BDS-1000 Dossier: BYD Co., Ltd. (比亚迪股份有限公司)

Dossier ID: 06-main-dossier.md Target Entity: BYD Company Ltd. Classification: Public - OSINT Research Corpus BRS Score: 311 | Tier D (Moderate) Date of Compilation: June 2026

Target Profile

Key Facts:

• Founded: 1995 by Wang Chuanfu
• Israeli presence: passenger NEV distribution via Shlomo Motors (since 2022); electric bus supply to Egged (since 2017)
• BDS-1000 score: 311 - Tier D (Moderate)

Executive Summary

BYD Company Ltd. is a Shenzhen-headquartered manufacturer of new energy vehicles, electric buses, and battery systems. It has become the dominant electric vehicle brand in the Israeli market through a commercial distribution agreement with Shlomo Motors, achieving the highest EV market share in Israel in 2022, 2023, and 2024. This presence is the most significant material dimension of BYD’s documented Israel nexus and is assessed under the economic domain.

The most operationally significant documented engagement with the Israeli state arose not from a direct government procurement relationship but through the indirect entry of BYD Atto 3 vehicles into IDF operational possession via a commercial vehicle leasing tender administered by the IDF Technology and Logistics Directorate. Over 600 Chinese-manufactured EVs, including BYD Atto 3 units, entered Ministry of Defence custody through this pathway before the Shin Bet and National Cyber Directorate imposed a security suspension in 2025–2026, citing concerns about telematics, cameras, and connectivity modules as potential intelligence-exfiltration vectors. The Israeli Ministry of Defence and IDF Chief of Staff subsequently ordered the formal removal of Chinese vehicles - explicitly including BYD - from military bases in January 2026.

This pattern defines the Military picture: BYD is not a defence contractor; it manufactures civilian vehicles. The military-adjacent involvement arose from standard commercial sales entering sensitive environments, and has now been formally terminated by Israeli state action. No evidence has been identified of BYD supplying purpose-built military variants, entering SIBAT defence export channels, or holding direct base-support or defence-primes supply relationships.

The digital domain presents no qualifying evidence. The Israeli security concern about BYD vehicles runs in the opposite direction - Israel assessed BYD’s (Chinese) vehicles as a potential espionage risk to Israel, not BYD providing surveillance technology to Israeli authorities. BYD’s confirmed relationship with Israeli-origin Karamba Security is BYD as the customer, procuring a software supply-chain tool.

The political domain shows no corporate statements on the conflict, no lobbying on Israel-Palestine policy, and no political donations to Israeli or Palestinian causes. The documented Affinity Partners (Kushner) investment in the Shlomo Group is a structural connection at the distributor-parent level with no established governance role over BYD’s franchise.

The resulting BRS of 311 places BYD in Tier D (Moderate), driven primarily by the scale of its economic presence in Israel (the largest EV seller by volume), with the former IDF vehicle engagement and settlement-adjacent bus operations as secondary contributors.

Timeline of Relevant Events

Corporate Overview

Corporate Structure and Foundational Facts

BYD Co., Ltd. was founded in 1995 by Wang Chuanfu in Shenzhen as a rechargeable battery manufacturer, expanding into automotive manufacturing in 2003. The company is publicly listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (002594) and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (1211). Its primary corporate mission, as articulated in investor and corporate materials, centres on new-energy-vehicle manufacturing, clean-energy generation, and battery storage. No defence-sector mission or heritage is identified in primary corporate materials.²²

Wang Chuanfu, the founder and executive chairman, is BYD’s largest individual shareholder. Berkshire Hathaway (Warren Buffett) was a long-standing major shareholder but has been in progressive partial divestiture since 2022. Chinese state institutions hold a low single-digit percentage. No Israeli parent entity, Israeli private equity sponsor, or golden-share arrangement linking BYD to any state’s foreign-policy objectives has been identified.

Israeli Distribution Structure

BYD does not operate as its own importer of record in Israel. The confirmed exclusive national distributor for BYD passenger new energy vehicles is Shlomo Motors Ltd., a subsidiary of the privately held Shlomo Group (founder: Shlomo Shmeltzer; current leadership: Asi Shmeltzer).²³²⁴ The formal announcement was made in August 2022.⁸⁹²⁵ Under this structure, Shlomo Motors assumes the importer-of-record function, operates the retail and service network, and interfaces with Israeli regulatory authorities on BYD’s behalf.

