Target: Sabra Dipping Company, LLC / Sabra Hummus
Research date: 26 October 2026
Entity and ownership: Sabra Dipping Company was a 50:50 joint venture between PepsiCo and Israel-based Strauss Group until 3 December 2024, when PepsiCo acquired Strauss’s remaining 50% interest for approximately $241 million and Sabra became a wholly owned PepsiCo subsidiary.1, 2, 3
Operational scope: Sabra manufactures refrigerated dips and spreads for the North American market; its principal hummus manufacturing facility is in Chesterfield County, Virginia.4, 5
Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships
Israeli-origin enterprise software and cybersecurity
No public evidence identified of Sabra holding a verified direct licence, subscription, procurement contract or integration agreement with Check Point, Wiz, SentinelOne, CyberArk, NICE, Verint, Claroty, Palo Alto Networks or another specifically identified Israeli-origin cybersecurity supplier.
No public evidence identified establishing the deployment of these products within Sabra’s networks, enterprise applications, production systems or cloud environments.
Parent-company technology governance
PepsiCo’s fiscal 2025 Form 10-K, filed on 3 February 2026, describes a group-wide cybersecurity programme encompassing information systems, threat monitoring, vendor risk assessments, third-party security obligations and incident response; it does not provide a Sabra-specific inventory of deployed security products.6, 7
PepsiCo’s fiscal 2024 Form 10-K similarly identifies cybersecurity and reliance on enterprise systems and third-party technology services as corporate risk-management matters, without disclosing a named Israeli-origin supplier for Sabra.8
Verified industrial technology and engineering relationship
Dennis Group identifies itself as Sabra’s exclusive design-build partner for the original Chesterfield manufacturing facility and subsequent expansions, describing the conversion of manual food-production processes into automated manufacturing operations.9
Dennis Group reports that the original 115,000-square-foot facility incorporated eight production lines and a 40,000-square-foot finished-goods distribution centre, and that subsequent expansions substantially increased production capacity; the project account does not name an Israeli-origin automation supplier.9
The Virginia Economic Development Partnership’s July 2026 account independently describes Sabra’s initial 2010 Chesterfield opening and subsequent expansions in 2013, 2014 and 2018, confirming the established US manufacturing footprint.5
IT integration and business carve-out
NE Digital published a case study concerning the divestment of certain Sabra manufacturing and warehouse assets in Oceanside, California, and their acquisition by Stir Foods; the described engagement addressed integration into the purchaser’s systems, processes and personnel.10
The case study establishes an IT-related transaction involving Sabra assets but does not identify the software involved or establish that NE Digital managed Sabra’s complete enterprise technology environment.10
No public evidence identified that the transaction required an Israeli systems integrator or deployed Israeli-origin cybersecurity, cloud, analytics or enterprise software.
Historical packaging supplier
[pre-2020] No independently corroborated public evidence identified establishing that Sabra replaced a specific Israeli packaging supplier with US-based Genpak during its 2009 transition to recycled-content PET packaging. Genpak’s own historical documentation confirms that it manufactured recycled-content APET food containers in 2009, but does not establish the alleged Sabra supplier transition.11
[pre-2020] no public evidence identified in the accessible replacement source confirming a Sabra-specific collaboration with Genpak on container and lid manufacturing, identifying Sabra’s former Israeli packaging supplier, or establishing a current Israeli digital-technology relationship.11
Scale and dependency
The Dennis Group relationship concerns substantial food-production infrastructure, including automated manufacturing lines, while PepsiCo’s public cybersecurity disclosures describe group-level systems governance; the reviewed records do not establish any Israeli-origin digital technology dependency at Sabra.9, 6
No public evidence identified quantifying Sabra’s expenditure on Israeli-origin software, its number of licences, the criticality of such software, or any dependence on Israeli technology support personnel.
Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology
Facial recognition and biometrics
No public evidence identified of Sabra deploying Israeli-origin facial recognition, biometric identification, gait analysis or computer-vision surveillance systems.
