Procter & Gamble

Key Findings

• Economic: P&G maintained a substantial supplier relationship with Avgol; Avgol reported P&G sales of US$116.758 million in 2025 and a framework agreement running through 31 December 2026, although purchase orders - not the framework - determine actual volumes.¹
• Settlements: Avgol’s 2020 annual report directly documented that its Barkan production line supplied a specific product to P&G; Avgol vacated Barkan on 24 March 2021, so later group-level purchases do not establish continued sourcing from that settlement industrial zone.^{2, 3}
• Political: P&G director Robert J. Portman supported the Israel Anti-Boycott Act as a U.S. senator in 2017, before joining P&G’s board; the record does not establish that he acted for P&G or that P&G adopted his position.^{4, 5}
• Not found: No public evidence identified of P&G contracts with Israeli military, intelligence, or security bodies, military-specific products, Project Nimbus participation, or P&G operations in occupied territory.^{6, 7, 8}

Target Profile

Key Facts:

• P&G Israel M.D.O. Ltd. appears in P&G’s June 2025 subsidiary exhibit as an Israel-jurisdiction subsidiary.¹⁴
• P&G’s Israel careers page states that P&G Israel has operated as part of a distributor market since 2001.¹⁵
• P&G’s disclosed business is consumer products sold through retail, e-commerce, direct-to-consumer, distributor, wholesale, pharmacy, and professional channels.⁹

Executive Summary

P&G is a U.S.-incorporated consumer-goods company with a documented Israeli market presence and a disclosed Israel-jurisdiction subsidiary, P&G Israel M.D.O. Ltd. P&G’s Israel-facing materials describe a distributor-market presence since 2001 and local availability of brands including Pampers, Gillette, Oral-B, Pantene, Ariel, Tide and Always. The record also supports marketing activity in Israel from April 2022 through a proposed Pampers consumer-class settlement notice, while leaving the respondents’ contractual roles and supply-chain responsibilities unresolved.^{14, 15, 16}

The strongest documented economic vector is P&G’s supplier relationship with Avgol, a producer of nonwoven hygiene fabrics. Avgol reported P&G as its largest customer in 2021 and later reported P&G sales of US$110.836 million in 2023, US$118.907 million in 2024, and US$116.758 million in 2025 - 31.1% of Avgol’s 2025 consolidated revenue. Avgol’s disclosed framework agreement runs through 31 December 2026, but purchase orders set actual supply and the evidence does not prove deliveries at a particular point in September 2026.^{1, 17}

The settlement-related element is historical and must be bounded accordingly. Avgol’s 2020 annual report expressly stated that a Barkan production line supplied P&G with a specific product. Avgol subsequently reported vacating Barkan on 24 March 2021. AFSC identifies Barkan as a settlement industrial zone in the occupied West Bank. The evidence therefore documents historical P&G supply from Barkan, but does not establish continued sourcing from Barkan after its closure, allocate subsequent P&G purchases to Israeli production, or document current sourcing from any operating settlement facility.^{2, 3, 18}

P&G also has documented Israel-related innovation and commercial links. A 2021 Moodify announcement identified P&G as a key equity investor in Moodify’s US$8 million financing round; neither P&G’s contribution nor ownership percentage was disclosed. In 2023, Moodify announced P&G’s selection of its AI-based fragrance-development software. Historical sources also describe P&G’s Israel House of Innovation and academic collaboration initiatives, but the record does not establish their current scale, staffing, premises, expenditure, or ongoing status.^{13, 19, 20}

The available record does not support military or digital complicity claims. No public evidence identified of Israeli defence or security contracts, military-specific P&G products, defence-prime integration, Israeli-state cloud work, Project Nimbus participation, or P&G technology supplied for surveillance, intelligence, offensive cyber, targeting, or security functions. The resulting fixed, human-vetted V6.5 assessment is BRS 347, Tier D (Moderate Complicity), driven by the economic record and political/directness considerations rather than a demonstrated military or digital nexus.^{6, 7, 8}

Timeline of Relevant Events

Corporate Overview

The ultimate reporting parent is The Procter & Gamble Company, an Ohio corporation headquartered in Cincinnati. Its FY2025 filing defines P&G and related terms to include the registrant and its subsidiaries, and describes a consumer-products business sold in approximately 180 countries and territories.⁹

P&G’s subsidiary exhibit lists P&G Israel M.D.O. Ltd. as an Israel-jurisdiction subsidiary. This establishes inclusion in P&G’s disclosed corporate group, but does not disclose ownership percentage, operating functions, premises, workforce, assets, revenue, technology role, or presence in occupied territory. P&G’s Israel accessibility page provides a Tel Aviv–Jaffa customer-contact address for “Procter & Gamble Israel Ltd.”; the reviewed material does not establish that this is the same legal entity as P&G Israel M.D.O. Ltd.^{14, 23}

