Digital Audit: BYD Co. Ltd.

Audit Phase: Digital (Digital / Technology Forensics) Subject Entity: BYD Co. Ltd. (Build Your Dreams; SHE: 002594 / HKEX: 1211) Registered Address: No. 3009 BYD Road, Pingshan District, Shenzhen, Guangdong, People’s Republic of China Audit Date: June 2026 Evidence Base: Vendor press releases, corporate announcements, trade and technology press, Israeli national media, and NGO research databases. All factual claims are drawn from publicly available sources cited in the End Notes.

Scope and directionality note: Digital assesses the digital/technology nexus to Israel. The serious case is the provision of surveillance, digital, data, or cyber technology to the Israeli state, military, or security services. The reverse direction - BYD procuring technology from Israeli-origin vendors - is a customer/inbound relationship, recorded explicitly as such and weighted far lower than provision. No transitive guilt is imputed: a vendor’s other clients, a founder’s military background, or a distributor group’s separate activities are not attributed to BYD. US-entity relationships (Google, AWS, Intel) are not Israeli-origin and are noted only for completeness. A recurring feature of BYD’s Israel nexus runs in the opposite direction to the serious Digital case: Israeli security authorities have assessed BYD’s own (Chinese) vehicles as a potential surveillance/espionage risk to Israel - that is an inbound import-security concern about BYD products, not BYD provisioning technology to Israel.

Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships

Israeli-Origin Technology Vendors in the BYD Stack (Direction: BYD as customer)

Karamba Security (VCode / SBOM) - confirmed inbound vendor relationship. On 4 June 2024, at the ESCAR USA automotive cybersecurity conference in Detroit, Karamba Security announced that BYD had selected its VCode binary-analysis software to automatically generate a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for the electronic control units (ECUs) in BYD vehicles, to secure its software supply chain and to support compliance with UN Regulation No. 155 (UN R155), the mandatory automotive-cybersecurity type-approval requirement.¹²³ Karamba Security maintains dual headquarters: Hod HaSharon, Israel (24 HaNagar Street) and Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, USA.¹ Karamba co-founder and CEO Ami Dotan was quoted on the announcement, stating the company was “proud to help successfully bridge U.S., European, Chinese and other nations’ OEMs with their global markets.”¹ The direction is BYD as the customer procuring a commercial software product for its own regulatory-compliance and product-security process; this is an inbound procurement relationship, not provision of technology to any Israeli entity.¹²³

Israeli-Origin Vendors - Reported but Not Confirmed as BYD

Valens Semiconductor (VA7000 MIPI A-PHY) - not confirmed as BYD. On 6 January 2026 (CES 2026), Israel-headquartered Valens Semiconductor (NYSE: VLN, Hod HaSharon) announced its fourth VA7000 MIPI A-PHY automotive-connectivity design win with “a premium carmaker serving the Chinese market,” with start-of-production scheduled for 2027.⁴ Valens did not name the carmaker; the Chinese premium-vehicle market contains multiple plausible candidates, and no public source identifies BYD as the customer.⁴ This is recorded as an unconfirmed, unnamed-OEM report, not a BYD finding.

Mobileye (Intel subsidiary, Jerusalem) - not identified as a confirmed BYD supplier. No public evidence was independently identified in this review confirming a BYD–Mobileye supply contract, design win, or ADAS-integration programme. Contemporaneous reporting of Mobileye’s 2021–2026 SuperVision/EyeQ design wins names other manufacturers (Geely, Zeekr, Volkswagen, Mahindra), not BYD; BYD’s own driver-assistance development is documented as proprietary and supported by Chinese partners (see “AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems”).⁵⁶⁷ No public evidence identified of a confirmed BYD–Mobileye relationship.

Israeli-Origin Cybersecurity Vendors - Corporate IT Environment

No public evidence was independently identified confirming that BYD’s corporate IT environment holds a direct licensing, subscription, or integration relationship with any Israeli-origin cybersecurity vendor - including Check Point, Wiz, CyberArk, SentinelOne, Claroty, Verint, or NICE Systems. No public source links any such vendor to BYD’s enterprise stack. No public evidence identified.

