Radware DIGITAL

Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships

• Radware’s FY2025 Form 20-F identifies Cisco and Check Point as strategic relationships that provide access to certain large customers, and states that Radware participates in Cisco Live and Check Point Experience events ¹.

• The disclosed Cisco and Check Point relationships establish channel or strategic-partner links, rather than evidence that Radware internally licenses or deploys either company’s technology ¹.

• Radware states that it sells mainly through independent distributors and resellers, but its filing does not identify an Israeli systems integrator deploying Israeli-origin technology for a named Radware programme ¹.

• No public evidence identified of Radware’s internal licensing, subscription, or integration use of Wiz, SentinelOne, CyberArk, NICE, Verint, Claroty, Palo Alto Networks, or the other specified vendors.

• Radware discloses related-party transactions with RAD-Bynet Group companies including BYNET Data Communications, CloudRide, BYNET Electronics, BYNET SEMECH, Bynet System Applications, Internet Binat, RAD-Bynet Properties and Services, and RAD Data Communications ¹.

• Radware states that it is not directly or indirectly owned or controlled by another corporation, government, natural person, or legal person, while describing founder-family, shareholder, director, related-entity, and transaction links within the RAD-Bynet Group ¹.

Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology

• No public evidence identified of Radware using or supplying facial recognition, biometric identification, gait analysis, predictive policing, social-media monitoring, or workforce-surveillance products in the reviewed materials.

• Radware’s June 2025 Israel Post case study describes a deployment of cloud WAF, bot management, load balancing, and around-the-clock security monitoring ².

• The Israel Post case study characterises the bot-management function as behavioural attack mitigation and does not describe biometric or person-identification functionality ².

• No public evidence identified that surveillance or biometric technologies reach Radware through a managed-security service, third-party platform, or bundled suite.

Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation

• Radware announced a Tel Aviv cloud application-security centre in September 2025 and described it as its second cloud-security centre in Israel ³.

• Radware’s FY2025 filing states that its Israeli cloud-security locations form part of a global network of more than 50 cloud-security centres ¹.

• Radware’s March 2026 Cloud WAF data-processing profile lists an approved Tel Aviv Cloud WAF point of presence at Binat’s Or Towers, Raoul Wallenberg 24, Tel Aviv ⁴.

• The same profile lists points of presence across Europe, the United States, Asia-Pacific, Africa, and other locations, but does not state which customer traffic or datasets are routed through the Tel Aviv point of presence ⁴.

• Radware states that its security-log and configuration database is stored in the European Union, while requests to view that database are encrypted and routed through a United States service portal ⁴.

• The Cloud WAF profile states that limited support data may be transferred to the United States, India, and Colombia ⁴.

• The profile describes processing of source IP addresses, cookies or session data, URLs, headers, attack payloads, and related security-event metadata, with feature-dependent retention periods ⁴.

• No public evidence identified that Radware participates in Project Nimbus or another identified Israeli government cloud-procurement programme.

• No public evidence identified of a published Radware contract marketed as data-sovereignty or resilience services for Israeli military bodies.

Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships

• Israel Post is identified in Radware’s June 2025 case study as a government or national postal-service customer using Radware Application Protection, Cloud WAF, Bot Manager, Alteon VA, GEL licensing, and emergency-response monitoring ².

• Radware’s case study states that Israel Post had been its client for more than five years as of June 2025, indicating a relationship beginning by 2020 or earlier and confirmed as ongoing at that date ².

• No public evidence identified of a verified Radware contract with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, the IDF, Israeli intelligence agencies, Israel Police, or Israel Prison Service.

• No public evidence identified that Radware developed, licensed, sold, or maintained offensive cyber tools, zero-day exploit capabilities, or digital weapons systems for Israeli state actors.

• Radware discloses that director Naama Zeldis “has also served” on the board of Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd., without providing dates or identifying a Radware contract, technology provision, or investment involving Rafael ¹.

