Rolls-Royce - Digital Domain Audit

Scope Note

“Rolls-Royce” spans two unrelated corporate entities: Rolls-Royce Holdings plc (UK aerospace/defence/power-systems group) and Rolls-Royce Motor Cars (luxury automaker, wholly owned by BMW Group since 2003 and legally unconnected to Rolls-Royce Holdings) ¹. All findings in this audit concern Rolls-Royce Holdings plc and its subsidiaries, including Rolls-Royce Power Systems, formerly MTU Friedrichshafen and rebranded Rolls-Royce Power Systems in 2014 following full acquisition by Rolls-Royce Holdings ², as well as Rolls-Royce Solutions America and Rolls-Royce Solutions Israel Ltd. No public evidence identified of an Israel-nexus for Rolls-Royce Motor Cars specifically.

Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships

Rolls-Royce’s primary enterprise cloud and IT platform is Microsoft Azure, including Azure Databricks, Power BI, Azure IoT Suite, and Microsoft Cloud for Manufacturing, as documented in company-attested Microsoft customer-story pages ³⁴. A 2025 Hannover Messe demonstration further showcased a joint Siemens–Microsoft–Rolls-Royce digital-transformation and AI initiative ⁵. Rolls-Royce’s IoT and digital-transformation platform, the TCS Connected Universe Platform, has been delivered by Tata Consultancy Services since a November 2017 partnership expansion, with delivery centres in Derby, Germany, the Nordics, Canada, Singapore, India, and an analytics hub in Bangalore ⁶⁷. Rolls-Royce SMR’s data-processing and control-systems supplier is Yokogawa Electric of Japan, under a partnership announced in late 2025/early 2026 ⁸⁹. No public evidence identified of licensing, subscription, or integration relationships between Rolls-Royce and Check Point, Wiz, SentinelOne, CyberArk, Nice, Verint, Claroty, or Palo Alto Networks. No public evidence identified of a Rolls-Royce/Palantir Foundry relationship.

On the supplier-facing cybersecurity side, Rolls-Royce SMR maintains a formal Supplier Cyber Security Standard governing third-party vendors (TS-QA-15/SMR-STD-042) ¹⁰, and Rolls-Royce plc has published supplier-facing guidance on cybersecurity breach incident notification (v1.2, December 2023) ¹¹. Rolls-Royce was reported to have been targeted in a sophisticated cyberattack with potential data breach in July 2023 ¹². Rolls-Royce was also among suppliers whose networks were reported to have been affected by cyberattacks connected to Airbus’s supply chain in 2018 incidents ¹³.

Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology

No public evidence identified of Rolls-Royce use of facial recognition, biometric identification, gait analysis, or Israeli-origin retail/loss-prevention technology such as Trigo, BriefCam, AnyVision/Oosto, or Trax. No public evidence identified of Israeli-origin predictive-policing, sentiment-analysis, social-media-monitoring, or workforce-surveillance tools in use by Rolls-Royce. No public evidence identified of indirect or bundled delivery of any such technologies to Rolls-Royce via managed security service providers.

Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation

Rolls-Royce’s confirmed physical presence in Israel comprises a sales-and-service office, Rolls-Royce Solutions Israel Ltd., located on Meir Ariel Street, Netanya ¹⁴, and a manufacturing joint venture, Techjet Aerofoils, at Tefen Industrial Park in northern Israel ¹⁵¹⁶. No public evidence identified that Rolls-Royce operates, leases, or co-locates data-centre infrastructure within Israel. No public evidence identified of Rolls-Royce participation in Project Nimbus or any comparable Israeli government cloud programme. No public evidence identified of Rolls-Royce provision of data-sovereignty, data-residency, or infrastructure-resilience services to Israeli state or military institutions.

Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships

Rolls-Royce, through its subsidiaries, holds a confirmed, ongoing hardware (propulsion) supply relationship with the Israeli Ministry of Defence executed via U.S. Foreign Military Sales. In April 2025, Rolls-Royce Solutions America was named principal contractor on a $180 million FMS contract to supply 8V199TE21-D diesel powerpacks for Israel’s Eitan armoured personnel carrier ¹⁷¹⁸. In February 2026, Rolls-Royce Solutions America was awarded a $73.5 million FMS contract for transmission kits and technical services supporting Merkava tank powerpacks, with work performed in Graniteville, South Carolina, through December 2032 ¹⁹²⁰²¹. Earlier contracts include a September 2021 $193.9 million FMS award for Namer APC “Power Packs Less Transmissions” engine systems and a February 2019 $238 million State Department-approved FMS sale of 270 Namer APC power-pack systems ²²²³. MTU’s MT-883 engine, produced by Rolls-Royce Power Systems, powers Merkava Mark 4/5 tanks ^22232425, and MTU engines were estimated as of 2015 to power roughly 80% of Israeli Navy vessels, including Super Dvora and Shaldag patrol/interdiction boats ²²²³²⁴. Additional historical contracts include a 2018 $7.946 million FMS award to MTU America for Israeli naval vessel engines and a 2015 $6.8 million contract for Super Dvora maintenance equipment ²².

