INDEX / DIRECTORY / RADWARE / POLITICAL

Radware POLITICAL

POLITICAL AUDIT UPDATED 2026-08-29
Political Score 3.75 /10 B Radware - BDS-1000 799
Political 3.75

Evidence-only forensic audit. Scoring happens downstream - see the main dossier for the composite assessment.

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Corporate Communications & Public Stance

Radware’s 11 October 2023 threat advisory described the 7 October Hamas attack, referred to the IDF response as “Operation Iron Swords,” and reported increased cyber activity targeting Israeli sites 1.

The advisory reported 143 claimed attacks on Israeli websites between 2 and 10 October 2023, characterized most as claims by pro-Palestinian hacktivists, and identified government sites as the largest stated target category at approximately 36 percent 1.

These figures were Radware threat-intelligence observations and characterizations, rather than independently verified incident totals 1.

Radware framed the publication as a cybersecurity threat advisory and promoted security products and customer support alongside it 1.

The reviewed conflict-related communication did not state that Radware provided free crisis services, credits, physical logistics, or infrastructure to an Israeli state or military entity 1.

Operations in Occupied or Contested Territories

Radware Ltd. is incorporated under Israeli law, maintains its principal executive office in Tel Aviv, and discloses leased premises mainly in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Ramat Gan, alongside sites in the United States and other international regions 2.

The FY2025 filing does not identify an occupied-territory location among Radware’s disclosed properties 2.

RADWARE (UK) LIMITED is an active UK entity incorporated in January 2000, with a Reading registered office and an information-technology-consultancy SIC classification 3.

Radware’s listed-subsidiary and property disclosures did not identify a subsidiary incorporated in, or registered office disclosed in, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, or a named Israeli settlement 2.

No public evidence identified of Radware-operated facilities, named resellers, customer deployments, or contracts located in an Israeli settlement, the occupied West Bank, East Jerusalem, or the Golan Heights.

Radware was not named in the supplied document-scoped checks of the 2023 and 2025 OHCHR settlement-business reports or the September 2025 OHCHR database-update announcement 4, 5, 6.

Radware was not named in the supplied document-scoped check of the UN Special Rapporteur’s July 2025 report concerning the economy of occupation and genocide 7.

The document-scoped non-mentions do not establish the absence of conduct, affiliates, distributors, principals, or differently named entities outside the reviewed materials 4, 5, 6, 7.

Internal Governance, Content & Retail Policies

The reviewed SEC filings, corporate communications, and targeted searches did not identify employee discipline, employment litigation, union disputes, content moderation, mapping or cartographic policy, retail labeling, charitable matching, reservist-pay policy, military-welfare donations, or conflict-period asset mobilization by Radware 2, 8.

No public evidence identified of Radware employee discipline, litigation, union disputes, platform or content-moderation disputes, or shareholder-resolution disputes connected to Palestine-related expression.

Radware’s reviewed public materials describe a cybersecurity and application-delivery business rather than a consumer retail or content-hosting platform 2.

The supplied checks found no Radware mention in Amnesty International’s 2022 report on Israeli apartheid or Human Rights Watch’s 2021 report on apartheid and persecution 9, 10.

Brand Heritage & State Partnerships

Radware describes its business as developing, manufacturing, and selling cybersecurity and application-delivery solutions for cloud, on-premises, and software-defined data centres 2.

The examined annual-report and charter material did not state that Radware’s primary corporate mission is to advance Israeli state geopolitical goals or infrastructure 2.

Israel Post has been a Radware customer for more than five years, according to Radware’s June 2025 case study 11.

The case study classifies Israel Post as “Government – National Postal Service” and says it deployed Radware Application Protection, Alteon VA, and GEL licensing, with monitoring, configuration updates, and proactive Emergency Response Team alerts 11.

The Israel Post source does not identify military, intelligence, occupation-administration, or settlement functions for that customer deployment 11.

No public evidence identified in the reviewed filings and targeted official-source searches of a direct Radware contract with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israel Police, Israel Prison Service, or COGAT 2.

Lobbying, Advocacy, Financing & Logistics

Bynet Data Communications Ltd., a RAD-Bynet Group company, is Radware’s non-exclusive distributor in Israel under a written agreement 2.

Radware reported sales to Bynet and other RAD-Bynet Group companies of approximately $3.3 million in 2023, $5.7 million in 2024, and $5.3 million in 2025 2.

Radware also reported approximately $3.4 million in purchases from specified RAD-Bynet Group entities in both 2024 and 2025 for network-management, IT and communications equipment, testing and repair, and mutual-marketing activities 2.

