Radware MILITARY

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

Radware Ltd. is an Israeli-incorporated foreign private issuer that describes its business as application-security and delivery solutions for multi-cloud environments, which does not itself establish defence or security-force end use ¹.

No public evidence identified.

The bounded searches did not verify a Radware contract, tender award, framework agreement, memorandum, or procurement relationship with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israel Police, Border Police, Israel Prison Service, Shin Bet, Mossad, or COGAT ^{2, 3}.

A 2013 Israeli Ministry of Transport and Road Safety sole-supplier notice recorded a civilian IT deployment of Radware DefensePro and proposed an upgrade, maintenance, version upgrades, and one year of support for the period 28 July 2013 to 28 July 2014 ⁴.

That Ministry of Transport record is civilian procurement and cannot substantiate a defence, security-force, occupied-territory, or current-use relationship ⁴.

Radware’s 2005 asset-purchase agreement made closing conditional on obtaining any required Israeli Ministry of Defense and United States National Security Authority approvals relating to encryption technology, but it does not identify either authority as a customer, purchaser, or end user ⁵.

The accessible SIBAT materials describe a directory of Israeli defence and homeland-security industries, but the reviewed material did not yield a verifiable Radware-specific entry ^{2, 3}.

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Radware’s documented product portfolio includes cloud DDoS protection, DefensePro X, DDoS-protection software, and attack-mitigation systems marketed in a telecommunications-trade catalogue as cybersecurity products ⁶.

DefensePro is documented as an inline network-intrusion-prevention system designed to detect and mitigate denial-of-service and other network attacks ⁷.

The cited DefensePro technical documentation does not describe targeting, fire control, autonomous target generation, weapons integration, or kinetic effects ⁷.

Spain’s National Cryptologic Centre certified a specified DefensePro and APSolute Vision attack-mitigation configuration on 19 July 2024, which is a product-security certification rather than evidence of an Israeli military end user, export licence, or end-user certificate ⁸.

No public evidence identified.

The reviewed sources did not verify a ruggedised, mil-spec, tactical, contract-modified, or weapons-integrated Radware product supplied to Israeli state-security end users ^{1, 2, 3, 7}.

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

Radware reports administrative, finance, research and development, marketing, and sales operations in Tel Aviv; development and manufacturing facilities in Jerusalem; a subsidiary operation in Ramat Gan; and United States facilities in Mahwah, New Jersey and North Carolina ¹.

The Form 20-F does not identify Radware’s Jerusalem facilities as being in East Jerusalem or otherwise within occupied territory ¹.

No public evidence identified.

The reviewed materials did not verify Radware equipment or services in settlement construction, demolitions, the separation barrier, checkpoints, military installations, or other physical infrastructure in occupied territory ^{2, 3}.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

Radware states that it and its subsidiaries are treated as part of the RAD-Bynet Group, while also stating that each RAD-Bynet member is independent and has a different ownership and board structure ¹.

The company disclosed leasing Tel Aviv headquarters and Jerusalem development and manufacturing facilities from companies owned by members of the Zisapel family group, alongside a non-exclusive Israeli distribution agreement with Bynet Data Communications Ltd ¹.

Sales to Bynet and other RAD-Bynet companies totalled approximately US$5.3 million in 2025, but the filing does not characterise those sales as defence-prime supply ¹.

Radware director Naama Zeldis is disclosed as having also served on the board of Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd., although the Form 20-F provides no dates, current-status confirmation, or Radware–Rafael commercial relationship ¹.

Radware’s June 2025 threat advisory named Elbit and IAI among alleged cyberattack targets, but that threat-intelligence context does not evidence a customer, supplier, integration, or joint-development relationship with either company ⁹.

No public evidence identified.

The reviewed sources did not verify Radware supply, joint development, co-production, technology transfer, licensed manufacturing, or component integration with Rafael, Elbit, IAI, IMI, or Elbit Land ^{1, 2, 3}.

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

No public evidence identified.

The bounded review did not verify Radware contracts for military-base services, detention-centre services, transport, freight, port handling, facilities management, or comparable logistical sustainment for Israeli security bodies ^{2, 3}.

The 2013 Ministry of Transport notice concerns civilian cybersecurity-system support and does not establish logistical or base-service activity ⁴.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

No public evidence identified.

The reviewed materials did not verify Radware manufacturing or supplying lethal platforms, ammunition, explosive materials, missile-defence components, fire-control systems, guidance systems, radars, or other critical weapons subsystems to Israeli forces ^{2, 3, 7}.

Available product documentation characterises DefensePro as network-security and attack-mitigation technology rather than a weapons system ⁷.

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

The 2005 asset-purchase agreement records a condition requiring delivery of any required Israeli Ministry of Defense and United States National Security Authority encryption-technology approvals before closing ⁵.

That historic transaction document does not state whether an approval was granted, denied, suspended, or revoked, and it does not establish a sale to an Israeli military or security end user ⁵.

The July 2024 Spanish decision is a cybersecurity-product security certification rather than an arms-export or export-licence decision ⁸.

No public evidence identified.

The reviewed materials did not verify an arms-export licensing decision, sanctions or export-control enforcement action, arms-embargo investigation, or court proceeding concerning Radware defence supply to Israel ^{1, 5, 2, 3}.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

Radware’s ESG report states that it supports Shekulo Tov, an external social-services organisation that Radware describes as a recognised provider to Israeli Ministries including Defense ¹⁰.

The ESG disclosure describes Shekulo Tov’s client status and does not establish a Radware contract or supply relationship with the Israeli Ministry of Defense ¹⁰.

Radware’s 2022 ESG report states that CEO and co-founder Roy Zisapel served in the Israel Defense Forces Intelligence Corps from 1989 to 1994 ¹¹.

Radware’s current Form 20-F identifies Roy Zisapel as President, CEO, and director, reports his 5.89% beneficial ownership, and states that the company is not directly or indirectly owned or controlled by another corporation, government, or person ¹.

The supplied document-scoped pre-scan reported no Radware mention in the listed OHCHR settlement-database updates, Albanese report A/HRC/59/23, PAX, Al-Haq, Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, BankTrack, BDS, KLP, and specified Who Profits reports, which cannot establish absence from unsearched sources or databases ^{1, 2, 3}.

No public evidence identified.

The reviewed sources did not verify a Radware-specific boycott, divestment, exclusion, civil-society investigation, corporate response, or post–19 July 2024 continuation allegation connecting its products to Israeli military supply, settlement activity, or occupied-territory infrastructure ^{1, 2, 3}.