Stanley Black & Decker

Key Findings

• Economic: Stanley Black & Decker owns current Israeli operating subsidiaries, including The Stanley Works Israel Ltd.; the validated Economic score of 6.50 is based on strategic foreign direct investment and sustained manufacturing/R&D activity, not divested AeroScout ownership or settlement operations.^{1, 2}
• Political: Current directly controlled Israeli operations and ordinary post-2024 Israel-related disclosures, combined with a documented Ukraine response and no comparable Israel/Palestine response, support the limited Business-as-Usual normalization finding; no state partnership, political funding, suppression, or Israel-policy lobbying was established.^{1, 3}
• Digital: AeroScout left the group in the 2022 Security and Healthcare divestment. The expanded audit found customer-side or on-premises deployments and no evidence of Israeli state-security access, Israeli-controlled hosting, or anti-Palestinian digital harm.^{4, 5}
• Military: No public evidence identified of defence procurement, military logistics, weapons, components, tactical products, or a qualifying Israeli military or security end user; Military remains zero.^{1, 4}

Target Profile

Executive Summary

Stanley Black & Decker’s validated BDS-1000 result is driven principally by its direct ownership of Israeli operating entities, including The Stanley Works Israel Ltd., and by continuing Israel-related sourcing and employee-plan disclosures. The scoring file assigns Economic 6.50, reflecting a direct, current corporate ownership relationship rather than evidence of settlement operations, agricultural trade, or Israeli state contracts.^{1, 2}

The Political score of 3.50 reflects business-as-usual normalization: the company continues ordinary Israeli corporate operations and disclosed Israel-related sourcing after July 2024, while the supplied record identifies no comparable public Israel/Palestine response to its documented Ukraine response. This is not evidence of a state partnership, political funding, lobbying on Israel policy, or support for Israeli security bodies.^{1, 3}

Military and Digital both score zero. The audited record does not establish Israeli military, security, intelligence, occupation-related, or qualifying digital beneficiaries. Historical AeroScout ownership, current consumer Robomow applications, Israeli subsidiaries, and the Keter brand-license lead do not by themselves meet those domains’ qualifying-result requirements.^{4, 5}

Timeline of Relevant Events

Corporate Overview

Stanley Black & Decker is a publicly traded U.S. company operating principally through Tools & Outdoor and Engineered Fastening. Its FY2025 filing reported $15.1 billion in revenue and identifies Israel as one of several sourcing jurisdictions. The filing also makes the employee stock-purchase plan available to eligible employees in Israel, Canada, and the United States.²

The relevant current corporate structure includes Israeli-incorporated F. Robotics Acquisitions Ltd., K.And.M. Holdco Products Ltd., and The Stanley Works Israel Ltd., as well as Netherlands-incorporated Stanley Israel Investments B.V. The subsidiary exhibit confirms consolidation but does not identify each entity’s operations, facility addresses, customers, data systems, or ownership chain below the group level.^{14, 2}

The supplied material identifies Stanley Works Israel/ZAG as an Israeli portable-storage operation with R&D and plastic-injection/assembly sites reported in Rosh Ha’Ayin, Carmiel, and Migdal HaEmek. Its stated work includes development, production, and export of storage products for DEWALT, Black+Decker, Craftsman, Irwin, and Stanley brands; the record does not place those locations in occupied territory.^{15, 16}

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

No public evidence identified of a Stanley Black & Decker contract, tender, framework, memorandum, or other procurement relationship with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israel Prison Service, Israel Border Police, or SIBAT. The scoring file accordingly applies a no-mechanically-eligible frame and assigns zero for impact, magnitude, and proximity.^{1, 4}

The company’s commercial presence in Israel does not itself establish military involvement. The audits identify an Israeli subsidiary, an Israeli operating entity, and investment activity, but none is documented as supplying Israeli military or security customers. A current Israeli commercial footprint is therefore relevant to Economic and Political, not sufficient evidence for Military.^{15, 16}

Stanley Infrastructure produces hydraulic breakers and hammers used in demolition, trenching, quarrying, and construction. These products may be dual-use-adjacent in principle, but the supplied evidence does not identify ruggedised or tactical variants, Israeli end-user certificates, export licences, military marketing, or a documented Israeli security-force sale.¹⁷ The record also identifies no link between this equipment and demolitions, checkpoints, the separation barrier, detention facilities, military bases, or settlement construction.