The legal character of the BYD–Shlomo Motors arrangement is a distribution/dealership agreement. A prior research characterisation of this as a “joint venture” is unverified - no BYD equity stake in Shlomo Motors has been confirmed from publicly available corporate disclosures or press reporting.²⁶²⁷

For electric buses, Shlomo Motors has functioned as the commercial interface with Israeli transit operators since at least 2017.² Confirmed Shlomo Motors operational locations at launch of the passenger NEV distribution (2022) include Petach Tikva, Haifa, Jerusalem, and Be’er Sheva.²⁷²⁵

Shlomo Group and the Affinity Partners Connection

Shlomo Motors is part of the Shlomo Group. Israeli financial press reported that Jared Kushner’s Affinity Partners acquired a 15% stake in the Shlomo Group’s vehicle and credit company, with the deal valued at approximately NIS 2.7 billion and completion reported around 1 February 2024. Affinity is reported to have raised funds from the sovereign wealth funds of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar.²⁸²⁹ Neither the Globes nor the Calcalist reporting names BYD in connection with this transaction. The documented chain is: BYD → Shlomo Motors (distributor) ← Shlomo Group (parent) ← Affinity Partners (15% investor). No public evidence establishes any governance, operational, or contractual role of Affinity Partners over Shlomo Motors’ BYD franchise specifically, or any direct relationship between Affinity Partners and BYD Co., Ltd.²⁸²⁹

Settlement-Adjacent Infrastructure: Afcon Holdings Connection

The Who Profits Research Center documents that Afcon Holdings, a subsidiary of the Shlomo Group, operates the “ON” EV charging network jointly with Dor-Alon, with charging stations installed at locations in Israeli settlements including Karnei Shomron, Beitar Illit, and Ramot in the Golan Heights.³⁰³¹ This is an Afcon operation. The connection to BYD is structural - arising from shared Shlomo Group parentage - not a direct operational or contractual relationship. No evidence that BYD charging equipment specifically was deployed at settlement charging sites has been identified.

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

BYD’s most significant and directly documented engagement with the Israeli defence establishment arose through a vehicle leasing tender administered by the IDF Technology and Logistics Directorate, covering electric and hybrid command vehicles for commissioned officers at Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel rank. The BYD Atto 3 - a standard commercial electric SUV - was among the vehicle models selected under this tender.¹¹ This was consistent with a broader Israeli government push toward electric vehicles in its fleet, including a parallel Government Vehicle Administration (GVA) tender that also shortlisted Chinese EV models for civilian and security agencies.¹¹

Over 600 Chinese-manufactured EVs - including BYD Atto 3 units alongside Chery Tiggo 8 Pro models - were delivered into Ministry of Defence custody under these arrangements. This figure is drawn from secondary aggregator reporting and should be treated as indicative rather than precisely confirmed; primary IDF tender documentation has not been publicly released.¹¹ The vehicles entered IDF operational possession as standard commercial units; no contract modifications, military-specification variants, or end-user certificates specific to defence use have been publicly identified.

BYD does not publicly manufacture, market, or certify ruggedised, tactical, mil-spec, or defence-grade variants of its passenger vehicles, commercial buses, or battery systems. The dual-use concern arises not from deliberate militarisation of BYD’s product line but from the inherent data-connectivity architecture of consumer-grade connected vehicles entering sensitive operational environments.¹¹

Security Suspension and Termination. Following security assessments by the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) and the National Cyber Directorate, the Ministry of Defence suspended further delivery and imposed operational restrictions on Chinese EVs - including BYD Atto 3 units already in IDF custody - citing concerns about embedded telematics systems, connectivity modules, and onboard cameras as potential exfiltration vectors.¹¹ The suspension was a unilateral Israeli government security decision; no voluntary action or refusal-to-supply by BYD or Shlomo Motors preceded it. The IDF reportedly attempted mitigation measures including disabling e-Call telematics and disconnecting onboard cameras; security experts and the ISA assessed these measures as insufficient.¹¹

In January 2026, the Israeli Ministry of Defence and IDF Chief of Staff formally ordered the removal of all Chinese-manufactured vehicles - explicitly naming BYD - from military bases and prohibited future procurement, citing espionage and data-exfiltration concerns.¹⁸¹⁹²⁰ This formally terminates the former indirect operational relationship.