P&G’s Israel careers page identifies a Tel Aviv office and describes the country operation as a distributor market. The record supports a consumer-goods market and distribution presence but does not identify a P&G-operated Israeli manufacturing site, warehouse, local importer-of-record arrangement, settlement outlet, or occupied-territory facility. P&G’s FY2025 annual report identifies 75 manufacturing sites outside the United States but does not identify Israel as one; that filing omission is not evidence of no Israeli manufacturing activity.^{15, 9}

The historical Gillette transaction record identifies S. Schestowitz Ltd. as an independent Israeli distributor of Gillette that Gillette did not control. That supports a historical civilian distribution relationship, not military or security end use.²⁴

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

No public evidence identified of a P&G or P&G Israel M.D.O. Ltd. contract, tender, framework agreement, procurement award, SIBAT listing, defence-exhibition listing, or other documented relationship with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israel Prison Service, Border Police, Israeli security bodies, or Israeli defence primes.^{6, 7, 24}

No public evidence identified of tactical, ruggedised, military-specified, or Israeli-security-force-specific P&G product lines; Israeli military end-user certificates; export-licence decisions; or P&G supply of weapons, munitions, platforms, strategic components, logistics, base services, or defence-prime manufacturing inputs.^{6, 7}

The documented Avgol relationship concerns nonwoven materials for baby-diaper, adult-incontinence and feminine-hygiene markets. It does not establish defence-prime integration, military end use, or military end use of later group-level purchases.^{25, 26, 1}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

P&G’s disclosed business is daily-use consumer products, not defence goods or services. The available Israeli competition record characterises the P&G/Gillette parties’ principal activities as toiletries. These are substantial civilian-character counterpoints to a military-complicity claim.^{9, 24}

The document-scoped review found no P&G mention in the specified UN reports. This is not evidence of comprehensive relationship-wide absence, but it is relevant negative evidence within the reviewed corpus.^{8, 27}

B. Marc Allen’s prior Boeing roles establish a personal defence-industry career connection, not Israel-, IDF-, IMOD-, settlement-, or Palestine-related activity by Allen or P&G.¹⁰

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

P&G selected Moodify White, an AI-based fragrance-design tool, for fragrance-development applications including malodour control, product development and speed-to-market. The announcement identifies Moodify as a Tel Aviv-based scent-technology company, but does not describe cybersecurity, state, military, consumer-data, or Israeli-government use; ongoing status is unknown.²⁸

Historical reporting described P&G’s relationship with Verix Business Intelligence and an Israel–Cincinnati startup initiative involving cyber and business-intelligence pilots. These reports do not establish named pilot firms, production deployment, procurement, data scope, deployment geography, ownership, or continuation.^{29, 30}

P&G’s Microsoft Azure migration is material enterprise-cloud activity, but the cited account does not identify an Israeli Azure region, Project Nimbus participation, an Israeli state customer, or an Israel-specific deployment.³¹

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified of P&G contracts or technology services for Israeli military, intelligence, law-enforcement surveillance, offensive cyber, zero-day, digital-weapons, autonomous targeting, tracking, or threat-detection functions.^{7, 8, 27}

P&G’s privacy policies describe collection and potential processing of substantial categories of personal data, and its Israel privacy policy discusses sharing hashed emails with online platforms and ad-tech businesses. Neither policy identifies Israeli processing infrastructure, Israeli state access, Israeli surveillance vendors, or data residency in Israel.^{32, 33}

The bounded review did not comprehensively examine every director’s outside interests, personal investment vehicles, foundations or grants. Accordingly, it does not support a comprehensive principal-level absence conclusion.^{10, 12}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

P&G’s documented economic nexus includes an Israel-jurisdiction subsidiary, a Tel Aviv office and local operating functions. The current careers page identifies the office and employer presence; a 2022 interview with innovation director Orr Hameiri describes his earlier local accounting, tax and payroll responsibilities and subsequent innovation role. Together these support an operating presence beyond a distributor listing, while the historical interview does not establish current staffing or an owned research laboratory.^{14, 15, 34}

P&G also has a substantial supplier relationship with Avgol. Avgol’s 2025 annual report recorded P&G sales of US$116.758 million in 2025, representing 31.1% of Avgol consolidated revenue; it described a framework agreement through 31 December 2026, with actual supply determined by purchase orders.¹