The historical Keter matter does not establish direct military supply. Keter was an independent Israeli company licensed to sell selected home, garden, storage, and Workmate products under the Black & Decker brand. Its reported Barkan activity was a third-party manufacturing and brand-license nexus, not evidence that Stanley Black & Decker owned, controlled, or supplied Keter’s settlement-linked facility.^{8, 18}

No public evidence identified connects Stanley Black & Decker to Israeli defence primes including Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, or IMI/Elbit Land. The audits likewise identify no munitions, weapons-system, missile-defence, aviation, naval, guidance, radar, propulsion, or defence-logistics role.⁴

The 2019 OFAC settlement concerns shipments to Iran through a Chinese subsidiary, not Israel. It documents a sanctions-compliance failure and associated internal-control commitments, but it is not evidence of a Stanley Black & Decker–Israel military nexus and does not alter the Military zero score.^{19, 20}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

A possible challenge is that heavy tools can be used in security, demolition, or infrastructure contexts. The available record establishes only a general commercial product line; it does not establish an Israeli military or occupation-related customer, qualifying use, or end-user result. A material Military reassessment would require documented procurement, delivery, licensing, field use, or a defensible supply-chain connection to an Israeli military or security beneficiary.^{17, 4}

The Keter relationship warrants continued distinction rather than dismissal. Civil-society sources document historic settlement-linked Keter operations and Black & Decker-branded goods, but identify Keter as the relevant operator. The supplied record contains no primary licensing agreement, no evidence of Stanley Black & Decker operational control, and no current independent reassessment of Keter’s status after its reported 2014–2016 exit.^{8, 9}

The audits also found no company-name match in the specified OHCHR settlement-database material or PAX report. Those negative findings are bounded to reviewed materials and should not be treated as proof that no undisclosed relationship exists.^{21, 22}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

The scoring file assigns Digital zero because no audited evidence establishes an Israeli state-security or occupation-related digital beneficiary, qualifying digital result, Israeli hosting or access, or anti-Palestinian digital harm. This absence-only frame governs all three digital criteria.¹

The most substantial historical technology link is AeroScout, an Israeli real-time-location-systems company acquired by Stanley Healthcare in 2012. AeroScout’s documented products processed location and status telemetry from tagged people, equipment, and devices in healthcare and industrial settings; this establishes RTLS capability, not facial recognition, biometric identification, predictive policing, military surveillance, or Israeli security deployment.^{7, 23}

The reviewed deployment material points to customer-controlled or on-premises models in particular installations. Tallahassee Memorial used hospital-network routing and a hospital back-end MobileView installation, while the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs record describes VA-controlled installations and SQL-backed data storage. Those examples do not prove every deployment was on premises, but neither do they establish Israel-based access or hosting.^{24, 25}

AeroScout was divested in July 2022 as part of the sale of Stanley Security and Healthcare to Securitas. The transaction predates the post-2023 events considered in the political frame, and the supplied record contains no evidence that the former business remains part of Stanley Black & Decker’s current portfolio.¹²

Robomow is a consumer robotic-lawnmower business brought into the group through the MTD acquisition. Its current applications permit remote mower control, scheduling, status, and operation-history functions, and developer declarations identify possible collection of certain personal and device-related information. The declarations do not identify infrastructure providers, retention periods, server locations, Israeli administrator access, or provision to an Israeli state or security recipient.^{11, 26}

The group’s current Israeli corporate footprint and past Humavox investment are also insufficient for Digital. The supplied evidence identifies portable-storage R&D and production, an Israeli robotics subsidiary, and a wireless-charging portfolio relationship, but no documented delivery of cyber, cloud, AI, surveillance, digital weapons, or data services to Israeli military, intelligence, settlement, or occupation-related recipients.^{15, 10}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The AeroScout record creates a legitimate data-governance question because RTLS systems can handle personnel and asset location data. The audits do not establish the physical location of all historical databases, backups, analytics systems, cross-border transfers, retention periods, or support-access arrangements during SBD ownership. These gaps require caution but do not establish Israeli-state access, Israeli infrastructure, or harmful deployment.^{24, 25}

The Robomow apps create a separate contemporary privacy question. Google Play declarations are vendor-supplied rather than independently audited data-flow evidence; they leave open questions about hosting, subprocessors, remote diagnostics, and access controls. A material Digital change would require evidence linking a relevant data flow or digital service to an Israeli state-security, occupation, or qualifying harmful beneficiary.²⁶

No public evidence identified of SBD enterprise use of named Israeli cyber vendors, participation in Project Nimbus, Israeli data-centre operations, or a security-sector technology contract. These are public-record findings, not conclusive proof about private vendor relationships or undisclosed systems.^{27, 4}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