Electric Bus Operations. BYD has supplied electric buses to Egged, Israel’s dominant national bus operator, since 2017. Egged is documented as operating bus lines serving Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, with routes transferred to subsidiary Egged Taavura covering settlements including Gush Etzion, Giv’at Ze’ev, Binyamin, Mount Hebron, Kiryat Arba, the Jordan Valley, and East Jerusalem neighbourhoods.⁶³² However, whether specific BYD-built bus chassis are operationally assigned to settlement-serving routes - as opposed to diesel or other rolling stock - is not confirmed at the route level. Fleet fungibility within Egged’s operational management means this cannot be excluded, but it is not directly evidenced.³³[^Military-24]

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest counter-arguments available to BYD are as follows:

1. Civilian product, civilian channel. BYD manufactures and sells standard commercial electric vehicles. It did not create, market, or certify any product for military use. The IDF selected BYD vehicles through a commercial leasing framework, not a defence procurement pathway. BYD’s engagement with Israeli defence entities arose through commercial automotive channels, not through SIBAT, ISDEF, or any Israeli defence export and procurement framework.¹¹

2. No direct contract with IDF. No direct government-to-government or B2B fleet procurement agreement between BYD and the IDF has been identified. Vehicles entered IDF custody through the civilian commercial market via Shlomo Motors.¹⁸

3. No end-user certification applicable. No publicly known Israeli government requirement for end-user certification on commercial EV purchases existed at the time of the IDF tender. BYD was not required to - and did not - provide end-user certificates or export licences specific to defence end-users.¹¹

4. Israeli state action terminated the relationship. The Israeli Ministry of Defence itself imposed the security suspension and subsequently ordered the removal of BYD vehicles from military bases. BYD did not voluntarily exit the market; Israeli regulatory authorities made the determination that BYD products posed unacceptable security risks. This is the inverse of a company providing material support to occupation: the Israeli state itself removed that support.¹¹¹⁸

5. Settlement bus routes unverified at vehicle level. The Egged settlement-route documentation identifies Egged’s operational patterns, not the specific assignment of BYD-manufactured chassis to those routes. Fleet-level attribution is an inference, not a directly sourced finding.³⁴

6. Battery cell supply to defence integrators - not confirmed. The prior research hypothesis that BYD supplies lithium iron phosphate cells to Israeli military battery integrators Epsilor and Amicell is an inference from global LFP market share. No invoice, procurement contract, corporate filing, or named source supports this claim; it was discarded as direct evidence.¹¹

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

No qualifying evidence was identified of BYD providing surveillance, digital, data, or cyber technology to the Israeli state, military, or security services. This is the directionally serious Digital case, and the audit found no supporting evidence for it.

The principal publicly documented Israel-security finding in this domain runs in the opposite direction. Israeli national media reported in 2025 that the Ministry of Defence halted the planned allocation of BYD Atto 3 vehicles to IDF lieutenant-colonels after examining the vehicles’ internal electronics. Dr. Harel Menashri, identified as a founder of the Shin Bet’s cyber division, characterised Chinese vehicles as potential intelligence-gathering systems capable of collecting visual, audio, and biometric data and transmitting it to servers in China. The Shin Bet spokesman stated the agency does not address the matter in media.³⁵³⁶ This is an Israeli import-security assessment of BYD’s (Chinese) vehicles as a surveillance risk to Israel - an inbound concern - not BYD providing surveillance technology to the Israeli state.

Confirmed Israeli-Origin Technology Vendor Relationship. On 4 June 2024, at the ESCAR USA automotive cybersecurity conference in Detroit, Karamba Security (headquartered in Hod HaSharon, Israel, and Bloomfield Hills, Michigan) announced that BYD had selected its VCode binary-analysis software to automatically generate a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for electronic control units in BYD vehicles, supporting compliance with UN Regulation No. 155 (automotive cybersecurity type-approval requirement).³⁷³⁸³⁹ The direction here is BYD as the customer - procuring a commercial software product for its own regulatory-compliance and product-security process. This is an inbound procurement relationship; it does not constitute BYD providing technology to any Israeli entity.

