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AMD MILITARY

MILITARY AUDIT UPDATED 2026-07-10
Military Score 2.09 /10 C AMD - BDS-1000 412
Military 2.09

Evidence-only forensic audit. Scoring happens downstream - see the main dossier for the composite assessment.

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Military Audit: AMD

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

The Israeli Ministry of Defense (IMOD) publicly documents large-scale, multi-billion-dollar production contracts with domestic prime contractors such as Rafael for systems including Iron Dome, illustrating that IMOD’s known contracting activity is generally visible and traceable when it occurs 1. AMD’s only confirmed corporate presence inside Israel consists of civilian chip-design operations: a subsidiary, “AMD Advanced Micro Devices Israel Ltd” (company no. 513515247), incorporated in 2004 and recorded in the Israeli company registry with status “voluntarily eliminated” 2, and a separate research-and-development center established in 2011 in Ramat Gan/Tel Aviv following AMD’s acquisition of Graphic Remedy 34. Israel’s broader defense-technology ecosystem - including MAFAT-led military innovation efforts 5 and the historic roots of Intel’s and AMD’s Israeli R&D presence in the country’s semiconductor industry 6 - is well documented, but no source reviewed places AMD within IMOD’s direct-contracting or procurement ecosystem specifically. No public evidence identified of any direct contract, tender award, or memorandum of understanding between AMD and Israel’s Ministry of Defence, the IDF, the Israel Prison Service, or the Israel Border Police. No public evidence identified of an AMD or Xilinx listing in Israel’s SIBAT defence-export and procurement directory. No public evidence identified of AMD press releases or official company statements announcing defence cooperation with any Israeli governmental or security entity.

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

AMD, through its 2022 acquisition of Xilinx, manufactures and markets defense-grade/mil-spec FPGA and adaptive SoC product lines - including Virtex-7Q, Artix-7 XQ, Kintex UltraScale+ XQ, and Versal - explicitly marketed worldwide for “missiles and munitions systems, avionics, milcomms, Electronic Warfare (EW), and Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR)” applications, with qualification to military reliability standards such as Mil-Std-883 Group D 7891011121314. This marketing material is generic and global in scope; no source distinguishes an Israel-specific, contract-modified, or purpose-built variant of these defense-grade FPGAs sold to Israeli security forces 78.

A documented dual-use export-control dispute connects AMD hardware to Israel via a third-party reseller: in February 2020, Israeli customs seized two shipments of AMD graphics processors (described as an older, circa-2011 model) from CNG Labs, a computer store in Kiryat Shmona - one shipment of 100 units bound for the Netherlands and another for California - on the position that the processors were dual-use and could support civilian or military applications such as drones or advanced computer systems where exclusive civilian end-use could not be guaranteed 15. On 27 March 2023, the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security added CNG to its “unverified list,” restricting U.S. companies’ ability to transact with it 15. This is a case of an AMD product entering an export-control dispute through an Israeli reseller rather than a direct AMD transaction with an Israeli military end-user; AMD itself was not named as a subject of the enforcement action 15.

No public evidence identified of end-user certificates or export-licence applications specifically naming AMD products destined for Israeli defence or security end-users.

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

No public evidence identified. AMD is a fabless semiconductor design company with no heavy-machinery, construction-equipment, or vehicle-manufacturing business line, and no reports, NGO investigations, or UN documentation reviewed link AMD products or corporate activity to settlement construction, demolition, checkpoint infrastructure, or the separation barrier.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

No public evidence identified of a verified, named supply relationship between AMD/Xilinx and Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, or Israel Military Industries. IAI’s ELM-2084 multi-mission radar, the fire-control radar associated with the Iron Dome and David’s Sling systems, does not carry a publicly disclosed processor or chip-supplier attribution in IAI’s own product materials or in secondary reporting reviewed 16. Rafael’s SPIKE precision-guided tactical missile family is described as using guidance and seeker electronics produced in-house or through the Rafael/Diehl/Rheinmetall EuroSpike partnership, with no AMD/Xilinx component attribution identified 17. Elbit Systems is described, in company materials reviewed via its Who Profits profile, as a vertically integrated manufacturer designing most of its components in-house, with no third-party semiconductor supplier named 18.

Xilinx FPGAs are a documented component of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter’s avionics - including communication/navigation/IFF and software-defined radio subsystems - supplied to prime contractor Lockheed Martin, with a reported contract covering allied air forces including Italy, Turkey, Australia, Norway, the UK, the Netherlands, and Denmark 1920. Israel operates the F-35 (“Adir”) under a separate Foreign Military Sale arrangement, but no source reviewed breaks out an Israel-specific allocation of Xilinx FPGA units; this is a multi-tier relationship (AMD/Xilinx to Lockheed Martin to global F-35 operators, of which Israel is one) rather than a direct AMD–Israel relationship, and is flagged as indirect and unverified for Israel specifically 1920.

Israeli semiconductor startup Kameleon partnered with Xilinx, prior to the AMD acquisition, to co-develop a hardware cybersecurity “proactive security” processor; this is a civilian cybersecurity collaboration with no documented kinetic or targeting application 21.

