Table of Contents
Morrisons is a large UK domestic grocery retailer with no identified military, defence, or digital technology relationship with the Israeli state or its security apparatus. The company’s connection to Israel is narrow and commercially transactional: it is a recurring import buyer of Israeli-origin fresh produce — primarily Medjool dates sourced through the Hadiklaim cooperative and citrus and avocados through Mehadrin-connected distribution channels — including produce that independent researchers associate with West Bank settlement agriculture. This sourcing relationship is the principal driver of its BDS-1000 score.
No public evidence has been identified of Morrisons holding defence contracts, supplying dual-use goods, operating surveillance technology linked to Israeli vendors, providing cloud or AI services to Israeli state bodies, making foreign direct investment in Israel, or lobbying on Israel-Palestine policy. On the political dimension, the audit documents a factual asymmetry: Morrisons made public statements on the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and on racial equality in 2020, but issued no corporate statement on the Gaza conflict from October 2023 through the close of the research period in April 2026. Employee restrictions on political symbols in late 2023 reinforce but do not independently elevate this finding.
The composite BDS-1000 score of 156 (Tier E) reflects a low-level commercial relationship with no evidence of material complicity in military, surveillance, or political suppression activities. The score is moderated by the absence of named primary-source procurement contracts and by structural opacity introduced by Morrisons’ delisting following the CD&R acquisition in October 2021.
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1899 | Morrisons founded in Bradford, England, by William Morrison as a market egg-and-butter stall 1 |
| 2020 | UK Government (DEFRA) issues guidance requiring settlement produce to be labelled “West Bank (Israeli settlement produce)” rather than “Produce of Israel” 2 |
| June 2020 | Morrisons issues public statement in support of racial equality in the context of the Black Lives Matter movement 3 |
| October 2021 | Clayton, Dubilier & Rice completes acquisition of Morrisons for approximately £7 billion; company delisted from London Stock Exchange 4 |
| March 2022 | Morrisons issues conflict-linked statement and pledges charitable donations to British Red Cross Ukraine Appeal 5 |
| June 2022 | Big Brother Watch publishes “Face Off” report on UK retailers deploying live facial recognition; Morrisons is not named 6 |
| June 2023 | ICO issues public warning on live facial recognition in UK retail; Morrisons is not named as a subject of investigation 7 |
| October 2023 | Hamas attack on Israel; subsequent Israeli military operations in Gaza; Morrisons issues no documented corporate statement 8 |
| October–November 2023 | Reports emerge that Morrisons instructed employees not to wear political symbols including Palestinian insignia while on shift 9 |
| October 2023 onwards | Palestine Solidarity Campaign organises protests at Morrisons stores; BDS Movement lists Morrisons among targeted UK retailers 10 |
| November 2023 | CEO Rami Baitiéh takes office 11 |
| 2023–2024 | Who Profits and Palestine Solidarity Campaign research identifies Morrisons as a buyer of Israeli-origin produce including Hadiklaim Medjool dates and Mehadrin-linked citrus and avocados 12 |
| April 2026 | Research period closes; no Morrisons corporate statement on Gaza identified; no V-MIL, V-DIG, or active V-POL evidence emerged 11 |
Wm Morrison Supermarkets Limited is one of the United Kingdom’s four largest grocery retailers by market share, holding approximately 10–11% of the UK grocery market by revenue as of 2022–2023.11 The company operates approximately 500 supermarkets across the United Kingdom and operates a vertically integrated food manufacturing arm encompassing own-label production, abattoirs, fresh food processing plants, and a national distribution network. It is the only one of the UK’s major supermarket chains to manufacture a substantial proportion of the fresh food it sells.1
Morrisons was taken private by Clayton, Dubilier & Rice (CD&R) in October 2021 following a competitive auction process, in a leveraged buyout valued at approximately £7 billion.4 The delisting removed Morrisons from the London Stock Exchange’s continuous disclosure regime. The company continues to file annual accounts at Companies House as required by UK company law, though the level of public disclosure in post-acquisition filings is reduced relative to its prior status as a listed entity. This structural opacity materially affects the verifiability of vendor relationships, supply chain agreements, and internal governance decisions across all audit domains.
CEO Rami Baitiéh, a French-Moroccan retail executive formerly of Carrefour France, was appointed in November 2023 and remains in post as of the research period close.11 The founding Morrison family sold their remaining stake prior to the CD&R acquisition and hold no current operational or ownership role.