No public evidence identified of Sabra procurement from Trigo, BriefCam, AnyVision/Oosto, Trax or comparable Israeli-origin biometric retail technology suppliers.
Predictive analytics and monitoring
No public evidence identified of Sabra using Israeli-origin predictive policing, sentiment analysis, social media surveillance, workforce-monitoring or behavioural surveillance systems.
Third-party deployment
Sabra operates through a food-manufacturing and retail-distribution business model, with the Virginia Economic Development Partnership documenting its primary manufacturing operations in Chesterfield County; the reviewed materials do not identify an associated biometric or surveillance-technology deployment.5
No public evidence identified of Israeli-origin surveillance systems reaching Sabra through a managed service provider, third-party retail platform, security contractor or bundled enterprise software package.
Retail technology distinction
No public evidence identified demonstrating that technological capabilities deployed by independent retailers carrying Sabra products were purchased, directed, administered or controlled by Sabra itself.
Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation
Data-centre operations
Sabra’s October 2024 company statement described its headquarters and manufacturing operations as North American, with employees in the United States and Canada; the statement did not disclose the geographic location of its cloud hosting, backups or consumer-data processors.12
No public evidence identified of Sabra operating, leasing or colocating a data centre in Israel.
No public evidence identified of Sabra maintaining a separately identifiable Israeli cloud region or disaster-recovery facility.
Cloud vendors and data residency
PepsiCo’s fiscal 2025 corporate cybersecurity disclosure identifies group-level processes concerning information systems, service providers, technology security and external risk, but does not identify Sabra’s hosting provider or data-residency arrangements.6
No public evidence identified establishing that Sabra customer, employee, payment, behavioural or identity data is stored, routed or processed within Israeli jurisdiction.
No public evidence identified establishing that Sabra’s data is accessible to Israeli state institutions through a named Israeli-hosted infrastructure provider.
Project Nimbus
No public evidence identified of Sabra being a supplier, subcontractor, customer or programme participant in Israel’s Project Nimbus government cloud initiative.
No public evidence identified of Sabra supplying cloud computing, artificial intelligence platforms, data storage, networking or managed infrastructure services to Israeli government institutions under Nimbus or a comparable programme.
Sovereign cloud and resilience
No public evidence identified of Sabra offering sovereign cloud, digital sovereignty, government data-residency or infrastructure-resilience services to Israel’s government, military or security institutions.
Group-level geographic distinction
PepsiCo’s corporate ownership of SodaStream establishes a separate business relationship with an Israeli operating company, while SodaStream’s official consumer documentation identifies Ashkelon, Israel, as the production location for certain flavour products.13, 14
That documented manufacturing activity does not establish the location of Sabra’s databases, software infrastructure or cloud services.13, 14
Data-exposure assessment
No public evidence identified sufficient to determine the complete jurisdictional route of Sabra website analytics, consumer communications, personnel records or third-party data processing.
Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships
Military and intelligence technology contracts
No public evidence identified of Sabra holding a verified technology contract with the Israeli Ministry of Defence, Israel Defense Forces, Israeli intelligence agencies or other Israeli security bodies.
No public evidence identified of Sabra supplying communications systems, administrative IT, cybersecurity, analytics, data storage or digital infrastructure to Israeli military or intelligence organisations.
Distinction between historical shareholder activity and Sabra contracts
[pre-2020] Historical boycott campaigns asserted that Sabra’s former shareholder Strauss Group supported Israeli military brigades, including the Golani and Givati Brigades; the April 2024 CJPME factsheet describes these allegations as grounds for consumer boycott activity.15
In October 2024, Sabra published a statement denying financial support for military or political operations and identifying its business as separate from its shareholders.12
The documented corporate ownership relationship ended on 3 December 2024 when PepsiCo acquired Strauss Group’s remaining shareholding.2, 3
The reviewed campaign materials do not establish that Sabra itself developed, supplied, licensed or maintained military technology.15, 12
Dual-use technology
Dennis Group’s documented automation work concerns commercial food production and packaging operations rather than military or intelligence applications.9
No public evidence identified of Sabra-supplied technology being deployed for surveillance, intelligence gathering, military communications or security operations in Israel or occupied territories.