No public evidence identified of joint development, co-production, or technology-transfer agreements between AMD/Xilinx and any Israeli defence prime.

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

No public evidence identified. AMD is a semiconductor design company with no service-contracting business line such as catering, transport, fuel supply, facilities management, or telecommunications services, and no sources reviewed indicate any AMD service contract with IDF bases, training facilities, or detention centers in the West Bank, Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, or the Negev. No public evidence identified of AMD involvement in shipping, freight, or port-handling contracts servicing Israeli military cargo.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

No public evidence identified that AMD is a prime contractor or licensed manufacturer of small arms, artillery, armoured vehicles, tactical drones, or naval vessels supplied to Israeli forces, and No public evidence identified of AMD supply of ammunition, explosive ordnance, or munitions precursor materials to Israel.

No public evidence identified of a verified AMD/Xilinx role in the Iron Dome, David’s Sling, or Arrow missile-defense systems, Israeli fighter aircraft, main battle tanks, or naval vessels. Xilinx defense-grade FPGAs are marketed generically worldwide for missile, munitions, radar, and electronic-warfare applications 7813, and teardown investigations have identified Xilinx components inside Russian Lancet kamikaze drones and Iranian-designed Shahed-136/Mohajer-6 drones used against Ukraine, evidencing that Xilinx components proliferate into weapons systems through secondary and uncontrolled distribution channels globally 22232425. No equivalent Israel-specific teardown or procurement evidence linking Xilinx/AMD components to an Israeli strategic platform was identified.

No public evidence identified of AMD component supply for guidance electronics, fire-control systems, radar components, propulsion systems, or warhead casings for any Israeli strategic platform.

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

No public evidence identified of any government decision to grant, deny, suspend, or revoke an export licence for AMD products specifically destined for Israeli military or security end-users.

The one documented export-control-adjacent event involving AMD hardware in Israel is the CNG Labs case described above: a February 2020 Israeli customs seizure of AMD GPU shipments, followed by the U.S. Commerce Department’s addition of CNG to its unverified list on 27 March 2023 - an Israeli domestic customs/export-control matter involving a reseller of AMD products, not a licensing action against AMD itself 15.

Israel sits within U.S. Export Administration Regulations Country Groups B/D:4/A:6 and is explicitly excluded from the most restrictive semiconductor-specific country groupings applied to broader U.S. advanced-computing export controls 26. AMD maintains a general regulatory trade-compliance disclosure page, but no Israel-specific licensing determinations are published there 27. Separately, Israeli officials have publicly discussed accelerating procurement of AI chips ahead of tightened U.S. export rules, indicating Israeli-government attention to U.S. semiconductor export policy generally, though no AMD-specific procurement action was identified in that coverage 28.

No public evidence identified of court proceedings, judicial reviews, or OECD National Contact Point complaints against AMD regarding Israel-related defence supply.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

The 2025 OHCHR settlement-business database (A/HRC/60/19) lists 158 enterprises across 11 countries, up from 97 in the prior 2023 update, naming companies such as Motorola Solutions Israel, Bezeq, Bank Leumi, Mekorot, Fosun International, Grupo ACS, Altice Group, and Booking.com; AMD and Xilinx do not appear on this list 2930. The database’s scope centers on construction, real estate, natural-resource use, banking/finance, and settlement-servicing telecommunications - a different activity profile from AMD’s semiconductor design business 30.

The UN Special Rapporteur’s July 2025 report “From economy of occupation to economy of genocide” (A/HRC/59/23) discusses technology-sector complicity primarily through Microsoft, Alphabet/Google, and Amazon in connection with cloud and AI infrastructure integrated into Israeli military and prison systems; no reference to AMD, Xilinx, or semiconductor manufacturers was found in available secondary coverage of the report’s named-company sections 31. Al Jazeera’s coverage of the UN report’s list of companies described as complicit in the conflict likewise does not name AMD 32.

The Business & Human Rights Resource Centre’s “Switched off” briefing invited more than 100 technology companies operating in Israel/the Occupied Palestinian Territories to respond on human-rights due diligence, with only Ericsson, Hewlett Packard Enterprise, TikTok, and Meta responding in detail; AMD is not listed among the surveyed companies 33.

Wikipedia’s “List of companies involved in the Gaza war,” an aggregator of NGO and press sourcing, names more than 60 companies including Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, IBM, Palantir, Lockheed Martin, Leonardo, Elbit Systems, and major institutional shareholders such as BlackRock and Vanguard; AMD is not named in the version reviewed 34.

The Who Profits research database returned a retrievable profile for Elbit Systems but no dedicated AMD or Xilinx company profile 18. No public evidence identified of an organized boycott or divestment campaign specifically targeting AMD’s defence-sector activities.

No public evidence identified of an AMD shareholder resolution on Israel/Gaza in the 2024 or 2025 proxy season; the Anti-Defamation League’s 2023 shareholder-proposal roundup and Times of Israel coverage of “longshot” Israel-related shareholder proposals name other companies including Caterpillar, Amazon, PayPal, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, and Intel, but not AMD 3536. AMD’s FY2025 SEC proxy statement was reviewed for board and governance context; no AMD board member, executive officer, or disclosed large shareholder was found to hold a defence-board role, Israeli defence-industry directorship, FIDF or reservist-fund donation record, equity stake in an Israeli defence prime, or public co-belligerency statement 37.