Morrisons has no identified involvement in any aspect of the defence, security, or military supply chain in relation to Israel. Across every sub-category examined in the V-MIL audit — direct defence contracting, dual-use products, heavy machinery and construction, supply chain integration with Israeli defence primes, logistical sustainment and base services, and munitions and weapons systems — no public evidence was identified.1314
The absence of any defence contracting footprint is analytically consistent with Morrisons’ declared business scope. The company’s corporate filings describe it as a UK domestic food retailer and food manufacturer engaged exclusively in grocery supply and retail.1113 The company is not a defence manufacturer, a dual-use technology exporter, or an infrastructure contractor. It manufactures own-label food products, household consumables, and fuel retailed through forecourts; none of these categories have been identified as subject to UK Military List or UK Dual-Use List export controls, and no Morrisons-specific entry appears in UK Strategic Export Controls licensing transparency data.14
The V-MIL audit surveyed Morrisons’ position against the SIBAT (Israel Defence Export & Defence Cooperation Directorate) export directories, international defence exhibition catalogues including DSEI and Eurosatory, and Israeli defence procurement registries. Morrisons appears in none of these.15 No verified supply relationships with Israeli defence prime contractors — Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, or Israel Military Industries — were identified in any corporate filing, government disclosure, or trade publication. Elbit Systems and IAI publicly enumerate significant supply partners in their published annual reports; neither contains a reference to Morrisons.15
No verified contracts for logistical sustainment — catering, transport, fuel, facilities management, or support services to IDF installations — appear on UK Contracts Finder or any equivalent transparency portal.16 Morrisons’ domestic logistics network — owned vehicle fleet, regional distribution centres — is vertically integrated for internal food retail replenishment and has no identified extension into Israeli military logistics or arms freight. Its petrol forecourt operations are a domestic UK consumer service with no identified link to Israeli military fuel contracts.13
No evidence links Morrisons to strategic defence platforms including Iron Dome, David’s Sling, the Arrow missile defence system, Merkava tanks, or Sa’ar-class warships, or to component supply for these systems. No export licence applications, end-user certificates, or government export control reviews related to Morrisons sales to Israeli defence or security end-users appear in any available record.14
One procedural caveat is necessary: Morrisons’ post-CD&R acquisition corporate structure includes subsidiaries not all fully enumerated in publicly indexed records. A comprehensive subsidiary-level audit would require live Companies House access to enumerate all registered entities. No subsidiary has been identified as carrying defence sector relevance, but this gap cannot be closed from available sources alone.
The most material evidence gap acknowledged by the V-MIL audit is the inability to conduct live searches of NGO databases, UK export licensing portals, and post-October 2023 civil society publications during the research phase.1315 Given the significant intensification of NGO scrutiny of corporate supply chains following October 2023, any investigations published between late 2023 and the research date of May 2026 that may have examined Morrisons in a V-MIL context could not be retrieved. This represents the principal unresolved uncertainty.
However, the plausibility threshold for any positive V-MIL finding is low. Morrisons’ business model — grocery retail and domestic food manufacturing — does not intersect with defence manufacturing, dual-use export, or military sustainment in any sector-level sense. The company produces perishable food, household goods, and retail fuel; none of these categories are plausible vectors for military supply chain integration. For the V-MIL score to change materially from zero, new evidence would need to emerge of an undisclosed subsidiary, a defence-relevant supply contract, or a dual-use product not identified in any public record through the research period. No such indication exists.
Palestine Solidarity Campaign and BDS consumer boycott campaigns have named Morrisons in civil society scrutiny, but these campaigns cite the stocking of Israeli-labelled food and agricultural produce — a commercial sourcing matter classified under V-ECON — rather than any defence or military contracting relationship. This category of scrutiny has been noted for completeness but falls outside V-MIL domain findings.17
No institutional divestment decisions specifically citing Morrisons’ defence sector activities have been identified. No major NGO — including Who Profits, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, or the American Friends Service Committee — has published a V-MIL-category report identifying Morrisons as a subject of investigation.18
| Entity | Type | Relevance | Finding |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wm Morrison Supermarkets Limited | Subject | Audit target | No defence sector activity identified |
| Clayton, Dubilier & Rice (CD&R) | Owner | Post-2021 beneficial owner | No defence sector mandate or portfolio identified |
| IMOD / IDF / Israel Prison Service | Israeli state | Potential contracting counterparty | No contract or relationship with Morrisons identified |
| Elbit Systems | Israeli defence prime | Potential supply chain counterparty | No Morrisons relationship identified in public filings |
| Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) | Israeli defence prime | Potential supply chain counterparty | No Morrisons relationship identified |
| Rafael Advanced Defense Systems | Israeli defence prime | Potential supply chain counterparty | No Morrisons relationship identified |
| SIBAT | Israeli defence export body | Registry searched | Morrisons does not appear |
| Who Profits Research Center | NGO | Database searched | No dedicated Morrisons V-MIL profile confirmed |
| UN OHCHR settlements database | UN body | Registry searched | Morrisons not listed |
| HM Revenue & Customs / DBT | UK regulator | Export control licensing data | No Morrisons-specific entry identified |
| UK Contracts Finder | Procurement portal | Contract awards searched | No Morrisons defence award identified |
| Palestine Solidarity Campaign | Civil society | Boycott campaigns | Campaigns cite commercial sourcing, not V-MIL grounds |
No public evidence of any digital technology relationship between Morrisons and Israeli-origin vendors, Israeli state bodies, or Israeli intelligence entities has been identified across any sub-category of the V-DIG audit. The findings span Israeli-origin software and services, surveillance and biometric technology, cloud infrastructure, defence and intelligence sector technology, AI and algorithmic systems, and R&D footprint.
