INDEX / DIRECTORY / TIKTOK / POLITICAL

TikTok POLITICAL

POLITICAL AUDIT UPDATED 2026-09-11
Political Score 6.04 /10 C TikTok - BDS-1000 542
Political 6.04

Evidence-only forensic audit. Scoring happens downstream - see the main dossier for the composite assessment.

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Corporate Communications & Public Stance

TikTok stated on 15 October 2023 that it stood against terrorism, was shocked by the 7 October attacks in Israel, and was deeply saddened by the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, while framing its response around free expression, human rights, and platform safety.1

TikTok reported establishing a crisis command centre, adding Arabic- and Hebrew-speaking moderators, adapting automated detection, and engaging law enforcement under its guidelines; it reported more than 500,000 videos removed and 8,000 livestreams closed by 15 October 2023, rising to more than 775,000 videos and 14,000 livestreams by 25 October.1

TikTok stated on 2 November 2023 that it had removed more than 925,000 videos in the conflict region since 7 October for policy breaches involving violence, hate speech, misinformation, and terrorism, including content promoting Hamas, and that it had engaged external experts including the Anti-Defamation League.2

TikTok updated its conflict post on 6 April 2024, stating that it had removed more than 3.1 million videos and suspended more than 140,000 livestreams in Israel and Palestine between 7 October 2023 and 31 March 2024, and that changes to machine moderation produced a 234% increase in violative comments removed by that technology.1

TikTok publicly rejected claims that its recommendation system promoted one side of the conflict, reporting that in the United States #standwithIsrael had 68% more views per video than #freePalestine, while cautioning that user-created hashtags and differing video volumes affect raw comparisons.3

At a Knesset committee meeting on 18 July 2024, TikTok public-policy and government-relations manager Liron Rifman Schwartz stated that TikTok did not take a side in the war, that “Free Palestine” was permitted unless it encouraged violence, and that political fundraising was prohibited while Gaza humanitarian-fundraising campaigns were permitted; this was a representative’s statement recorded by the Knesset, not independent verification of implementation.4

TikTok’s January–June 2025 Code of Practice on Disinformation report described continued Arabic- and Hebrew-language moderation capacity, Israel- and Palestine-related search interventions, and training on antisemitism and Islamophobia; it said TikTok could not provide Israel-Hamas-specific advertising-enforcement metrics.5

The 2025 report separately itemised Russia-Ukraine enforcement metrics while declining to provide Israel-Hamas-specific advertising metrics; this is a difference in disclosed metrics, not proof of unequal moderation or a causal explanation for the difference.5

The reviewed communications framed the conflict as the “Israel-Hamas war” and emphasised platform-safety enforcement rather than articulating a public corporate position on occupation, settlements, Palestinian civilian protection, or Israeli state conduct.2, 3

No public evidence identified of sufficient reviewed material to make a documented comparison between TikTok’s conflict posture and its communications concerning Ukraine, Black Lives Matter, or COVID-19.1, 5

Operations in Occupied or Contested Territories

TikTok and ByteDance were not named in the supplied document-specific full-text checks of the 2023 and 2025 OHCHR settlement-business database iterations, the UN Special Rapporteur’s 2025 report A/HRC/59/23, or the BDS Movement’s 30 November 2024 corporate-priority-targets guide; these are document-scoped results and do not establish the absence of operations, customers, advertisers, resellers, or service availability in settlements.6, 7, 8

ByteDance’s published product page identifies TikTok offices in Los Angeles, New York, London, Paris, Berlin, Dubai, Mumbai, Singapore, Jakarta, Seoul, and Tokyo, and does not identify an Israel/Palestine office or legal entity.9

ByteDance’s current corporate page states that it has more than 150,000 employees in nearly 120 cities and lists locations including Beijing, Dublin, Hong Kong, London, Los Angeles, New York, Paris, Seoul, Shanghai, Singapore, and Tokyo, without listing an Israel/Palestine location.10