Offensive cyber and digital weapons
No public evidence identified of Sabra developing, acquiring, selling, licensing or maintaining offensive cyber platforms, zero-day exploits, interception systems or digital weapons.
No public evidence identified of Sabra technology being used by Israeli state actors to conduct offensive cyber operations.
Constructive-notice dates
The historical PepsiCo–Strauss joint venture remained in existence after 19 July 2024 and until the 3 December 2024 transaction closing, as established by PepsiCo’s announcement and subsequent SEC filing.1, 3
No public evidence identified of a Sabra technology-provision contract with Israeli military or security institutions continuing after 19 July 2024 or the November 2024 ICC arrest warrants.
AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems
Artificial intelligence and machine-learning provision
No public evidence identified of Sabra providing AI, machine-learning, computer-vision, natural-language-processing or autonomous decision-support products to Israeli state institutions.
No public evidence identified of Sabra acting as a technology supplier to the Israeli Ministry of Defence, military intelligence services or government AI programmes.
Manufacturing automation distinction
Dennis Group describes automated food-manufacturing operations at Sabra’s Virginia facility, but does not identify autonomous military applications, AI model development or an Israeli-origin AI supplier.9
No public evidence identified establishing that Sabra’s manufacturing automation uses Israeli-developed artificial intelligence.
Training data and model development
No public evidence identified of Sabra training AI models on Israeli civilian population data, intercepted communications, biometric databases or surveillance-derived information.
No public evidence identified of Sabra providing AI training datasets or model-development infrastructure to Israeli military, intelligence or security bodies.
Autonomous systems and lethality
No public evidence identified of Sabra developing or supplying autonomous target identification, target-generation, fire-control, weapons guidance or other purpose-built kinetic military systems.
No public evidence identified of Sabra providing general-purpose AI systems for Israeli military surveillance or intelligence operations.
Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint
Israeli research and development facilities
Sabra’s October 2024 company statement identified its employees, manufacturing and operating market as North American; the Virginia Economic Development Partnership separately documents its established Chesterfield manufacturing and expansion history.12, 5
No public evidence identified of Sabra operating an Israeli software engineering centre, digital R&D laboratory, cybersecurity research facility or technology accelerator.
Technology acquisitions and investments
PepsiCo acquired the remaining 50% of Sabra from Strauss Group on 3 December 2024 for approximately $241 million; this was an acquisition of a refrigerated food business rather than an identified Israeli technology company.2, 3
No public evidence identified of Sabra acquiring an Israeli cybersecurity, AI, surveillance, cloud or enterprise software company.
No public evidence identified of Sabra investing in an Israeli technology venture-capital fund, start-up accelerator or defence-technology business.
Group-level Israeli operations
PepsiCo’s corporate portfolio includes SodaStream, whose official product documentation identifies manufacturing activity in Ashkelon, Israel; this constitutes a separately identifiable Israeli operational footprint within the parent group.13, 14
No public evidence identified that SodaStream’s Israeli operations supply digital services, software development or IT security capabilities specifically to Sabra.
Research institutions and patents
No public evidence identified of Sabra holding technology patents jointly with Israeli universities, government laboratories or technology companies.
No public evidence identified of Sabra entering technology co-development or software-licensing arrangements with Technion, Hebrew University, the Weizmann Institute or another Israeli research institution.
Controlling principals
The 2024 PepsiCo acquisition eliminated Strauss Group’s direct equity interest in Sabra, with PepsiCo’s fiscal 2025 SEC filing continuing to identify Sabra as a wholly owned subsidiary.3, 6
No public evidence identified linking a named Sabra executive, director or controlling PepsiCo principal through a verified personal investment or corporate board role to NSO Group, Cellebrite, Carbyne, Oosto, Wiz, Palantir, Check Point, SentinelOne, Verint, NICE or another specified Israeli surveillance, intelligence or military-technology company.