Morrisons is a grocery retailer, not a technology developer or platform vendor. Its technology function exists to support domestic food retail operations — warehouse management, transport management, e-commerce, customer loyalty, and corporate IT — and is not structured or scaled as a provider of technology services to third parties, including state entities. This business model fact is analytically determinative: the directionality and customer-cap rules of the V-DIG rubric both independently confirm a zero score, because Morrisons cannot be characterised as a technology provider to any state body.19
The V-DIG audit examined specific Israeli-origin vendors active in UK markets and relevant to Morrisons’ operational domains. For cybersecurity (Check Point, CyberArk, SentinelOne, Wiz, Palo Alto Networks), retail analytics and computer vision (Trigo Vision, AnyVision/Oosto, BriefCam), contact-centre and workforce analytics (NICE Systems, Verint), and IoT and OT security (Claroty), no Morrisons-specific case studies, press releases, or named-customer confirmations were identified from any of these vendors in public sources.67
For facial recognition and biometric surveillance specifically, the audit confirmed that Morrisons is not named in the Big Brother Watch June 2022 “Face Off” report, which documented UK retailers deploying live facial recognition technology. Retailers named in that report included Southern Co-op using Facewatch technology; Morrisons does not appear.6 The ICO’s June 2023 public warning on live facial recognition in UK retail does not name Morrisons as a subject of investigation, recipient of an enforcement notice, or identified deployer.7 Trigo Vision’s publicly named retail partners as of the research cutoff include Albert Heijn, Netto, and Aldi Nord; Morrisons is not among them.
In relation to cloud infrastructure and Project Nimbus — the contract between the Israeli government and Google Cloud and Amazon Web Services under which cloud services are provided to Israeli state bodies including the military — Morrisons has no identified participation.20 Morrisons is not a cloud infrastructure or platform vendor and has no documented data-centre footprint outside the United Kingdom.
Confirmed technology relationships identified in the audit are with non-Israeli vendors: Manhattan Associates (US, Atlanta) for supply chain management software, IBM UK and Capgemini UK for enterprise IT managed services. No Israeli-origin technology deployment via these integrators for the Morrisons account has been identified in public sources, though sub-vendor technology choices within prime integrator engagements are not publicly disclosed and represent a residual evidence gap.
The Morrisons data breach litigation of 2017–2020, which concerned vicarious liability for an employee-perpetrated internal data breach and was resolved in Morrisons’ favour by the Supreme Court in April 2020, has no connection to Israeli technology vendors or any aspect of the V-DIG domain.21
The principal limitation on V-DIG analysis is structural opacity introduced by the CD&R private acquisition. Morrisons no longer files detailed public accounts subject to the disclosure level that would typically surface named IT vendor relationships. Post-acquisition annual accounts filed at Companies House are consolidated at group level and do not itemise technology vendor relationships. This prevents comprehensive verification of the enterprise technology stack.
A secondary gap exists in the loss-prevention technology domain. Morrisons operates approximately 500 stores, and specific CCTV analytics, AI-driven stock monitoring, or in-store computer-vision providers are not publicly named. This gap prevents both verification and confirmed exclusion of Israeli-origin retail analytics vendors from Morrisons’ loss-prevention estate. However, no positive indicator — no case study, press release, or campaign report — has pointed to any such deployment.
For the V-DIG score to move from zero, new evidence would need to emerge either of a named Morrisons deployment of Israeli-origin technology, or of Morrisons providing technology services of any kind to Israeli state, military, or intelligence bodies. The latter scenario has near-zero plausibility given the company’s business model. The former — an undisclosed Israeli-origin vendor in Morrisons’ technology estate — is possible but entirely unsubstantiated. The Who Profits database, the ICO, Big Brother Watch, and the Palestine Solidarity Campaign have not specifically targeted Morrisons for any technology-domain relationship with Israel. The absence of any positive indicator across multiple independent monitoring bodies substantially reduces the likelihood of a significant undisclosed relationship.
| Entity | Type | Relevance | Finding |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wm Morrison Supermarkets Limited | Subject | Audit target | No Israeli-origin technology relationship identified |
| Manhattan Associates | US technology vendor | Supply chain software | Confirmed Morrisons customer; no Israeli technology connection |
| IBM UK / Capgemini UK | IT managed services | Enterprise IT | Morrisons relationship documented; no Israeli-origin sub-vendor confirmed |
| Check Point / CyberArk / SentinelOne / Wiz | Israeli-origin cybersecurity | Potential vendor | No Morrisons relationship confirmed |
| Palo Alto Networks | Israeli-co-founded cybersecurity | Potential vendor | No Morrisons relationship confirmed |
| NICE Systems / Verint | Israeli-origin analytics | Potential vendor | No Morrisons relationship confirmed |
| Trigo Vision | Israeli-origin computer vision | Retail analytics | Not among Trigo’s named retail partners |
| AnyVision / Oosto | Israeli-origin facial recognition | Retail security | No Morrisons deployment confirmed |
| BriefCam | Israeli-origin video analytics | Loss prevention | No Morrisons deployment confirmed |
| Big Brother Watch | UK NGO | Facial recognition campaigning | “Face Off” 2022 report does not name Morrisons |
| ICO | UK regulator | Facial recognition enforcement | June 2023 warning does not name Morrisons |
| Project Nimbus | Israeli government cloud contract | Cloud infrastructure | Morrisons has no identified participation |
| Clayton, Dubilier & Rice (CD&R) | Owner | Post-2021 beneficial owner | Private ownership limits disclosure; no Israeli tech mandate identified |
Morrisons’ principal economic relationship with Israel is as a recurring import buyer of Israeli-origin fresh produce. The audit identifies documented or credibly reported sourcing across several product categories: Medjool dates, avocados, citrus fruit, fresh herbs, and cherry tomatoes, all consistent with the principal export lines of Israeli agricultural aggregators active in the UK market.2223
The mechanism operates through established Israeli agricultural exporters. Hadiklaim (Israel Date Growers Cooperative) is the dominant exporter of Israeli Medjool dates and supplies UK supermarkets including Morrisons, as identified in Who Profits and Palestine Solidarity Campaign-affiliated research.2425 Mehadrin, one of Israel’s largest fresh produce exporters with documented operations in the Jordan Valley, has been identified by Who Profits as supplying citrus, avocados, and herbs to UK supermarket chains with Morrisons referenced as a recipient market.2226 A proportion of this produce — particularly Medjool dates from the Jordan Valley — is associated with Israeli settlement agricultural zones, raising questions of settlement-produce labelling compliance under UK DEFRA guidance issued in 2020.2
These sourcing relationships are mediated through UK-based importers and distributors rather than direct named bilateral contracts. Morrisons operates a centralised buying function handling fresh produce; it is the direct procuring entity placing orders through its supply chain, even where those orders are fulfilled via intermediary UK importers. Carmel Produce UK and Carmel-branded entities registered at Companies House have historically acted as UK importers of record for Israeli fresh produce distributed to British supermarkets, and Morrisons is referenced within UK fresh produce distribution networks that relied on these entities.27 Whether Morrisons continues to utilise a Carmel-branded entity as an importer of record for Israeli-origin goods post-2021 is not confirmed in public filings.
