Qatar Airways DIGITAL

Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships

• Qatar Airways Group Q.C.S.C. is a Qatari Closed Shareholding Company established on 30 November 1993, with registered office in Doha; its 2022 consolidated financial statements state that it was ultimately wholly owned by the Government of the State of Qatar.¹

• The current UK overseas-entity record identifies Qatar Airways Group Q.C.S.C. as a Qatar-incorporated private joint-stock company under Qatar law, with an annual statement dated 3 April 2026.²

• Companies House identifies Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) as the active person with significant control, with more than 25% of shares and voting rights and the right to appoint or remove directors.³

• Qatar Airways identifies Amadeus Altéa NDC as its NDC technology provider and states that its Oryx Connect programme is implemented through Amadeus, Sabre and Travelport distribution platforms.⁴

• The available NDC documentation does not identify an Israeli-origin software component within that distribution arrangement.⁴

• Qatar Airways publicly identified Sabre as a technology partner; an earlier Accenture partnership-extension announcement is pre-2020 evidence and does not by itself establish current continuity of that particular agreement.^{5, 6}

• Ooredoo announced 2024 hybrid-cloud programmes for Qatar Airways involving Google Cloud, Microsoft Azure, Nutanix, Cisco, Fortinet and Zscaler across cloud, network, security and customer-experience functions.^{7, 8, 9, 10}

• The public Ooredoo announcements identify Ooredoo as the integrator and network provider, but do not identify Israeli-origin components, subcontractors, or the programmes’ current completion status.^{7, 8, 9, 10}

• SITA’s 2023 activity report states that Secure SD-WAN would enhance connectivity, security and operational efficiency across Qatar Airways’ international offices and destinations; the available source does not identify rollout completion or an Israeli-origin component.¹¹

• Verint named Qatar Airways as a 2024 EMEA award recipient in the “Driving Digital-First Engagement” category, describing the awards as recognising customer organisations using its CX automation, AI and analytics offerings.¹²

• This establishes a Qatar Airways–Verint customer relationship no later than November 2024, but the available public material does not disclose contract term, deployment scale, hosting model, processing location, data categories, product modules, or current status.¹²

• Verint is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York, while its public corporate materials identify operational activity in Israel; the cited evidence does not establish that Qatar Airways uses Israel-developed code or processes Qatar Airways data in Israel.^{12, 13}

• The IATA World Data Symposium 2025 programme listed a Qatar Airways vice president responsible for cybersecurity, governance, risk and compliance, and aircraft cybersecurity, as a speaker on aviation supply-chain security; its separate listing of a Check Point employee does not establish a Qatar Airways–Check Point vendor relationship.¹⁴

• No public evidence identified of Qatar Airways directly procuring, licensing, subscribing to, or integrating Check Point, Wiz, SentinelOne, CyberArk, NICE, Claroty, Palo Alto Networks, AnyVision/Oosto, BriefCam, Trigo, or Trax.^{4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 14}

• No public evidence identified that Israeli-origin components are delivered indirectly through Ooredoo, Microsoft, IBM, Accenture, Sabre, SITA, Amadeus, or Google Cloud; public materials do not provide a component-level bill of materials.^{4, 7, 12, 15, 11, 14, 5, 6}

• Qatar Airways’ supplier-registration material provides an invitation-based e-sourcing process rather than a comprehensive public inventory of IT, cybersecurity, SaaS, data-centre, or subcontractor vendors; below-prime-vendor Israeli-origin exposure therefore cannot be conclusively excluded from public records.¹⁵

Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology

• Hamad International Airport, Qatar Airways and SITA announced “Fast Pass,” an opt-in facial-biometric passenger journey operating across more than 700 touchpoints in July 2026.¹⁶

• The stated enrolment routes are the Qatar Airways mobile check-in application and terminal kiosks, while stated uses include check-in, bag drop, security and boarding.¹⁶

• SITA is the publicly named Fast Pass technology partner, and the announcement does not name an Israeli-origin facial-recognition, behavioural-analytics, gait-analysis, retail-analytics, or surveillance component.¹⁶