Historical supplier changes
[pre-2020] No independently corroborated public evidence identified establishing the reported replacement of Sabra’s former Israeli packaging supplier by Genpak before December 2012. Genpak’s historical documentation establishes its production of recycled-content APET packaging in 2009 but does not identify a former Sabra supplier or establish any continuation of Israeli commercial arrangements.11
Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History
Civil-society investigations
CJPME’s April 2024 Sabra factsheet documented consumer boycott campaigns based on the company’s then-existing Strauss Group ownership and allegations concerning Strauss’s support for Israeli military brigades.15
Ethical Consumer’s boycott chronology described the November 2024 sale of Strauss Group’s Sabra holding as a development in the longstanding campaign against the brand.16
Visualizing Palestine’s BDS campaign database separately recorded Strauss Group’s November 2024 divestment from Sabra and Obela.17
These identified investigations and campaign records concern ownership, alleged historical military-related financial support and consumer purchasing; they do not document Sabra’s provision of military technology or Israeli-origin digital surveillance products.15, 16, 17
Retailer boycott process
Willy Street Co-op reported that at least 337 members had requested removal of Sabra products during 2024 because of concerns about PepsiCo and Strauss ownership and alleged military financial support, prompting a formal comment period in December 2024.18
In its 6 January 2025 update, the retailer reported 205 comments supporting the proposed boycott, 38 opposing it and three that did not fall into either category.19
Sabra’s written response stated that the company did not provide financial support for military or political operations; this is the company’s publicly documented position.12
Additional boycott reporting
A December 2023 Philadelphia Inquirer report documented anti-Sabra boycott stickers placed on products at Acme stores in Pennsylvania and described the relationship between boycott activism and Strauss Group’s former ownership of Sabra.20
UK Lawyers for Israel published an opposing account in December 2023 disputing claims directed at Sabra-branded hummus in British supermarkets and identifying a separate British-market manufacturing and distribution chain involving Osem.21
These disputes concern consumer campaigns and product provenance; the cited reports do not establish technology procurement or technology provision to Israeli security institutions.20, 21
Ownership response and subsequent transaction
PepsiCo announced the agreement to purchase Strauss Group’s remaining ownership on 22 November 2024 and reported completion on 3 December 2024.1, 3
The SEC acquisition disclosure records the approximately $241 million transaction consideration and Sabra’s resulting wholly owned subsidiary status.3
Settlement-related technology scrutiny
No public evidence identified of a UN, NGO or academic investigation specifically documenting Sabra’s provision of digital services, telecommunications equipment, biometric systems, cloud infrastructure or software to Israeli settlements.
No public evidence identified of Sabra operating or licensing a digital platform specifically serving settlements in the West Bank, East Jerusalem or occupied Golan Heights.
Regulatory and legal actions
No public evidence identified of an Israeli or foreign regulator investigating Sabra for the provision of surveillance software, offensive cyber tools, military cloud services or controlled digital technology to Israeli state agencies.
No public evidence identified of export-control enforcement or sanctions proceedings specifically involving Sabra’s technology sales to Israeli military or intelligence bodies.
No public evidence identified of a technology-related OECD National Contact Point complaint against Sabra concerning Israeli settlements.