Morrisons’ position in the UK market — approximately 10–11% grocery market share by revenue — means it participates materially in the seasonal Israeli fresh produce import cycle, which runs broadly October–April for Medjool dates, citrus, and herb categories.11 UK trade statistics show consistent annual import volumes of Israeli-origin fresh produce during these windows; Morrisons’ individual contribution within those aggregate volumes is not publicly disclosed.28
Beyond agricultural trade, Morrisons has no identified financial exposure to Israel. No evidence of direct capital investment — factory acquisitions, logistics hubs, real estate, or retail locations within Israel or the occupied territories — has been identified. No R&D facilities, technology partnerships, or innovation labs within Israel have been identified. Morrisons’ technology and digital operations are UK-based.1311 Post-acquisition, Morrisons’ profits flow upward to CD&R’s Fund XI and ultimately to the fund’s predominantly US and internationally domiciled LP base; no mechanism has been identified by which Morrisons’ operating profits flow to Israeli-domiciled entities.429
Commercial payments from Morrisons to Israeli agricultural suppliers constitute export revenue for Israeli-domiciled agricultural companies — standard commercial payments for goods delivered — but the specific annual value is not publicly disclosed in Morrisons’ filings. These are import-buyer payments, not capital investment or profit repatriation in the financial sense. Morrisons’ corporate engagement with Israel is therefore confined to the role of import buyer of agricultural commodities; it is not an investor, operator, or market participant within the Israeli domestic economy.1128
The UK DEFRA guidance of 2020 requires that produce grown in Israeli settlements in the West Bank, Jordan Valley, or Golan Heights be labelled with the specific territory of origin rather than as “Produce of Israel.”2 NGO investigations by Corporate Occupation and Who Profits have documented instances across UK supermarkets, including Morrisons, where Israeli-origin produce was labelled generically as “Produce of Israel” despite suspected or confirmed settlement origin.2230 The Palestine Solidarity Campaign has specifically named Morrisons among UK supermarkets selling products with inadequately labelled settlement-origin goods.25 No formal DEFRA enforcement action or Trading Standards prosecution specifically naming Morrisons has been identified in available records.
The most significant limitation on V-ECON evidence is the absence of primary-source procurement documentation. No public procurement records, tender documents, or named supply agreements between Morrisons and any specific Israeli exporter are available. All sourcing evidence derives from NGO investigations, trade statistics, and civil society campaigning materials rather than primary corporate filings. This means the sourcing relationships with Hadiklaim and Mehadrin are credibly reported but not contractually confirmed from primary sources.2426
Morrisons-specific import volumes for Israeli-origin goods are not publicly disclosed. HMRC UK Trade Info data is aggregate at commodity level and does not identify individual retail buyers.28 The M score of 4.50 (Modest Presence) reflects this gap — it could move in either direction with better trade data. If Morrisons’ actual Israeli produce procurement volumes prove to be substantially higher or lower than its market share proportion implies, the score would need revision.
A further uncertainty is whether Morrisons altered its Israeli fresh produce sourcing after October 2023 in response to consumer pressure and the escalation of the Gaza conflict. This is not confirmed by available public evidence in either direction. The Agrexco/Carmel-branded UK distribution channel’s post-2021 status is similarly unconfirmed. If Morrisons has materially reduced or ceased sourcing Israeli-origin produce since 2023, the I and M scores would warrant downward revision.
The full LP-base of CD&R Fund XI — the ownership vehicle for Morrisons — is not publicly disclosed, making it impossible to determine from open sources whether any LP is Israeli-domiciled or holds material Israeli economic exposure. This gap is acknowledged but is not scored, as no positive evidence supports an Israeli LP connection.