In July 2024, UN human rights experts publicly called on Rolls-Royce Power Systems, alongside other companies, to halt arms transfers to Israel; Rolls-Royce responded only that it “abide[s] by all applicable export control and sanctions laws” without addressing the substantive human-rights concerns raised ²⁶. The Business & Human Rights Resource Centre sought comment from Rolls-Royce on its Israel military-engine sales in June 2025, and as of 23 January 2026 no response had been received ²⁴, with the underlying commercial relationship continuing through at least the transmission-kit contract’s December 2032 completion date ¹⁹²⁰. These contracts are hardware/propulsion engagements; no digital, cyber, or AI service component was identified within them. No public evidence identified of Rolls-Royce offensive cyber capability, zero-day or exploit tooling, or digital-weapons development, sale, or licensing to Israeli state actors.

AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems

Rolls-Royce’s IntelligentEngine and Engine Health Management platform applies AI/ML, built on Microsoft Azure with IFS-supported forecasting, to predictive-maintenance analytics for commercial jet engines in the Trent and RB211 families, tracking more than 10,000 engine parameters per aircraft ³⁴. No public evidence identified that this AI platform is provided to, or trained on data from, Israeli state, military, or security bodies, or that it has any target-identification, kill-chain, or autonomous-weapons application. No public evidence identified of Rolls-Royce AI/ML systems trained on or given access to civilian population data, intercepted communications, or surveillance-derived datasets originating from Israel or the Occupied Palestinian Territories. No public evidence identified of Rolls-Royce provision of autonomous target-generation, automated threat-detection, or autonomous-tracking systems to Israeli military or security forces.

Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint

Techjet Aerofoils Ltd., established in 1999 and 50%-owned by Rolls-Royce alongside Blades Technology Ltd. (30%) and the Wertheimer family, operates a manufacturing facility at Tefen Industrial Park producing compressor blades for the Trent, BMW-Rolls-Royce BR700, and IAE V2500 engine families ¹⁵¹⁶; this is a hardware manufacturing joint venture rather than a digital or software R&D centre. Rolls-Royce Solutions Israel Ltd. in Netanya is a wholly owned sales-and-service subsidiary offering lifecycle support, including spare parts, overhaul, and training, alongside a “Digital Solutions” service line for marine, power-generation, and defence products, though the specific scope and staffing of that service line were not publicly detailed in available sources ¹⁴. Rolls-Royce’s Israel-sourced revenue across subsidiaries was reported by Who Profits to have exceeded $97 million in 2024 ²². Rolls-Royce Holdings’ FY2024 Annual Report confirms a group structure spanning Civil Aerospace, Defence, and Power Systems divisions ²⁷. No public evidence identified of Rolls-Royce acquisitions of Israeli-origin technology companies. No public evidence identified of Rolls-Royce strategic investment in Israeli technology startups or venture funds. No public evidence identified of patent, licensing, or co-development arrangements between Rolls-Royce and Technion, Hebrew University, the Weizmann Institute, or other Israeli-domiciled research institutions.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History

Who Profits (Coalition of Women for Peace) profiles Rolls-Royce as a documented Israeli-military engine supplier, citing the wholly owned Rolls-Royce Solutions Israel Ltd., the 50%-owned Techjet Aerofoils joint venture, 2024 revenue exceeding $97 million, and the Namer/Merkava/naval contract history ²². AFSC Investigate profiles Rolls-Royce Holdings plc as the UK’s second-largest weapons manufacturer and the world’s 22nd-largest by 2023, documenting MTU’s role supplying Merkava, Namer, and Eitan engines and Israeli Navy vessel engines ²³, and separately lists Rolls-Royce in AFSC’s “Companies Profiting from the Gaza Genocide” compilation, citing reporting on tank and hospital-strike deployments and Michigan-based FMS assembly ²⁵. A BDS at UCL campus briefing from November 2024 documents Rolls-Royce’s supply of F-35 fighter-jet components and links this to the UK’s 2024 partial arms-export licence suspension and civilian-casualty reporting, without identifying any digital, cyber, or AI content in the relationship ²⁸.

The UK government suspended approximately 30 of roughly 350 arms-export licences to Israel in September 2024 over international humanitarian law concerns ²⁹³⁰. No public evidence identified that a Rolls-Royce-specific licence was among those suspended. No public evidence identified of a Rolls-Royce-specific mention within the OHCHR Database of Business Enterprises maintained pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolutions 31/36 and 53/25 ³¹, nor within the UN Special Rapporteur’s July 2025 report “From economy of occupation to economy of genocide” ³².

End Notes