Later evidence establishes Israeli commercial and public-policy functions. Forbes reported in April 2024, citing two company sources, that TikTok’s Israeli branch had roughly 160 employees.11 TikTok’s business site promoted an Israel-focused 2025 advertising-awards programme and a December ceremony in Tel Aviv.12 An Israel Democracy Institute programme dated 17 June 2026 identified Lior Weintraub as Head of Public Policy, TikTok Israel.13

These sources establish local activity but do not independently establish the legal entity, ownership, directors, registered address, or employing group entity of an Israeli branch.11, 13, 12 no public evidence identified in the reviewed material of a TikTok-owned facility, contract, reseller, subsidiary, franchisee, service contract, or company-controlled commercial activity in an Israeli settlement, East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, or the Golan Heights.14, 6, 7, 8, 9

No TikTok-specific boycott, divestment, or sanctions campaign was identified beyond the document-scoped BDS-guide result.8

Internal Governance, Content & Retail Policies

The UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression reported that TikTok transparency reporting recorded 260 Israeli-government takedown requests in the second half of 2023, covering 10,191 content items and 529 accounts, with 98.2% removed; the report discusses these figures in a wider analysis of restrictive or unbalanced moderation risks rather than adjudicating the merits of each removal.15

A separate UN report stated that Meta and TikTok collectively approved more than 92% of 21,000 Israeli-government social-media removal requests in the first 50 days after 7 October 2023, without providing a TikTok-only approval rate.16 A June 2024 UN Special Procedures communication likewise reported information received that Israel’s Cyber Unit had submitted more than 21,000 removal requests and that Meta and TikTok had complied with more than 92% of them; it is not an adjudicated finding or a TikTok-specific request-by-request dataset.17

A February 2024 letter from 7amleh alleged that Israeli officials continued to disseminate dehumanising and inciting material on TikTok and requested stronger Hebrew-language moderation and independent human-rights due diligence; the letter is a civil-society allegation and request rather than an independently verified enforcement finding.18

TikTok stated that content under fact-checking would be ineligible for the For You feed, and that content for which fact-checking was inconclusive would be labelled unverified and likewise excluded.1

TikTok stated in its January–June 2025 report that it removed a 12-account network, assessed as operating from the United States, for artificially amplifying narratives critical of Israel and U.S. support for Israel; it reported that the network had 26,647 followers.5 TikTok reported continued monitoring for conflict-related covert influence operations, but did not disclose a comparable list of networks associated with other viewpoints in that report; its self-report does not establish the validity of the assessment or platform-wide asymmetry.5

Forbes reported internal disagreement in April 2024 within TikTok’s Israeli branch concerning paid advertisements referring to hostages.11 It reported that employee Barak Herscowitz resigned and alleged hostage-related advertisements had been ruled out of policy, and that TikTok subsequently permitted at least two Hostages and Missing Families Forum advertisements; these are attributed staff and company-source accounts, not court or regulatory findings.11

Associated Press reported in January 2024 that TikTok restricted individual-hashtag searches in Creative Center and that stored Gaza- and Ukraine-related hashtags had been removed; TikTok said the change responded to misuse of the tool and directed approved academics to its Research API.19

The European Commission sought information from TikTok in December 2023 concerning Digital Services Act compliance in the context of the 7 October attacks and escalation of the conflict.20 The Commission opened formal DSA proceedings in February 2024 concerning minors’ protection, advertising transparency, researcher data access, addictive design, and harmful-content risk management; the announcement did not identify Israel-Palestine moderation as a subject and stated that opening proceedings did not prejudge the outcome.21

No public evidence identified of TikTok dismissals, sanctions, litigation, or union disputes specifically over employee pro-Palestinian expression.17, 18, 11 The reported resignation concerns internal advocacy and advertising policy, rather than documented HR discipline against pro-Palestinian staff.11

No public evidence identified of retail, sourcing, settlement-product labelling, or supply-chain categorisation practices relevant to TikTok as a platform business.1, 5