| Entity | Type | Relevance | Finding |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wm Morrison Supermarkets Limited | Subject | Audit target | Direct import buyer of Israeli-origin produce |
| Clayton, Dubilier & Rice (CD&R) | Owner | Post-2021 beneficial owner | No Israeli-specific investment identified; LP base not fully disclosed |
| CD&R Fund XI | Acquisition vehicle | Holds Morrisons post-LBO | LP base not publicly disclosed |
| Hadiklaim (Israel Date Growers Cooperative) | Israeli exporter | Medjool dates | Identified as Morrisons supplier by Who Profits and PSC research |
| Mehadrin | Israeli exporter | Citrus, avocados, herbs | Jordan Valley operations; identified as supplying UK supermarket chains including Morrisons |
| Carmel Produce UK / Carmel Agrexco | UK importer of record | Israeli fresh produce distribution | Historical role; post-2021 status unconfirmed |
| Who Profits Research Center | NGO | Supply chain documentation | Profiles Morrisons as buyer of Israeli settlement produce |
| Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC) | Civil society | Labelling concerns | Names Morrisons in settlement produce research |
| Corporate Occupation | NGO | Labelling research | Documents UK supermarket settlement-origin labelling gaps |
| Ethical Consumer | NGO/publisher | Supermarket surveys | Includes Morrisons in UK supermarket produce analysis |
| DEFRA | UK regulator | Settlement produce labelling | 2020 guidance on West Bank labelling |
| HMRC UK Trade Info | UK trade statistics | Import data | Aggregate commodity-level data; no named retailer breakdown |
| Companies House | UK registry | Corporate structure | Morrisons subsidiary enumeration requires live access |
Morrisons’ V-POL score is driven by two documented categories of evidence: selective silence on the Gaza conflict against a documented record of engagement on comparable situations, and a reported workplace restriction on political symbols in late 2023. Neither finding constitutes active political advocacy or lobbying; the score reflects passive political conduct characterised by asymmetry and omission.
The selective silence finding rests on a factual asymmetry that is well-documented in the public record. In March 2022, Morrisons published a statement and pledged charitable donations to the British Red Cross Ukraine Appeal in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.5 In June 2020, Morrisons issued statements of support in the context of the Black Lives Matter movement, consistent with the behaviour of the majority of major UK supermarket chains.3 From October 2023 through the research period close of April 2026 — a period of over two and a half years covering sustained, internationally documented military operations in Gaza — Morrisons issued no public corporate statement on the conflict, no expression of solidarity with any affected civilian population, and no response to the organised consumer boycott campaigns specifically targeting the company.831
This asymmetry is not merely passive. Given the documented precedents of public engagement with Ukraine and BLM, the absence of any Gaza statement represents a deliberate communications decision rather than a general corporate policy of geopolitical non-comment. Civil society commentators, including Ethical Consumer, have noted this asymmetry.31 The BDS-1000 rubric classifies this pattern as a Low (2.1–3.0) Impact finding under the selective silence criterion, which is the appropriate band: the evidence supports a characterisation of omission rather than active suppression of accountability mechanisms, which would carry a higher score.
The second documented element is the reported instruction in October–November 2023 that Morrisons employees not wear political symbols — including Palestinian keffiyehs, Palestinian flag badges, or pro-Palestinian insignia — while on shift in customer-facing roles, citing workplace neutrality policies.9 This was reported in the context of broader UK employer responses to political expression during the conflict. No formal employment tribunal rulings, legal proceedings, or formally filed union-level disputes have been identified in available records through April 2026, and the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW) has not been documented publishing a formal public position on Morrisons’ specific enforcement of these restrictions.32 The measure is classified as corroborating the pattern of political passivity rather than independently elevating the score.
No evidence has been identified of active political conduct in any direction: no lobbying on Israel-Palestine trade legislation, no anti-BDS advocacy, no donations to pro-Israel organisations (including the Friends of the Israel Defence Forces, the Jewish National Fund, or Conservative Friends of Israel), no contributions to pro-Palestinian welfare or civil society organisations, and no Morrisons executive holding a board seat at any geopolitically oriented advocacy organisation.3334 The British Retail Consortium, of which Morrisons is a member, engages in standard regulatory lobbying on trade and labelling matters; no BRC lobbying activity specifically related to Israel-Palestine policy has been identified.34
Morrisons’ position as a UK domestic retailer wholly owned by a US private equity firm, with no state ownership stake and no government-retained interest, means its V-POL footprint is structurally limited. The company has no formal state partnership role, no institutional ties to Israeli or Palestinian governmental or parastatal bodies, and no corporate charter features linking it to any state-aligned mission. Rami Baitiéh, appointed CEO in November 2023, has no documented personal philanthropy or public statements directed toward Israeli or Palestinian advocacy organisations.11
Morrisons is not listed in the UN OHCHR database of companies with operations in Israeli settlements (A/HRC/43/71, February 2020), which is definitionally limited to enterprises with direct operational presence within settlement infrastructure.35 As a UK import buyer rather than a settlement operator, Morrisons falls outside that database’s scope.
The strongest challenge to the V-POL score is whether corporate silence in the absence of any legal or lobbying obligation constitutes a scorable political act. Many large UK retailers made no public statement on the Gaza conflict; Morrisons’ silence is therefore not uniquely anomalous at the sector level. The scoring significance of the selective silence finding depends on the documented asymmetry with Ukraine and BLM statements — without those precedents, the baseline would be general corporate non-engagement, which is harder to score.
The employee political symbol restriction is reported but not formally adjudicated. The internal scope of the policy, the consistency of its enforcement, and any formal outcomes from internal grievance processes are not publicly available. If the restriction applied symmetrically to all political symbols — Israeli flags and pro-Israel insignia as well as Palestinian symbols — rather than asymmetrically, the V-POL characterisation would need revision. The available reporting does not clarify this.9
A further limitation is the absence of any confirmed direct contract, service agreement, or B2B relationship between Morrisons and Israeli settlement enterprises or Israeli state-owned entities.835 The V-POL finding is grounded entirely in corporate conduct — communications and HR policy — not in direct political or financial relationships with state entities. This is analytically important: the score reflects Morrisons’ own decisions as the responsible actor, but the absence of any active political intervention places a ceiling on the appropriate score band.
