Uber DIGITAL

Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships

• Uber Technologies, Inc. is a Delaware-incorporated SEC registrant whose 2025 Form 10-K describes proprietary mobility, delivery, and logistics applications available in more than 70 countries as of 31 December 2025.¹

• Uber Engineering described a 2023 production environment comprising 4,500 services across four clouds, hundreds of thousands of hosts, and leased data centres.²

• Data Center Dynamics reported that Uber entered seven-year agreements with Google and Oracle in 2023 covering Google Cloud, Google Maps routing, Google Ads, Oracle cloud ERP, and Oracle database products for Uber Freight; the current operational status of those agreements was not independently confirmed in the reviewed material.³

• The reported Google and Oracle relationships are material cloud, mapping, advertising, ERP, and database relationships, but the cited reporting does not identify either provider as an Israeli-origin vendor.³

• No public evidence identified that Uber still deploys SentinelOne as of September 2026, or that establishes its current functions, coverage, duration, contract terms, renewal history, data-retention configuration, or operational criticality.^{4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}

• September 2022 incident reporting identified an allegedly accessed SentinelOne EDR dashboard as used by Uber, while a contemporaneous KPMG threat-notification report listed SentinelOne’s incident-response portal among internal systems shown in breach screenshots.^{4, 5}

• Uber’s 19 September 2022 security update confirmed compromise of internal tools after contractor credentials were stolen, but did not name SentinelOne or identify it as a deployed control.⁹

• The SentinelOne evidence supports a 2022 enterprise-security relationship involving endpoint detection and response and incident-response access, but not its start date, subscription term, endpoint or cloud-workload coverage, geographic footprint, criticality, data flows, or post-2022 continuation.^{4, 5, 9}

• SentinelOne describes its platform generically as subscription-based and capable of endpoint, cloud-workload, identity, and telemetry functions, but its public disclosures and customer page do not name Uber; those generic capabilities and the customer-page omission do not establish what Uber licensed, whether Uber remains a customer, or whether any deployment was operationally critical.^{6, 7, 8}

• A contemporaneous Uber security-engineering job listing referred to CrowdStrike and SentinelOne only as examples of EDR-framework expertise and subsequently redirected; it is not durable evidence of procurement or current deployment.^{6, 7}

• No public evidence identified of Uber licensing, subscribing to, or integrating Check Point, Wiz, CyberArk, NICE, Verint, Claroty, Palo Alto Networks, or the other named Israeli-origin enterprise or security products examined.^{10, 2, 11}

• Uber’s 2023 annual report states that it conducts third-party due diligence and applies cybersecurity and data-handling requirements to suppliers that process Uber personal data, but does not identify a systems integrator deploying Israeli-origin technology for Uber.¹¹

• No public evidence identified of a major systems integrator publicly stating that it deployed Israeli-origin technology for Uber.¹¹

• Uber’s 2026 proxy discloses that director Nikesh Arora has served as Chair and CEO of Palo Alto Networks since 2018, but this board affiliation does not establish an Uber procurement, supplier, data-sharing, Israeli operational, or individual Israeli-investment relationship.^{10, 12}

Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology

• Uber’s rider privacy notice, updated 1 September 2026, states that Uber may collect biometric information generated through facial-verification technology, including identity-document information, selfies, and facial-verification information, for account verification, age verification, or fraud prevention.¹³

• The notice also describes collection of precise and approximate location, trip or order information, payment data, device information, communications content including recordings, transcripts and chat logs, and in-vehicle video or audio for autonomous-vehicle rides.¹³

• Uber’s privacy notice states that it uses data for research and development, including machine-learning-model training, and describes automated matching, pricing, and fraud processes.¹³

• No public evidence identified that Uber uses Israeli-origin facial-recognition, biometric-identification, gait-analysis, retail-analytics, predictive-policing, sentiment-analysis, social-media-monitoring, or workforce-surveillance products, including Trigo, BriefCam, AnyVision/Oosto, or Trax.^{2, 11, 13}

• No public evidence identified that such capabilities reach Uber through a named managed-security provider or bundled enterprise suite; the 2022 SentinelOne evidence concerns endpoint security rather than facial recognition, behavioural surveillance, or retail technology.^{4, 5}