Brand Heritage & State Partnerships

TikTok’s corporate statement describes ByteDance as founded by Chinese entrepreneurs, says TikTok does not operate in mainland China, and states that a Chinese-government-affiliated entity holds a 1% interest in Douyin Information Service Co., Ltd. for China-only media licensing, which TikTok says does not concern its global operations.22

No public evidence identified that TikTok markets itself through Israeli military heritage, Israeli state-security origins, defence-sector origins, “Brand Israel” activity, or formal sponsorship of Israeli government, cultural, academic, public-relations, or settlement-linked programmes.22, 12

The Israeli President’s Office confirmed that President Isaac Herzog met TikTok executives Michael Beckerman and Theo Bertram at the President’s Residence in Jerusalem on 6 February 2024.23 The release says the meeting responded to concerns about antisemitism, “fake news,” and anti-Israel hate after 7 October, and records an undertaking to continue working with the President’s Office and Israeli bodies to counter those phenomena; it does not describe a contract, funding arrangement, legal mandate, or formal partnership.23 The contemporaneous Jerusalem Post report similarly did not describe a contract, funding arrangement, or formal partnership.24

TikTok’s Israel-focused 2025 advertising awards were a commercial-marketing initiative, not evidence of a state-sponsored cultural or public-relations partnership.12

Lobbying, Advocacy, Financing & Logistics

ByteDance’s 2026 first-quarter U.S. lobbying report disclosed $1.57 million in expenses and listed internet technology, content moderation, privacy, data security, children’s safety, intermediary liability, cross-border data transfers, and internet-company trade rules as issues.25 The filing does not identify Israel-Palestine policy, anti-BDS legislation, military aid, settlement policy, or regional trade advocacy as reported lobbying issues.25

The February 2024 President’s Office release documents company engagement with the Office and other Israeli bodies on antisemitism and platform content, but does not evidence lobbying expenditure, regional-legislation advocacy, financing, or a policy commitment beyond the stated undertaking.23

Forbes reported that TikTok paid roughly US$2,500 to Israeli employees while its office was closed, and that one unnamed employee said they personally donated the payment to the Hostages and Missing Families Forum.11 This does not establish a TikTok corporate donation because the reported transfer to the recipient was an individual act and no corporate transfer or recipient filing was identified.11

No public evidence identified in the reviewed primary lobbying record and supplied research of TikTok or ByteDance funding, directing, or sponsoring FIDF, JNF/KKL, settlement organisations, IDF welfare, AIPAC, CFI, or anti-BDS advocacy.25, 11 no public evidence identified of TikTok furnishing free services, infrastructure, logistics, or conflict-period assets to the IDF, Israeli ministries, settlement bodies, or aligned NGOs.1, 25, 11

The targeted principal screening located an unverified lead concerning a William E. Ford role at GA Partners Foundation and reported 2023 grants to Israel-linked medical or emergency-service charities and Gaza emergency medical services, but the underlying 2023 Form 990-PF was not independently retrieved and the lead does not establish that Ford personally directed, funded, or controlled any grant.26 It is therefore not treated as a verified personal, control-linked, or TikTok/ByteDance financing finding.26

Corporate Structure & Primary Mission

TikTok’s May 2025 EEA/Swiss terms identify TikTok Technology Limited, company no. 635755, in Dublin as the contracting entity for EEA and Swiss residents and TikTok Information Technologies UK Limited, company no. 10165711, in London as the contracting entity for UK residents.27 TikTok’s December 2024 EEA/UK/Swiss privacy policy identifies those entities as joint data controllers for users in those jurisdictions.28

Companies House records TikTok Information Technologies UK Limited as an active UK private limited company incorporated on 6 May 2016, previously named Cheetah Technology UK Limited and ByteDance UK Limited; its group accounts were made up to 31 December 2024 and its confirmation statement to 31 October 2025.29

TikTok stated in April 2023 that ByteDance Ltd. was its parent company and represented that approximately 60% of ByteDance was beneficially owned by global institutional investors, 20% by employees, and 20% by its founder; this is a company representation rather than an independently audited ownership register.22