For the V-POL score to increase materially, evidence would need to emerge of active lobbying against BDS legislation, direct financial contributions to pro-Israel organisations, formal institutional partnerships with Israeli state bodies, or suppression of employee or shareholder accountability mechanisms. None of these have been identified.
| Entity | Type | Relevance | Finding |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wm Morrison Supermarkets Limited | Subject | Audit target | Selective silence on Gaza; employee political symbol restrictions Oct–Nov 2023 |
| Rami Baitiéh | CEO (from Nov 2023) | Corporate decision-maker | No documented political donations or advocacy identified |
| Clayton, Dubilier & Rice (CD&R) | Owner | Post-2021 beneficial owner | No political advocacy or lobbying on Israel-Palestine identified |
| Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC) | Civil society | Boycott organiser | Organised protests at Morrisons stores from Oct 2023; no Morrisons response documented |
| BDS Movement (UK) | Civil society | Boycott targeting | Lists Morrisons among targeted UK retailers; no Morrisons response documented |
| British Retail Consortium (BRC) | Trade body | Lobbying | Standard retail policy lobbying; no Israel-Palestine lobbying identified |
| USDAW | Trade union | Employee representation | No formal public position on Morrisons political symbol restrictions documented |
| British Red Cross Ukraine Appeal | Charity | Comparator case | Morrisons donated March 2022; documented public statement issued |
| UN OHCHR settlements database | UN body | Company registry | Morrisons not listed; definitional scope excludes import buyers |
| Electoral Commission | UK regulator | Political donation records | No Israel-Palestine policy-linked donations identified |
| Ethical Consumer | Publisher | Conflict conduct analysis | Documents Morrisons’ selective silence and sourcing practices |
| War on Want | NGO | Boycott campaigns | Lists Morrisons among targeted retailers |
The aggregate picture across all four domains is of a UK domestic grocery retailer with a low-level, commercially transactional relationship to the Israeli economy and a pattern of political passivity. The principal cross-domain limitation is the structural opacity introduced by Morrisons’ 2021 delisting: post-acquisition corporate disclosures are reduced, subsidiary structures are not fully enumerated in publicly indexed records, and technology vendor and supplier relationships are not itemised in public filings. This opacity applies across V-MIL, V-DIG, V-ECON, and V-POL simultaneously.
A second cross-domain gap is temporal: the research phase was conducted without live web retrieval capability. NGO publications, regulatory decisions, and corporate statements issued between late 2023 and May 2026 could not be retrieved. Given the significant escalation of civil society scrutiny of UK retailers following October 2023, this is a material gap, particularly for V-ECON (whether sourcing patterns changed), V-POL (whether any corporate statement was subsequently issued), and V-MIL (whether any new NGO investigation was published). The findings should be treated as accurate to training-data coverage through April 2026 but should be supplemented by live NGO database retrieval in any formal review or legal proceeding.
A third cross-domain observation is the consistency between domains: the V-MIL and V-DIG zero scores are well-supported, and the V-ECON and V-POL non-zero scores are grounded in documented commercial conduct and communications decisions rather than inferred or speculative relationships. The composite score of 156 is not driven by any single high-confidence finding but by a coherent pattern of low-level commercial engagement and selective political passivity.
| Entity | Domain(s) | Type | Role / Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wm Morrison Supermarkets Limited | All | Subject | UK grocery retailer; audit target |
| Clayton, Dubilier & Rice (CD&R) | All | Private equity owner | Sole owner post-Oct 2021; no Israeli mandate identified |
| CD&R Fund XI | V-ECON, V-POL | Acquisition vehicle | Holds Morrisons; LP base not fully public |
| Rami Baitiéh | V-POL | CEO (from Nov 2023) | No documented political advocacy identified |
| Hadiklaim | V-ECON | Israeli exporter | Medjool dates supplied to UK including Morrisons |
| Mehadrin | V-ECON | Israeli exporter | Citrus, avocados; Jordan Valley operations |
| Carmel Produce UK | V-ECON | UK importer of record | Historical Israeli produce distribution; post-2021 status unconfirmed |
| Elbit Systems / IAI / Rafael | V-MIL | Israeli defence primes | No Morrisons supply relationship identified |
| SIBAT | V-MIL | Israeli defence export body | Morrisons not listed |
| Who Profits Research Center | V-MIL, V-ECON, V-DIG | NGO database | Profiles Israeli settlement corporate involvement; Morrisons cited in V-ECON |
| Palestine Solidarity Campaign | V-MIL, V-ECON, V-POL | Civil society | Boycott campaigns; names Morrisons for produce sourcing |
| BDS Movement (UK) | V-POL | Civil society | Lists Morrisons among targeted UK retailers |
| Corporate Occupation | V-ECON | NGO | Documents UK supermarket settlement produce labelling |
| Ethical Consumer | V-ECON, V-POL | Publisher | Supermarket surveys; notes Morrisons selective silence |
| War on Want | V-POL | NGO | Boycott campaigns targeting Morrisons |
| Big Brother Watch | V-DIG | NGO | “Face Off” facial recognition report; does not name Morrisons |
| Manhattan Associates | V-DIG | US technology vendor | Confirmed Morrisons supply chain software provider |
| Trigo Vision / AnyVision (Oosto) | V-DIG | Israeli-origin tech vendors | No Morrisons deployment confirmed |