• No public evidence identified of Qatar Airways using Israeli-origin predictive-policing, social-media monitoring, sentiment monitoring, workforce-surveillance, retail-recognition, or loss-prevention products; the available Verint evidence is limited to customer-experience functions and does not establish surveillance use.^{12, 16}

• No public evidence identified that Israeli-origin biometric or surveillance products reach Qatar Airways indirectly through SITA, Ooredoo, Google Cloud, Microsoft Azure, Cisco, Fortinet, or Zscaler, although public supplier announcements do not provide component-level bills of materials.^{7, 8, 9, 10, 16, 11}

Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation

• Qatar Airways and Google Cloud announced an intended use of Google data analytics, BigQuery and Vertex AI for personalised customer offerings and operational optimisation in May 2023.¹⁷

• Qatar Airways stated that Google Cloud’s presence in Qatar provided assurance that its data would stay in-country.¹⁷

• Ooredoo described a hybrid multi-cloud environment combining Qatar Airways’ private cloud with Google Cloud services hosted in Google’s Qatar region, with an intended role in supporting local data-residency and compliance requirements.⁷

• Ooredoo also described a stated objective of a 360-degree customer view for hyper-personalised customer touchpoints, without publishing the programme’s complete data flows or sub-processor stack.⁷

• Qatar Airways’ privacy notice identifies Qatar Airways Group Q.C.S.C. as controller and states that personal data may be transferred internationally within the group and to third-party service and technology providers subject to safeguards.¹⁸

• The privacy notice identifies processing involving customer, travel, payment, booking, contact-centre, API and PNR-related personal data; it also identifies potential disclosures to airlines, customs, border-control, security, anti-terrorism and immigration authorities where required or permitted.¹⁸

• The privacy notice does not publish a complete data-flow map, all storage and processing locations, the identities of all sub-processors, or an Israel-related routing or legal-access mechanism.¹⁸

• In August 2025, Ooredoo and Qatar Airways signed a memorandum of understanding to enhance AI, cloud and cybersecurity capabilities in Qatar, describing a proposed national AI hub, local training, Ooredoo’s NVIDIA GPU platform, and Qatar Airways’ operational and technology expertise.¹⁹

• The August 2025 announcement does not name an Israeli technology vendor, Israeli data centre, Israeli customer, or Israel-related delivery location.¹⁹

• No public evidence identified that Qatar Airways operates, leases, or co-locates a data centre in Israel, or routes its customer-data pipeline through Israeli infrastructure or jurisdiction; public disclosures instead identify Qatar-region cloud arrangements while also acknowledging unspecified international transfers.^{7, 17, 18, 19}

• Israel’s Project Nimbus selects Google and AWS as public-cloud suppliers for Israeli-government use, with the Ministry of Finance stating that services are provided from local Israeli cloud sites and that data are processed and stored in Israel.²⁰

• Qatar Airways is not named in the Project Nimbus source as a contracting party, subcontractor, or recipient.²⁰

• No public evidence identified of Qatar Airways providing cloud, data-sovereignty, data-residency, or resilience services to Israeli state institutions, the military, or other Israeli public bodies.²⁰

Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships

• No public evidence identified of a Qatar Airways contract, partnership, service agreement, or technology provision involving the Israeli Ministry of Defence, IDF, intelligence agencies, Israeli police, or another Israeli state-security body.^{20, 21, 22, 23, 19}

• No public evidence identified that Qatar Airways’ commercially available technology, data, cloud capacity, or software has been publicly reported as deployed by Israeli military, intelligence, or law-enforcement bodies in Israel or the occupied territories.^{20, 21, 22, 23}

• No public evidence identified that Qatar Airways develops, sells, licenses, brokers, or maintains offensive cyber tools, zero-day exploits, or digital weapons for Israeli state actors.^{21, 22, 23}

AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems

• Qatar Airways’ announced AI use includes Google Cloud analytics, BigQuery and Vertex AI for personalised offerings, airline and airport operations, and customer and employee experience.¹⁷

• The Google Cloud announcement does not identify Israeli state customers, Israeli training data, Israeli hosting, or military use.¹⁷

