Lockheed Martin DIGITAL

Audit Phase: Digital Audit
Target Entity: Lockheed Martin Corporation
Date of Audit: 2026
Audit Standard: Domain Inventory Grid - Technology Relationships & Ecosystem Footprint

Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships

Israeli-Origin Software & Services

• Lockheed Martin made a strategic $25 million Series B investment in Cybereason, an Israeli cybersecurity firm, in 2015 as part of a strategic partnership.^{1, 2}
• Cybereason stated that Lockheed Martin, already a customer, deployed its Detection and Response Platform across more than 120,000 internal endpoints and servers, intended to integrate the technology into cybersecurity offerings, and participated as a strategic investor.²
• Cybereason subsequently stated that Lockheed Martin was its customer, investor, and partner, and that its endpoint sensors collected endpoint and server data for its Malop Hunting Engine; this documents general platform architecture, not Lockheed Martin’s hosting location, processing jurisdiction, or data-access arrangements.³
• The historical evidence establishes an enterprise-scale endpoint-security deployment and technology partnership, but does not establish the current deployment status, criticality, contract term, hosting model, data location, support location, routing, legal-access jurisdiction, or full current equity position.^{2, 4, 3}
• Cybereason described itself as founded by former Unit 8200 members and stated that its product could be offered on-premises or as a cloud service; this does not establish that Lockheed Martin data was processed in Israel.²
• Lockheed Martin Ventures’ currently indexed public portfolio content lists Cybereason as a portfolio company, providing current public evidence that Lockheed Martin continues to present it in that portfolio; the listing does not establish the legal holder, share class, percentage, voting rights, valuation, continuous retention, or a presently held equity interest.⁴
• No primary corporate filing, Cybereason capitalization disclosure, merger document, or Lockheed Martin announcement retrieved in the bounded research establishes whether Lockheed Martin retained, diluted, transferred, or disposed of its Cybereason equity after the 2015 investment.^{2, 4}
• No public evidence identified in the targeted retrievals of a Cybereason contract, deployment, or product capability for an Israeli state body, IDF, intelligence agency, police body, settlement authority, or settlement customer during a period in which Lockheed Martin’s investment was verified.^{2, 3}
• Lockheed Martin Skunk Works and XTEND integrated XTEND’s XOS operating system into Lockheed Martin’s MDCX autonomy platform; Lockheed Martin described multi-class uncrewed-aircraft command and control, situational awareness, and a November 2025 demonstration in which a larger uncrewed aircraft deployed a smaller drone.^{5, 6}
• The XOS/MDCX integration concerns JADC2-related command-and-control scenarios and is principally a military-technology lead rather than a verified general-enterprise deployment; the retrieved material does not identify an Israeli governmental or military customer, Israeli deployment, data location, data beneficiary, targeting function, or kinetic functionality.^{5, 6}
• Lockheed Martin Ventures materials describe a $1 billion evergreen fund, more than 120 investments, and focus areas including cyber, AI, autonomy, and digital transformation.⁴
• No public evidence identified of Lockheed Martin licensing, subscribing to, or integrating Check Point, CyberArk, SentinelOne, Palo Alto Networks, Wiz, Claroty, Verint, Nice, Trigo, BriefCam, AnyVision/Oosto, Trax, or comparable Israeli-origin enterprise products.^{1, 2, 4}
• Director John M. Donovan’s outside Palo Alto Networks governance role is a personally attributable relationship, not evidence of a Lockheed Martin procurement or product-integration relationship with Palo Alto Networks.^{7, 8, 9, 10}

Scale of Dependency

• The Cybereason deployment represents verified historical use of Israeli-origin cybersecurity technology at enterprise scale within Lockheed Martin’s internal IT infrastructure.²
• No public evidence identified permitting determination of the current scale or criticality of Cybereason or of other Israeli-origin software integrations within Lockheed Martin’s enterprise infrastructure.^{2, 4}

Procurement & Integrator Relationships

• In 2007, Lockheed Martin stated that its proposed Israeli Navy LCS-I team included Rafael, Elbit Systems, and Ness, with contemplated integration between COMBATSS-21, the Israeli Navy’s IC2 command-and-control system, and Israeli/U.S. sensors and weapons; this was a purpose-built naval combat-system proposal rather than an enterprise-IT transformation programme, and continuation is unknown.¹¹
• No public evidence identified of a current enterprise-IT integrator programme requiring Israeli-origin technology.¹¹

Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology

Facial Recognition & Biometrics

• Lockheed Martin is a global aerospace and defense technology company, rather than a retail or facilities operator, and its FY2025 Form 10-K identifies capabilities including information technology and cybersecurity.¹²
• No public evidence identified of Lockheed Martin using Israeli-origin facial recognition, biometric identification, gait analysis, retail analytics, predictive policing, sentiment analysis, social-media monitoring, or workforce-monitoring products.^{1, 2, 4}
• The 2019 Nevatim arrangement concerned aircraft training simulation and F-35 maintenance and logistics support; it is not public evidence of facial recognition, population surveillance, or civilian-data processing.¹³

Third-Party Deployment

• No public evidence identified that Israeli-origin facial-recognition, biometric, retail-analytics, predictive-policing, sentiment-analysis, social-media-monitoring, or workforce-monitoring products reach Lockheed Martin through a managed-security provider, bundled suite, intermediary, or other third-party deployment.^{1, 2, 4}

Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation

Data Centre Operations in Israel

• Lockheed Martin’s Israel page remains publicly accessible and describes industrial-participation agreements with Israeli companies, collaboration with Israeli industry and academia, and a late-2014 expansion of Museum Tower office space in Tel Aviv; because the page is undated, it does not independently establish that the office or activities remain operational in 2026.¹⁴
• The available third-party registry lead identifies Lockheed Martin Israel Ltd. as company number 515125763, an Israeli private company incorporated on 27 August 2014, with an address at 4 Berkovitz Street, Tel Aviv–Jaffa, an “active” status, and a 2025 annual report.¹⁵
• The same third-party record displays Lockheed Martin Global Inc. in ownership or management information, but its English display characterizes the relationship as “Option Holder” while its Hebrew-language counterpart describes it as a shareholder; because this is a third-party mirror that disclaims translation accuracy, it does not establish the precise shareholding, control chain, or current parent-subsidiary relationship.¹⁵
• Israel’s official Corporations Authority provides basic company information and paid full extracts, including officer and shareholder information, but no company-specific official extract was obtained in the supplied research.¹⁶
• FY2025 Exhibit 21 identifies significant consolidated subsidiaries including Lockheed Martin Global, Inc., Lockheed Martin Investments, Inc., Lockheed Martin Overseas, LLC, Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, and Sikorsky International Operations, Inc.; like the FY2024 exhibit, it omits non-significant subsidiaries and therefore neither confirms nor excludes Lockheed Martin Israel Ltd. as a consolidated subsidiary.^{17, 18}
• The subsidiary’s published function includes business development, programme management for Israeli defense contracts, and innovation engagement with Israeli startups.^{14, 19, 20}
• The subsidiary maintains or historically maintained a demonstration center in Museum Tower, Tel Aviv featuring F-35 and CH-53K simulators.²¹
• No public evidence identified of Lockheed Martin operating, leasing, or colocating data-centre infrastructure within Israel for cloud-service delivery.^{14, 16}

Government Cloud Contracts

• Project Nimbus is the Israeli government sovereign-cloud programme awarded in 2021 to Google Cloud and Amazon Web Services; the reviewed official-report material does not identify Lockheed Martin as a bidder, awardee, provider, or participant.²²
• No public evidence identified of Lockheed Martin participation in Project Nimbus or another Israeli state sovereign-cloud programme.²²