Procurement Transparency Constraints

BYD does not publicly disclose its full IT, software, or security vendor stack below the level of named, publicly announced partnerships. The confirmed Karamba VCode relationship is documented by vendor and trade-press announcements; sub-strategic vendor relationships are not in the public domain. This is the principal evidence gap in this domain.

Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology

Israeli-Origin Surveillance / Biometric Vendors

No public evidence was identified that BYD has deployed facial-recognition, biometric, gait-analysis, or behavioural-analytics technology of Israeli origin (e.g. Oosto/AnyVision, BriefCam, Trigo, Trax) in any application - in-vehicle, retail, or workforce-facing. No public evidence identified.

Driver Monitoring Systems (DMS) - In-Vehicle Biometrics

BYD vehicles incorporate cabin-facing camera systems within their driver-assistance suites; BYD’s entry-level “God’s Eye C” configuration is documented as using 12 cameras, alongside radar and ultrasonic sensors.⁸ No public source identifies the supplier of BYD’s driver-monitoring/computer-vision software as Israeli-origin; BYD’s documented driving-assistance partners are Chinese (see “AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems”).⁸⁹ No public evidence identified of Israeli-origin DMS or in-cabin biometric technology in BYD vehicles.

No public evidence was identified of BYD using Israeli-origin predictive-analytics, sentiment-analysis, social-media-monitoring, or workforce-surveillance tools.

Israeli Charging-Network Adjacency (Direction: BYD vehicles as downstream users)

BYD passenger vehicles in Israel are charged across public EV-charging infrastructure that includes the “ON” network operated by Afcon Electric Transportation, a subsidiary of Afcon Holdings, which collaborated with the Israeli firm ZOOZ Power on ultra-fast charging deployments along the Cross-Israel Highway.¹⁰¹¹ Afcon Holdings’ separate divisions are documented by NGOs as suppliers of checkpoint and detention-related security technology (see “Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History”); however, Afcon’s charging arm and its security divisions are distinct, and BYD is not named in any Afcon or ZOOZ source reviewed.¹¹¹² This is a downstream commercial adjacency (BYD vehicles use a charging network), not provision of technology by BYD. No public evidence of Israeli-origin surveillance technology reaching BYD vehicles or customers via this pathway was identified.

Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation

BYD Cloud Migration

Trade-press reporting (February 2025) documents that BYD shifted its overseas cloud operations away from Amazon Web Services toward Google Cloud and Alibaba Cloud; AWS had announced a connected-vehicle partnership with BYD in December 2023, and BYD was reported as a significant AWS automotive customer prior to the migration.¹³ Google and AWS are US entities and Alibaba Cloud is a Chinese entity; none is Israeli-origin, and these are recorded for completeness only.¹³

Project Nimbus & Israeli State Cloud Infrastructure

Not applicable as a provision finding. Project Nimbus is the ~$1.2bn Israeli-government cloud contract awarded to Google Cloud and Amazon Web Services; BYD is neither a participant nor a sub-provider. BYD’s use of Google Cloud creates a shared-hyperscaler adjacency only, and does not constitute BYD providing services to the Israeli government. No public evidence was identified of BYD involvement in any Israeli state-backed digital-infrastructure programme.

Data Centre Operations in Israel

No public evidence was identified that BYD operates, leases, or co-locates data-centre infrastructure within Israel, or that BYD stores customer or operational data in an Israeli cloud region.

Government Cloud Contracts

No public evidence identified of BYD holding any contract with Israeli government bodies for cloud, AI, or data-infrastructure services. BYD is an automotive and battery manufacturer, not a cloud-services vendor to governments.

Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships

Israeli Security Assessment of BYD Vehicles (Direction: inbound - BYD products as an espionage risk to Israel)

The principal publicly documented Israel-security finding in this domain runs opposite to the serious Digital case. As reported by Israeli national media in 2025, Israel’s Ministry of Defense halted the planned allocation of Chinese BYD Atto 3 electric vehicles to IDF lieutenant-colonels after the vehicles’ internal electronics were examined.¹⁴¹⁵ Dr. Harel Menashri, identified as a founder of the Shin Bet’s cyber division, characterised Chinese vehicles as potential intelligence-gathering systems capable of collecting visual, audio, and biometric data and transmitting it to servers in China; reporting noted that disconnecting the emergency e-Call module was considered insufficient mitigation.¹⁴¹⁵ The Shin Bet spokesman’s office stated it does not address the matter in the media.¹⁴ This is an Israeli import-security assessment of BYD’s (Chinese) products as a surveillance risk to Israel - an inbound concern - not BYD providing surveillance technology to the Israeli state. The decision was reported across mid-to-late 2025.¹⁴¹⁵