Avgol’s 2020 annual report expressly documented P&G supply from its Barkan production line. Since Avgol vacated Barkan in March 2021, later group-level Avgol sales cannot be treated as proof of continuing settlement-facility sourcing. Avgol also reports that Israel accounts for approximately 10% of group production but does not allocate P&G purchases among factories; total P&G purchases must not be attributed to Israeli production or settlements.^{2, 3, 1}

P&G was identified as a key equity investor in Moodify’s 2021 financing round and later as a user of Moodify’s fragrance-development software. The total round was US$8 million, not P&G’s individual investment; P&G’s investment amount, ownership percentage, and present holding are undisclosed.^{13, 19}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The evidence does not establish current P&G sourcing from an operating settlement facility, quantify purchases from Avgol’s Dimona plant, or show that P&G’s 2023–2025 Avgol purchases originated in Israel at all. It does not identify a current P&G-owned Israeli manufacturer, R&D centre, innovation lab, data centre, logistics hub, or real-estate investment.^{1, 2, 3, 14}

No public evidence identified of direct procurement from named Israeli agricultural exporters, settlement-origin product labelling, Israeli sovereign-bond holdings, Israel-focused funds, public investments in Israeli-domiciled companies beyond the documented Moodify investment, or Israeli state ownership or governance control.^{13, 9}

P&G’s responsible-sourcing materials set general expectations for external partners but do not describe Israel- or occupied-territory-specific sourcing requirements. The presence of an Israeli subsidiary does not itself disclose Israel-related profit flows, tax payments, assets, or investment values.^{35, 14}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

P&G maintains Israel-facing corporate communications through its locations selector and careers page, which lists a Tel Aviv office and describes local brands and programmes. The local page describes four active “Brands on a Mission” programmes and two in development, without naming recipients, amounts, locations, or conflict-related activity.^{36, 15}

The political-score record also includes director Robert J. Portman’s documented support, as a U.S. senator in 2017, for the proposed Israel Anti-Boycott Act. The cited announcement described opposition to boycotts intended to isolate Israel and to the UNHRC database initiative. This was pre-P&G-board conduct: Portman became a P&G director in 2023, and the record does not establish P&G adoption, funding, direction, or implementation of his position.^{4, 5}

Historical sources describe a 2010–2011 Israeli public-academic collaboration context and the Israel House of Innovation. They do not confirm a current state partnership, current research operation, grant, expenditure, or institutional agreement.²⁰

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified of P&G corporate donations to the IDF, Friends of the Israel Defense Forces, JNF/KKL, settlement organisations, reservist funds, military-welfare bodies, or Israeli political-advocacy bodies. No verified primary record was located of P&G lobbying on Israel/Palestine, anti-BDS legislation, or regional trade policy.^{9, 10}

The reviewed materials did not yield a public P&G statement concerning 7 October 2023, Gaza, Palestinian civilian harm, Israel, or conflict-period relief. No public evidence identified of P&G deploying corporate products, logistics, transport, free services, or assets for Israeli military, state, or state-aligned NGO activity after that date.^{36, 15, 9}

A 2011 activist allegation that P&G was a major fuel supplier to the Israeli military lacked underlying contract, tender, corporate, or government evidence and is not treated as established evidence.³⁷

Named Entities and Evidence Map

BDS-1000 Score

Method: V6.5.

• V_MAX: 3.93 Avg_OTHERS: 1.17
• BRS Score: 347 Tier: D (Moderate Complicity)

V_MAX is driven by P&G’s documented Israeli operating presence: the disclosed subsidiary, Tel Aviv office and evidence of local business functions. The approved assessment treats this as a bounded support-office presence, not a demonstrated large manufacturing or research operation. Avgol procurement, historic Barkan supply and Moodify investment were assessed as separate economic scenarios and did not determine the domain maximum. Political scoring reflects the current Israel-facing business presence; Portman’s pre-board legislative activity is retained as context and does not determine that score.

The V6.5 method is scale-free, evidence-only, and human-vetted. Scores reflect documented activity type, scale, and directness - not allegations, transitive associations, or unsupported inferences.

Methodology Note

• Evidence is limited to the four supplied domain audits and their cited documentary record.
• Impact (I) assesses activity type; Magnitude (M) assesses documented scale; Proximity (P) assesses directness to the relevant nexus.
• The method is scale-free: ratings are not a market-capitalisation, revenue, popularity, or moral-worth ranking.
• Divested, exited, or closed operations mitigate attribution. The Barkan finding is retained as historical direct supply, while post-closure Avgol purchasing is not treated as continuing Barkan sourcing.
• Entity attribution is direct: no transitive guilt is assigned through directors’ prior employers, suppliers’ other operations, or unverified third-party allegations.
• Settlement operations may affect both Economic and Political where independently supported; “No public evidence identified” is used where the audits’ bounded checks found no supporting record.