Data Sovereignty & Resilience Services

• ODIN replaced the F-35’s legacy ALIS system and is hosted and developed in a U.S. government-owned cloud; the U.S. Department of Defense states that it supports real-time performance monitoring, automated collection of performance information, parts, technical orders, and programme-performance data.²³
• The F-35 Joint Program Office describes ODIN as a cloud-native successor with an integrated data environment and user-focused applications intended to reduce administrator and maintainer workload, improve mission-capability rates, and support rapid software updates.²⁴
• DOT&E reported that ALIS version 22.Q4 began fielding in June 2024 while the programme deployed updated ODIN hardware and pursued a gradual transition to containerized ODIN software.²⁵
• DOT&E describes a general ALIS architecture in which a Central Point of Entry connects to an Autonomic Logistics Operating Unit that interfaces with Lockheed Martin’s global sustainment system; the report does not disclose locations, Israeli processing, customer-data categories, access rights, cloud tenancy, or Israeli-jurisdiction legal access.²⁵
• Third-party architecture reporting describes ODIN processing nodes in Fort Worth, Texas, but does not provide a complete or authoritative determination of ODIN data residency, routing, legal access, or processing arrangements.²⁶
• No Israeli data residency is confirmed for ODIN-related Israeli Air Force information in the reviewed evidence.^{26, 23, 25}
• The reviewed evidence does not establish an Israeli-jurisdiction exposure point for Lockheed Martin enterprise data, Cybereason deployment data, or Israeli Air Force ALIS- or ODIN-related data; this limitation is not proof that no such exposure exists.^{2, 23, 3, 25}
• No public evidence identified of Lockheed Martin marketing or contracting data-sovereignty, data-residency, cloud-resilience, or cloud-infrastructure services to Israeli state institutions or military bodies.^{14, 23, 22}

Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships

Military & Intelligence Contracts

• Lockheed Martin maintains a verified relationship with the Israeli Air Force through the F-35 programme; Israel operated 48 F-35I “Adir” aircraft in early 2026, with 27 additional aircraft reported on order.^{27, 28}
• Israel was the first country to use the F-35 in combat, with operational deployment beginning in 2018.²⁸
• Lockheed Martin and Israel Aerospace Industries jointly produce F-35 wings; IAI delivered its 350th F-35 wing to Lockheed Martin in February 2026.^{29, 30}
• The Pentagon reached a $450 million deal in 2012 to enhance F-35 electronic-warfare capabilities and integrate Israeli-unique systems beginning in 2016.³¹
• On 4 June 2024, Israel’s Ministry of Defense announced a Letter of Offer and Acceptance with the U.S. government for a third F-35 squadron, including support and maintenance services.³²
• On 5 March 2026, the Ministry approved a fourth F-35 squadron with full fleet integration, sustainment, spare parts, and logistics support; neither this approval nor the 2024 announcement identifies ALIS, ODIN, Lockheed Martin Israel’s Nevatim agreement, software hosting, or a specific Lockheed Martin digital-service role.^{33, 32}
• On 24 March 2025, Israel’s Ministry of Defense announced a contract worth hundreds of millions of dollars with Sikorsky, a Lockheed Martin company, to integrate Israeli-required mission systems and equipment into 12 CH-53K “Pere” helicopters.³⁴
• The Ministry stated that Sikorsky would establish a dedicated production line and integrate Ministry-supplied avionics, navigation systems, and electronic-warfare suites, while production of all 12 aircraft was underway.³⁴
• On 5 February 2026, the Ministry stated that the 12 Lockheed Martin-Sikorsky CH-53Ks remained in assembly in Connecticut and would proceed to a dedicated integration line for Israeli systems.³⁵
• The Umbrella Industrial Cooperation Agreement between Lockheed Martin and Israel’s Industrial Cooperation Authority was extended through 2029, with reporting stating $4 billion invested since 2005 and $470 million under the current agreement.³⁶
• Lockheed Martin and Rafael partnered to develop the SPICE 250 weapon system for the U.S. military, announced in October 2019.³⁷
• Lockheed Martin and Rafael announced high-energy-laser-system collaboration in December 2022.³⁸