Unconfirmed Relationships. Valens Semiconductor (Hod HaSharon, Israel) announced a VA7000 MIPI A-PHY automotive-connectivity design win at CES 2026 with “a premium carmaker serving the Chinese market” but did not name the carmaker; no public source identifies BYD as the customer.⁴⁰ No public evidence was identified confirming a BYD–Mobileye supply contract, design win, or ADAS integration programme; BYD’s documented driving-assistance partners are Chinese (Momenta, DJI Automotive, Horizon Robotics).^4142434445

No evidence was identified of BYD operating data-centre infrastructure in Israel, holding government cloud contracts with Israeli authorities, or appearing in Israeli state digital-infrastructure programmes including Project Nimbus (the ~$1.2bn Israeli government cloud contract awarded to Google Cloud and Amazon Web Services, in which BYD is neither a participant nor sub-provider).⁴⁶

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

1. The serious case does not apply. Digital assesses the provision of surveillance or digital technology to the Israeli state. The documented Israeli security concern about BYD vehicles is the inverse: BYD’s products are assessed as a potential surveillance risk to Israel. This distinction is material. BYD is not a surveillance-technology vendor to the Israeli state; Israeli authorities are concerned about BYD’s (Chinese) technology collecting data on Israeli soil.

2. BYD’s Karamba relationship is ordinary commercial procurement. BYD purchasing a cybersecurity software tool from an Israeli company is a standard global supply-chain relationship. It does not indicate that BYD provides sensitive technology to the Israeli state; it indicates the opposite - that an Israeli firm has sold a compliance tool to a Chinese OEM.

3. BYD’s documented ADAS partners are Chinese. The God’s Eye/DiPilot platform is documented as developed with Chinese partners (Momenta, DJI Automotive, Horizon Robotics). The hypothesis of Israeli-origin AI or perception components in BYD vehicles is not supported by available evidence.⁴⁴⁴⁵

4. BYD is not a cloud-services vendor. BYD is an automotive and battery manufacturer. It does not hold government cloud contracts, does not operate data centres in Israel, and has no documented role in Israeli digital-infrastructure programmes.⁴⁶

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

BYD’s economic presence in Israel is material and well-documented. It is the dominant electric vehicle brand in the Israeli market by volume and has established commercial relationships with Israeli government-linked transit operators at scale.

Passenger Vehicle Distribution. BYD appointed Shlomo Motors as exclusive national distributor for new energy passenger vehicles in August 2022.⁸⁹²⁵ BYD subsequently became the leading EV brand in Israel: the Atto 3 was the #1 EV model in November 2022, across full-year 2023, and across full-year 2024 (10,607 units). BYD led the Israeli EV segment with 16,690 units across six models in 2024.¹⁰¹⁷ Multiple Chinese brands are active in the Israeli market, with BYD consistently the leading Chinese marque.

Electric Bus Supply. BYD has been a supplier to Egged since 2017 across multiple procurement rounds:

• Haifa, 2017: 17 single-deck 12m BYD eBuses to Egged²³
• Jerusalem, 2018: 7 BYD eBuses, second order⁴
• Jerusalem, September 2019: 10 BYD 12m single-deck eBuses to Egged; Ministry of Transport funding confirmed⁵⁶⁷
• November 2021: 100 BYD eBuses across multiple Israeli cities - confirmed as majority share of Israel’s largest-ever electric bus tender at that time^13141516

Former IDF Vehicle Supply. Multiple sources confirm that BYD passenger vehicles entered IDF operational use prior to the January 2026 ban.¹⁸¹⁹ The vehicles entered through the civilian commercial market via Shlomo Motors; no direct government-to-government or B2B fleet procurement agreement has been identified.¹⁸ The Israeli government’s own ban - ordering removal of all Chinese vehicles including BYD from military bases - confirms the former indirect operational relationship.

Technology Supply Relationship. BYD is confirmed as one of the top-10 automakers to adopt Mobileye Surround ADAS, constituting an active technology supply relationship between BYD’s global vehicle manufacturing operations and an Israeli-domiciled technology firm (Mobileye Global Inc., Intel subsidiary, headquartered in Jerusalem).⁴⁷ BYD’s strategic development of its proprietary “God’s Eye” ADAS platform may reduce future reliance on Mobileye, but the current contractual relationship has not been confirmed as terminated.