ByteDance’s current corporate page identifies its board as Rubo Liang (Chairman), Arthur Dantchik, William E. Ford, Xavier Niel, and Neil Shen.10 This updates TikTok’s 2023 five-member board description of Liang, Dantchik, Bill Ford, Philippe Laffont, and Neil Shen.22

ByteDance states it was founded in 2012 by a team led by Yiming Zhang and Rubo Liang.10 Its May 2021 announcement identified Zhang as founder and stated that Liang Rubo would become CEO at the end of 2021.30 ByteDance’s current page confirms Liang’s chair role but does not state whether he remains global CEO, whereas TikTok’s 2023 statement described him as chairman and CEO.22, 10

No public authoritative filing in the supplied record identifies current global ByteDance holders of at least 10%, voting rights, or the vehicles holding the stated founder and employee interests.22, 30, 10 The reported 20% founder block cannot be currently attributed to Zhang, Liang, or another named person from these sources.22, 30, 10 no public evidence identified in the reviewed records of a TikTok/ByteDance state-held golden share; the disclosed 1% Douyin interest is described as China-only.22

TikTok announced on 23 January 2026 that TikTok USDS Joint Venture LLC operates independently in the United States and has authority over U.S. trust-and-safety policy and moderation, while TikTok global’s U.S. entities retain global interoperability and certain commercial activities including e-commerce, advertising, and marketing.31 TikTok’s U.S. terms identify the joint venture as U.S. platform operator.32

TikTok stated that Silver Lake, Oracle, and MGX each held 15% of the U.S. joint venture and ByteDance retained 19.9%; it named Dell Family Office, Vastmere Strategic Investments, Alpha Wave Partners, Revolution, Merritt Way, Via Nova, Virgo LI, and NJJ Capital as remaining investors without individual percentages.31 NJJ Capital is identified as Xavier Niel’s family office, but the disclosure does not establish Niel’s individual percentage, a global ByteDance holding, or a qualifying Israel/Palestine-related act.31

TikTok named Shou Chew, Timothy Dattels, Mark Dooley, Egon Durban, Raul Fernandez, Kenneth Glueck, and David Scott as joint-venture directors, and Adam Presser and Will Farrell as its CEO and Chief Security Officer, respectively.31 The U.S. joint venture’s ownership and board are not a global ByteDance ownership register.31, 33

The U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel concluded in July 2026 that the U.S.-operated version functions independently of ByteDance, is majority-owned by American investors, and had revised the ByteDance-originated recommendation algorithm and cybersecurity programme using U.S. user data.34, 33

No public evidence identified that TikTok’s charter, stated mission, founding mandate, or ownership structure is explicitly tied to Israeli state geopolitical goals or infrastructure.19, 22, 11, 12

Executive & Leadership Footprint

Shou Zi Chew’s role as TikTok CEO was documented in his March 2023 testimony before the U.S. House Energy and Commerce Committee.35 The current U.S. joint-venture board separately lists Shou Chew as a director, while Adam Presser is the venture’s CEO; those roles should not be conflated with global ByteDance leadership.31

The current global ByteDance board representation identifies Liang, Dantchik, Ford, Niel, and Shen; Zhang is identified as founder, and the supplied sources do not establish a present global chief-executive title for Liang or a current individual holding of at least 10% for any named principal.30, 10

Lior Weintraub was identified by the Israel Democracy Institute’s June 2026 programme as Head of Public Policy, TikTok Israel; this is an external event-programme identification, not a corporate officer filing.13 The February 2024 meeting identified Beckerman as TikTok Vice President for Public Policy for the Americas and Bertram as Vice President for Government Relations and Public Policy for Europe.24, 23

An IRS-hosted 2021 Form 990-PF record identifies Arthur Dantchik, but the retrieved PDF could not be reliably rendered or parsed to identify its filing organisation or grant schedule; it therefore does not verify a recipient, amount, charitable purpose, or Dantchik control relationship.36, 37