• Uber’s May 2015 Israel announcement described app-based pickup-location entry, driver and vehicle details, trip-location and ETA sharing, and card-on-file payment, documenting historic collection or processing of location, contact, and payment-related information in that service.¹⁴

• The historic announcement does not identify where that information was stored or processed, whether the service remained active, or whether it involved facial-verification technology.¹⁴

Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation

• Uber’s public infrastructure materials confirm use of cloud and leased-data-centre infrastructure, while not disclosing data-centre locations.^{2, 3}

• Uber’s current privacy notice states that it operates and processes user data globally, including on Uber servers in the United States, and may transfer or enable access globally for service provision, account access, customer support, and government or law-enforcement information requests.¹³

• Uber’s 2025 Form 10-K also identifies potential disclosures in response to government, law-enforcement, and intelligence-agency demands, without identifying Israeli storage, routing, controllers, processors, or access.¹

• The notice identifies Uber Technologies, Inc. as global data controller except specified joint-controller arrangements involving entities in Mexico, the EEA/UK/Switzerland, South Korea, and Türkiye; it does not name the Israeli entity as a data controller.¹³

• Uber maintains an Israel-jurisdiction legal portal with Israel-localised privacy, third-party-request, mobility, delivery, and business-document links, but the portal does not disclose data residency, processing, storage, data-centre location, government access, or an Israeli cloud provider.¹⁵

• No public evidence identified that Uber workloads, personal data, or cloud tenancy are stored, routed, processed, or legally accessible through Israeli-controlled infrastructure.^{2, 3, 15, 13}

• No public evidence identified that Uber operates, leases, or co-locates a data centre in Israel.^{2, 3}

• Israel’s Ministry of Finance states that Project Nimbus local cloud zones process and store information within Israel and that Google was the first provider to activate a local zone in October 2022.¹⁶

• The cited Project Nimbus release does not identify Uber as a participant, contractor, customer, or subcontractor; Uber’s reported Google Cloud relationship therefore does not establish use of Nimbus or a Google Israel region.^{3, 16}

• No public evidence identified that Uber provides sovereign-cloud, data-residency, resilience, or digital-sovereignty services to Israeli state institutions or military bodies.^{11, 16, 17}

• Uber’s AV Labs statement says that it deploys hundreds of sensor-equipped vehicles collecting millions of miles of high-fidelity driving data monthly for AV partners generally, but it does not name Autobrains, identify any transfer of data to Autobrains, or identify Israeli storage, access, or processing.¹⁸

• No public evidence identified that Uber personal data, AV-sensor data, drone telemetry, model-training data, or relationship-specific technical support under the Autobrains or Flytrex collaborations is processed in Israel or legally accessible through an Israeli entity or Israeli-controlled infrastructure.^{13, 19, 20, 21, 22, 18, 23}

Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships

• No public evidence identified of a contract, tender award, partnership, or service agreement between Uber and the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israeli intelligence agencies, another Israeli security body, or settlement entities.^{11, 16, 17, 24}

• Israel’s Ministry of Defense states that its Applications and Technology Department operates defence-establishment IT and communications infrastructure, data centres, internal networks, and a dynamic-tender platform; the department page does not name Uber as a supplier, contractor, customer, or partner.¹⁷

• The Ministry of Defense vendor portal provides authenticated routes for RFPs, orders, invoices, supplier registration, and procurement inquiries, but its publicly visible landing page does not identify Uber or Flytrex as a supplier, order recipient, or tender participant; this is not a comprehensive tender-search result.²⁴

• No public evidence identified that Uber technology has been documented as deployed by Israeli military, intelligence, or law-enforcement bodies for surveillance in Israel or the occupied Palestinian territory.^{11, 17}

• No public evidence identified of Uber developing, selling, licensing, or maintaining offensive-cyber capabilities, exploit tools, or digital weapons for Israeli state actors.^{11, 17}

• ICIJ’s Uber Files reporting states that Uber executives held private meetings with at least six world leaders, including then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, during Uber’s 2013–2017 global expansion period.²⁵

• The cited ICIJ account does not specify the purpose of the Netanyahu meeting or identify a resulting technology, data, defence, intelligence, cloud, procurement, or settlement arrangement.²⁵

• Autobrains’ leadership page states that founder and CEO Igal Raichelgauz began his career in “elite military intelligence,” and that SVP R&D Adam Harel previously served in an “elite intelligence unit” in the IDF; the page does not identify Unit 8200, a specific military body, a defence contract, or a military-technology transfer.²⁰