IDF Vehicle Leasing - Distributor-Group Context

BYD’s Israeli passenger-vehicle distributor is Shlomo Motors, part of the Shlomo Group.¹⁶¹⁷ A separate Shlomo Group company, Shlomo Sixt, together with Eldan, won an Israeli Defence Ministry vehicle-leasing tender announced in June 2014 - a contract documented as supplying Mitsubishi vehicles to IDF officers, with no BYD vehicle named.¹⁸ This is corporate-group context within the same distributor family; no direct BYD–IMOD/IDF contract is established by it. No public evidence identified of a direct BYD supply relationship to the IDF (and the 2025 Atto 3 allocation was halted, per above).¹⁴¹⁵¹⁸

Direct BYD Contracts with Israeli Security Bodies

No public evidence identified of any direct contract, partnership, or service agreement between BYD Co. Ltd. and the Israeli Ministry of Defense, the IDF, Mossad, Shin Bet, AMAN, or any other Israeli state security body for technology, surveillance, or data services.

Provision of Technology / Data to the Israeli State or Military

No public evidence was identified of BYD providing surveillance technology, data, software, cloud capacity, or digital services to the Israeli state, military, or security services. This is the directionally serious Digital case, and no qualifying evidence of it was found. No public evidence identified.

Offensive Cyber Capability

No public evidence identified. BYD is an automotive and battery manufacturer and does not develop, license, or sell offensive cyber capability.

AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems

AI/ML Provision to Israeli State Bodies

No public evidence identified of BYD providing artificial-intelligence, machine-learning, computer-vision, or autonomous decision-support systems to Israeli state, military, or security bodies.

BYD Proprietary AI/ADAS Systems and Their Suppliers

BYD launched its “God’s Eye” / DiPilot driving-assistance platform on 10 February 2025 across three tiers (DiPilot 100/300/600), described as independently developed by BYD.⁸ BYD’s documented driving-assistance technology partners are Chinese: BYD and Momenta formed a joint venture, DiPi Intelligent Mobility, in 2021, and BYD has worked with DJI Automotive and Horizon Robotics on ADAS compute and algorithms.⁹ No public evidence was identified of Israeli-origin AI, perception software, or compute components within the God’s Eye/DiPilot system; the Karamba VCode relationship (above) is a software-supply-chain security tool, not an AI/perception component.¹⁸⁹

Training Data & Model Development Involving Israeli Population Data

No public evidence was identified of BYD AI models being trained on surveillance-derived or population data from Israel or the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Autonomous Systems & Lethality

No public evidence identified. BYD does not operate in the autonomous-weapons or lethal-systems market.

Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint

Israeli R&D Facilities

No public evidence was identified that BYD operates any research-and-development facility, engineering office, innovation lab, or accelerator programme within Israel.

Acquisitions & Investments in Israeli Technology Companies

No public evidence was identified of BYD acquiring, or taking a corporate-venture stake in, any Israeli technology company, start-up, or venture fund.

Patents & IP Co-Development with Israeli Institutions

No public evidence was identified of patent portfolios, licensing, or co-development arrangements between BYD and Israeli-domiciled entities or research institutions (Technion, Hebrew University, Weizmann Institute, Ben-Gurion University).