F-35 ALIS, ODIN and the Nevatim Training Centre

• On 11 June 2019, Israel’s Ministry of Defense announced that its Procurement Administration and Lockheed Martin Israel had signed a maintenance agreement under which Lockheed Martin would operate and maintain the advanced F-35 training centre at Nevatim Air Force Base, including the Full Mission Simulator, and provide ALIS support services and experts.¹³
• The Ministry described ALIS as the F-35 maintenance-and-logistics information-management system, and described the simulator as supporting training and operational scenarios; it stated that ALIS tracks maintenance and logistics requirements to improve aircraft readiness and availability.¹³
• The public description of the agreement does not describe target generation, civilian surveillance, intercepted-communications processing, or population-data analytics.¹³
• The agreement identified an initial five-year term, an option for a further five years, estimated value of more than NIS 150 million, and anticipated recruitment of approximately 25 workers, largely from southern Israel.¹³
• The reference to operation over the coming decade describes a five-year agreement plus a possible five-year option rather than a confirmed ten-year performed term.¹³
• The Ministry attributed the stated operational role to Lockheed Martin and Lockheed Martin Israel: operating and maintaining the training centre, maintaining the Full Mission Simulator, and providing ALIS support and specialist personnel.¹³
• The Ministry quoted Lockheed Martin Israel’s then managing director as stating that Lockheed Martin Israel employees would maintain the Full Mission Simulator and ALIS systems and provide close support to the Israeli Air Force’s F-35 maintenance and logistics activity.¹³
• The announcement establishes the 11 June 2019 signing date, but not a separately documented service-commencement date, actual staffing deployment, performance milestone, invoice, acceptance record, aircraft coverage, number of users, server or node count, hosting location, access arrangement, or data-routing architecture.¹³
• No public evidence identified of actual service-performance records, exercise of the extension option, a current end date, a closure notice, a replacement operator, or an active post-2024 Nevatim agreement; its current status is unknown rather than confirmed ongoing.¹³
• No public evidence identified in the bounded live search of an authoritative programme or government record confirming that the Israeli Air Force currently operates ODIN, identifying an Israeli ODIN node, or documenting a completed ALIS-to-ODIN transition for Israel.^{13, 24, 39, 25}
• The JPO’s February 2022 announcement identified initial ODIN Base Kit installations at sites in the United States, Italy, and the United Kingdom; Israel and Nevatim were not among that initial July 2021–January 2022 deployment group, which does not establish that ODIN was never fielded in Israel later.³⁹
• DOT&E’s FY2024 account reports programme-wide ODIN rollout and transition activity, including an ODIN Country Kit variant, but does not publicly identify Israel as a fielded country, a Nevatim node, or an Israel-specific deployment date.²⁵
• Israel’s March 2025 delivery of three F-35I aircraft to Nevatim and assignment to the 116th Squadron provides post-July-2024 fleet activity, but does not identify ALIS, ODIN, a maintenance-system cutover, or the Lockheed Martin personnel operating the system.⁴⁰
• A 30 March 2023 U.S. Department of Defense contract modification awarded to Lockheed Martin Aeronautics covered programme-wide development, installation, integration, testing, training, delivery, engineering, maintenance, logistics, material support, software development and modification, and ALIS-to-ODIN re-architecture for U.S. services, Foreign Military Sales customers, and non-U.S. DoD participants.⁴¹
• The announced work under that modification was at Fort Worth, Texas, with completion expected in December 2024; it did not name Israel or establish that the work was performed for the Israeli Air Force.⁴¹
• The JPO identifies itself as the U.S. government representative and implementing agency for F-35 production, sustainment, and follow-on development for international partners and Foreign Military Sales customers, including Israel.⁴²
• The U.S. government-owned cloud and JPO-led collaborative development are distinct from the Nevatim on-site role attributed to Lockheed Martin Israel; the supplied evidence does not establish that Lockheed Martin Israel owns, operates, hosts, or develops the ODIN cloud.^{23, 13}
• GAO reported that DoD relied heavily on Lockheed Martin to lead and manage F-35 sustainment while pursuing a shift toward greater government control and military-service-led sustainment; this programme-wide finding does not establish which party operated a particular Israeli ALIS or ODIN node.⁴³
• A SAM.gov notice states that the JPO intended to issue FY2026–2030 sole-source Lockheed Martin actions for maintenance-system ODIN hardware, including logistics-information-system hardware encompassing ALIS and ODIN, administrative support to field ODIN and Mission Planning Environment hardware, future retrofits, engineering, software, training, and fleet support.⁴⁴
• The SAM.gov notice is an intent notice rather than evidence of an awarded contract, delivery, or Israeli deployment, and it identifies Fort Worth, Texas as the place of performance.⁴⁴

Dual-Use Technology Provision

• ODIN provides logistics and fleet-management functions within the F-35 programme, including maintenance-related supportability information, parts, technical orders, performance monitoring, and automated collection of performance information.^{26, 23}
• The reviewed official ODIN description supports data-driven supportability analysis, but does not describe Israeli targeting, civilian-data analytics, intercepted communications, or population surveillance.²³
• The reviewed official Nevatim record supports aircraft-training and maintenance/logistics functions, rather than target-generation or civilian-surveillance functions.¹³
• No public evidence identified of Lockheed Martin commercial technology publicly reported as deployed for intelligence or law-enforcement surveillance in Israel or the occupied territories.^{23, 22}