• The IDF describes Unit 8200 as the Military Intelligence Directorate’s principal information-gathering unit and states that it develops and uses information-gathering tools and processes collected information; this general description does not identify Autobrains, Flytrex, Raichelgauz, Harel, or Uber.²⁶

• A 2021 CTech interview reported that Flytrex co-founder and CEO Yariv Bash served as a fighter in an IDF special-forces unit in the artillery corps; it does not identify Unit 8200, a defence-sector position, a military customer, or a connection between that service and Flytrex technology supplied through the Uber relationship.²⁷

• No public evidence identified that the specific Autobrains autonomous-driving technology integrated by Uber, or the Flytrex drone-delivery technology subject to Uber’s partnership, derives from Unit 8200, an Israeli defence programme, or a military-technology transfer.^{19, 20, 21, 22, 18, 26, 27}

• No public evidence identified of post-19 July 2024 or post-November 2024 continuation of technology provision by Uber to Israeli state, military, intelligence, or settlement entities.^{17, 19, 21, 18, 23}

AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems

• On 1 June 2026, Uber, Autobrains, and NVIDIA announced a strategic collaboration, pending regulatory approval, to launch a Munich robotaxi programme combining Autobrains’ agentic autonomous-driving technology, NVIDIA DRIVE Hyperion Level 4 robotaxi platform, and Uber’s ride-hailing platform, marketplace access, and operational capabilities.¹⁹

• Uber describes Autobrains’ contribution as decision-making software that decomposes driving into specialised agents operating in real time, and states that the programme is designed to integrate across vehicle platforms within Uber’s ride-hailing ecosystem.¹⁹

• Uber’s announcement does not disclose source-code licensing terms, payment terms, contract duration, exclusivity, source-code access, API specifications, technical-support allocation, vehicle or fleet numbers, vehicle manufacturer, model-training inputs, data-access rights, data-hosting or processing locations, or which party operates the autonomous-driving stack.¹⁹

• IAA Mobility and Euronews described the Munich initiative as a planned test or concept, reporting that manufacturers, fleet size, and passenger-service timing had not been disclosed.^{28, 29}

• Uber’s August 2026 prepared remarks refer to “new deployments across Europe with Autobrains and WeRide,” but do not distinguish the two partners, identify an operating city beyond the separately announced Munich programme, establish completed regulatory approval, identify operating hours, passenger trips, vehicle numbers, or establish that an Autobrains passenger service had begun.¹⁸

• No public evidence identified, in the reviewed primary and reliable contemporaneous sources, that passenger robotaxi operations using Autobrains had commenced by September 2026; the public record establishes an announced, approval-contingent Munich programme and Uber’s later general reference to European deployments, but not operational service or scale.^{19, 18, 28, 29}

• Autobrains describes itself as founded and headquartered in Tel Aviv and as developing autonomous-driving AI, with Israeli engineers, neuroscientists, machine-learning experts, academics, automotive-industry personnel, and a demo fleet testing its AI technology on roads.²⁰

• Autobrains also identifies Munich as its second headquarters, supporting European demo-fleet development, testing, and validation; it does not allocate development, model-training, support, testing, or data-processing tasks between Munich and Tel Aviv.²⁰

• The available records do not establish that Autobrains’ Israeli team performs particular work for Uber’s Munich programme, receives Uber, vehicle, or rider data, hosts Uber-related systems in Israel, or has Israeli legal access to Uber data.^{19, 20, 18}

• On 18 September 2025, Uber announced a strategic partnership with Flytrex and an investment it described as Uber’s first investment in drone-delivery technology, intended initially to integrate Flytrex’s autonomous delivery system with Uber Eats in United States pilot markets.²¹

• Uber described the intended result as a fully integrated end-to-end Uber Eats experience combining Flytrex’s autonomous system with Uber’s platform and logistics capabilities.²¹

• AP identifies Flytrex as Tel Aviv-based, while CTech reported a company-official statement that Flytrex then had 50 employees in Israel and 20 in the United States and aimed to double headcount following Uber’s investment; the staffing information is reporting on an executive statement rather than a primary staffing disclosure.^{22, 30}