• Radware discloses that CTO David Aviv served in the Israeli Air Force as a senior technical leader until 2000, but this biographical disclosure does not identify a Radware relationship with the Israeli Air Force ¹.

AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems

• Radware describes AI SOC Xpert as a product that automates security-incident root-cause analysis, timelines, and contextualisation across DDoS and bot attacks ¹.

• Radware’s filing describes subsidiary SkyHawk Security products for cloud detection and response, cloud infrastructure entitlement management, cloud security posture management, and autonomous purple-team functions for AWS, Google Cloud, and Azure ¹.

• No public evidence identified that Radware’s AI or security products were provided to Israeli state, military, or intelligence bodies.

• No public evidence identified that these products were trained on population or intercepted-communications datasets from Israel or the occupied territories, or used for autonomous targeting or target generation.

Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint

• Radware Ltd. is an Israeli-law corporation with principal offices, manufacturing facilities, and R&D facilities in Israel, and its principal executive office is at 22 Raoul Wallenberg Street, Tel Aviv ¹.

• Radware’s FY2025 R&D activity occurred mainly in Israel, Bangalore, Vancouver, and North Carolina, with 406 R&D employees and 68 R&D subcontractors reported as of 31 December 2025 ¹.

• Radware reports final integration, quality-assurance testing, packaging, shipping, and part of final assembly primarily from a Jerusalem facility ¹.

• An Israeli Radware subsidiary received $0.4 million in Israel Innovation Authority royalty-bearing R&D grants during FY2025 for an approved project, while the filing does not identify the project’s technology, customer, or end use ¹.

• In January 2026, Radware acquired Pynt, Inc., an API-security-testing company ¹.

• In February 2022, Radware acquired the technology and operations of DC Security Ltd., formerly SecurityDAM, a related-party cloud-DDoS network operator whose scrubbing-centre services supported Radware’s Cloud DDoS Protection Service ¹.

• Radware leases Tel Aviv headquarters and principal R&D, administrative, finance, marketing, and sales space from private RAD-Bynet Group companies associated with specified Zisapel family interests, and leases Jerusalem development and manufacturing space from affiliated companies ¹.

• No public evidence identified of co-development or licensing arrangements between Radware and Technion, Hebrew University, Weizmann Institute, or other named Israeli research institutions.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History

• A supplied deterministic full-text scan found no mention of Radware in UN Human Rights Council report A/HRC/59/23, the 2023 OHCHR settlement-business database, or the 2025 OHCHR update, which is a document-scoped result rather than evidence of absence from all UN materials or of links involving affiliates or individuals ^{5, 6, 7}.

• No public evidence identified of an NGO or academic report specifically addressing Radware’s technology relationship with Israeli state operations or settlements.

• No public evidence identified of an organised Radware-specific boycott, divestment, or sanctions campaign supported by independently verifiable primary campaign materials.

• Radware’s FY2025 Form 20-F states that the Israel Tax Authority conducted a routine examination of its 2019–2022 tax returns, which Radware settled in December 2025 with no material effect on consolidated operations or tax expense according to the filing ¹.

• A July 2026 CTech report states that the Israel Tax Authority was investigating DC Protection concerning alleged tax-evasion conduct related to Radware’s February 2022 acquisition, while DC Protection denied tax evasion and said the matter had no connection to Radware or other RAD-Bynet companies ⁸.

• The reported DC Protection matter is an investigation and company response, rather than a finding against Radware ⁸.

• A 2014 U.S. federal-court order in Radware’s private patent litigation against A10 Networks and F5 Networks concerned patent discovery and does not identify Israeli state, military, intelligence, settlement, or occupied-territory use ⁹.

• No public evidence identified of a regulatory or court finding concerning Radware technology sales to Israeli state-security bodies, export-control breaches, sanctions violations, surveillance exports, or deployment in occupied territory.