Offensive Cyber & Weapons Technology

• No public evidence identified of Lockheed Martin developing, selling, licensing, or maintaining offensive cyber capabilities, zero-day exploit tools, or commercial digital-weapons products for Israeli state actors.^{1, 2, 22}

AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems

AI/ML Provision to State Bodies

• ODIN incorporates prognostic and health-management methods for predictive maintenance within the F-35 sustainment ecosystem; its documented function is logistics and operational readiness rather than targeting.^{26, 23}
• Because the Israeli Air Force participates in the F-35 programme and the 2019 Nevatim agreement provided contracted ALIS support, this establishes historic data-driven supportability provision in the logistics domain for that force; it does not confirm current Israeli ODIN use.^{26, 23, 13}
• No public evidence identified of Lockheed Martin providing standalone AI/ML platforms, computer-vision systems, autonomous decision-support tools, or general-purpose AI products to Israeli state, military, or security bodies for autonomous target generation, automated target identification, or autonomous tracking.²³

Training Data & Model Development

• No public evidence identified of Lockheed Martin AI models being trained on civilian-population data, intercepted communications, or surveillance-derived datasets originating from Israel or the occupied territories.²³

Autonomous Systems & Lethality

• The XTEND integration concerns XOS multi-drone command-and-control software and is distinct in the available reporting from autonomous targeting or lethal autonomous-weapons functionality.^{5, 6}
• Elbit and Lockheed Martin developed an experimental renewable-energy propulsion system for small UAVs in 2011, demonstrating historical cooperation in autonomous-systems technology.⁴⁵
• An SEC-filed 2026 Odysight.ai presentation reports fleet-level orders involving Israeli Air Force Lockheed Martin SH-60 aircraft and initial orders involving Israeli Air Force Boeing AH-64 aircraft, but does not identify Lockheed Martin or Lockheed Martin Israel as an investor.^{46, 23}
• The prior claim that Lockheed Martin Israel invested in Odysight.ai remains unresolved and is not treated as independently verified on the supplied evidence.^{46, 23}

Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint

Israeli R&D Centres

• Lockheed Martin established a presence in Israel’s technology ecosystem by 2019, including a reported innovation centre in Tel Aviv focused on identifying Israeli defense-technology startups and dual-use technologies.^{19, 20}
• A 2022 Globes update reported that the Tel Aviv office remained operational at that time.²⁰
• Lockheed Martin’s current Israel page describes intended collaboration with Israeli industry and academia in cyber, education, and research and development, but does not identify present projects, facilities, personnel, or university partners.¹⁴
• In April 2014, Lockheed Martin announced a Be’er Sheva office to support the IDF “Move to the South” strategy, linking the office to the consolidation of IDF technical units in the Negev and describing investment in facilities and personnel for related critical projects.⁴⁷
• Israel’s Ministry of Defense Southern Relocation Administration currently lists Lockheed Martin among companies “already located” in Be’er Sheva’s High-Tech Park; the page provides no address, legal entity, personnel count, function, contract, data-processing activity, or dated confirmation of operations.⁴⁸
• The current Ministry web statement supplements, but does not displace, the 2014 announcement of a Be’er Sheva information-systems office; neither source establishes a defined current operational mandate, classified-network access, processing location, or specific customer system.^{47, 48}
• No public evidence identified of a Lockheed Martin office, subsidiary facility, data centre, or other corporate location inside internationally recognized occupied Palestinian territory; this does not resolve customer deployment, contractor activity, resellers, or downstream service delivery.^{14, 47, 16, 15}