• Neither the AP or CTech materials attributes a particular Uber engineering, operations, data-processing, support, remote-piloting, model-development, or drone-control function to Israel.^{22, 30}

• No public evidence identified of an Israeli data-processing, remote-piloting, engineering-support, model-development, or R&D function specifically serving Uber under the Flytrex relationship.^{21, 22, 30, 23}

• Uber said that United States Flytrex pilot markets were expected by the end of 2025, while AP reported that the pilot markets had not been named and that financial details were undisclosed.^{21, 22}

• Flytrex’s reported pre-existing scale of more than 200,000 United States deliveries and FAA beyond-visual-line-of-sight authorisation is a company capability anchor, rather than a measure of Uber work, Uber Eats deliveries, or Uber-funded operations.^{21, 22}

• In an August 2026 newsletter, Axios reported that Uber “already” had a Flytrex drone partnership in Dallas; this is the strongest retrieved post-announcement indication of ongoing Uber–Flytrex activity, but it does not disclose a launch date, delivery count, customer coverage, equity percentage, contract duration, operational control, or Israeli involvement.²³

• CTech reported an estimated Flytrex investment of “tens of millions” of dollars while quoting its executive chair as calling the investment “very significant”; Uber’s and AP’s disclosures do not confirm an amount, so the estimate is not treated as verified.^{22, 30}

• Uber’s August 2026 remarks state that AVs were live on Uber in seven cities and that partners had committed approximately 120,000 vehicles over coming years, but the remarks do not allocate either figure to Autobrains and neither is an Autobrains deployment measure.¹⁸

• The verified Autobrains scale anchors are the announced integration of Agentic AI, NVIDIA DRIVE Hyperion, and Uber’s platform and operations, with Munich as the first proposed city; public sources do not disclose fleet size, OEM, passenger trips, contract duration, commercial terms, technical dependency, exclusivity, or an operational launch date.^{19, 28, 29}

• The verified Flytrex anchors are the strategic partnership, Uber’s investment, and intended United States Uber Eats integration; public disclosures do not establish the investment size, equity percentage, duration, pilot locations, launch date, Uber Eats delivery volume, technical dependency, or material operational scale.^{21, 22, 23}

• The Autobrains and Flytrex relationships post-date 19 July 2024 and November 2024, but the retrieved records identify a planned Munich civilian robotaxi programme and United States civilian food-delivery activity rather than Israeli state, military, intelligence, settlement, or occupied-territory activity.^{19, 21, 22, 18, 28, 29, 23}

• In August 2026, AP reported that Dutch regulators imposed an €825 million fine concerning Uber’s historical automated driver-account suspensions during 2018–2022; Uber stated that it would appeal and that the historic policies had been discontinued.³¹

• The reported Dutch regulatory matter concerns algorithmic governance and is not evidence of an Israel-related technology relationship.³¹

• No public evidence identified that Uber provides AI or ML, computer vision, autonomous decision-support, target-generation, automated threat-detection, autonomous-tracking, fire-control, or other systems designed primarily for kinetic targeting or weapons effects to Israeli state, military, or security bodies.^{11, 16, 17, 13}

• No public evidence identified that Uber AI models have been trained on, or afforded access to, civilian, communications, intercepted-communications, or surveillance-derived data from Israel or the occupied Palestinian territory.^{2, 11, 13}

Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint

• Uber’s 2025 SEC subsidiary exhibit lists subsidiaries in the United States, Singapore, and the Netherlands, but no Israeli-incorporated subsidiary appears in that exhibit; the exhibit is not a complete country-by-country corporate-register extract and cannot establish that no Israeli entity exists.^{32, 33}

• A 2019 SEC subsidiary exhibit listed Uber Technologies Systems Israel Ltd. in Israel; the difference from the 2025 exhibit does not establish dissolution, exit, ownership change, or current functions.^{34, 32}

• A business-registry mirror lists UBER TECHNOLOGIES SYSTEMS ISRAEL LTD as an active Israeli private company incorporated on 27 March 2014, with a Tel Aviv address and a 2024 annual filing.³⁵

• A second secondary registry presentation identifies Uber International Holding B.V. as a shareholder, but neither secondary record establishes the entity’s present functions, staffing, ownership percentage, directors, or operational scope.^{36, 37}