No public evidence identified of AMD public statements, policy changes, or end-use monitoring commitments issued in response to civil-society pressure regarding Israel or Gaza. AMD does not appear in the OHCHR settlement-business database or in the Who Profits settlement-reseller documentation reviewed, and No public evidence identified of AMD or its distributors/resellers operating from, or supplying, West Bank, East Jerusalem, or Golan Heights settlements 3018.

End Notes

Footnotes

  1. https://mod.gov.il/en/press-releases/press-room/israel-mod-signs-multi-billion-dollar-contract-with-rafael-to-expand-serial-production-of-iron-dome-system ↩

  2. https://en.checkid.co.il/company/AMD+ADVANCED+MICRO+DEVICES+ISRAEL+LTD-k8OaX48-513515247 ↩

  3. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/2011-06-01/ty-article/chip-giant-amd-establishing-r-d-center-in-ramat-gan/0000017f-e710-d62c-a1ff-ff7bf7710000 ↩

  4. https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-1000651071 ↩

  5. https://www.jpost.com/defense-and-tech/article-881440 ↩

  6. https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/h1mqgmtykx ↩

  7. https://www.xilinx.com/applications/aerospace-and-defense.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  8. https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/products/adaptive-socs-and-fpgas/fpga/7-series/7-series-defense-grade-fpgas-product-brief.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  9. https://www.xilinx.com/products/silicon-devices/fpga/virtex-7q.html ↩

  10. https://www.amd.com/en/products/adaptive-socs-and-fpgas/fpga/artix-7-xq.html ↩

  11. https://newwavedesign.com/blog/amd-versal-fpga-militarys-secret-weapon/ ↩

  12. https://www.xilinx.com/content/dam/xilinx/publications/product-briefs/aerospace-defense-product-brief.pdf ↩

  13. https://militaryembedded.com/radar-ew/signal-processing/fourth-gen-secure-architecture-for-defense-grade-fpgas-and-socs-released-by-xilinx ↩ ↩2

  14. https://www.avnet.com/americas/products/cp/defense-and-aerospace/xilinx/ ↩

  15. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/security-aviation/2023-03-27/ty-article/red-flag-the-strange-case-of-an-israeli-computer-lab-flagged-by-the-u-s/00000187-1dc8-d7c4-ab8f-fdee9b040000 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  16. https://www.iai.co.il/p/elm-2084-ms-mmr ↩

  17. https://www.rafael.co.il/worlds/land/spike-5th-gen-precision-guided-tactical-missiles/ ↩

  18. https://www.whoprofits.org/companies/company/3794 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  19. https://www.militaryaerospace.com/commercial-aerospace/article/14227038/tens-of-thousands-of-xilinx-fpgas-to-be-supplied-by-lockheed-martin-for-f-35-joint-strike-fighter-avionics ↩ ↩2

  20. https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2013/06/10/lockheed-awarded-105-million-to-buy-parts-from-xil.aspx ↩ ↩2

  21. https://www.calcalistech.com/ctech/articles/0,7340,L-3870610,00.html ↩

  22. https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/downed-russian-drone-used-at-least-30-chips-from-western-companies-silicon-from-xilinx-ti-marvell-micron-and-others-found-in-the-wreckage ↩

  23. https://gagadget.com/en/226952-russias-lancet-kamikaze-drone-is-equipped-with-an-nvidia-jetson-tx2-computer-and-an-xilinx-zynq-chip/ ↩

  24. https://hackaday.com/2026/05/04/teardown-of-a-shahed-136-gimbaled-camera/ ↩

  25. https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-drones-iran-western-technology/32115733.html ↩

  26. https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/enforcement/220-eco-country-pages/1147-israel-export-control-information ↩

  27. https://www.amd.com/en/legal/compliance/trade-compliance.html ↩

  28. https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-to-bring-forward-procurement-of-ai-chips-ahead-of-bidens-new-export-rules/ ↩

  29. https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/israelopt-un-updates-database-of-businesses-involved-in-illegal-israeli-settlements-listing-158-enterprises-from-11-countries/ ↩

  30. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session60/advance-version/a-hrc-60-19-aev.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  31. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/a-hrc-59-23-from-economy-of-occupation-to-economy-of-genocide-report-special-rapporteur-francesca-albanese-palestine-2025/ ↩

  32. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/1/un-report-lists-companies-complicit-in-israels-genocide-who-are-they ↩

  33. https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/from-us/briefings/tech-sector-opt-analysis-2024/ ↩

  34. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_companies_involved_in_the_Gaza_war ↩

  35. https://www.adl.org/resources/article/2023-shareholder-roundup-israel-related-proposals-hold-steady-focus-human-rights ↩

  36. https://www.timesofisrael.com/longshot-shareholder-proposals-bring-fight-over-israel-to-corporate-boardroom/ ↩

  37. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2488/000119312525067170/d869673ddef14a.htm ↩