Acquisitions & Investments

• Lockheed Martin made a strategic $25 million Series B investment in Cybereason in 2015.^{1, 2}
• Lockheed Martin Ventures’ current public portfolio listing includes Cybereason, while the supplied record does not establish the investment’s present legal or economic status.⁴
• No verified acquisitions of Israeli-origin technology companies by Lockheed Martin were identified within the 2020–2024 period; Terran Orbital, which Lockheed Martin agreed to acquire in 2024, is U.S.-based.⁴⁹
• A/HRC/59/23 reports that MIT administered a Lockheed Martin seed fund connecting students with teams in Israel between 2019 and 2024.²²
• MIT’s 18 April 2019 primary announcement confirms that Lockheed Martin sponsored the MIT-Lockheed Martin Seed Fund with more than $150,000, administered through MISTI for early-stage collaboration between MIT faculty/researchers and universities or public research institutions in Israel; the inaugural structure contemplated two to four Israel projects, travel and workshop costs, and one MIT-Israel student internship.⁵⁰
• MIT identified the fund’s inaugural focus as advanced manufacturing, including manufacturing-process control, modelling of materials and processes, novel materials for extreme environments, and “Factory of the Future” automation.⁵⁰
• The MIT primary source does not identify surveillance, facial recognition, biometrics, population-data processing, target generation, weapons effects, project awardees, a specific Israeli beneficiary, or a deployed product.⁵⁰
• MIT reported in 2021 that the MIT-Israel Lockheed Martin Seed Fund was included in a September call for MIT-Israel Seed Fund proposals; this supports solicitation activity in 2020/2021, but does not independently establish activity through 2024, post-2024 continuation, recipient institutions, outputs, or deployment.⁵¹
• No public evidence identified in the retrieved MIT primary material that the fund produced or deployed a specified surveillance, biometric, targeting, or comparable digital capability, or that it identifies a beneficiary for any such result.^{22, 50, 51}

Patent & Intellectual Property

• No public evidence identified of significant patent co-development arrangements, licensing agreements, or current research agreements between Lockheed Martin and Israeli-domiciled academic institutions including Technion, Hebrew University, Weizmann Institute, or another Israeli academic institution.^{14, 19, 20, 50, 51}

Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History

NGO & Academic Reports

• Who Profits lists Lockheed Martin as supplying weapons to the Israeli military; this is an advocacy-source characterization rather than primary procurement evidence.⁵²
• AFSC Investigate lists Lockheed Martin on a BDS divestment shortlist in connection with its manufacture and supply of military equipment; AFSC states that its company information is valid through 1 August 2024 and is an advocacy/research source rather than a primary procurement record.⁵³
• The UN Special Rapporteur’s 2025 report discusses Lockheed Martin in relation to the Israeli F-35 fleet, stating that Israel customizes and maintains the fleet in partnership with Lockheed Martin and domestic companies; this remains an official-report finding because the underlying full contract record was not retrieved in the supplied research.²²
• A/HRC/59/23 separately addresses surveillance, AI, data infrastructure, and Project Nimbus, naming Microsoft, Alphabet, and Amazon in its cloud discussion rather than Lockheed Martin.²²
• The MIT primary sources clarify the report’s seed-fund/R&D-hub lead: they support advanced-manufacturing research and internships, not a stated surveillance, biometric, targeting, or data-processing result.^{50, 51}
• Lockheed Martin was not named in the specifically reviewed 2023 and 2025 OHCHR settlement-business database updates; this document-scoped absence does not establish the absence of all settlement nexus.^{54, 55}
• BIRD Foundation’s approved-projects database showed no Lockheed Martin project in 2021; searches for 2021 autonomous/AI projects returned Israeli companies paired with other U.S. firms, without Lockheed Martin involvement.⁵⁶

Boycott & Divestment Campaigns

• AFSC’s listing supports the narrower conclusion that Lockheed Martin has appeared on an AFSC divestment shortlist related to military supply.⁵³
• The current BDS Movement corporate-priority guide contains no “Lockheed Martin” text match and therefore does not substantiate characterizing Lockheed Martin as a current BDS corporate-priority target.⁵⁷