Commercial Product Footprint in Israel (Direction: BYD as vendor of consumer/commercial vehicles)

BYD is a major commercial presence in the Israeli vehicle market. BYD supplied electric buses to Israel’s national operator Egged - Egged has been a BYD eBus customer since 2017, and in November 2021 ordered 100 12-metre BYD eBuses (the majority share of Israel’s largest electric-bus tender) for deployment in Haifa.¹⁹²⁰ In passenger vehicles, the BYD Atto 3 was the single best-selling model in Israel in November 2022 and again across full-year 2023 and 2024 (10,607 units in 2024); BYD led Israel’s EV segment with 16,690 units across six models in 2024.²¹²² These are consumer/commercial vehicle sales (BYD as ordinary market vendor), not provision of surveillance, data, or digital technology to the Israeli state. The 2024 distributor (Shlomo Motors) and the 2025 IDF security assessment are covered in the relevant sections above.¹⁶¹⁴

Supplier Code of Conduct - Technology Supply-Chain Provisions

No public evidence was identified that BYD operates a technology-supply-chain due-diligence framework specific to the national origin or geopolitical exposure of its software, surveillance, or digital-infrastructure vendors.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History

NGO Documentation - Afcon Holdings (Adjacency, not BYD)

The Who Profits Research Center maintains a profile on Afcon Holdings, documenting Afcon subsidiaries supplying metal detectors recorded at Israeli checkpoints (e.g. the Cave of the Patriarchs checkpoint in Hebron, Beit Iba, and Erez), DM (3000) Engineering’s provision of equipment for the Meitar biometric checkpoint project (2018), and Afcon Electric Transportation operating EV-charging stations in the Karnei Shomron and Beitar Illit settlements in the occupied West Bank and the Ramot settlement in the occupied Golan.¹² BYD is not mentioned in the Afcon Holdings profile.¹² The relevance to BYD is solely that BYD vehicles in Israel can use the Afcon-operated “ON” charging network (see “Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology”); BYD does not own, operate, or contract Afcon’s security divisions, and no direct BYD–Afcon relationship is documented.¹⁰¹¹¹²

NGO & Academic Scrutiny - BYD Technology Supply Chain

No public evidence was identified of an NGO investigation, academic study, or UN report addressing BYD’s technology relationships with the Israeli state, Israeli defence entities, or Israeli-origin vendors. BYD is not itself the subject of a Who Profits or AFSC Investigate company profile in the sources reviewed.¹²

BDS Campaigns

No public evidence was identified of an organised BDS or NGO campaign specifically targeting BYD in relation to technology provision to Israeli state entities or occupation infrastructure. General BDS-movement materials reviewed did not name BYD’s technology relationships.²³

Regulatory & Legal Actions - Technology Sales to Israeli State Entities

No public evidence identified of any regulatory inquiry, export-control action, or sanctions proceeding (Israeli, EU, US, or other) against BYD in relation to the provision of technology, surveillance systems, or data services to Israeli state entities. The documented official action flows in the opposite direction: the 2025 Israeli Ministry of Defense / Shin Bet assessment of BYD vehicles is an import-security review of Chinese technology entering Israel, not an export-control or sanctions action against BYD for supplying Israel.¹⁴¹⁵

Israeli Media & Security-Policy Coverage

Israeli media coverage of BYD in 2025 centred on the espionage-risk assessment angle - the IDF Atto 3 allocation halt and the framing of Chinese connected vehicles as potential intelligence-collection platforms.¹⁴¹⁵ This coverage frames BYD as a potential surveillance risk to Israel, an inbound concern, rather than as a provider of technology to Israeli state entities - a directional distinction material to this audit.

Evidence Gaps

Full IT and software vendor stack (highest priority) - BYD does not publicly disclose its sub-strategic IT, software, and security vendor relationships. Beyond the confirmed Karamba VCode relationship, Israeli-origin vendor exposure within BYD’s broader enterprise stack cannot be positively excluded on public evidence.
Unnamed-OEM Israeli design wins - The January 2026 Valens VA7000 “premium carmaker serving the Chinese market” design win is unattributed; whether BYD is the customer cannot be confirmed or excluded from public sources.
Mobileye relationship status - No confirmed BYD–Mobileye supply relationship was identified, but BYD’s full historical ADAS sensor/compute sourcing across all model programmes is not exhaustively documented in public sources.
In-vehicle DMS/computer-vision supplier identity - The precise supplier(s) of BYD’s cabin-camera/driver-monitoring software stack are not fully disclosed; Israeli-origin embedding cannot be positively excluded, though no such instance was identified.
Charging-network data flows - Whether any data generated by BYD vehicles using the Afcon-operated “ON” network flows to Afcon systems is not publicly documented; this is an unresolved indirect-exposure question, not a finding.