Settlement-Adjacent Operations. Egged, the sole recipient of confirmed BYD eBus supply, operates settlement-serving routes documented by Who Profits covering West Bank and East Jerusalem settlements.³² Vehicle-level attribution to specific BYD units on specific settlement routes is not directly confirmed.³⁴ The Afcon/ON charging network in settlements is an Afcon Holdings operation with a structural connection to BYD via shared Shlomo Group parentage; no direct BYD operational or contractual involvement has been identified.

ICA Offset Obligations. Israel’s Industrial Cooperation Authority requires foreign companies winning government procurement contracts above approximately USD 5 million to commit to reciprocal procurement or investment in Israel, typically at 20–35% of contract value.⁴⁸ BYD’s confirmed wins in Israeli government-linked electric bus tenders - including the 2021 tender for 100 buses - are consistent with the scale at which ICA obligations would attach. However, the specific dollar quantum of BYD-attributed ICA obligations is unverified and requires live confirmation against ICA Authority public disclosures or Ministry of Economy records.⁴⁸

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

1. No direct investment or physical assets. BYD holds no directly owned offices, showrooms, warehouses, service centres, factories, data centres, logistics hubs, or real estate in Israel or the occupied territories. All physical infrastructure is operated by Shlomo Motors under the distribution agreement.²⁶²⁷²⁵

2. Distribution, not joint venture. The BYD–Shlomo Motors arrangement is a distribution/dealership agreement. The prior characterisation as a “joint venture” is unverified; no BYD equity stake in Shlomo Motors has been confirmed.²⁶²⁷

3. Israeli state action terminated the IDF relationship. The January 2026 MoD ban is not evidence of ongoing BYD support for Israeli military operations - it is evidence that the Israeli state itself terminated BYD’s ability to participate in that operational environment.¹⁸¹⁹

4. Settlement route attribution is indirect. Egged’s settlement-route operations are documented, but the specific assignment of BYD-manufactured bus chassis to those routes is not directly confirmed. Fleet-level inference is not vehicle-level evidence.³³³⁴

5. No agricultural or consumer goods supply chains. BYD’s product categories (EVs, buses, batteries) are not subject to the settlement-origin labelling frameworks applicable to fresh produce. No third-party sourcing arrangements connecting BYD to settlement-linked agricultural producers have been identified.

6. ICA offset quantum unverified. While ICA obligations are a plausible structural feature of BYD’s Israeli government-linked tender wins, the specific financial quantum has not been independently confirmed from public disclosures.⁴⁸

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

No qualifying evidence was identified of BYD taking public political positions, making political donations, conducting lobbying, or entering institutional partnerships that materially support the Israeli state in its actions in the Israel-Palestine conflict.

Corporate Statements. No public evidence was identified of any named, dated corporate statement by BYD Company Ltd. addressing the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack, the subsequent Israeli military operations in Gaza, or the Israel-Palestine conflict as a geopolitical matter.⁸⁴⁹ BYD’s official communications about Israel are framed in commercial and sustainability terms, describing sales, aftersales services, and eMobility solutions without geopolitical language.⁸¹³ BYD has made no public statement specifically addressing the IDF vehicle deployment, the subsequent security suspension, or the telematics controversy.

No UN OHCHR Listing. No public evidence was identified that BYD appears in the UN OHCHR database of business enterprises involved in activities relating to Israeli settlements; the September 2025 update lists 158 enterprises including China-based companies such as Fosun International, and no BYD listing was identified in the reviewed dataset records.⁵⁰⁵¹

No Political Lobbying on Israel-Palestine. BYD is a registered lobbying client in the United States (approximately $0.74 million in 2024) and maintains EU Transparency Register engagement and registered consultant lobbyists in Canada. The documented subject matter concerns electric-vehicle, trade, tariff, transport, and clean-energy policy.⁵²⁵³ No evidence was identified of BYD lobbying on Israel-Palestine policy, settlement-trade rules, BDS legislation, or Middle East foreign policy.