Ownership & Controlling Principals

• Lockheed Martin Corporation is the SEC registrant, incorporated in Maryland, with principal executive offices in Bethesda, Maryland; its FY2025 Form 10-K reports Aeronautics, Missiles and Fire Control, Rotary and Mission Systems, and Space as its four business areas.¹²
• James D. Taiclet is Lockheed Martin’s Chairman, President, and CEO; the 2026 proxy identifies Frank A. St. John as COO, Evan T. Scott as CFO, Timothy S. Cahill as President of Missiles and Fire Control, and Kevin J. O’Connor as Senior Vice President, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary.⁷
• Lockheed Martin’s 12 May 2026 Form 8-K confirms the election through the 2027 annual meeting of John C. Aquilino, David B. Burritt, John M. Donovan, Thomas J. Falk, Vicki A. Hollub, Debra L. Reed-Klages, Taiclet, Heather A. Wilson, and Patricia E. Yarrington.⁵⁸
• As of 2 March 2026, State Street Corporation was the sole disclosed beneficial holder at or above 10%, at 14.9%; Vanguard and BlackRock were disclosed at 8.9% and 7.4%, respectively.⁷
• The proxy reports State Street’s ownership through fiduciary and related capacities, with shared voting and dispositive power and no sole voting or dispositive power in the cited disclosure.⁷
• No director, nominee, executive officer, or the listed management group beneficially owned more than 1% of Lockheed Martin common stock as of 2 March 2026; Taiclet’s reported aggregate 110,349 shares and stock units were below 1%.⁷
• Lockheed Martin director John M. Donovan is disclosed as a current director of Palo Alto Networks, Inc.; Lockheed Martin’s proxy records his Lockheed Martin board service from 2021.⁷
• Palo Alto Networks’ 2025 proxy identifies Donovan as Lead Independent Director, a director since 2012, and a member of its Compensation and People, Governance and Sustainability, Security, and Corporate Development committees; it identifies Lockheed Martin as his other current public-company board.⁸
• Palo Alto Networks’ currently accessible board page continues to list Donovan, while its ownership summary reports 14,188 directly held non-derivative securities and holdings below 1% of Palo Alto Networks’ outstanding shares.^{9, 10}
• Donovan’s disclosed ongoing Palo Alto Networks governance role continued after July 2024 and is a personally attributable governance relationship in a cybersecurity company named in the vendor review.^{7, 8, 9, 10}
• The available disclosures do not establish a Lockheed Martin procurement relationship with Palo Alto Networks, a family-office interest beyond disclosed securities, or Palo Alto Networks activity involving Israeli state bodies, occupied territory, surveillance, or military deployment.^{7, 8, 9, 10}
• No public evidence identified in the targeted research of a qualifying personal or family-office Israeli-tech interest by Taiclet.⁷
• No comprehensive principal-level absence conclusion is made for every C-suite officer, director, or relevant State Street decision-maker because person-by-person reviews of private holdings, trusts, family offices, charitable vehicles, and outside directorships were not completed.⁷

Regulatory & Legal Actions

• No regulatory inquiry, legal challenge, export-control action, sanctions-related investigation, court proceeding, or parliamentary record specifically concerning Lockheed Martin’s digital-technology sales or services to Israeli entities was independently identified in the supplied bounded research; this is a research limitation rather than a conclusion that none exists.²²
• No public evidence identified of Lockheed Martin digital products or services being supplied in, to, or specifically for Israeli settlements through a named reseller, licensee, franchisee, or direct contract.^{54, 55}

Constructive Notice - Post-ICJ and Post-ICC

• The Israeli Ministry of Defense’s March 2025 and February 2026 CH-53K announcements provide post-July 2024 and post-November 2024 official evidence of continuing Lockheed Martin/Sikorsky programme activity for the Israeli Air Force.^{34, 35}
• Israel’s June 2024 third-squadron Letter of Offer and Acceptance, March 2025 delivery of F-35I aircraft to Nevatim, and March 2026 fourth-squadron approval provide continuing official evidence of Israeli F-35 programme activity after July 2024; those records do not confirm Israeli ALIS continuation, ODIN deployment, or the post-2024 status of the Nevatim agreement.^{32, 33, 40}
• Those announcements concern purpose-built military aircraft and integration of Israeli avionics, navigation, electronic-warfare, command-and-control, and DIRCM systems; the core programme belongs principally to the military domain, while the interfaces are relevant contextual technology detail.^{34, 35}
• Lockheed Martin’s current Israel corporate page remains publicly available in 2026, but its undated operational assertions do not establish continuation of a particular office, startup programme, contract, or digital service after July or November 2024.¹⁴
• No public announcement of Cybereason-deployment termination, ODIN withdrawal for the Israeli Air Force, or closure of the historic Be’er Sheva information-systems office was identified in the supplied research; Cybereason’s current deployment status, Israeli ODIN status, and the historic office’s current status remain unknown rather than confirmed ongoing.^{2, 47, 23, 13, 24}
• CEO James D. Taiclet stated in February 2026 that operational feedback from Israel’s F-35 use was “worth many billions” to the company, according to CAAT reporting.⁵⁹