On 22 August 2023, Shomrim reported, based on IRS documents it said it obtained, that Claws Foundation transferred approximately US$12 million to Silver Valley Research Foundation in 2021, that Silver Valley transferred most of that sum to Central Fund of Israel, and that Kohelet Policy Forum’s Israeli filings named Central Fund of Israel as a donor.38 Shomrim further reported that Dantchik held no official role at Silver Valley and that no direct Claws-to-Kohelet transfer had been identified.38 These are investigative-journalism claims rather than primary-filing findings independently verified in the supplied research.38

Shomrim also reported that Dantchik confirmed he had ceased donations to Kohelet Policy Forum as of August 2023, but no primary statement, grant agreement, or post-2023 filing in the supplied evidence establishes the date of final payment or whether funding later resumed.38 The reported cessation is therefore not independently confirmed, and continuation after 19 July 2024 or November 2024 is unknown.38

For the period 2010–2020, Shomrim reported Claws support for Israeli organisations including Shalom Hartman Institute, Taub Center, and American Friends of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, but no successfully parsed primary Form 990-PF schedule in the supplied record verifies individual amounts, purposes, or continuity.38

No public evidence identified in the scoped targeted web and filing searches of an Arthur Dantchik or Claws grant to FIDF, the IDF, JNF/KKL, a settlement organisation, Regavim, Im Tirtzu, AIPAC, or an anti-BDS organisation; this is not a complete historical review of all IRS, Israeli Registrar, donor, or court records.36, 38, 37

Targeted public searches for Zhang Yiming with Israel/Palestine, FIDF, JNF, AIPAC, Gaza, settlement, and donation terms found general education and COVID-era philanthropy but no public evidence identified of a personal or controlled-foundation donation, advocacy role, board role, military-welfare funding, settlement funding, or anti-BDS activity related to Israel-Palestine.22, 30, 10 No U.S. private-foundation vehicle or equivalent public-charity filing under Zhang’s control was established in the scoped research, and this searched absence does not establish that no unpublicised giving occurred.37

Targeted public searches for Rubo Liang with the same Israel-Palestine, funding, and advocacy terms produced no public evidence identified of personal or control-linked political advocacy, charitable funding, board affiliation, military-welfare support, settlement involvement, or anti-BDS activity.22, 30, 10 No personal or family-office charitable vehicle suitable for primary-return review was identified in the scoped research; this is not a comprehensive China, Hong Kong, or private-donor-record review.37

Targeted public searches for Shou Zi Chew with the same terms produced material concerning his corporate role and correspondence concerning TikTok moderation, but no public evidence identified of a personal donation, foundation grant, advocacy-board role, military-welfare funding, settlement funding, or anti-BDS activity.1, 2, 35, 4, 5 Corporate and executive communications about TikTok moderation are distinct from this personal-financing finding.1, 2, 4, 5

IRS-derived filing records displayed by ProPublica identify William E. Ford as President of Screaming Comet Foundation in Form 990-PF entries for fiscal years 2020–2024.39 The record establishes the displayed officer role, but is not the original IRS return and the supplied research did not retrieve usable underlying grant schedules.39 No primary-verified public evidence identified in the targeted searches of a Screaming Comet Foundation or personal Ford grant to FIDF, the IDF, JNF/KKL, settlement organisations, AIPAC, CFI, or anti-BDS bodies; the result is limited because the primary grant schedules were not successfully reviewed.39

Targeted searches for Xavier Niel with Israel/Palestine, FIDF, JNF, Gaza, settlement, and donation terms did not identify a personal or family-foundation donation, military-welfare support, settlement funding, advocacy-board role, or anti-BDS activity.40 A 2026 SEC Schedule 13D identifies Niel and Niel-family-controlled entities in connection with Millicom share ownership, but contains no Israel-Palestine-related advocacy, donation, military, settlement, or political-financing disclosure.40 Historical commercial associations with Israeli telecommunications markets appeared as search leads, but no primary source in the supplied research established a current investment, a defence or surveillance investment, or an Israel-Palestine political act by Niel; those leads remain unresolved.40