No Political Donations. No public evidence was identified of BYD making corporate financial contributions to Israeli settlement organisations, military-welfare funds (e.g. Friends of the IDF), the Jewish National Fund, or parastatal bodies associated with the occupation; nor of contributions to Palestinian organisations or Gaza humanitarian funds.⁵²⁵³

Executive Activity. BYD Chairman Wang Chuanfu visited Israel in early September 2023 as a guest of Shlomo Motors. No government meetings or specific counterparts were named in available reporting; the visit was described as concerning planned 2024 market expansion. No post-7-October-2023 visit or meeting between Wang Chuanfu and Israeli officials has been identified.¹² No evidence was identified of Wang Chuanfu or other BYD executives making personal financial contributions to Israeli or Palestinian advocacy organisations, or holding positions in pro-Israel lobbying bodies or occupation-linked foundations.²²

Crisis Asset Mobilisation. No evidence identified of BYD directing corporate logistics, infrastructure, fleet, cloud, or other material assets to Israeli state, military, or state-aligned efforts during or after October 2023.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

1. Silence is not complicity. BYD’s absence of public statements on the conflict is consistent with its general pattern of avoiding geopolitical positioning. BYD’s documented Russia export suspension (attributed to conflict, currency, and sales factors) was a factual commercial action, not a political statement.⁵⁴ The absence of a comparable action regarding Israel is notable but is not itself a positive act of support for Israeli government policy.

2. No lobbying or donations on Israel-related matters. BYD’s documented lobbying activity concerns trade, tariff, and clean-energy policy in standard commercial regulatory environments. No Israel-specific lobbying, donations, or institutional advocacy has been identified.⁵²⁵³

3. Affinity Partners connection is structurally distant. The Affinity Partners investment in the Shlomo Group is documented at the distributor-parent level. No evidence establishes that Affinity’s investment creates governance, operational, or contractual influence over BYD’s Israeli franchise, or any direct relationship between Affinity and BYD Co., Ltd.²⁸²⁹

4. No executive positions in advocacy organisations. No BYD executive is documented as holding seats, advisory positions, or memberships in Israeli geopolitical-advocacy organisations, Israeli state academic institutions, or occupation-linked foundations.²²

Named Entities and Evidence Map

BDS-1000 Score (V4)

• V_MAX: 4.38 (Economic)
• Sum_OTHERS: 2.97
• BRS Score: 311 | Tier: D (Moderate)

Interpretation. The Economic domain drives V_MAX at 4.38, reflecting BYD’s material and sustained commercial presence as the dominant EV brand in the Israeli market through Shlomo Motors distribution, its role as the primary supplier to Israel’s largest bus operator (Egged), and the former IDF vehicle engagement. The other three domains contribute cumulatively but at lower magnitude: Military reflects the indirect IDF vehicle entry and subsequent Israeli state-ordered termination; Political reflects the absence of political positioning or advocacy; and Digital records zero qualifying provision of digital technology to the Israeli state. The Tier D classification (BRS 311) reflects a documented, material economic and commercial presence with limited military-adjacent involvement that has been formally terminated by the Israeli government itself.

Method note: Scores are evidence-only, derived from the four domain audits. V-Domain = Impact (activity type) × Magnitude × Proximity. No fabricated claims, divested operations, or wrong-entity attributions were included; the human vetting process reduced or zeroed scores where allegations did not withstand verification.

Methodology Note

• Evidence-only standard: All factual claims in this dossier are drawn exclusively from the four domain audit documents (Military, Digital, Economic, Political). No claims are introduced that are not traceable to those audits. Where an audit found nothing, this dossier uses “No public evidence identified.”
• Scale-free Impact scoring: Impact (I) reflects activity type: whether the involvement is lethal-systems supply, surveillance-technology provision, economic market presence, or political communication. The V-Domain score = I × M × P, where M = scale/magnitude and P = directness/proximity.
• Divested and exited operations: Where operations have been terminated, suspended, or divested - as with the IDF vehicle suspension and January 2026 ban - the former operational relationship is documented with the caveat of termination by Israeli state action.
• Entity attribution: No transitive guilt is imputed. A vendor’s other clients, a founder’s prior affiliations, a distributor group’s separate activities, or a shareholder’s unrelated portfolio holdings are not attributed to BYD unless a direct operational or contractual link is established.
• Settlement operation scoring: Operations serving Israeli settlements (such as Egged settlement bus routes and Afcon/ON charging infrastructure in settlements) are counted in Economic and Political where applicable, with the caveat that vehicle-level attribution to settlement routes is not directly confirmed.
• “No public evidence identified”: This formulation is used where searches across the source classes examined in the audits - corporate filings, trade press, NGO databases, UN documentation, national media - found nothing. It is not a proof of absence; it is a faithful record of what the audits found.

End Notes