Economic is the highest-scoring domain: impact 6.50, magnitude 7.00, and proximity 7.50. The governing evidence is Stanley Black & Decker’s ownership of The Stanley Works Israel Ltd., a current Israeli operating company, rather than a finding that the company trades in settlement goods or provides Israeli state services.^{1, 16}

The identified Israeli operation is a direct corporate asset within the consolidated group. It is described as an R&D centre with plastic-injection and assembly production sites that export portable-storage products globally under several SBD brands. This establishes a continuing operational and economic relationship through corporate ownership, production, employment, and global export activity.^{15, 16}

The magnitude score reflects more than a passive portfolio holding. The record describes an operational manufacturing and R&D footprint, current Israeli subsidiaries, and Israel-related materials sourcing in the FY2025 filing. At the same time, the public record does not disclose Israel-specific revenue, employee count, tax payments, facility-level output, or the economic share of the group attributable to Israel.^{2, 15}

The evidence also identifies Robomow as an Israeli operating asset brought under full SBD ownership through the MTD transaction. Its headquarters and manufacturing location are reported in Pardesiya, within Israel proper rather than a recognized settlement. The record does not establish settlement-related production, state ownership, military procurement, or Israeli sovereign-bond holdings.^{11, 28}

A 2018 Stanley Ventures investment in Tel Aviv-based Humavox provides an additional Israeli capital relationship. Available sources frame it as a minority corporate-venture investment and technology partnership for possible Black+Decker wireless-charging integration; they do not establish control, current investment status, Israeli-state customers, or a security-sector use.^{10, 29}

The historical Keter lead does not serve as the basis for the current Economic score. It is evidence of a separate third-party brand-license relationship, with historic Barkan-linked manufacturing reported as discontinued. The supplied evidence does not establish that SBD owned Keter, directed its location choice, audited its operations, or presently derives economic benefit from Barkan activity.^{8, 9}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The score should not be read as a finding that every Israeli corporate presence is equivalent to settlement activity. The audited operating sites are reported in Rosh Ha’Ayin, Carmiel, Migdal HaEmek, and Pardesiya, while no current SBD facility was identified in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Golan Heights, or Gaza. The score rests on direct ownership of ordinary Israeli operations, not territorial location in occupied territory.^{15, 28}

Public disclosures provide insufficient detail to quantify the economic relationship precisely. No public evidence identified of Israel-specific revenue, profits, tax contribution, workforce, supplier identities, subcontractors, export destinations, or profit-repatriation arrangements. The observation that profits may ultimately flow to the U.S. parent is a structural inference from subsidiary ownership, not a disclosed accounting result.^{16, 2}

The Humavox relationship is particularly uncertain because supplied sources do not verify whether SBD still holds the investment, its ownership percentage, whether integration occurred, or the investment’s present commercial effect. Updated corporate disclosures, facility evidence, and country-level financial reporting could materially refine the magnitude assessment.^{10, 29}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

The Political score is 3.50 for impact, 7.00 for magnitude, and 9.00 for proximity. The scoring file characterizes the relevant mechanism as direct corporate business-as-usual normalization: current wholly owned Israeli operations and ordinary post-2024 Israel-related disclosures, combined with a documented Ukraine response and no comparable Israel/Palestine response.¹

The company’s FY2025 filing references Israel in practical corporate terms: materials sourcing, regional conflict risk, and employee stock-purchase-plan eligibility. These are ordinary corporate disclosures rather than evidence of a formal state partnership, Israeli government counterparty, military relationship, public advocacy effort, or conflict-response programme.²

The political proximity score reflects that the current relationship is direct to the company’s own Israeli operations rather than mediated solely through an investor or distributor. The current subsidiary exhibit confirms group ownership of three Israeli-incorporated entities, but does not establish each entity’s location, functions, customer base, workforce, territorial presence, or links to public authorities.^{14, 2}

The contrast supporting the impact assessment is limited and specific. In 2022, Stanley Black & Decker publicly announced closure of its Russian business, a $1 million contribution split among humanitarian organizations, enhanced employee-donation matching, and a tool donation connected to Ukraine search-and-rescue support. The audits found no comparable public response concerning Gaza or Israel after October 2023.^{13, 30}

Historical Israeli innovation announcements, the 2012 AeroScout acquisition, and the 2018 Humavox investment do not establish an ongoing political partnership. AeroScout exited with the Securitas transaction in 2022, and the present status of Humavox is not established in the supplied record.^{12, 10}