Targeted public searches for Neil Shen with Israel/Palestine, FIDF, JNF, AIPAC, Gaza, settlement, and donation terms produced no public evidence identified of a personal or controlled-vehicle donation, advocacy affiliation, board role, military-welfare support, settlement funding, or anti-BDS activity.10 No Neil Shen personal or family foundation, or other public charitable-control vehicle suitable for primary-filing review, was identified in the scoped session; this is not a review of Chinese corporate, private-equity, or non-English charitable records.37

The principal-level searched absences above do not establish the non-existence of undisclosed giving or activity, because the supplied research did not obtain Israeli Charity Registrar records, French association filings, Chinese charity filings, non-U.S. donor records, personal social-media archives, or FEC contribution searches for every individual.36, 37, 39, 40

The original Claws Foundation grant schedules, associated Silver Valley returns, Central Fund of Israel records, and relevant Israeli Registrar filings were not successfully retrieved and reviewed; accordingly, the reported Dantchik-to-Kohelet pathway remains a substantial lead rather than a primary-verified financing finding.36, 38, 37

Supplemental Primary-Record Verification

Local source verification on 11 September 2026 resolved the Claws, Screaming Comet and GA Partners filing-access limitations recorded above; the earlier transport limitations describe the initial research pass, not the final record review.36, 41, 42

Claws Foundation’s IRS-hosted 2021 Form 990-PF identifies the foundation and tax year on PDF page 1 and lists Arthur Dantchik, Jeff Yass and Alan P. Dye as directors on page 6; it does not establish Dantchik’s exclusive control of every grant decision.36

The same return’s grant schedule records US$12,100,000 paid to Silver Valley Research Foundation in 2021 for general support (PDF page 19), US$500,000 to American Friends of Hebrew University (page 14), US$25,000 to JDC–Taub Center (page 16), US$475,000 to PEF Israel Endowment (page 17), and US$3,250,000 to Shalom Hartman Institute (page 18), each labelled general support.36

The Claws return verifies these direct recipient payments and Dantchik’s director role; it does not trace onward disbursements by Silver Valley or PEF, earmark any amount for Kohelet, establish a military or settlement purpose, or show continuation after 2021.36 The onward Silver Valley–Central Fund of Israel–Kohelet pathway and reported August 2023 cessation therefore remain attributed to Shomrim’s investigation, with no independently verified final payment date or resumption in the reviewed record.38

Screaming Comet Foundation’s 2024 Form 990-PF, retrieved as ProPublica’s rendering of released IRS e-file data, lists William E. Ford as president and a substantial-contributor manager; its Part XIV grant schedule totals US$7,468,786 across nine recipients, with no Israel/Palestine-specific purpose stated in that schedule.41 This finding covers the reviewed 2024 schedule only and does not establish an absence across all earlier returns, ultimate beneficiaries or private giving.41

GA Partners Foundation’s 2023 Form 990-PF, likewise retrieved as rendered IRS e-file data, lists William E. Ford as director and CEO.42 Its Part XIV schedule records US$100,000 to American Friends of Magen David Adom and US$100,000 to Friends of United Hatzalah, both for general and unrestricted purposes; US$25,000 to PEF Israel Endowment Funds for Friends of Barzilai Medical Center; and US$25,000 to Médecins Sans Frontières USA to support emergency medical services for wounded civilians in Gaza.42

Those GA Partners payments are verified foundation acts; the return does not identify which director initiated an individual grant, prove Ford’s exclusive control, or identify a military, settlement or anti-Palestinian purpose for these medical-relief grants.42 They must not be represented as direct TikTok donations or military-welfare payments merely because Ford serves on ByteDance’s board.10, 42

Footnotes

  1. https://newsroom.tiktok.com/protecting-community-israel-hamas-war?lang=en-150 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9