• Qatar Airways announced “Sama 2.0,” an AI virtual cabin crew developed with UneeQ for travel-planning and customer-support interactions through QVerse and the Qatar Airways application.²⁴

• The Sama 2.0 announcement does not identify Israeli-origin technology, Israeli data processing, or state-security use.²⁴

• In August 2025, Qatar Airways and Accenture established “AI Skyways,” describing responsible-AI practices, data and platform offerings, and use cases including flight-schedule optimisation, predictive maintenance, and personalised customer interactions across Qatar Airways Group.²⁵

• The AI Skyways announcement does not name an Israeli-origin AI platform, Israeli training data, Israeli hosting, or an Israeli state customer.²⁵

• The August 2025 Ooredoo memorandum is additional evidence of AI, cloud and cybersecurity activity, but identifies Qatar-focused infrastructure and does not establish Israeli technology or Israeli-state participation.¹⁹

• No public evidence identified of Qatar Airways providing AI/ML, computer-vision, autonomous decision-support, or algorithmic systems to Israeli state, military, or security bodies.^{20, 21, 22, 23}

• No public evidence identified that Qatar Airways AI systems have been trained on, or given access to, civilian-surveillance data, intercepted communications, or other datasets originating from Israel or the occupied territories.^{17, 18, 24, 26, 19}

• No public evidence identified of Qatar Airways providing purpose-built autonomous target-generation, fire-control, kill-chain, target-identification, or autonomous-tracking systems.^{21, 22, 23}

Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint

• Qatar Airways’ official group page identifies Qatar Duty Free, Al Maha Services, Qatar Airways Cargo, Qatar Aviation Services, Internal Media Services, MATAR/Qatar Company for Airports Operation and Management, Qatar Executive, Qatar Distribution Company, Qatar Aircraft Catering Company, Discover Qatar, and Qatar Airways Holidays as group entities or brands.²⁷

• The group page expressly describes Qatar Duty Free as a Qatar Airways subsidiary, Qatar Aviation Services as providing ground handling at Hamad International Airport, and Qatar Aircraft Catering Company as catering for Qatar Airways and other airlines using that airport.²⁷

• The group page is brand- and function-oriented and, except for Qatar Duty Free, does not establish each named unit’s legal form, ownership percentage, registration number, directors, or whether it is a separate subsidiary rather than a division or trading name.²⁷

• Qatar Investment Authority led Snyk’s $196.5 million Series G financing announced in December 2022.²⁸

• Snyk states that it began in London and Tel Aviv and identifies Tel Aviv as one of its office hubs.²⁹

• The financing establishes a Qatar Investment Authority capital relationship with a cybersecurity company having an Israeli operating footprint, but the public materials do not disclose the resulting stake, governance rights, subsequent dilution, exit, or current holding status.^{28, 29}

• Snyk subsequently announced acquisitions of Enso Security in June 2023 and Helios in January 2024; those announcements establish application-security and runtime-risk-visibility acquisitions but do not establish a Qatar Airways customer, technical, or data relationship with either product.^{30, 31}

• Qatar Airways’ December 2025 announcement identifies Saad Sherida Al-Kaabi as group chair and Hamad Ali Al-Khater as group CEO, effective 7 December 2025; QIA’s leadership page separately identifies Al-Kaabi as a QIA board member.^{32, 33}

• QIA’s leadership materials identify Mohammed Saif Al-Sowaidi as QIA CEO and state that he holds a Qatar Airways Group board role; they also identify Sheikh Faisal bin Thani bin Faisal Al Thani as a QIA board member and a Qatar Airways Group board member.^{34, 33}

• QIA describes its general approach to portfolio companies as that of a financial investor, while noting that it may take a more active role where appropriate; this general statement does not establish an investment-specific role in Snyk or Qatar Airways.³⁵

• QIA announced a September 2025 digital-infrastructure partnership with Blue Owl involving an initial platform of more than US$3 billion in data-centre assets; the announcement does not identify Qatar Airways, Israeli assets, Israel-based data centres, Israeli customers, or Israeli state institutions.³⁶