No public evidence identified of SBD lobbying on Israel-Palestine policy or anti-BDS measures, PAC activity supporting Israel-specific candidates or advocacy, donations to Israeli military-welfare or settlement organizations, state honors, Brand Israel campaigns, or executive leadership roles in named geopolitical advocacy organizations.^{31, 32}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The absence of a public Israel/Palestine statement is not, by itself, evidence of endorsement, intent, or a political programme. The political score is an examiner-adjudicated assessment of business-as-usual normalization under the stated rubric; it should not be presented as proof of support for Israeli state policy or military conduct.¹

The comparison with the Ukraine response is informative but incomplete. Companies may respond differently to conflicts for reasons not captured in public materials, and the record does not identify internal deliberations, legal assessments, employee discussions, private charitable activity, or undisclosed policies. A stronger political finding would require evidence of direct advocacy, state collaboration, political financing, suppression, or a conflict-specific policy decision.^{13, 2}

The historical Keter co-branding controversy is not evidence of a present political relationship. Supplied reporting identifies historic Barkan activity and subsequent cessation, while current SEC disclosures do not establish SBD operations at Barkan or Oranit. The parent company also was not identified in the reviewed OHCHR settlement-database updates.^{8, 9}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Cross-Domain Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The dossier separates four distinct questions. Current Israeli ownership and ordinary operations support the Economic and Political analyses, but do not convert into evidence of military supply or qualifying digital involvement. The score file expressly requires a documented qualifying result for Military and Digital, and general Israeli association is insufficient.¹

Several findings depend on corporate disclosures, company LinkedIn material, commercial directories, trade reporting, and civil-society documentation. These sources vary in authority and temporal reliability. In particular, the historical Keter material is indirect to Stanley Black & Decker, and the supplied record lacks a primary license agreement or evidence of SBD operational control.^{8, 18}

The review is public-record bounded. It cannot resolve private contracts, non-public end-user agreements, confidential corporate data flows, internal human-rights reviews, undisclosed charitable activity, or subsequent changes after the cited filings. “No public evidence identified” should be understood as an evidence limit, not proof of absence.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

BDS-1000 Score

The validated BDS-1000 score is 561, producing Tier C: Substantial Complicity. Economic is the maximum domain score. The low Political impact score is confined to the rubric’s business-as-usual normalization frame; the audit did not substantiate state partnership, political financing, suppression, or advocacy bands.¹

Confidence, Limits, and Open Questions

Confidence is highest for the existence of current Israeli subsidiaries, the current filing’s Israel-related sourcing disclosure, the 2022 Securitas divestment, and the historical AeroScout acquisition. Confidence is lower for the current status and operational details of individual Israeli facilities, the present Humavox relationship, all historical AeroScout data arrangements, and the precise terms of the Keter license.^{2, 14}

Open questions include: the identities and locations of Israeli suppliers; country-level revenue, profit, tax, employment, and production data; functions of K.And.M. Holdco Products Ltd.; whether SBD retains any Humavox interest; any current data-hosting or support access associated with Robomow; and whether any current third-party license arrangement includes territorial compliance requirements.

No public evidence identified of a current SBD facility in occupied territory, Israeli military or state-security procurement, Israeli state digital access, or Israel/Palestine-specific political advocacy. These negative findings remain limited to the supplied and reviewed public evidence.^{4, 27}

Recommended Actions

1. Seek a public, independently verifiable country-level account of SBD’s Israeli subsidiaries, facilities, workforce, sourcing, revenues, and territorial due-diligence procedures. This would most directly test the Economic basis and unresolved magnitude questions.

2. Request confirmation that SBD has no current facilities, manufacturing, subcontracting, or licensed production in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Golan Heights, or Gaza, including through brand-licensees. This addresses the historic Keter-related uncertainty without attributing Keter’s conduct to SBD.^{8, 9}

3. Request disclosure of Robomow data architecture, including hosting locations, subprocessors, access controls, retention, and remote-support arrangements. Current app-store declarations leave these questions unresolved, though no qualifying Digital nexus was established.²⁶

4. Request a conflict-specific human-rights and supply-chain due-diligence statement covering Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory. The company’s general human-rights framework does not identify an Israel/Palestine-specific assessment in the supplied record.³⁴

5. Preserve the present Military and Digital zero findings unless new documentary evidence identifies a qualifying military, security, occupation-related digital beneficiary, result, or data-access pathway. General corporate presence should not be used to inflate those domain scores.¹