| NICE Systems / Verint | V-DIG | Israeli-origin analytics vendors | No Morrisons deployment confirmed |
| DEFRA | V-ECON, V-POL | UK regulator | 2020 settlement produce labelling guidance |
| ICO | V-DIG | UK regulator | 2023 facial recognition warning; does not name Morrisons |
| USDAW | V-POL | Trade union | Represents Morrisons workers; no formal position on symbol restrictions documented |
| British Retail Consortium (BRC) | V-POL | Trade body | Standard lobbying; no Israel-Palestine policy activity identified |
| British Red Cross Ukraine Appeal | V-POL | Charity | Recipient of documented Morrisons donation (March 2022) |
| UN OHCHR settlements database | V-MIL, V-POL | UN body | Morrisons not listed; definitional scope excludes import buyers |
| Domain | I | M | P | V-Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| V-MIL | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| V-DIG | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| V-ECON | 3.50 | 4.50 | 7.50 | 2.25 |
| V-POL | 2.50 | 3.50 | 8.50 | 1.25 |
Composite BDS-1000 Score: 156 — Tier E (0–199)
V-ECON is the leading domain (V_MAX = 2.25) reflecting Morrisons’ role as a direct, recurring import buyer of Israeli-origin fresh produce including produce associated with settlement agriculture. Impact is scored at the Sustained Trade band (3.50): the relationship is transactional and import-only, with no foreign direct investment or operational presence in Israel. Magnitude is scored at the Modest Presence band (4.50), conservatively, given the absence of named contract volume data; Morrisons’ ~10–11% UK market share provides a structural inference of participation in the seasonal Israeli produce import cycle but not a quantified volume figure. Proximity is scored at the Direct Commercial Contract band (7.50): Morrisons’ centralised buying function makes it the direct procuring entity even where orders are fulfilled through UK importers.
V-POL contributes as the secondary domain (1.25), with Selective Silence (I=2.50) grounded in the documented asymmetry between public statements on Ukraine and BLM and the absence of any statement on Gaza over a two-and-a-half-year period. The Proximity score (8.50, Controller/Architect) reflects that Morrisons is directly responsible for its own communications decisions and HR policy — there is no intermediary. The score does not reach the Moderate band because no sustained lobbying, shareholder resolution opposition, or active political suppression has been identified.
V-MIL and V-DIG are both zero, reflecting the thoroughness of those audits and the fundamental incompatibility of Morrisons’ grocery retail business model with defence manufacturing, dual-use technology export, or digital services provision to state bodies.
High-confidence findings: The V-MIL and V-DIG zero scores carry high confidence. The audit sub-categories are comprehensive and Morrisons’ business model makes positive findings implausible. The V-POL selective silence finding (I=2.50) carries high confidence: the Ukraine statement and BLM statement are documented, the absence of a Gaza statement is documented, and the asymmetry is factually clear.
Moderate-confidence findings: The V-ECON sourcing relationships (Hadiklaim, Mehadrin) are credible but derived from NGO and civil society sources rather than primary corporate filings or named contracts. No supply agreement has been confirmed from primary documentation. The M score (4.50) is conservative and could move modestly in either direction with better data.
Open questions:
– Have Morrisons’ Israeli fresh produce sourcing practices changed materially since October 2023? No evidence confirms continuation or cessation of the Hadiklaim and Mehadrin relationships post-2023.
– Has Morrisons issued any corporate statement on Gaza since the research cutoff? None identified through April 2026.
– Has any NGO published a specific V-MIL or V-DIG category investigation of Morrisons since late 2023? Live NGO database retrieval was unavailable during the research phase.
– What is the full subsidiary structure of Morrisons post-CD&R acquisition? Live Companies House access would be required to enumerate all registered entities.
– What is the full LP roster of CD&R Fund XI? Not publicly disclosed; any Israeli institutional investor connection cannot be confirmed or excluded from open sources.
– What technology vendors supply Morrisons’ in-store loss-prevention and CCTV analytics functions? Not publicly named; Israeli-origin vendors cannot be confirmed or excluded.
For civil society researchers and campaigners: The V-ECON sourcing evidence is the strongest basis for consumer engagement. Named supplier relationships (Hadiklaim, Mehadrin) are credible and consistently cited across multiple independent sources.2426 The DEFRA 2020 labelling guidance on settlement produce provides a concrete regulatory standard against which Morrisons’ shelf-level labelling can be independently audited.2 In-store spot checks of Medjool date and citrus labelling would provide primary-source evidence currently lacking from public records.
For institutional investors and lenders: The V-ECON score of 2.25 and the V-POL score of 1.25 are both at the lower end of their respective activity bands. The primary material risk is reputational — exposure to ongoing consumer boycott activity and civil society scrutiny — rather than regulatory or legal. No enforcement actions have been identified. Post-CD&R private ownership reduces public disclosure, and any institutional lender or debt investor should request supply chain transparency on Israeli-origin produce sourcing as part of ESG due diligence, given the acknowledged evidence gap on post-2023 sourcing decisions.