• QIA announced in December 2025 that Qai, a QIA subsidiary, and Brookfield would establish an AI-infrastructure joint venture focused on Qatar and selected international markets; the announcement does not identify Qatar Airways participation, Israel, Israeli suppliers, Israeli data centres, or Israeli state customers.³⁷

• The cited Qai announcement does not establish that Qai is part of Qatar Airways Group or that Qatar Airways has received Qai services.³⁷

• No public evidence identified of personal investments, board roles, or family-office investments by Saad Sherida Al-Kaabi or Hamad Ali Al-Khater in Israeli surveillance, cyber, AI, SIGINT, or military-technology firms; the QIA–Snyk financing is a controller-level institutional investment, not evidence of a personal holding.^{28, 32, 33}

• The available sources do not provide a complete Qatar Airways board register or principal-investment disclosure; accordingly, they do not support an absence finding concerning private, family-office, foundation, or personal investments of other directors or principals.^{2, 34, 38}

• No public evidence identified that Qatar Airways itself operates an Israeli R&D centre, engineering office, innovation lab, or accelerator; acquired an Israeli technology company; invested directly in an Israeli technology startup or fund; or entered patent, licensing, or co-development arrangements with Israeli research institutions.^{28, 3, 29, 26, 19}

• The Qatar Investment Authority–Snyk financing is a controller-level investment and does not establish that Qatar Airways is itself a Snyk customer or investor.^{28, 3, 29}

• The 2022 SEC Schedule 13D/A identifies Qatar Airways Group Q.C.S.C. and Qatar Airways Investments (UK) Ltd. as joint reporting persons concerning LATAM Airlines Group securities, but does not establish a complete current group-ownership chart or a technology relationship.³⁹

Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History

• The supplied document review reported no Qatar Airways hit in the 2023 and 2025 OHCHR settlement databases or in the UN report From economy of occupation to economy of genocide; this finding is document-scoped and does not establish absence from all other sources or future editions.^{21, 22, 23}

• A full-text check of A/HRC/59/23 and A/HRC/60/19 found no occurrence of “Qatar Airways”; this is likewise document-scoped rather than evidence of absence from all records.^{21, 23}

• The reviewed BDS priority-target and DBIO materials do not provide an underlying primary reference establishing a Qatar Airways technology relationship with Israeli state entities or operations in the occupied territories.^{40, 41}

• No public evidence identified of an NGO or academic investigation specifically addressing Qatar Airways’ technology provision to Israel, Israeli state bodies, or operations in occupied territories.^{21, 22, 23, 40, 41}

• No public evidence identified of an organised boycott, divestment, or sanctions campaign specifically targeting Qatar Airways for technology, software, cloud, surveillance, or AI provision to Israel or the occupied territories.^{40, 41}

• A U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security enforcement notice states that Pratt & Whitney Component Solutions received 13 Qatar Airways requests between May 2019 and March 2020 to refrain from importing Israeli-origin goods into Qatar in fulfilment of purchase orders.²⁶

• The BIS enforcement action was against Pratt & Whitney for failure to report the requests, rather than against Qatar Airways, and the notice does not identify the goods or establish that they were software, cloud, surveillance, or cybersecurity products.²⁶

• BIS’s September 2024 Requester List named Qatar Airways, Qatar, with a June 2024 listing date; the list states that named entities had been reported by a U.S. person as having made a boycott-related request, without identifying the individual transaction, product, or requested contract language.⁴²

• In December 2024, BIS listed Qatar Airways among parties removed from the Requester List, stating that removal followed cessation of boycott conditions by more than 40 removed entities collectively; the notice does not supply Qatar Airways’ individual transaction documents or identify the products involved.⁴³

• The BIS records concern boycott-related requests, not Qatar Airways’ provision of technology to Israel, Israeli state bodies, or occupied territories, and no public evidence identified of regulatory inquiries, export-control proceedings, sanctions investigations, or legal actions involving Qatar Airways’ technology sales or services to Israeli state entities.^{26, 42, 43}

• No post-19 July 2024 or post-November 2024 evidence identified in the reviewed sources establishes Qatar Airways technology provision to Israeli state bodies, settlements, or occupied territories.^{21, 22, 23, 40, 41}