• The Israeli Corporations Authority confirms that basic company information and paid full extracts are available through its registry service, but the retrieved official page did not supply an entity-specific extract for company no. 515048254.³⁸

• Uber’s official Israel newsroom announced a Jerusalem taxi-service rollout in May 2015.¹⁴

• A 2015 Knesset research report records Uber’s statement that its then-current Israeli service used taxis and transportation companies rather than UberX or private vehicles, and identifies the Director General of “Uber Technologies Systems Israel Ltd.”³⁹

• Uber’s current Israel legal portal provides evidence of an Israel-specific legal and compliance web presence, while an Israel driver-support page states that Uber is “not currently available in your location”; neither source establishes current ride availability, staffing, engineering activity, data processing, or R&D in Israel.^{15, 40}

• No public evidence identified in the reviewed corporate and official records of a current Uber-operated Israeli office, engineering site, R&D centre, data centre, headcount, innovation lab, accelerator, or material technology-development programme.^{14, 35, 39, 15, 38, 36}

• The reliable evidence establishes historic Israeli legal-entity and service activity, current secondary evidence of an active entity, and a current Israel-jurisdiction legal interface; none establishes R&D or the entity’s material operational scope.^{14, 35, 39, 15, 36}

• Autobrains’ public disclosure establishes a Tel Aviv headquarters with engineering, machine-learning, and demo-fleet functions, but the Uber–Autobrains relationship does not publicly allocate Uber programme work to that Israeli footprint.^{19, 20}

• No public evidence identified of an Uber acquisition of an Israeli technology company, strategic investment in an Israeli venture fund or startup, or material patent, licensing, or co-development arrangement with an Israeli research institution; the Autobrains collaboration and Flytrex investment are disclosed technology relationships, not acquisitions or Israeli research-institution arrangements.^{1, 11, 19, 20, 21}

• Uber’s 2026 proxy identifies Ronald Sugar as independent chairperson and Dara Khosrowshahi as CEO and director, and lists Vanguard, BlackRock, and Capital Research Global Investors as greater-than-5% holders as of 2 March 2026; no listed beneficial owner held 10% or more and officers and directors as a group held 3.81%.¹⁰

• Targeted searches of the listed leadership and principal-holder names did not identify a primary filing, company announcement, or other reliable public record establishing an equity stake, personal or family-office investment, or board role in a named Israeli surveillance, cyber, AI, SIGINT, or military-technology firm beyond Arora’s Palo Alto Networks role; this is a bounded public-record finding, not a comprehensive investigation of private investments.^{10, 12}

Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History

• The supplied deterministic full-text scan found no Uber mention in the 2023 OHCHR settlement-business database, OHCHR’s 2025 update, the UN Special Rapporteur report A/HRC/59/23, or the specified NGO-report set, including the named DBIO, BDS, Amnesty, HRW, Al-Haq, PAX, KLP, Who Profits, AFSC-related, and related reports.^{41, 42, 43}

• These findings are document-scoped and do not establish Uber’s absence from each organisation’s live database, every edition, tender system, patent registry, regulatory proceeding, or other unreviewed record.^{41, 42, 43}

• No public evidence identified of a current Uber service location in an Israeli settlement or elsewhere in occupied Palestinian territory; Uber’s current Israel legal portal does not provide a service-area list.¹⁵

• The Israel legal portal and secondary active-company record were accessible after 19 July 2024 and November 2024, but do not identify settlement operations, state customers, Israeli data hosting, or another occupation-related technology arrangement; no constructive-notice finding follows from these records alone.^{35, 15}

• ICIJ’s Uber Files source does not support the foregoing UN, OHCHR, or NGO document-scoped absence findings; it supports only historical reporting on Uber’s global lobbying, regulatory-evasion practices, and expansion, including the 2013–2017 Netanyahu meeting.²⁵

• No public evidence identified of an organised boycott, divestment, or sanctions campaign specifically directed at Uber’s technology provision to Israeli state bodies or occupied-territory operations, or of a documented company response to such a campaign.^{41, 42, 43}

• No public evidence identified of a published NGO or UN finding specifically addressing Uber’s technology provision to Israeli state bodies or operations in occupied territory.^{41, 42, 43}

• No public evidence identified of technology-specific sanctions, export-control, regulatory, or legal proceedings concerning Uber technology sales or services to Israeli state entities.^{11, 16, 17, 24}