For policymakers and regulators: The labelling enforcement gap documented across UK supermarkets including Morrisons warrants Trading Standards resource allocation. The DEFRA 2020 guidance is clear; the absence of any identified enforcement action against named retailers despite documented civil society evidence of compliance concerns suggests an under-resourced enforcement regime.230 Parliamentary scrutiny of DEFRA’s enforcement record on settlement produce labelling would be proportionate given the documented gap.
For Morrisons itself: The score of 156 (Tier E) is low and reflects a commercially transactional rather than strategically complicit relationship. The most cost-effective actions to reduce V-ECON and V-POL exposure are: (1) publicly disclosing country-of-origin and territory-of-origin sourcing data for fresh produce at SKU level; (2) confirming compliance with the DEFRA 2020 settlement labelling guidance with independent verification; and (3) adopting a consistent geopolitical communications framework rather than a pattern susceptible to selective-silence characterisation. None of these actions would require withdrawal from commercial relationships with Israeli suppliers.
Verification priority: Any formal use of this dossier in legal, regulatory, or formal advocacy proceedings should be preceded by live retrieval of: (a) the current Who Profits Morrisons profile; (b) current Palestine Solidarity Campaign and Ethical Consumer supermarket assessments; (c) Companies House subsidiary enumeration for Morrisons post-2021; and (d) any post-October 2023 NGO investigations of Morrisons in V-MIL or V-DIG categories.
Morrisons corporate history — https://www.morrisons-corporate.com/about-us/our-story/ ↩↩
UK Government settlement produce labelling guidance — https://www.gov.uk/guidance/labelling-of-produce-grown-in-israeli-controlled-territories ↩↩↩↩↩
UK retailers and Black Lives Matter, Retail Gazette — https://www.retailgazette.co.uk/blog/2020/06/black-lives-matter-uk-retailers-respond/ ↩↩
Reuters, CD&R wins Morrisons auction — https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/cd-r-wins-morrisons-auction-285-bln-pounds-2021-10-02/ ↩↩↩
Morrisons Ukraine donation press release — https://www.morrisons-corporate.com/media-centre/corporate-news/morrisons-donates-to-ukraine-appeal/ ↩↩
Big Brother Watch, “Face Off” facial recognition report — https://bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Face-Off-Report-Final.pdf ↩↩↩
ICO warning on live facial recognition in UK retail — https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/media-centre/news-and-blogs/2023/06/ico-warns-public-about-use-of-live-facial-recognition-technology-in-uk-retail/ ↩↩↩
Ethical Consumer, supermarkets and Israel-Palestine conflict — https://www.ethicalconsumer.org/food-drink/supermarkets-israel-palestine-conflict ↩↩↩
The Guardian, UK workers told not to wear pro-Palestine symbols — https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/20/uk-workers-told-not-to-wear-pro-palestine-symbols ↩↩↩
BDS Movement UK actions — https://bdsmovement.net/act-now/actions/united-kingdom ↩
Morrisons annual reports — https://www.morrisons-corporate.com/investor-centre/annual-reports/ ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
Who Profits, Morrisons company profile — https://whoprofits.org/company/morrisons/ ↩
Morrisons corporate overview — https://www.morrisons-corporate.com/about-us/ ↩↩↩↩↩
UK Strategic Export Controls licensing data — https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/strategic-export-controls-licensing-data ↩↩↩
SIBAT defence export directorate — https://www.sibat.mod.gov.il/ ↩↩↩
UK Contracts Finder — https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/ ↩
Palestine Solidarity Campaign boycott campaigns — https://www.palestinecampaign.org/actions/boycott-israeli-goods/ ↩
Human Rights Watch, business and human rights — https://www.hrw.org/topic/business-and-human-rights ↩
TechCrunch, AnyVision rebrands as Oosto — https://techcrunch.com/2022/02/16/anyvision-rebrands-as-oosto/ ↩
The Guardian, Google Amazon Israel Project Nimbus — https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/oct/12/google-amazon-israel-cloud-project-nimbus ↩
The Guardian, Morrisons Supreme Court data breach ruling — https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/apr/01/morrisons-wins-data-breach-supreme-court-case ↩
Who Profits, settlement agriculture industry profile — https://whoprofits.org/industry/settlement-agriculture/ ↩↩↩
Who Profits, Mehadrin company profile — https://whoprofits.org/company/mehadrin/ ↩
Who Profits, Hadiklaim company profile — https://whoprofits.org/company/hadiklaim/ ↩↩↩
Palestine Solidarity Campaign, supermarkets and Israeli settlement produce — https://www.palestinecampaign.org/resources/supermarkets-israeli-settlement-produce/ ↩↩
UK Government DEFRA settlement produce labelling news — https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-government-statement-on-labelling-of-settlement-produce ↩↩↩
Who Profits, Carmel Agrexco company profile — https://whoprofits.org/company/carmel-agrexco/ ↩
HMRC UK Trade Info — https://www.uktradeinfo.com/trade-data/ ↩↩↩
CD&R portfolio — https://www.cdr-inc.com/portfolio/ ↩
Corporate Occupation, supermarkets research — https://corporateoccupation.org/supermarkets/ ↩↩
The Guardian, UK supermarkets Israeli goods boycott pressure — https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/oct/14/uk-supermarkets-israeli-goods-boycott-pressure ↩↩
USDAW — https://www.usdaw.org.uk/ ↩
War on Want, boycott apartheid campaigns — https://waronwant.org/campaigns/boycott-apartheid ↩
UN OHCHR Human Rights Council session 43 reports — https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session43/list-reports ↩↩