Footnotes
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PepsiCo, “PepsiCo to Acquire Full Ownership of Sabra and Obela,” 22 November 2024. https://www.pepsico.com/newsroom/press-releases/2024/pepsico-to-acquire-full-ownership-of-sabra-and-obela ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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PepsiCo, fiscal 2024 Form 10-K, annual report for year ended 28 December 2024. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/77476/000007747625000007/pep-20241228.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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SEC, PepsiCo fiscal 2024 acquisition and divestitures disclosure, including the Sabra purchase consideration and closing date. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/77476/000007747625000007/R21.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7
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Sabra Dipping Company, October 2024 corporate statement reproduced by Willy Street Co-op. https://www.willystreet.coop/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Sabra-Letter-to-Willy-Street-Co-op-about-Sabra-10.25.24.pdf ↩
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Virginia Economic Development Partnership, “Virginia and Sabra Partner on World’s Largest Hummus Facility,” published 9 July 2026, updated 25 August 2026. https://www.vedp.org/success-story/virginia-and-sabra-partner-worlds-largest-hummus-facility ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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PepsiCo, fiscal 2025 Form 10-K, annual report for year ended 27 December 2025, filed February 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/77476/000007747626000007/pep-20251227.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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US Securities and Exchange Commission, PepsiCo fiscal 2025 Form 10-K filing index, confirming filing date of 3 February 2026, reporting period ended 27 December 2025 and accession number 0000077476-26-000007. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/77476/0000077476-26-000007-index.htm ↩
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PepsiCo, annual reports and proxy information archive, including fiscal 2024 and fiscal 2025 reports. https://www.pepsico.com/en/investors/annual-reports-proxy-information ↩
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Dennis Group, “Sabra Dipping Co. - World’s Largest Hummus Facility,” project case study, undated. https://dennisgroup.com/project/sabra-dipping-co/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
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NE Digital, “Case Study: Carve-out Integration,” describing Sabra assets and Stir Foods, undated. https://www.nedigital.com/en/carve-out-integration ↩ ↩2
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Genpak, “The Importance Of Post Consumer Recycled (PCR) Content,” 1 February 2010, describing the company’s use of post-consumer recycled resin in APET food packaging during 2009. This source does not independently verify a Sabra supplier transition or identify an Israeli packaging supplier. https://www.genpak.com/environment/why-buy-products-made-from-pcr/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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Sabra, “The Facts,” company statement dated 25 October 2024, hosted by Willy Street Co-op. https://www.willystreet.coop/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Sabra-Letter-to-Willy-Street-Co-op-about-Sabra-10.25.24.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
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PepsiCo, “PepsiCo to Acquire Full Ownership of Sabra and Obela,” describing the PepsiCo portfolio, 22 November 2024. https://www.pepsico.com/newsroom/press-releases/2024/pepsico-to-acquire-full-ownership-of-sabra-and-obela ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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SodaStream, official consumer support, “Where Are the Flavors Produced?” https://support-us.sodastream.com/hc/en-us/articles/15041137136539-Where-are-the-flavors-produced ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East, “Boycott Campaign: Sabra,” Factsheet No. 239, April 2024. https://www.cjpme.org/fs_239 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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Ethical Consumer, “History of Successful Boycotts,” Sabra boycott entry concerning November 2024. https://www.ethicalconsumer.org/ethicalcampaigns/boycotts/history-successful-boycotts ↩ ↩2
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Visualizing Palestine / BDS campaign chronology, “Strauss Group Sells Holdings in Sabra Hummus,” 22 November 2024. https://bds.visualizingpalestine.org/data/strauss-group-sells-holdings-in-sabra-hu-2024-11-22/ ↩ ↩2
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Willy Street Co-op, “Request for Boycott of Sabra Hummus,” 3 December 2024. https://www.willystreet.coop/co-op-news/request-for-boycott-of-sabra-hummus/?can_id=57e1b3064a698d0f29f0f8bc2b74ed1b&email_referrer=email_2553861&email_subject=update-on-willy-street-sabra-boycott&link_id=0&source=email-thank-you-for-contacting-willy-street-co-op-2 ↩
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Willy Street Co-op, “Update on Requested Sabra Boycott,” 6 January 2025. https://www.willystreet.coop/co-op-news/update-on-requested-sabra-boycott/ ↩
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The Philadelphia Inquirer, “Sabra Products at Acmes Vandalized in Lower Merion,” 6 December 2023, updated 7 December 2023. https://www.inquirer.com/news/pennsylvania/sabra-acme-vandalism-boycott-lower-merion-pennsylvania-20231206.html ↩ ↩2
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UK Lawyers for Israel, “Sabra Hummus Targeted by BDS Campaigners,” 21 December 2023. https://www.uklfi.com/sabra-hummus-targeted-by-bds-campaigners ↩ ↩2