  2. https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-US/ensuring-a-safe-authentic-space-during-times-of-conflict?lang=en ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  3. https://newsroom.tiktok.com/il-the-truth-about-tiktok-hashtags-and-content-during-the-israel-hamas-war?lang=he-IL ↩ ↩2

  4. https://m.knesset.gov.il/EN/News/PressReleases/Pages/18724q.aspx ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  5. https://disinfocode.eu/reports/tiktok/6/text ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  6. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/59/23 ↩ ↩2

  7. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/un-human-rights-office-updates-database-businesses-involved-israeli ↩ ↩2

  8. https://bdsmovement.net/Guide-to-BDS-Boycott ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  9. https://www.bytedance.com/en/products?redirect_uri=%2Fedit%2Fsupported-regions-and-providers ↩ ↩2

  10. https://www.bytedance.com/Extension-Bars ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11

  11. https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexandralevine/2024/04/03/tiktok-israel-gaza-hostages-ads-internal-outrage/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11

  12. https://ads.tiktok.com/business/en/blog/tiktok-ad-awards-israel-shortlist-2025 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  13. https://en.idi.org.il/events/64706 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  14. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/report-of-the-special-committee-to-investigate-israeli-practices-20sep24/ ↩

  15. https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/n2424788.pdf ↩

  16. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/report-of-the-special-committee-to-investigate-israeli-practices-20sep24/ ↩

  17. https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28834 ↩ ↩2

  18. https://7amleh.org/storage/pdrc%20letters/TikTok%20PDRC%20Letter%207FEB24.pdf ↩ ↩2

  19. https://apnews.com/article/tiktok-china-israel-hamas-war-research-7e94266c51b21f48e21b648463e65b0c ↩ ↩2

  20. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2023-003062-ASW_EN.html ↩

  21. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/ip_24_926/IP_24_926_EN.pdf ↩

  22. https://newsroom.tiktok.com/the-truth-about-tiktok?lang=en-AU&trk=article-ssr-frontend-pulse_little-text-block ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11

  23. https://www.president.gov.il/%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%A8%D7%A7%D7%A2-%D7%94%D7%A2%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%91%D7%9E%D7%A7%D7%A8%D7%99-%D7%94%D7%90%D7%A0%D7%98%D7%99%D7%A9%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%99%D7%A7-%D7%A0/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  24. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-785561 ↩ ↩2

  25. https://lda.gov/filings/public/filing/6d80b579-f1b0-42ad-a303-2cbc5744497f/print/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  26. https://grantedai.com/foundations/ga-partners-foundation-5309 ↩ ↩2

  27. https://www.tiktok.com/legal/page/eea/terms-of-service/de ↩

  28. https://www.tiktok.com/legal/page/eea/privacy-policy/en?appLaunch=app ↩

  29. https://data.companieshouse.gov.uk/doc/company/10165711 ↩

  30. https://www.bytedance.com/en/news/60a526af053cc102d640c061 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  31. https://newsroom.tiktok.com/announcement-from-the-new-tiktok-usds-joint-venture-llc?lang=en ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  32. https://t.tiktok.com/legal/page/us/terms-of-service/en ↩

  33. https://www.justice.gov/olc/media/1453136/dl ↩ ↩2

  34. https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/application-no-tiktok-government-devices-act-tiktok-usds-joint-venture ↩

  35. https://www.congress.gov/118/chrg/CHRG-118hhrg53839/CHRG-118hhrg53839.pdf ↩ ↩2

  36. https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/cor/201658710_202112_990PF_2023010920737565.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  37. https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/search-for-tax-exempt-organizations ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  38. https://www.shomrim.news/eng/danchik-kohelet ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9

  39. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/200512645 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  40. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/912958/000110465926036326/xslSCHEDULE_13D_X02/primary_doc.xml ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  41. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/full_text/202513219349102016/IRS990PF ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  42. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/full_text/202433529349101408/IRS990PF ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5