The disclosed Bynet relationship does not identify Bynet’s end customers or establish that Radware products were supplied to Israeli military, security, occupation-administration, or settlement bodies 2.

No public evidence identified of a Radware corporate PAC, regional-policy lobbying registration, direct financial contribution to the IDF, FIDF, JNF/KKL, settlement entities, or a named military-welfare body 2.

The supplied document-scoped check did not name Radware in the BDS Movement’s November 2024 corporate-priority-target guide 12.

No usable primary or specialist-NGO source was retrieved establishing that Radware was subject to a named boycott, divestment, or sanctions campaign, or documenting a company response 12.

No Radware-specific OECD National Contact Point case, court proceeding, regulatory enforcement action, or parliamentary inquiry concerning Israeli settlements or the Israel–Palestine conflict was retrieved within the bounded searches reflected in the research memo 4, 5, 6, 7.

Corporate Structure & Primary Mission

Radware Ltd. is the Nasdaq-listed issuer, incorporated in Israel in May 1996 and operational since 1997 2.

Radware Inc. is a wholly owned New Jersey subsidiary that conducts sales and marketing primarily in the United States and Canada and serves as the issuer’s authorized U.S. representative and agent 2.

The FY2025 filing lists subsidiaries across the United Kingdom, Europe, Asia-Pacific, North and South America, including entities associated with SkyHawk, Pynt, Edgehawk, CSR Cloud Security, Overcast Security, and Radyoos Media 2.

Radyoos Media Ltd. is approximately 91 percent owned and ceased activities in 2017, while SkyHawk (CNP) Security Ltd. is approximately 76.2 percent owned 2.

Radware identifies itself and certain Zisapel-family-linked companies as the “RAD-Bynet Group,” while stating that each group company is independent and has different ownership and board structures 2.

The reviewed filing does not identify RAD-Bynet as Radware’s corporate parent 2.

Radware reported acquiring Pynt, Inc. in January 2026 and acquiring the technology and operations of related party DC Security Ltd., formerly SecurityDAM, in February 2022 2.

No public evidence identified in the reviewed entity records of state-held shares, a golden share, or a charter provision assigning Radware a state-geopolitical mandate 2, 13.

Executive & Leadership Footprint

Yuval Cohen is chair, and Roy Zisapel is Radware’s president, chief executive officer, and a director 2.

The FY2025 filing lists Yair Tauman, Stanley B. Stern, Naama Zeldis, Meir Moshe, Israel Mazin, and Alex Pinchev as other directors 2.

The named executive team includes Guy Avidan as CFO, David Roth as CRO, David Aviv as CTO, Gabi Malka as COO, Constance Stack as CGO, and Riki Goldriech as CPO 2.

Radware states that it has no controlling shareholder, while noting that the estate of Yehuda Zisapel, Nava Zisapel, and Roy Zisapel may exert significant influence over director elections and shareholder matters 2.

As of 20 March 2026, Radware reported beneficial ownership of 6.85 percent for Nava Zisapel, 5.89 percent for Roy Zisapel, and approximately 2.5 percent for the Yehuda Zisapel estate 2.

Roy Zisapel is also identified as a director of Bynet Data Communications and multiple other RAD-Bynet companies 2.

The filing states that Naama Zeldis previously served on the board of Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd., but does not state that the role is ongoing 2.

No usable accountability-source record was retrieved linking Radware, an identified parent or subsidiary, or a named Radware principal to settlement entities, military-welfare funds, IDF/FIDF/JNF donations, anti-BDS lobbying, or post-July 2024 conflict-related conduct 7, 9, 10, 12.

Footnotes

  1. https://www.radware.com/security/threat-advisories-and-attack-reports/cyber-aggression-rises-following-the-october-2023-israel-hamas-conflict/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  2. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1094366/000117891326001923/zk2634899.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23 ↩24 ↩25 ↩26 ↩27 ↩28

  3. https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/03903389 ↩

  4. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/53/71 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  5. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/60/19 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  6. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/un-human-rights-office-updates-database-businesses-involved-israeli ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  7. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/59/23 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  8. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1094366/000117891324001040/zk2431148.htm ↩

  9. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde15/5141/2022/en/ ↩ ↩2

  10. https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution ↩ ↩2

  11. https://www.radware.com/getattachment/2aa98fe7-ea17-4bd4-b431-846877645ec0/RWI-505_Israel_Post_Case_Study_06-19-25.pdf.aspx ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  12. https://bdsmovement.net/Guide-to-BDS-Boycott ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  13. https://www.radware.com/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?ID=6c87bb0d-c75b-4b95-8eb7-dbd43a62c7ce ↩