SIGNAL-STRENGTH-OCCUPIED-THE-TELECOMMUNICATIONS-SECTOR-AND-THE-ISRAELI-OCCUPATION-1-1.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  8. https://www.whoprofits.org/companies/company/6347/ar ↩ ↩2

  9. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/924613/000110465921032429/tm218178d2_6k.htm ↩

  10. https://www.nokia.com/sites/default/files/2025-08/binding-corporate-rules-for-data-processor_public-version-legal-entities.pdf ↩ ↩2

  11. https://iati.co.il/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Booklet-2025.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  12. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/59/23 ↩ ↩2

  13. https://www.nokia.com/we-are-nokia/leadership-and-governance/ ↩

  14. https://www.nokia.com/about-us/investors/stock-information/biggest-shareholders/ ↩